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Abstract
The PFLP represents a violent Marxist trend among 
Palestinian political organizations. It is uncompromisingly 
hostile toward Israel, the industrialized West and the West's 
regional allies, and rejects any settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which does not entail both Israel's elimination and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state on all land it 
claims as Palestine. Until this occurs, the PFLP remains 
committed to armed conflict with its enemies.
This study attempts to explain the PFLP's lagging position 
within the Palestinian national movement by comparing its 
policies with Fatah's. Unlike the PFLP, Fatah's overriding 
concern was to establish a Palestinian authority on any portion 
of 'liberated land' and consider the question of Israel's 
existence later. Fatah's selection of supporters was never 
conditioned upon ideological compatibility. It formed coalitions 
with all interested parties and accepted assistance from all 
willing providers. Most importantly, Fatah - as the PLO's 
dominant faction ~ transformed itself from an underground group 
to a quasi-government with diplomatic status and later, to 
leadership of the PNA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Fatah's flexibility enabled it to survive regional and 
global changes. In the unipolar international order which 
followed the Soviet bloc's collapse in 1991, the PLO courted the 
United States and its allies, participated in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, and was rewarded with authority over part of the 
Palestinian 'homeland'. The PFLP, spurning change, refused to
act likewise. From its Damascus headquarters, it can currently 
do nothing without the Syrian government's approval and Syria, on 
the verge of a peace agreement with Israel, is unlikely to allow 
its protege to do more than issue statements. Only an 
imaginative and bold move by the PFLP, at this point, can restore 
the organization's prestige among its constituents and notoriety 
among its enemies.
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Introduction: Overview of the PFLP's Ideology and Aims
Although the priorities of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) - and its predecessor, the Arab 
Nationalists Movement (ANM) - have shifted with every major 
international and Middle Eastern political realignment, its 
fundamental aim of eliminating Israel and replacing it with a 
Palestinian state has remained constant throughout its history. 
What have changed over time are the focus of its activities, the 
alliances which it has formed with other organizations and 
governments, and the time limits which it has set for achieving 
its aims.
The PFLP is a secular nationalist organization which seeks 
to set up a Palestinian state on territory which is currently 
under Israel's sovereignty or administrative control. This 
territory, which, between 1917 and 1948, was governed under a 
British Mandate, should have - in the PFLP's view - been turned 
over to a Palestinian Arab government in 1948, but was instead 
unjustly transferred to Zionist control. This eventually 
resulted in Israel's establishment and the dispersal of most of 
the territory's Arab inhabitants to the neighboring countries and 
beyond. The PFLP seeks to restore what it considers stolen 
territory to Palestinian sovereignty, dismantle the State of 
Israel, bring about the return of the Palestinian diaspora to its 
homeland, and establish a 'secular democratic state' in Israel's 
place.
This is the PFLP's core aim and Israel is its principal 
adversary. However, the PFLP has also identified its ancillary 
foes; that is, countries which it believes facilitated Israel's 
establishment and continue to ensure the Jewish state's survival 
through military and economic aid. The United States is the 
chief target in this category, due primarily to what the PFLP 
regards as its unconditional support for Israel and the vast 
amounts of American military and economic aid which Israel 
receives annually.
Included in this category, but guilty to a lesser degree, 
are Britain and other Western European nations such as France and 
Germany, all of whom the PFLP blames for having provided the 
Zionist movement - and later Israel - with political, military, 
or economic support. The PFLP holds Britain, for example, 
responsible for having legitimized the Zionist presence in 
Palestine in the 1917 Balfour Declaration. This document 
implied, among other things, British support for the eventual 
establishment there of a Jewish state. The PFLP blames both 
Britain and France for having supplied Israel with sophisticated 
weaponry from the early 1950's until the 1967 Six Day War and 
vilifies Britain, France, and Germany for their maintenance of 
close economic links with Israel to the present day.
The PFLP explains Israel's close links with the United 
States and Western Europe by Israel's purported function as a 
proxy through which they protect their economic and political 
interests in the region from being undermined by Arab nationalist
movements. It regards Israel as a source of intelligence on 
these political movements for the United States and its allies; a 
surrogate military force which can attack or threaten countries 
or organizations which oppose western aims, and a potential 
staging area for direct military intervention.
The United States and its allies do indeed have vital 
economic interests in the Middle East - chief among which is 
maintaining a steady flow of the region's crude petroleum 
resources, upon which they depend to provide electrical power and 
automotive fuel for their public and industrial needs. Without 
petroleum, their economies would collapse and their way of life 
would change dramatically. The western alliance also has a 
political interest in supporting and protecting the Arab nations 
from which it purchases petroleum and whose citizens constitute a 
fertile market for its industrial exports.
The rulers of the petroleum-producing Arab countries have a 
reciprocal economic interest in maintaining a close relationship 
with the United States and its allies; a relationship through 
which they have accumulated vast amounts in petroleum revenues. 
The PFLP claims that these profits go directly to the local 
rulers' personal bank accounts at the expense of the general 
population's well-being. Guided by Marxist economic theory, it 
asserts that the western industrialized nations purchase crude 
petroleum from weak, economically-dependent Arab countries at 
unnaturally low prices, and use it to produce consumer goods - 
which they resell to these countries at enormous profit. The
Gulf oil-producing nations' close economic association with the 
United States and its allies {and, indirectly, Israel), 
consequently, renders them no less threatening an adversary for 
the PFLP than the Western nations from whom Israel receives 
military and economic support.
The PFLP's strategic goals during the course of its history 
have been: 1) to deprive Israel of its supporters by directly 
overthrowing, or causing the overthrow of pro-western Arab 
governments, upon whom the United States and its allies - 
Israel's principal backers - depend for a steady supply of crude 
oil. This would weaken the western nations' economies and 
thereby reduce the amount of financial and military aid which 
Israel would receive from them; 2) to carry out armed attacks 
against Western and Israeli targets worldwide, in order to draw 
attention to the Palestinian cause; "and 3) to mount armed attacks 
against targets inside Israel itself, in order to demoralize 
Israel's citizens and government.
Ambitious though this program may be, the PFLP realizes that 
its success requires both popular and external backing. In its 
search for the most dependable source of popular support for its 
activities, the PFLP has employed the Maoist analytical technique 
of classifying the elements of every society in which it operates 
and determining the usefulness or detriment of each grouping to 
the Palestinian cause. The ruling wealthy upper classes, in the 
PFLP's view, clearly have the most to gain from their 
relationship with the Western nations since it is with these
classes that the industrialized governments must deal in order to 
obtain the Arab world's petroleum resources cheaply.
Consequently, the PFLP sees little chance of a successful 
alliance with these strata and, in fact, regards them as a danger 
to its cause.
Instead, the PFLP looks to the working and middle classes 
for support (to which it refers, respectively, as the proletariat 
and the petite bourgeoisie) . The PFLP believes that the 
proletariat's anger against exploitation by the upper classes can 
be successfully channeled into revolutionary activity. It 
believes that this activity will culminate in the overthrow of 
the current pro-western regimes and their replacement by 
governments inclined to take a strong stand against the regional 
initiatives of the United States and its allies, and that these 
governments will act in the 'true interests' of their 
constituents.
Theoretically, the PFLP views members of the working class 
as the ideal leaders of its social and political revolution 
because their downtrodden condition leaves them with the least to 
lose in their current state and most to gain from the overthrow 
of the upper classes. They are, therefore, the most likely to 
carry the revolution through to a successful conclusion. For the 
time being, however, the PFLP believes that they lack the 
education and skills required to conduct such an effort and must 
temporarily accept the guidance of the sympathetic intellectuals 
and professionals of the petite bourgeoisie. It is this class'
task to prepare the members of the proletariat to eventually 
assume their leadership role.
Organizing its members into cells of three or four people, 
and grouping them into a pyramidal hierarchical structure, the 
PFLP operates in a particular area by rallying the general 
population, or the 'masses', to popular action against the 
government. The cell members may also carry out both armed and 
unarmed operations in their particular sector.
In attempting to implement its program, the PFLP has 
traditionally relied on both superpower and regional patrons to 
supply it with financial and military assistance, as well as 
training and logistical backing. Its parent organization, the 
ANM, depended upon the Egyptian government, under President Gamal 
'abd al-Nasir, for training, funding, and logistical support of 
its operations in various Middle Eastern countries. Following 
the PFLP's establishment in December 1967, it developed strong 
ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the former Soviet 
Union and - at various times - with regional powers such as 
Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Libya, 
and Iraq. It also forged links with like-minded subversive 
organizations in western and pro-western nations around the 
world.
Theoretically, these links were to have provided the PFLP 
with the same international support mechanism which made Israel 
appear so invulnerable. However, while Israel's ties with the 
United States and its allies remain as strong as ever, the PFLP's
allies have either ceased to exist, lost interest in actively 
supporting the Palestinian cause, or turned downright hostile.
This dissertation will examine the development of the PFLP's 
ideology and political program over the years of its existence - 
beginning with the establishment of its predecessor, the ANM - to 
the present. It will contend that the PFLP's program has failed, 
so far, due to its imperfect assessment of the reasons for 
popular hostility to the West. For while this hostility exists, 
it is generally in response to the threat which the inundation of 
western culture into the region is said to pose to indigenous 
Islamic values, rather than the alleged economic exploitation of 
the region's rank-and-file inhabitants. Indeed, the anti-western 
Islamic movements have embraced the economic benefits resulting 
from petroleum exports to the United States and its allies (the 
Islamic fundamentalist government of Iran, for example, favors 
expanded trade with Europe and the pro-western Persian Gulf 
states^) , while struggling vigorously against what it considers 
a western cultural invasion. This trend has made irrelevant the 
appeals of the PFLP and its allies for economic class warfare, 
while calls by the Islamic organizations for the preservation of 
the area's cultural and religious identity have been well- 
received.
This dissertation will further contend that the PFLP was 
able to pursue its program only as long as it received support
 ^H.C. Metz, Iran: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: U.S Department of the Army, 1989), pp. 187-189.
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from superpowers such as the Soviet Union and from regional 
powers such as PDRY and Syria. When that support diminished or 
ceased altogether in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the PFLP 
was forced to seek out new sponsors and allies.
Its search intensified as the end of 1991 approached, with 
the start of the Madrid Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, during 
which Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and an 'unofficial' 
Palestinian delegation faced each other in direct talks geared 
towards eventual peace treaties. Because of Israeli opposition 
to its participation, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO)^ had been excluded. It was apparent, though, that the 
Palestinian delegation's positions and negotiating strategy were 
being formulated behind the scenes by the PLO.
Even the PLO's indirect involvement in peace negotiations 
with Israel, its sworn enemy, was sufficiently worrisome to the 
PFLP to prompt it to develop contacts with Islamic fundamentalist 
groups linked to Iran, such as the Palestinian organization Hamas 
and the Lebanon-based Hizbullah. This would have been 
unthinkable for the avowedly Marxist PFLP during the 1970's and 
1980's, when it had received Soviet support. The PLO's agreement 
with Israel in September 1993, and the direct negotiations which 
followed, further isolated the PFLP from the umbrella 
organization and led it to conclude a formal alliance with the 
Iranian-backed groups. This alliance was aimed at impeding
 ^ The PLO claims to be Palestinian national movement's umbrella organization, of which the PFLP - at the time - was an active member.
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progress toward a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
In attempting to explain the apparent failure of the PFLP's 
agenda to take root in Middle East politics, this study will 
trace the organization's ideological and political development 
from its ANM incarnation in the 1950's and early 1960's until the 
PFLP's establishment in 1967, and from the founding of the PFLP 
through its present crisis. It will focus, in particular, on the 
differences between the approaches of the PFLP and its more 
successful rival, Fatah, to resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
contending that Fatah's ideological and operational flexibility 
have enabled it to become the Palestinian national movement's 
dominant organization while the PFLP has been marginalized from 
the mainstream by its rigid devotion to ideology.
Chapter One will: review the historical events and 
ideological trends which preceded the emergence of the leaders 
who would eventually form the PFLP. Chapter Two will trace the 
history of the Palestinian national movement from its beginnings 
in the late nineteenth century to the present. Chapter Three 
will examine the PFLP's ideology, structure, and method of 
operation. Chapter Four will assess the PFLP's changing 
relationship with the PLO over the years. Chapter Five will 
present conclusions by examining the extent to which the PFLP has 
fulfilled its ideological goals, evaluate its current problems, 
and speculate on the possible future directions which the 
organization might take.
Part One: Historical and Ideological Background
Since its establishment at the end of 1967, the PFLP has 
been the subject of numerous books and articles, perhaps more 
frequently than any of the PLO's other constituent groups. Most 
of these works, whether by scholars or journalists, emphasize: 1) 
the organization's consistent uncompromising rejection of 
Israel's right to exist; 2) its insistence on Israel's total 
dismemberment; 3) its insistence on the transfer to Palestinian 
sovereignty of all land over which Israel currently exercises 
control; 4) its emphasis on armed violence - against both 
civilians and military personnel - as the primary means to 
achieve these aims; and 5) its international and regional links 
with like-minded groups.
These characteristics, however, typify many other 
Palestinian nationalist organizations - both secular and
religious. What had distinguished the PFLP from its peers had
been its attempt, until recently, to operate within the framework 
of an increasingly moderate Fatah-dominated PLO, while 
simultaneously adhering to its longstanding ideological 
principles. PFLP offshoots such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) and certain 
Fatah progeny (Fatah - the Revolutionary Council and Fatah - the
Uprising) had always functioned independently of the PLO and
never made any pretensions of accepting its authority.
The PFLP, until the signing of the September 19 93 PLO- 
Israeli peace accord (under which the two entities, among other
10
things, recognized one another), erratically maintained at least 
a symbolic presence on the umbrella organization's Executive 
Committee and participated in meetings of the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC). Despite its serious disagreements with 
Fatah's leader, Yasir 'Arafat, the PFLP had always believed in 
the importance of maintaining at least the appearance of unity 
among the Palestinian national movement's various groups and 
consequently, made an effort to cooperate with the PLO's dominant 
faction whenever possible. In cases where the Palestinian 
organizations faced common danger - such as Israel's 1982 
invasion of Lebanon - the PFLP cooperated very closely with the 
other groups, particularly Fatah. In cases where Fatah diverged 
from what the PFLP considered fundamental nationalist principles ^
“ such as the PLO's recognition of Israel in September 1993 - the |
latter detached itself completely from the 'Arafat's |
organization, claiming that it had ceased to be the 'true' PLO j
and required basic reconstruction and rehabilitation. |
Until the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in 1993, the i
PFLP was unique among Palestinian organizations for its ability I
to maintain a rigidly maximalist hostility towards Israel and the 
West, while concurrently preserving a tenuous working 
relationship with the more pragmatic Fatah. Given the sharp 
contrast between the approaches of the two organizations, it is a 
wonder that their relationship lasted as long for as it did. The 
PFLP leadership's strict ideological approach to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, however, can be readily explained through an
11
examination of the historical events and ideological trends by 
which they were influenced. This chapter will trace these 
developments from the advent of Islam through the formative years 
of the PFLP's founders. It will focus, in particular, on the 
interaction between the region's inhabitants and the West, as 
well as this interaction's effect on the development of the Arab 
and Palestinian nationalist movements.
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Chapter 1: Islam as the Basis for Arab Nationalism
Islam's appearance in the seventh century A.D., and the
subsequent conquests within what is now the Middle East, North
Africa, and the Indian subcontinent by the Prophet Muhammad and
his successors is responsible for the spread of Arabic language
and culture throughout these regions. Hourani describes Islam's
first three centuries as:
a compelling drama in three acts: the early days of the Prophet and his immediate successors, the golden age when the umma [Islamic community of believers] was what it should be; the Umayyad period when the principles of the Islamic polity were overlaid by the natural human tendency towards secular kingship; and the early 'Abbasid age when the principles of the umma were reasserted and embodied in the institutions of a universal empire, regulated by law, based on the equality of all believers, and enjoying the power, wealth, and culture which are the reward of obedience.^
 ^A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Acre : 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)(hereinafter, "Hourani, Arabic Thoucrht"), p. 7. Hourani's Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age : 1798-1939, together with M. Khadduri's Political Trends in the Arab World, T. Sonn's Between Qur'an and Crown: The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Arab World, and S .Haim's Arab Nationalism: An Anthology survey the ideologies embodied in this response and the intellectuals who developed them. They document, as well, the evolution of the manner in which the Arabs defined themselves. The Arabs were transformed, in the minds of their intellectual elite, from an Islamic community whose political actions were meant to further religious ends - and whose members regarded themselves as Muslims with a common language, culture, and history - to an Arab nation, bound by these three elements, for whom Islam was a vital, but by no means the defining component of its national consciousness. See also A. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 19 91) (hereinafter "Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples). p. 4. Hourani's A History of the Arab Peoples traces the Arabs' development, both as a nation and as a cultural and ethnic group, from pre-Islamic times to the present day. Beginning with the birth of Islam, he discusses its unifying effect on the then mostly tribal Arab society, which was at first confined primarily to the Arabian(continued...)
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3(...continued) - Peninsula. Islam, he contends, was to convert an amalgam of warring Arab clans into an empire - extending, at its height, from the Indian Subcontinent to the Iberian Peninsula, whose subjects were united by a common language, culture, and religion. Although this empire eventually split into twenty-two separate Arab-ruled entities (in addition to Christian Spain and Portugal, and Islamic - but non-Arab - Iran, Pakistan, and parts of India) whose political alliances seemed to shift with every passing day, a certain cultural and linguistic stability remained over the years :
A world where a family from southern Arabia could move to Spain, and after six centuries return nearer to its place of origin and still find itself in familiar surroundings, had a unity which transcended divisions of time and space; the Arabic language could still open the door to office and influence throughout that world; a body of knowledge transmitted over the centuries by a known chain of teachers, preserved a moral community even when rulers changed; places of pilgrimage, Mecca and Jerusalem, were unchanging poles of the human world even if power shifted from one city to another; and belief in a God who created and sustained the world could give meaning to the blows of fate [p. 4] .
The Ottoman Empire, based in present-day Turkey, brought the Islamic polity to the zenith of its political influence and military power, extending its boundaries into the Balkans and Central Asia, its armies eventually reaching the outskirts of Vienna in 1683. By the late eighteenth century, however, the major European powers shifted from a policy of static defense against Ottoman encroachments to an offensive strategy whereby they gradually extended their influence over the Ottoman territorial domains themselves, often competing with local authority in the region's political and commercial affairs, and eventually dominating them.
In a gradual process, which will be described later on in greater detail, the European powers - Britain, France, and Russia in particular - nibbled away at the Ottoman Empire both physically and economically, conquering areas previously under Ottoman control (Crimea and parts of Central Asia by Russia between 1768 and 1774, the creation of independent states in the Balkans through local revolutions in the late nineteenth century, Britain's occupation of Aden in 1839, and Egypt in 1882, and France's occupation of Algiers in 1830) and extracting economic concessions from the Ottoman authorities. These concessions allowed the former to exercise indirect control over local(continued...)
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Although the circumstances described above no longer prevailed by 
the time the Ottoman rulers reached the height of their power in 
the sixteenth century, it was this image of a unified Islamic 
entity - which they believed capable of withstanding foreign 
(non-Arab) interference - to which early Arab nationalists looked 
as a model on which their dream of the unified modern Arab state 
might be based.
A solid grasp of the Arab nationalists' views, faithfully 
described in the three works introduced above, is vital to 
understanding the ideology under which the leadership of the ANM 
- and later the PFLP - operated. Dr. George Habash, founder and 
leader of the ANM, and Secretary General of the PFLP since its 
inception, was profoundly influenced by the ideas of Qustantin 
Zuraiq and Sati' al-Husri - two prominent Arab nationalists of 
the 1940's and 1950's.* The PFLP's doctrine, summarized at the
^(...continued)commerce and secure for Europeans the right to travel and trade freely within Ottoman territory.
Hourani's portrayal of the relationship between the Western powers and the provinces under Ottoman control as one in which the former enjoyed clear economic and political advantage and exploited this advantage to the letter's detriment corresponds to the PFLP's description of this association summarized earlier.It was this imbalance of forces which prompted local intellectuals to consider developing an appropriate response to what they considered an economic and cultural invasion of their region.
^ F . Matar, Hakim al-Thawrah; Oissah al-Havah al-Duktur Juri Habash FSace of the Revolution: The Life Story of Dr. George Habashl (London: Highlight Publications, 1984)(hereinafter "Matar"), pp. 31-32. This series of interviews by Lebanese journalist Fu'ad Matar is perhaps the most authoritative first- person account of the ANM's activities during the 1950's and(continued...)
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beginning of this thesis - and outlined in detail in chapter 
three - is a synthesis of the views of these nationalists with 
the conclusions drawn by the PFLP from contemporary 
circumstances. Those whose ideas contributed to PFLP doctrine, 
in turn, derived their positions from their own mentors and 
environments. An ideological genealogy, therefore, can be traced 
from the first thinkers to challenge the Ottoman system's 
legitimacy during the latter half of the nineteenth century to 
those upon whose ideas ANM and PFLP doctrine is immediately 
based.
Arab nationalism rose out of the need to confront the 
extension of European influence to the Levant, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and North Africa, in light of the Ottoman authorities' 
apparent inability to do so. Arab nationalists and reformers 
regarded the Ottoman view of Islam's role in daily life as 
antiquated and pointed to the Empire's virtual self-dismemberment 
-and its government's tendency to yield to almost all European 
demands - as proof that radical change in the manner in which 
Arabs viewed themselves and their collective purpose was 
necessary.
^(...continued)I960's. It confirms many of W. Kazziha and Basil al-Kubaisi's assertions and claims on the ANM's behalf (see below) for having established and guided anti-western organizations all over the Middle East and North Africa.
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A. Abbasid Caliphate's Loss of Arab Character in the 9th Century: Turkish Provincial Governors Assume Political Control
The apparatus governing the unified Islamic polity in North 
Africa and the Middle East began to lose its exclusively Arab 
character in the ninth century, when the Turkish mercenary troops 
upon whom the 'Abbasid rulers had come to rely accumulated ever 
greater influence over policy-making and administrative issues. 
The mercenaries exercised this influence to such an extent that 
they were able to depose caliphs of whom they disapproved. The 
caliphate in Baghdad found itself increasingly unable to assert 
its authority in the empire's remote provinces - whose Turkish 
governors recognized the caliph's religious authority, but 
reserved political power for themselves.^
The caliph's authority was dealt a fatal blow following 
Baghdad's destruction in the mid-thirteenth century and the final 
transfer of political authority to the Mamluk sultans in Egypt, 
where the caliph existed as a mere figurehead. Separate states 
sprang up, in the wake of Baghdad's ruin, in which power was 
concentrated in the hands of ". . . a military group, central
Asian, Turkish, Kurdish, or Caucasian by origin - the sultan, his 
freedmen, and their dependents." This group's primary concern 
was the seizure and maintenance of power and to this end, it took
 ^Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 10. See also Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, pp. 35-3 6.
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pains to retain control over the armed forces and government 
officials.G
Laws which related to state interests were based on 
proclamations issued by the sultan, who held temporal power. The 
caliph served as a respected religious advisor with whom the 
sultan consulted on whether or not his actions were in accord 
with Islamic law. It was the caliph who nominally invested the 
sultan with the authority to rule and it was from this 
investiture that the sultan's government derived its 
legitimacy.7
B . Ottoman Empire Established in 14th Century: Turks Form Ruling Class
The group which formed the ruling class, at the time of the 
Ottoman Empire's establishment in the fourteenth century,® was 
composed of Muslim Turks who had - and whose forebears had - 
served in the armed forces of the early sultans. As the empire 
expanded, leading members of this martial class were given the 
right to collect and retain tax revenues from the areas which 
they had been assigned to rule in exchange for military service 
to the sultan. These regional chieftains, transformed from 
soldiers to landowners, decayed as a military force. As their 
charters lapsed, they were replaced by tax-farmers, who became an
® Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 11. See also T. Sonn, Between Qur'an and Crown: The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Arab World (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990)(hereinafter "Sonn"), p p . 61-63.
Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 11. See also Sonn, p. 63.
® S o n n ,  p .  6 1 .
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hereditary landholding class; and although members of this class 
were granted the authority to rule, they were given no intrinsic 
power.®
The military caste which replaced it was composed of members 
of the slave-corps, a group which had served in the army since 
Islam's earliest days. The slaves had originated in the Balkans 
and the Caucasus Mountains. They had either been bought or 
acquired through periodic levy and educated in the military or 
palace schools. They eventually became either commanders in the 
sultan's army or high officials in his government.
C. The Ottoman Legal System
Although the sultan did not claim to be a caliph in the same 
sense that the Prophet Muhammad's immediate successors were 
caliphs, he nevertheless based his religious authority ". . . o n
the divine right of those who had established their effective 
power and used it in the interests of I s l a m . A l l  of the 
sultan's acts and proclamations were officially subject to the 
Sunni interpretation of the shari'ah, or the Islamic legal 
c o d e . He was additionally responsible for protecting the
® Hourani, Arabic Thought. pp. 25-26. See also Sonn, pp. 67-68.
10 Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 26. See Sonn, p. 66.
11 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 27. See also Hourani,History of the Arab Peoples, p. 221.
12 According to Sonn, the Ottoman rulers, rather than consulting the shari'ah to ensure that their acts comported with its provisions, " . . .  elicited legal justifications (fetva; in Arabic, fatwa) from the religious scholars for their actions." p. 62 .
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Islamic holy places and defending Ottoman frontiers against the 
Christian and Shi'i states."
Under the sultan was a religious legal hierarchy headed by 
the chief interpreter of Islamic law, al-shaikh al-Islam. who was 
empowered to disapprove of government actions for being contrary 
to the law. In practical terms however, the sultan held final 
authority. Under the Ottoman legal system, it was the task of 
the judges (cadis) to dispense the law. At the next lower level, 
the jurisconsults (muftis) interpreted the law, while instructors 
taught it in schools. Together with mosque officials, these 
elements formed ". . . a n  official corps, with regular grades and
a system of promotion . . . ", which served as a communications
channel between the sultan and his subjects. It was through this 
hierarchy that the sultan issued his decrees and through it that 
the rank-and-file expressed their grievances to him.
D, The Role of Minority Religious Communities
The sultan did not attempt to impose a homogeneous belief 
system on his subjects, but rather, regulated the empire's 
various elements and classes in such a way as to ensure 
harmonious coexistence among them. They formed a collection of 
communities, whose members owed immediate loyalty to their 
leaders, who, in turn, were responsible to the central
Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 27. See also Sonn, pp. 6263 .
" Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 28. See also Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, pp. 224-225.
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government. These communities were divided along regional, 
religious, or functional lines, and often all three.
Communities of the empire's recognized religious minorities 
(Christians and Jews) were organized into the millet system, 
under which they were subject to Ottoman jurisdiction in civil 
legal matters, but were permitted to administer their own court 
system in family law concerns." In exchange, they owed the 
sultan loyalty and good behavior, and were required to pay 
personal taxes (iizivah) not demanded of their Muslim 
counterparts."
The empire's Christian communities would play a dual role in 
the region's historical development from the sixteenth century 
onwards; first, as the willing absorbers of European languages 
and cultural values, and later, as leading elements in the 
revival of Arabic as a means of popular expression and ideologues 
of the Arab nationalist movement. Although both the Christian 
and Jewish communities felt alienated in a predominantly Muslim 
society, each responded differently to their respective feelings 
of isolation. Jews felt both religiously and culturally 
estranged, since a significant portion of Jewish doctrine 
maintained that they were a community in exile and aspired to the
" Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 29.
Sonn, p . 78.
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 217. See also E. Mortimer, Faith and Power; The Politics of Islam (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 127. Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam is a survey of modern Islamic trends (nineteenth century and beyond), which also reviews Islam's early history.
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re-establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in the Land of Israel.
Christians, on the other hand, considered themselves Arabs 
culturally, speaking Arabic as their primary language and 
practicing Arab customs in much the same way as their Muslim 
neighbors. Their existence as a separate community within 
Ottoman society led them to look to the West for protection and 
guidance. In the twelfth century, the Maronite Christians of 
Lebanon adopted Roman Catholicism and accepted papal 
authority. By the late sixteenth century, the Catholic Church 
had established a number of colleges in Rome to train Arab 
Christian priests for service in the Levant."
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 97. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 55.
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 242. Hourani, Arabic Thought, p p . 55-56.
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Chapter 2; Western Incursions; Ottoman Concessions
The Ottoman government's efforts to bring parts of Europe 
under its control paved the way for European political incursions 
into the empire. Sultan Sulaiman, whose siege of Vienna had been 
repulsed in 1529, was keen on preventing the Hapsburg dynasty 
from regaining control of the European areas under his authority. 
For this reason, he entered into an alliance with France in 1535. 
In concluding the alliance, Sulaiman agreed to grant France 
trading privileges within his domain, among them semi-autonomous 
status for the communities which they established in Syria. He 
granted similar privileges to British merchants in 1580. While 
this move was intended to encourage foreign commerce, it instead 
weakened the sultan's image as a devout Islamic ruler. France 
was a Catholic nation and the privileges granted to its merchants 
were seen as a ". . . concession to their religion rather than
their nationality.
A. Ottoman Sultanate Faces Physical Threat From Russians and Venetians; Seeks English and Dutch Protection
The sultanate was forced into further concessions to certain 
European powers during the seventeenth century, when, for the 
first time, its 'home' territory faced physical threat from that 
quarter. Russian forces began to attack Ottoman positions on the 
empire's northeastern frontier and in 1625, raided the Ottoman 
capital, Istanbul. The Venetian fleet expanded its operations 
into the Mediterranean Sea - previously considered an 'Ottoman
2° S o n n ,  p .  6 5 .
23
lake' - and contended with the Ottoman fleet for the position of 
dominant regional naval power. It was only after a costly 
struggle lasting more than twenty years that the Ottomans were 
able to halt Venetian expansion at the island of Crete. This was 
carried out with the aid of English and Dutch vessels, in 
exchange for which the Ottomans granted further concessions to 
British merchants operating on its territory. The Ottoman forces 
were no more successful in Europe, being driven back, for 
example, in a second attempt to take Vienna in 1683. By the end 
of the seventeenth century, Ottoman efforts at further conquest 
in Europe had c e a s e d .
B. Extends Trading Privileges to European Allies
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
commercial advantages granted to European traders by the Ottoman 
government began to have an effect on local society. Western 
exports to the region reduced the competitiveness of the 
indigenous industrial sector. Those who would normally have 
worked to develop this sector in the empire's Arab provinces 
found it more profitable to cooperate with the European 
commercial colonies and came to depend on them as a vital source 
of income, so much so, that they neglected to develop Arab 
industry to the point where it could compete with foreign 
trade.
2^ Sonn, p. 68. See also Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, p p . 258-262.
22 S o n n ,  p .  6 9 .
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By 1740, Sultan Mahmud further broadened the range of 
privileges extended to French visitors to the empire by allowing 
them to be subject to French, rather than Ottoman law. The 
French began to build textile factories in Syria. In addition, 
French, English, and later, American missionaries were permitted 
to establish schools in the region." Key figures in the Arab 
nationalist movement would eventually receive their education at 
these institutions and gain exposure to Western political 
thought.
The Arab nationalist movement, however, would not draw 
public attention until the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Before Arabs could conceive of themselves as a nation, the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman government had to be challenged. The 
empire's Turkish rulers differed from their Arab subjects in both 
language and culture. Their only comèion link was adherence to 
Sunni Islam and it was the sultan's image as the guardian of 
Islam which justified his continued rule in the eyes of the 
populace.
C. Early Anti-Ottoman Revolts - First Challenges to Sultan's Legitimacy
This image was first tarnished in the early fourteenth 
century with the Ottoman government's initial capitulations to 
the (Christian) French; however, by the late seventeenth century, 
a movement had emerged in the Arabian Peninsula which, for the 
first time, directly and systematically attempted to undermine
2® Sonn, p. 72. See also Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, p. 303.
25
the sultan's image as Islam's mainstay. Its founder and 
spiritual leader, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), was 
born into a family of religious scholars in the Najd region of 
what is today Saudi Arabia. Sent as a young man for religious 
training in Madinah, Basrah, and Damascus, he adopted the Hanbali 
interpretation of Islamic law.
The Hanbali school, founded in the ninth century by the 
Islamic jurist Muhammad Ibn Hanbal, rejects the concept of iim a ', 
or- interpretation of the aur'an and hadith" by consensus among 
the religious scholars ('ulama') The Hanbali interpretation 
of the Quran is instead derived solely, and almost literally, 
from the hadith. It also rejects the notion that the aur'an was 
created by earthly means and emphasizes its divine 
inspiration.
'Abd al-Wahhàb was guided by the teachings of the Hanbali 
jurist Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah (1263-1328), who maintained that
2^ The aur'an is "the book which contains the revelations Muhammad professed to have received from time to time, chiefly through the intervention of the angel Gabriel, which he delivered as a divine message to those around him." F.A. Klein, The Religion of Islam (London: Curzon Press, [original publication date unknown, paperback reprint published in 1985])(hereinafter "Klein"), p. 2. It is ". . . a complete collection of the revelations of Muhammad . . . ." Id., p. 18. Klein defines the hadith. "the second foundation of Islam" as "information, account narrative, story and record of the actions, doings and sayings of the Prophet [Muhammad], as recorded and handed down by tradition and which have become the rule of faith and practice of Muslims." Id., p . 24.
2^ R. Nyrop, et.al.. Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1977)(hereinafter "Nyrop, Saudi Arabia"), p. 120.
2® Id.
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as long as a ruler imposed laws derived from God's commands which
ensured the community's spiritual welfare, he should be obeyed.
However, just as kings had a right to obedience, so should they
obey God and enforce divine law. Ibn Taimiyyah pointed to the
original caliphate as the ideal example of such a system, but
bemoaned the fact that it had since split into several kingdoms.
Nevertheless, original responsibility for compliance with Islamic
law lay with the r u l e r . T h i s  was not the case under the
Ottoman system, where the 'ulama' existed to provide religious
justification for the sultan's secular decrees.
By the time the Wahhabi movement appeared in the early
eighteenth century, the Muslim inhabitants of the Arabian
peninsula and southern Iraq had reverted to customs and practices
which had either predated the time of Muhammad or of which the
Prophet and his followers had disapproved. These customs and • ;
practices fell under the transgression of shirk - the ascription j
of divine or superhuman qualities to anyone other than God or |
practices and beliefs which denied God's basic nature. These |
included: '
the visiting of saints and tombs and the veneration of 'trees and rocks. Forbidden bida [innovations] alsoincluded rendering improper honor to the ProphetMuhammad, including the custom of celebrating hisbirthday. Particularly forbidden was the invocation ofthe name of the Prophet or of saints in prayers in the ihope that they would intercede with God." i
27 Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 18-19.
2® Nyrop, Saudi Arabia, pp. 121-122. See also Klein, pp 235-236.
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Having observed these practices, 'Abd al-Wahhab was 
determined to reform what he regarded as Islam's corrupt state 
and set out ". . . t o  restore it to its early purity in
conformity with the teachings of the Qur'an, the example of the 
Prophet and the practice of the Companions and early M u s l i m s . " "  
His views met with hostility in his home town of Uyainah and he 
fled with his family and possessions to the nearby village of 
Dariyyah, where, in 1744, he concluded a pact with its ruler, 
Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud. Under the pact, Ibn Sa'ud undertook to ". .
. adopt, fight for, and propagate the Wahhabi doctrines and that 
in all conquered territories, the Al Sa'ud [the Sa'ud household] 
would hold political power and the Al Ash Shaykh [the household 
of 'Abd al-Wahhab] would hold religious power."" The interests 
of the two families became further enmeshed after 'Abd al-Wahhab 
married Ibn Sa'ud's daughter."
Following Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud's death in 1765, his son 'Abd 
al-'Aziz took over and continued his father's efforts to extend 
Wahhabism's influence. By the time of 'Abd al-Wahhab's death in 
1792, Al Sa'ud had extended its influence southward to the Rub' 
al-Khali (Empty Quarter). In 1801, the Wahhabis attacked the 
Tomb of Hussein in Karbalah (a site holy to Shi'i Islam), 
stripping it of its jeweled encasing and pillaging the
2® Klein, p. 236.
2° Nyrop, Saudi Arabia, p. 121 
Klein, p. 236.
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surrounding area. When 'Abd al-'Aziz died in 1803, most of the 
Arabian Peninsula was under Wahhabi control.
In the years 1801 and 18 05, Al Sa'ud took Mecca and Medinah, 
respectively, and cleansed them of ". . . anything perceived as a
religious infraction . . . .", including the tombs of saints."
The Ottoman government, whose control over the area had been 
tenuous in any case, had ignored previous requests of its 
governor in Baghdad to put down the Wahhabi insurrection. The 
loss of Islam's two holiest cities, however, compelled the 
government to take action to quash the rebellion. By " . . .  
challenging the accepted religious order the Wahhabis were 
challenging the very basis of the Ottoman claim to 
legitimacy."" In 1816, the sultan ordered his governor in 
Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali, to put down the Wahhabi revolt and the 
rebellion was finally contained in 1818." The sultan's claim
32 Nyrop, Saudi Arabia, p. 25.
Sonn, p. 75. Hourani writes that
. . . in the circumstances of his time, ['Abd al-Wahhab' s] preaching was not only a call to repent, it was a challenge to the dominant social forces : on the one side to the revived strength of the Arab tribes, still living in ignorance of religion and the Shari'a . and on the other to the Ottoman Empire, which stood for Islamic orthodoxy not as the salaf [original Muslims] were supposed to have conceived it, but as it had developed over the centuries. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was really saying that the Islam the sultan protected was not the true Islam, and he was therefore implying that the sultan was not the true leader of the umma [religious community].
Hourani, Arabic Thought. pp. 3 7-38.
N y r o p ,  S a u d i  A r a b i a . p .  2 7 .  S e e  a l s o  S o n n ,  p .  7 6 .
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on his subjects' loyalty, however - at least on the basis of his
religious authority - had been further eroded.
Parallel attempts to undermine the Ottoman government's
religious jurisdiction were also being made by the European
powers, as well. France's effort had the most lasting impact on
the Arab nationalist trend by far, since it introduced Arab
intellectuals to contemporary European ideas and technology and
simultaneously presaged the end of their way of life if the Arabs
were not brought into the modern world quickly. Since the
Ottoman government had proven incapable of countering European
advances with its own values and resources, the means had to be
found to adopt those European ideas from which the Arab world
would benefit, while preserving the region's cultural integrity.
D . The End of Ottoman Illusions: The Scramble to Modernize
In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded and occupied Egypt
during his war with Britain for dominance in the Eastern
Mediterranean. He continued his efforts, through 1799, to occupy
the Levant as well, and it was only with British assistance that
the Ottomans succeeded in driving out the French. While in
Egypt, however, the French brought with them an entourage of
scientists and scholars who willingly shared their knowledge with
local intellectuals with whom they came in contact. According to
the Islamic historian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti:
[I]f any of the Muslims came to them in order to look round they did not prevent him from entering their most cherished places . . . and if they found in him anyappetite or desire for knowledge they showed their friendship and love for him, and they would bring out all kinds of pictures and maps, and animals and birds
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and plants, and histories of the ancients and of nations and tales of the prophets . . .  I went to them often, and they showed me all that. -
Although France's occupation of Egypt brought indigenous 
Arab intellectuals into contact with European science and 
culture, it also confirmed for them beyond all doubt the empire's 
inability to physically defend itself against the non-Muslim 
West. In response, the Ottoman government, having re-established 
itself in Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
embarked upon a hurried - if belated - effort to catch-up with 
Europe technologically, militarily, and economically.
In this spirit, the Ottoman government in 183 9 announced its 
intention to reorganize its administrative procedures along 
European lines: central governmental control and bureaucracy, the 
rule of law, and social equality. In practical terms, this meant 
that :
[o]fficials should be free from the fear of arbitrary execution and seizure of property; they should govern in accordance with regulations drafted by high officials meeting in council. The subjects should live under laws derived from principles of justice, and which enabled them to pursue their economic interests freely; the laws should recognize no difference between Muslims, Christian and Jewish Ottomans. New commercial laws would enable foreign merchants to trade and travel freely.
The efforts to implement this policy that followed were known as 
the tanzimat, derived from the Arabic word for order, and its
'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Aia'ib al-Athar fi al-Taraiim wa al-Akhbar (Cairo: 1965), Vol. 4, p. 285, quoted in Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 266.
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 2 72.
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principles were applied locally in the Arab provinces of Egypt 
and Tunis.
The power vacuum left after the expulsion of the French from 
Egypt was filled by a Macedonian Turk named Muhammad 'Ali, who 
ruled from 1805 to 1848. Muhammad 'All's modernization program 
included the training of military officers, physicians, 
engineers, and government officials through missions to Europe 
and special schools established locally."
2"^ Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 273. See also Sonn, pp. 74, 78; L.C. Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules. Dangerous Game (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)(hereinafter "Brown"), p. 43. Brown, in addition to describing the events which contributed to the Ottoman Empire's downfall, presents a model of the characteristics which he believes were common among the national liberation movements in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Certain elements of Brown's model are helpful in providing the reader with interesting insights into the development of the Arab and Palestinian nationalist movements.
First, according to Brown, the revolt's armed activity was generally preceded by a proto-nationalist cultural renaissance among the rebelling population. This renaissance usually entailed " . . .  language reform, interest in vernacular literature, new literature adapting Romanticist themes, evoking a past 'golden age' of the specific 'national' group as the exemplar of what must be recaptured."; second, in addition to seeking independence from foreign rule, national liberation movements challenged the favored position of the traditional elites under the system being rebelled against. In the case of the Balkan rebellions, a largely Christian population sought to seize power from their rulers - the representatives of an Islamic state in which non-Muslims felt like second-class citizens; third, aware that the strength of their forces was insufficient, nationalist leaders sought the political, economic, and military support of the major European powers in their efforts to oust their Ottoman occupiers; fourth, in providing this support, the European powers made simultaneous, "but clearly separate and occasionally contradictory efforts" to force the Ottoman government to implement political and social policy changes; and fifth, final settlements to local conflicts were concluded among(continued...)
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Muhammad 'Ali used his power to eliminate tax farms and turn 
cotton into Egypt's primary export crop. Initially, he attempted 
to set up textile mills and other factories, but the local 
market's small size, the lack of indigenous technical skill, and 
the scarcity of generated power made this venture extremely 
difficult. Eventually, under pressure from European competition, 
Egypt's economy once again became agriculture-based, exporting 
raw materials to the industrialized nations and importing 
manufactured goods.
Similar reforms were undertaken in Tunis, leading to a 
proclamation of reform in 1857, which guaranteed " . . .  security, 
civil liberty, regular taxation and conscription, the right of 
Jews and foreigners to own land and carry out all kinds of 
economic activity." In 1861, the Muslim world's first 
constitution was enacted - within whose limits the local ruler 
promised to govern - which envisioned a sixty-member council 
whose approval would be necessary for the enactment of laws.®®
The empire's new social and economic order favored merchants 
who engaged in commerce with Europe, which was steadily 
increasing. The merchants were in a position to regulate not 
only trade, but local agricultural production as well. With
continued)the European powers, rather than among the warring parties themselves, and then imposed upon the combatants [pp. 57-58].
®® Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 273.
®® Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 274. See alsoHourani, Arabic Thought. pp. 64-65.
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ready access to capital, they were able to advance it to local 
landowners and farmers, and consequently determine what sort of 
crops would be produced. After purchasing Egyptian cotton, for 
example, the merchants would process and export it as well.
The largest group of merchants were Europeans, who were 
familiar with the European market and had access to bank credit. 
Their indigenous commercial partners were members of the empire's 
formerly underprivileged minorities : Christians and Jews who 
possessed extensive knowledge of the local markets and who, with 
their knowledge of foreign languages, were in a favorable 
position to serve as intermediaries with the Europeans. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, many of them had acquired 
foreign nationality and, consequently, the protection of European 
consulates and embassies. Some had even set up offices in major 
European commercial centers."
The final element contributing to the weakening of the 
Ottoman sultan's legitimacy in his subjects' eyes was found in 
the series of successful armed rebellions in the empire's 
predominantly Christian Balkan provinces during the nineteenth 
century. Beginning with the Serbian revolt in 1 8 0 5 , the 
process continued with the Greek rebellion in 1821, and the
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 276.
The Serbs were granted autonomy in 1817 and complete independence in 1878. See Brown, pp. 4 5-46.
"^2 Greece was granted independence in 183 0 after European intervention. See Brown, p. 3 33.
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granting of autonomy to two Bulgarian provinces in 1885'^ ® and 
Crete in 18 98."
These events had three important consequences for the 
region. Apart from undermining the Ottoman government's image as 
guardian of the Islamic domain against the Christian West's 
military and commercial onslaughts, they opened the door wider 
for further European intervention in the area's affairs and, for 
the first time, introduced the concept of secular cultural 
nationalism to the Muslim world - that is, a sense of community 
among people based on a common language, history, culture, and, 
in most cases, geographical location.
The Ottoman government's gradual loss of legitimacy as the 
leader of an Islamic community, the coming of secular nationalism 
to the Middle East, and its expression through rebellion against
1 Ithe established system were among the factors' which laid the 
groundwork for the Arab-speaking world's transformation from a 
theocracy to a conglomeration of nation-states sharing a common 
language and in most cases, a common culture and religion.
“^® Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 280. 
Crete was incorporated into Greece in 1913. Id-
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Chapter 3; Arab Nationalism: Issues and Programs
For the Arab nationalist idea to establish itself in the 
region, however, two important issues had to be addressed. Chief 
among these - simply stated - was the question of why Europe had 
bested the Ottoman Empire militarily, politically, and 
economically, or more importantly, what it was about the European 
nations which made them stronger than the communities and 
governments of the Arab/Muslim East. Its corollary was the 
question of what steps could be taken to close the qualitative 
gap between the two regions.
In an attempt to present an overview of the many solutions I
Iproposed, three 'generations' of social and political thinkers |
will be discussed; the generations here being not so much |
chronological as conceptual. The first generation (Tahtawi, I
Khair al-Din Pasha, and Bustani), was composed of
functionaries in the Ottoman administration who had been trained î
in Europe and wished to reform the system internally, without 
implementing radical changes. The second generation (Afghani and 
'Abduh) called for internal reforms as well, but rejected the 
notion that they could be implemented under an Ottoman 
administration and called for the formation of a unified, 
exclusively Arab-Muslim commonwealth. The third generation 
(among them Husri and Zuraiq), upon whose ideas Habash and his ;
colleagues would base their program, emphasized Arab history, 
culture, and language over Islam as the means to unite the Arab •
world. They by no means minimized Islam's importance, but instead
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depicted it as an inseparable component (rather than the sum- 
total) of the Arab historical and cultural legacy.
Their anti-western sentiments took on a more urgent tone, 
living as they did not only at a time when their native lands 
were being occupied and governed by European forces and 
officials, but also at a time when a non-Arab nationalist 
movement (Zionism) was successfully establishing a Jewish 
commonwealth in what was then Palestine, at the expense - in 
their view - of its Arab inhabitants. In the late 1940's and 
early 1950's, they imparted their doctrines to eager Palestinian }
students at the American University of Beirut (AUB). Many of I
those students went on to become leaders in the Palestinian |
national movement's radical wing - particularly the ANM and PFLP
i- and attempted to implement the theories which had inspired j
them. ;■
A. The Quiet Internal Reformers: Tahtawi, Khair al-Din Pasha, and Bustani
Many of the Ottoman empire's internal reformers were 
officials who sought change their government's orientation while 
preserving its framework intact. The first of these, Rifa'a 
Badawi Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), served from 1826 to 1831 in 
Paris as the spiritual leader of one of several Ottoman 
educational missions sent by Muhammad 'Ali to study European 
science and culture. During this time, Tahtawi studied and 
translated numerous French historical, philosophical, literary, ’
geographical, and mathematical works and acquired an in-depth 
knowledge of the political system in France. Unlike his
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ideological successors, Tahtawi's concern was with Egypt's 
revival as a nation, rather than with that of the Arab world as a 
whole. Upon his return to Egypt, he wrote a detailed description 
of the French political process, the most salient characteristic 
of which was, for him, the stress placed by France's system on 
justice and equality, which Tahtawi considered the " . . .  
foundation of civilization."^^
Tahtawi believed that Egypt could improve its economic and 
strategic standing by adopting a similar attitude and that this 
could be accomplished by acquiring the modern knowledge which 
Europe had to offer. He consoled those among his fellow Ottomans 
- whose pride would not allow them to acknowledge the superiority 
of certain aspects of European civilization over their own - by 
maintaining that, in any case, all western knowledge had 
originated with the A r a b s . f
At the time that Tahtawi was in Paris, nationalism had only 
recently been introduced into Europe under circumstances similar 
to those which the Ottoman empire was then experiencing.
According to Tahtawi, the Europeans had recognized that while 
they shared a common Christian identity, there were clear 
linguistic, historical, and cultural differences among the 
French, Spanish, Germans, and English. The task of nationalism 
was to clarify the reasons for those differences, to encourage
82 .
7 6  .
Sonn, pp. 88-89. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 
Sonn, p. 89. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 75
38
each differentiated group to consider itself a separate nation, 
and to instill a sense of national pride and a desire to improve 
the condition of its m e m b e r s .
Tahtawi similarly differentiated between Egyptians and 
Europeans. However, if Egyptians (and indeed, all Ottoman 
subjects) were not Europeans, then what were they? How should 
they identify themselves? While all native residents of the 
empire were considered Ottoman citizens, there were differences 
among them comparable to those among Europeans - particularly 
those which existed between speakers of Arabic and Turkish, as 
well as among those who lived in different parts of the empire. 
This self-definition, then, was unsatisfactory.
Muslims had hitherto identified with the ummah or community 
of believers. Tahtawi's exposure to such French political 
philosophers as Voltaire and Fenelon introduced him to the term 
1'amour de la patrie, which he translated into Arabic as hubb al- 
watan, or 'love of homeland'. Here, watan refers to a geographic 
separation from other homelands - a narrower associational 
concept than that of the ummah.^ Citizens of the same homeland 
professing love for their country, then, had a moral obligation 
". . . t o  work together to improve it and perfect its
Sonn, p. 89 
Sonn, p. 8 9
39
organization in all that concerns its honour and greatness and 
wealth. "49
Tahtawi's identification with his Egyptian homeland, 
however, was consistent, in his view, with Islamic doctrine. 
Under Islam, Tahtawi maintains, society's purpose is to endeavor 
to establish maslahah. or social well-being. For him, these are 
" . . .  the economic activities which lead to wealth and the 
improvement of conditions and contentment among the people as a 
whole. --In order for this endeavor to succeed, freedom and 
equality are essential. This cannot be limited solely to 
Muslims, since Islamic Egypt is not exclusively Muslim, but must 
also include Jews and Christians. Since Egypt's religious 
minorities are also required to contribute to the country's well­
being, they should have full equality with Muslims.
Like Tahtawi, Khair al-Din Pasha (c. 1820-1889) was an 
Ottoman official who acquired his ideas for internal reform as a 
result of a four-year sojourn in France. There he observed the 
workings of the French political system and attempted to apply 
them to his native environment. Khair al-Din believed that only 
his government's adoption of a system based on universal justice 
as well as the characteristics of European societies which made
R.R. al-Tahtawi, Manahii al-Albab al-Misriwah fi Mabahii al-Adab al-'Asrivvah [Egyptian Intellectual Methods in the Delights of Modern Literature! (Cairo: 1912) quoted in Hourani Arabic Thought, p. 79. See also Sonn, p. 90.
Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 77. See also Sonn, p. 90.
Sonn, p. 90. Hourani, Arabic Thought. pp. 80-81.
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them strong would enable it to modernize itself and compete with 
the modern European governments that were currently attempting to 
weaken and dismember the Ottoman empire.
Khair al-Din was born in the Caucasus Mountains and received 
his education and political training in Istanbul. Upon 
completing his education, he was sent to serve in the army of 
Ahmed Bey of Tunis. In 1852, he was sent on a mission to Paris, 
where he was able to study French politics and society first 
hand.
Returning to Tunis, Khair al-Din was appointed Minister of 
the Marine and for the next six years, led the movement for 
constitutional reform. He was a member of the body which drafted 
Tunis' constitution in 1860, and during the same year, was 
appointed president of the Supreme Council. He spent his long 
government career attempting to forestall attempts by various 
European powers, particularly France, to occupy Tunisia. At 
first, he sought the help of the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul in 
1859 to use his influence - together with that of the other major 
European powers - against French territorial ambitions by 
attempting to secure his recognition of the province as an 
autonomous entity linked with the empire. The sultan, however, 
was unwilling to offend France and Khair al-Din was unable to 
secure his recognition of Tunisia's special status. Efforts to 
ratify a constitution there failed as well.^
Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 85. See also M. Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals(continued...)
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For the remainder of his tenure in public service, however, 
Khair al-Din's efforts were primarily aimed at attempting to 
enlist the Ottoman government's support to counterbalance 
European influence in the area and at attempting to subject the 
Bey in Tunis to constitutional control. In 1873, he was 
appointed prime minister and held the position for four years, 
during which time he took steps to improve the efficiency of 
government administration, made urban improvements, founded a 
public library, and reformed the educational system to include 
the teaching of European languages and modern sciences. His 
attempts to limit the Bey's power, however, as well as those to 
limit European influence^ in Tunis drew hostility from both 
quarters. In 1877, Ahmad Bey had accumulated enough power to 
force Khair al-Din out of office, putting an end to his career in 
Tunis.
After moving to Istanbul, Khair al-Din won the favor of 
Sultan Abdulhamid, who appointed him grand vezir at the end of 
1878. Khair al-Din again found himself faced with the problems 
which had hounded him in Tunis: difficulties in his effort to 
limit the influence of the European powers and the sultan's
^^ (. . . continued) in Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,1970)(hereinafter "Khadduri"), p. 30.
This he tried to accomplish by maintaining balanced relations with the European powers with interests in Tunisia: Britain, France, and Italy " . . .  trying neither to make too many concessions to any of them nor to alienate [them] completely."In the end, he disappointed all of them. Hourani, Arabic Thought.p . 86 .
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reluctance to share his power with other government bodies.
After attempting to impose a program of political and economic 
reforms on the sultan in 1879, the sultan turned against Khair 
al-Din and deposed him. His career in public service at an end, 
Khair al-Din continued to live in retirement in Istanbul and died 
there in 1889.^
Like Tahtawi, Khair al-Din Pasha believed that as far as the 
Ottoman empire was concerned, " . . .  whatever is conducive to the 
welfare of the Islamic community and the development of its 
civilization, such as the expansion of the bounds of science and 
learning and the preparation of the paths which lead to wealth .
. as long as they were in harmony with the spirit of Islamic
law, should be adopted - notwithstanding that the ideas and 
practices assimilated might have originated in the West.^s 
Like Tahtawi as well, Khair al-Din considered equal justice and 
limitation of the ruler's power over his subjects the fundamental 
prerequisites for the successful implementation of beneficial 
reforms. However, while Tahtawi concerned himself only with 
Egypt's situation, Khair al-Din's ideas were aimed at all Muslim 
states.
Khair al-Din firmly believed that absolute rulers tended to 
be corrupt and that unless his power was shared with other
54 A. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 86-87.
Khair al-Din Pasha, Agwam al-Masalik fi Ma'rifah Ahwal al-Mamalik [The Road Most Straight to Know the Conditions of the State [Hourani translation!1 (Tunis: 1867-8) quoted in Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 88. See also Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, p. 306.
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governmental bodies, the ruler's corruption would continue 
unchecked. While it is theoretically possible for an absolute 
ruler to be righteous and honest, this is more by virtue of his 
innate goodness rather than of the political system's soundness. 
At the apex of Islamic civilization, the ruler's actions were 
limited by the shari'ah and he consulted with his advisors. For 
Khair al-Din, limitation of the sultan's influence by 
constitutional and parliamentary authority was entirely 
compatible with the Islamic administrative system at its most 
effective.
Tahtawi and Khair al-Din sought to modernize the Ottoman 
empire by attempting to integrate potentially beneficial European 
ideas with Islamic principals in order to make them palatable to 
the theocratic government which they served. They took for 
granted the notion that Ottoman society would be governed 
according to Islamic law. As long as this was the case,
Christian Arabs, although theoretically equal to Muslims, could 
never feel thoroughly at home in a society which defined itself 
in religious terms.
Christian Arabs, having developed extensive commercial ties 
with Europe, and having been educated in mission schools, had no 
misgivings about assimilating Western ideas into their culture. 
Despite this, they considered themselves Arabs in every sense 
and, but for religious differences, were culturally and 
linguistically identical to their Muslim counterparts. As a
Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 8 9
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minority, however, Christian Arabs were aware that even within 
the reformed Islamic polity proposed by Tahtawi and Khair al-Din, 
their political and social status would never equal that of 
Muslims. The 1860 Lebanese civil war, during which members of 
the Christian community in Damascus were massacred by Muslims 
opposed to reform, reinforced their feeling of alienation, as 
well as their perception that " . . .  religious loyalty was a 
dangerous basis for political life."^?
In order for Christians to be truly equal in Arab society, 
the focus of its identity would have to be shifted from religion 
to a common history, culture, and language. Islam, whose 
development spread Arab civilization throughout the Levant and 
North Africa, could not be ignored, of course, but it was thought 
that it should be seen in its proper light; neither as a guide 
for daily living nor as ". . . the basis for political life . .
. ", 58 as an important phase of Arab historical development.
Christian Arabs, then, concentrated on the revival and 
development of these aspects of Arab civilization, seeking 
thereby, to ensure themselves a participatory status in their 
society equal to that of their Muslim peers. Taking the lead in 
this effort were Lebanese Maronite intellectuals whose influence 
was felt during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and whose
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 277. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 97.
== Id.
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primary contribution was the adaptation of the Arabic language
for the propagation of modern ideas.
The most prominent among them was Butrus al-Bustani (1819-
1883). Bustani was educated at the 'Ain Waraqah Maronite
Catholic seminary in Lebanon, but later converted to
Protestantism as a result of his association with American
missionaries. He assisted them in the translation of an Arabic
version of the Bible and taught at their schools until 1863. In
that year, he founded the National School [al-Madrasah al-
Wataniwahl, an institution whose curriculum was based, not on
religious, but on national principles (the most important of
which was that " . . .  all who spoke Arabic, whether Christians
or Muslims, are Arabs . . . and therefore deserve equal
consideration within Arab society). The National School focused
on the teaching of Arabic language and the modern sciences.
During the course of his efforts to revive Arabic as a
modern language, Bustani compiled a dictionary and an
encyclopedia, and edited a wide variety of periodicals, all of
which, according to Hourani,
. . . contributed to the creation of modern Arabicexpository prose, of a language true to its past in grammar and idiom, but made capable of expressing simply, precisely, and directly the concepts of modern thought. From the circle which gathered around him - his sons and relations, his friends and pupils - there
H o u r a n i ,  A r a b i c  T h o u g h t . p .  1 0  0
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came the modern novel and drama in Arabic as well as modern Arabic journalism.
Unlike fellow Lebanese Christian intellectuals,Bustani's 
agenda transcended mere cultural revival and, like Tahtawi and 
Khair al-Din, he articulated what he considered the requirements 
for a modern Arab society capable of competing with the rest of 
the world. These were based, in part, on the acceptance by Arab 
society of western ideas and customs from which it might benefit; 
a selective assimilation, whereby these concepts would be 
absorbed or rejected on their own merits. Like Tahtawi and Khair 
al-Din, as well, Bustani saw no shame in borrowing European 
ideas. When Arab civilization was at its zenith, Europe had 
appropriated many aspects of its culture and knowledge and, as a 
result, had advanced and overtaken the Arab world. It was now 
the letter's turn to learn from Europe and resume its former 
leading position.®^
!Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 100. See also Sonn, pp. 84- {85; K. Abu al-Shabab, "Al-Qissah wa al-Riwayah wa al-Masrahiyyah jfi Filastin (1900-1948) [The Narrative, Novel, and Theater in Palestine (1900-1948)," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The !Palestinian Encvclooedia, Vol. 4 (Beirut: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- IFilastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Abu al-Shabab"), p. 129. The 11984 edition of the Palestinian Encyclopedia contains articles jcovering most aspects of Palestinian history, politics, culture, iand geography, and is organized in the standard encyclopedic Iformat. The 1990 edition is a series of specialized studies in ithese and other areas of interest to Palestinians by noted Iauthors. It is supplemented by an index. The PLO financed the iencyclopedia's compilation and leading figures in the Palestinian *national movement sit on its editorial board. ;
For example, Faris al-Shidyaq (1804-1887). See, e.g.,Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 97. See also Khadduri, p. 101.
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Chief among these ideas was the concept of national unity, 
or ". . . the willingness of all who share the same country to
cooperate on a level of e q u a l i t y . O n e  had to recognize that 
there exists a universal human nature and that all, at bottom, 
worship the same God. For the sake of the Arab world's general 
advancement, a sense of patriotism, or love of country (hubb al- 
watan), was desirable and the participation of all segments of 
society in its betterment was to be encouraged.^
.Despite his commitment to the revival of Arabic language and 
culture, however, Bustani never indicated a desire to break away 
from the Ottoman empire. Instead, he sought to improve 
conditions in the region comprising Lebanon and Syria, which was 
considered an autonomous Ottoman subdivision. Like Tahtawi and
Khair al-Din, Bustani accepted the empire's legitimacy and sought I*to effect peaceful change, primarily through education and I
Iadministrative reforms. The subsequent ideological generation, |
however, expanded the scope of its methods to include anti- !
government activism and even violence.
iB. The Militant Reformers; Afghani and 'Abduh ;
The first member of this generation to advocate reform 
through violent and extra-legal means was a Muslim cleric named I
Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi (1838-1897), better known as Jamal al- i
Hourani, Arab Thought, pp. 100-101.
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Din al-Afghani. Throughout his career as an activist, Afghani 
took Ottoman rulers to task for their inability to stem European 
military and cultural incursions into the region and, at times, 
advocated their violent overthrow. During his residence in 
Egypt, from 1871 through 1879, he acquired a government pension 
through the influence of a minister friend of his. During this 
time, he led a secret revolutionary organization, known as al- 
Hizb al-Watani, or the National Party, composed of Egyptian 
activists dissatisfied with the incompetence of Egypt's ruler, 
Khedive Isma'il, and what they regarded as undue European 
influence over the country. Afghani urged Egyptians to take 
direct action and overthrow the system, suggesting to his pupil 
and ideological heir, Muhammad 'Abduh (see below), that the 
Khedive be assassinated.
Born in what was then Persia and educated in the Shi'ite tradition of Islam, Jamal al-Din changed his surname to Afghani - with the intention of obscuring his Shi'ite origins - in order to allow him to operate in countries whose residents were primarily Sunnis. Afghanistan is in the same geographical area as Persia and its habitants were known to be Sunni Muslims. See S. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (London: University of California Press, 1976)(hereinafter "Haim"), pp. 6-7.
W.S. Blunt, Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt (New edition, 1924), p. 489, quoted in Haim, p. 8. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 116-117. Afghani's violent sentiments remained with him throughout his life. In 1896, while living in Istanbul, he encouraged the murder of Nasir al-Din Shah, of Persia, and was quoted as saying, "There is no deliverance except in killing, there is no safety except in killing." See M.L. Khan (translated into Arabic by S. Nash'at and 'A. Hasanain), Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi al-Ma'ruf bi al- Afghani [Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi, Known as al-Afghanil (Cairo: 1957), quoted in Haim, p. 8.
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Holding informal classes in his home, Afghani imparted his 
views to his disciples on ". . . theology, jurisprudence, 
mysticism, and philosophy . . . ," but also discussed " . . .  the
danger of European intervention, . . . "  the means by which one 
might resist it, and the need for internal reforms (such as a 
constitution to limit the Khedive's power). While Isma'il 
tolerated Afghani's activity, his son Tawfiq did not and in 1879, 
had Afghani deported to India.
Because of his involvement in the underground opposition 
leadership in Egypt, the British authorities in India restricted 
Afghani's movements following the occupation of Egypt by British 
forces in 1882. By 18 84, Afghani had made his way to Paris, 
where, together with Muhammad 'Abduh, he formed a clandestine 
organization composed of Muslims dedicated to working toward 
Islamic unity:and reform. The group published eighteen issues of 
an Arabic-language periodical known as al-'Urwah al-Wuthaa [The 
Indissoluble Bond]. Discussion in al-'Urwah revolved around 
three principal issues: the policies of the European powers in 
Muslim regions, the exposure of what they regarded as Islam's 
inner weaknesses, and the admonition of fellow Muslims to take 
steps to rectify them. 8^
67 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 109.
Hourani writes of Al-'Urwah that " . . .  more than one thinker of a later generation has borne witness to the profound effect on him of a copy of it found and read by chance years afterwards." See Hourani, Arabic Thought. pp. 109-110. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that future PFLP Secretary General George Habash was drawn to an organization of the same(continued..
50
Afghani believed that Islamic civilization had declined to a 
pitiable state and that Muslims were vulnerable to European 
encroachment because the rulers charged with protecting them and 
perpetuating their way of life were weak and incompetent. In 
order to correct this, " . . .  the Muslims had to take matters 
into their own hands; they had to force, even terrorize, their 
rulers into governing efficiently, and they had to band together 
in order to present a powerful and united front to the 
encroaching European." European ambitions, according to Afghani, 
could be withstood only through the Ottoman empire's 
transformation into a strong and stable union of Islamic states 
and it was toward this goal that Afghani attempted to spur his 
fellow Muslims.G9
Afghani's concept of Islam differed from the traditional 
view, however, which held that living one's life according to 
Islamic law and tradition was an end in itself. It was not, as 
Afghani held, a ". . . powerful political force which enables men
to band together in a strong state and successfully withstand 
their enemies.
(. . . continued) |name during his student days at the American University of Beirut Iin the late 1940's. See Matar, p. 23. See also 'A. Muhafidh, |"Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Filastini qabla 'Am 1948 [Palestinian |Political Doctrine Before 1948]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah {[The Palestinian Encyclopedia], Vol. 3 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Muhafidh"), p. 530.
Haim, p. 9.
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For Afghani, religious solidarity was the means by which the 
Muslim world would maintain its political and cultural integrity 
against European attempts to undermine it.^^ Whether or not 
this solidarity was sincere was immaterial so long as the 
objective was served.^ A common language and culture were more 
likely to unite the region than merely a common religion;^ and 
while Afghani believed that true Islamic solidarity would 
theoretically prove far more effective in stemming what he 
regarded as European cultural and military assaults on the 
region^^ than national cohesion, the linguistic and cultural 
diversity of Islam's community of believers rendered religion 
less effective, in practice, for this p u r p o s e .
Like Tahtawi, Khair al-Din, and Bustani, Afghani recognized 
". . . that the successes of Europe were due to knowledge and its
proper application, and the ^ 'weaknesses of the Muslim States to 
ignorance, and he knew that the orient must learn the useful arts 
of Europe. . . . and like them, he knew that the region's
ability to stand up to the West depended largely on the degree to
Haim, p. 14.
Haim, pp. 10-12.
Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 118.
The perception of a physical European threat was sharpened among reformers in the region after France occupied Tunis in 1881 and Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. See Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 103.
Haim, pp. 13-14. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 118-119; Sonn, p. 93.
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which it succeeded in learning t h e m . H o w e v e r ,  unlike his 
ideological predecessors, who believed that the Ottoman 
authorities were capable of adopting the necessary reforms to 
strengthen their hand against Europe, Afghani doubted their 
ability to do so and advocated their overthrow.
Like Bustani and other Christian Arab reformers, Afghani 
viewed Islam more as a civilization than merely as a religion, 
but unlike them, he was able to combine it with the European idea 
of national cohesion in order to make it palatable to his fellow 
Muslims, who had hitherto tended to resist all foreign concepts. 
By depicting such temporal notions as cultural and linguistic 
solidarity in Islamic terms, Afghani enabled them to become 
involved - alongside their Christian counterparts - in the infant 
Arab nationalist movement.
Afghani's most devoted disciple was an Egyptian seminary 
student named Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), who, unlike his 
peripatetic mentor, was firmly rooted in his own homeland and its 
affairs. Born in Tantah to a family with a tradition of 
religious study, 'Abduh was sent, at the age of thirteen, to 
study at the village's Ahmadi mosque, which, at the time, was 
Egypt's greatest Islamic learning center beside Cairo's al-Azhar. 
The Ahmadi mosque's rote method of teaching thoroughly bored him 
and after awhile, he ran away. Persuaded to return by his uncle.
Khadduri, p. 58.
53
'Abduh finished his studies in Tantah and then went on to study 
at al-Azhar, where he remained from 186 9 to 1877.^
While at al-Azhar, 'Abduh met Afghani for the first time as 
he passed through Cairo briefly. When Afghani returned to Cairo 
in 1871, 'Abduh attended the informal classes which his mentor 
held at his house and later helped to disseminate his ideas. 
Following his graduation from al-Azhar in 1877, 'Abduh taught 
there for a time, but held informal classes at his home, as well. 
Shortly thereafter, he began to lecture at Dar al-'Ulum, a 
college established not long before to teach modern subjects to 
al-Azhar students who later wished to become judges or 
instructors in government schools.
The 1870's were a period during which Egyptian national 
awareness was well-defined and clearly expressed. The government 
of the Ottoman sultan's representative, the Khedive Isma'il, had 
become deeply indebted to western banks, and the European powers 
- in order to secure their interests - assumed control over the 
Egyptian government's financial affairs. In 1878, as the 
Khedive's prime minister Nubar Pasha took office, European 
ministers assumed posts in his cabinet. When the Khedive 
dismissed them, and appeared to be on the verge of breaking away 
from European control, the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul - after 
succumbing to pressure from the European powers - deposed him in 
turn. The heavy taxes which he and his successor Tawfiq imposed
Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 13 0-131.
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on the population in order to repay the government's foreign 
debt, however, made them enormously unpopular and galvanized an 
active and violent opposition movement.®®
Three principal factions comprised the opposition to 
Tawfiq's policies: those motivated by religious or nationalist 
sentiment, who were alarmed by the Khedive's apparent 
subservience to European influence and believed that this would 
endanger Egypt's independence; those who wanted to see the 
Khedive's absolute rule replaced by a constitutional government; 
and native-born Egyptian military officers who sought to wrest 
control of the army from the 'Turco-Circassian' officers.®^
British and French support for Tawfiq against the opposition 
groups prompted them to combine into a single movement, whose 
leader was an Egyptian military officer named 'Urabi Pasha. At 
the ijeginning of 1882, 'Urabi Pasha became the Minister of War 
and, in effect headed the government. The British and French 
considered his government a threat to their interests and the 
period of tension which followed ended with the British bombing 
of Alexandria and occupation of Egypt in September of that 
year. ®^
During this time, 'Abduh played an active part in the 
opposition movement. Although he disapproved of the methods of
7 5 .
®® Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 13 2-133.
®^ Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 13 3.
®^  H o u r a n i ,  A r a b i c  T h o u g h t . p .  1 3 3 .  S e e  a l s o  M o r t i m e r ,  p
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the military faction's leaders, he offered what aid he could to 
them in organizing a national resistance to the British 
occupation. Following the resistance movement's subsequent 
collapse in 1882, the British restored the khedival government to 
power. 'Abduh was subsequently arrested and sentenced to be 
exiled for three years.®®
'Abduh's travels in exile took him first to Beirut and then 
to Paris, where he collaborated with Afghani in establishing his 
underground organization and publishing al-'Urwah. When al- 
'Urwah ceased publication, he moved on. 'Abduh eventually 
returned to Beirut, where, for three years, he lectured on 
theology at a school established by a Muslim charitable 
organization. As in Cairo, his Beirut home was the site of 
informal lectures on Islam and the Arabic language, which drew 
Muslim, as well as Christian and Druze, intellectuals.®*
In 1888, the Khedive allowed 'Abduh to return to Egypt. 
Although 'Abduh hoped to resume his teaching career, the Khedive 
feared that allowing him to do so would unfavorably influence his 
students. Instead, 'Abduh was made a judge in the system of 
tribunals established in 1883 to decide cases involving the 
secular legal codes promulgated that year.
While he continued to work in this capacity until his death 
in 1905, he served in other capacities as well. The most
®® See Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 133-134. See also Haim,p . 17 ; Khadduri, p . GO.
®* See Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 134. See also Haim, p.17 ; Khadduri, p . 6 0.
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important of these was as Mufti of Egypt, a post to which he was 
appointed in 1899. This granted him ultimate authority over the 
entire Egyptian system of religious law. During his tenure, 
'Abduh issued edicts on public issues which reinterpreted them in 
light of modern circumstances. Not long thereafter, he was 
appointed to be a member of the Legislative Council, a 
governmental advisory body.®®
Throughout his public service career, 'Abduh involved 
himself in educational reform and the establishment of new 
schools in Egypt. In this capacity, he participated in the 
creation and administration of the Muslim Benefit Society, whose 
purpose was to establish private schools. 'Abduh also prevailed 
upon the Khedive in 1895 to authorize an administrative council 
for al-Azhar. He served on the council for ten years and during 
this time, succeeded in reforming the university's teaching 
methods and curriculum to meet the needs of modern life.®®
When 'Abduh came of age in the 1870's, Egypt was 
experiencing the second stage of the modernization process begun 
in the early nineteenth century - under Muhammad 'Ali - with the 
dispatch of study missions to Europe and the establishment of 
individual local science and foreign language teaching 
institutions. The Khedive Isma'il further advanced the 
modernization process by enacting legal codes based on human
®® Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 134. See also Khadduri, pp. 6 0 and 6 2.
®® S e e  H o u r a n i ,  A r a b i c  T h o u g h t , p .  13  5 .
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reason, rather than on divine law, and establishing a school 
system modeled after those in Europe.
'Abduh accepted many of the changes as inevitable and even 
necessary. However, they produced a division of the Egyptian 
population between its religious element, governed by Islamic 
principles, and its secular element, which embraced the imported 
European innovations unconditionally. The measures were, in 
effect, an attempt to secularize a society which would always 
have a strong Islamic component and could, therefore, never be 
completely secularized. 'Abduh's fear was that unless the means 
were found to bridge the gap between the perspectives of these 
two opposing spheres, Egypt's societal fabric would deteriorate 
irreparably.
The schism was most apparent in what 'Abduh considered 
society's essential elements: its legal and educational systems.
'Abduh believed that a society derived its laws from a unique 
history and set of circumstances. Society could not adopt laws I
which went beyond these parameters - as he believed the European- j
i
style legal codes did - since the inhabitants, unable to relate |
them to their own experiences, would find them meaningless.*® ;
'Abduh was similarly concerned over the competition between i
the traditional religious schools, on the one hand, and the i
modern European-style schools, on the other. He found them both I
®'^ Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 13 6. See also Khadduri, pp 60-61.
®® H o u r a n i ,  A r a b i c  T h o u g h t , p .  13  7 .
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unsatisfactory because neither prepared Egyptian students to 
compete in the modern world while maintaining their Islamic 
identity. The traditional religious schools taught Islam without 
integrating its instruction with courses in the modern sciences. 
The mission schools, while they taught modern science - as well 
as European languages and ideas - were administered by 
foreigners. Whether intentionally or not, a mission school 
education drew the students away from their native religion and 
culture and closer to that of their teachers - so much so that 
there were instances of Muslim children being converted to 
Christianity.®® At best, Egyptian students at these schools, 
whose curriculum was taught in a foreign language, would become 
dependent on the language and culture imparted there for 
intellectual advancement. The Ottoman government schools were 
similar in every way to the mission schools, except that thèy did 
not teach Christianity. However, the manner in which they taught 
Islam was stilted and descriptive, and did not include 
instruction in social and political morality.®®
The result, 'Abduh feared, would be Egyptian society's 
polarization into two segments; on the one hand, a completely 
secularized element, estranged from its religious and cultural 
roots and on the other, an element steeped in Islamic tradition.
®® Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 13 7. 
®® Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 13 8.
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but, lacking training in modern science and ideas, unable to 
apply it to the modern world.
'Abduh, therefore, took it upon himself to find common 
ground for these two elements. The question for him was not, as 
it had been for Khair al-Din, whether modern concepts and 
institutions could be made acceptable to Muslims, but rather, 
whether a person living in modern society could be an observant 
Muslim, as well. In other words, could Islamic precepts - or 
indeed, those of any other revealed religion - still serve as a 
moral guide?®®
'Abduh set out to prove that they could. The modern 
concepts imported from Europe opened a wide range of behavioral 
and policy choices for Egyptians and Islam, he claimed, was the 
means by which they would make the correct ones. One must first 
restate Islam's true nature and then consider its implications 
for modern society.®® The ideal society was one which applied 
Islamic law in the public interest. This described Islam's true 
nature and reflected its original interpretation.®*
Observant Muslims, 'Abduh believed, were unable to 
distinguish between the essential and the superficial and tended 
to attach the same importance to detailed social regulations
91 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 138 . See also Haim, pp. 1718 .
92 Hourani, Arabic Thought. P- 139 . See also Haim, p. 17.
93 Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 140 . See also Khadduri, p .63 .
94 Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 149 .
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formulated during Islam's early centuries as they did to its 
fundamental and eternal principles upon which these regulations 
were based. This made it difficult for them to change and accept 
the modern concepts which he considered essential to enabling 
Egypt to compete with the rest of the world. 'Abduh believed 
that Egypt's Turkish rulers had encouraged this blind application 
of archaic laws in order instill apathy among their subjects.
They feared, in his view, that the acquisition of knowledge would 
awaken the citizenry to its backward state and prompt its members 
to demand changes in the manner in which they were governed.®® 
'Abduh sought to make Islam fully rational and compatible 
with modern science and philosophy. Although he is not 
considered a nationalist, his ideas are relevant to the study of 
Arab nationalism's development in that they fostered the belief 
that human initiative - based on reason - could change society 
for the better. In so doing, ". . . h e  exemplified and made
popular a hopeful attitude toward politics . . . "  in Egypt.®®
C. The Authentic Arab Nationalists: Rida, Zuraiq, and Husri 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), 'Abduh's ideological 
successor, may be regarded as the first true Arab nationalist. 
While 'Abduh had no great love for the Turks, he counted them, 
along with all other Muslims, as potential beneficiaries of his 
ideas; and while Rida shared 'Abduh's discontent with Islam's
-®® Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 150-151. See also Haim, p 17; Khadduri, pp. 62-64.
®® Haim, p. 18.
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current state and desire to restore to it its previous glory, it
was the Arabs, to the exclusion of all others, who were the focus
of his thoughts and whom, as opposed to the T u r k s , h e
considered the 'true ummah' . ®®
Rida was born near Tripoli, Lebanon and came to Egypt in
1897, where he lived for the remainder of his life editing the
periodical Al-Manar [The Lighthouse!. Through Al-Manar. Rida
spread the notion that only by studying the history of the Arabs
and working to revive their past glories could Islamic unity be
achieved. This unity only existed
. . . in past centuries thanks to the Arabs, and willnot return in this century except through them, united and in agreement with all races. The basis of this union is Islam itself, and Islam is none other than the book of God Almighty, and the Sunna of his prophet - prayer and peace be upon Him. Both are in Arabic. No one can understand them properly unless he understands their noble language.®®
®"^ Rida believed that the contribution of the Arabs to the Islam's advancement far outweighed that' of the Turks. "Most of the lands which the Turks conquered," he maintained, "were a burden on Islam and the Muslims, and are still a warning of clear catastrophe . . . "  while it was "in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs that Islam spread, became firmly established and prospered." See "Al-Turk wa al-'Arab [The Turks and the Arabs]," Al-Manar, III (Cairo, 1900), p. 172, quoted in Haim, pp. 22-23.
®® Haim, pp. 20-22.
®® Al-Manar, III (Cairo, 1900), pp. 290-291, quoted in Haim, p. 23. See also Khadduri, p. 181. Through Al-Manar, as well, Rida warned against the dangers which he and his contemporaries believed the Zionist movement posed for the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine; an alarm which his ideological heirs continued to sound in their writings. See 'A. Rafiq, "Filastin fi 'Ahd al-'Uthmaniyyin (2): Min Matla' al-Qarn al-Thalith 'Ashir al-Hijri/al-Tasi' 'Ahir al-Miladi li al-'Am 1336 H./1918 M.[Palestine During the Ottoman Period (2): From the Beginning of(continued...)
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The notion of Islam as an expression of Arab nationalism, 
and vice versa, had gained widespread popularity, through Rida, 
among Arab intellectuals and enabled both Muslim and Christian 
Arabs to share a common glorious history and common future goals. 
The next generation of Arab nationalist thinkers, consequently, 
did not feel compelled to justify the adoption of modern 
technology and political ideas in Islamic terms. That the two 
were compatible had already been well-established.
Two of these philosophers are particularly relevant to this 
study's main topic for the lasting impression they made on George 
Habash and his associates during their student days at the 
American University in Beirut and eventually formed the basis for 
the PFLP's i d e o l o g y . T h e y  are Qustantin Zuraiq^°^ and Sati' 
al-Husri.
Qustantin Zuraiq, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus,
99(... continued) the Thirteenth Century A.H./Nineteenth Century A.D. to 133 6 A.H./1918 A.D.]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial, Vol. 2 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Rafiq"), p. 873; M. al-Fara, "Madhkhal ila Dirasah al-Qadhiyyah al-Filastiniyyah [Introduction to the Study of the Palestinian Issue]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah, Vol. 5 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "al-Fara"), pp. 8-9; K. Qasimiyyah, "al-Harakah al-Wataniyyah al-Filastiniyyah fi Thulthi al-Qarn al-Hali (1900-1964) [The Palestinian National Movement During the First Two Thirds of this Century (1900-1964)]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah. Vol 5 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Qasimiyyah"), pp. 44, 48,50, and 53.
100 Matar, pp. 31-32.
Hourani described Zuraiq as the " . . .  consulting don to a whole generation of nationalists." Hourani, Arabic Thought. p. 309 .
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was a professor and medieval historian at the American University 
of Beirut whose 193 9 book of essays, al-Wa'i al-Oawmi [National 
Consciousness!, provided the doctrinal foundation for secular 
Arab nationalists during the second half of the twentieth 
century. The Arabs' basic problem, he wrote, was that 
collectively, they had no convictions and were, therefore, 
incapable of surrendering their individual concerns to those of 
an organization acting for the common good. Nationalism, or ". .
. a sense of collective responsibility, the will to create and 
maintain a community, " would supply those convictions.^”^
This community would draw inspiration from a religion, since 
religions contain the moral principles " . . .  necessary to build 
a stable and prosperous society." While all religions professed 
the same essential principles, Islam was the only one whose 
history and culture suited the nationalist movement because it 
was so uniquely Arab. Although a Christian, he regarded the 
prophet Muhammad as an Arab national hero who united a collection 
of scattered tribes, imparted to them a feeling of solidarity, 
and transformed them into an empire. Islam and the prophet 
Muhammad, Zuraiq believed, were an inseparable part of the Arab 
consciousness and all Arabs, regardless of their religion, should 
draw guidance and inspiration from t h e m .
102 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 3 09.
Zuraiq's appreciation of Islam was historical and cultural and he never suggested that Arabs should adhere to Islamic law or attempt to restore the Caliphate. See Al-Wa'i al- Oawmi (Beirut, 1949), pp. 109-118, translated and reprinted in(continued...)
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Zuraiq was an early activist in the Palestinian cause. The 
Arab Nationalist Bloc, formed in Palestine in 1929, established 
ties with Zuraiq's Arab Nationalist Society in Lebanon and merged 
with it in 193 7.^”^ Following Israel's defeat of the combined 
Arab forces sent to destroy it in 1948, Zuraiq characterized the 
Palestinian cause as having " . . .  exceptional historical value 
and consequently, should not be solely an Arab battle, but an 
international humane one as well. Secondly, he emphasized that 
ideologically and historically, challenges had always stimulated 
civilizational development and that it should be assumed that the 
defeat would play this role for us." As PFLP doctrine would 
later uphold, the conditions for Palestine's liberation were, 
according to Zuraiq, " . . .  the strengthening of the sense of the 
Zionist danger in every Arab country, international contacts,
involvement of the popular forces in the battle, andi
dissatisfaction with the role of the [Arab] regimes' forces." A 
longterm solution to the conflict would require ". . . a
fundamental revolution in Arab society, based on the premise that 
the Jewish victory was not due to the superiority of one nation 
over another, but of one regime over another.
(. . . continued)Haim, pp. 167-171. See also Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 309- 310; Khadduri, p. 184; Sonn, p. 13 9.
Muhafidh, p. 552.
I. Sahab, "Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Filastini ba'da 'Am 1948 al-Kitabat al-Siyasiyyah al-Filastiniyyah hawla al-Qadhiyyah al- Filastiniyyah [Palestinian Political Ideology after 1948 : Palestinian Political Writings on the Palestinian Cause]," Al-{continued...
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George Habash was among those who attended Zuraiq's lectures 
at AUB on ". . . Arab nationalism and the Zionist danger . . . "
in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Among the principles 
imparted to Habash by Zuraiq, which later appeared in PFLP 
doctrine, was the importance of following a set of principles 
under strict organizational control, as well as that of 
subordinating one's individual concerns to those of the 
n a t i o n . Z u r a i q ,  however, was opposed to the use of violent 
and conspiratorial methods advocated by Habash and his fellow 
students and called upon them to " . . . calm down."^°”
Habash was also greatly influenced by Sati' al-Husri,^”® an 
Arab Muslim intellectual who, like Rida, gave priority to Arab 
unity over Islamic unity. Unlike Zuraiq, who expressed 
appreciation for Islam's historical and cultural aspects, Husri 
drew a sharp distinction between nationalism and religion. While 
he believed, as did Afghani, that religion could serve as an 
important social force in motivating people to achieve 
nationalist goals, it could never replace, or complement.
-tef {...continued)Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia! . Vol. 3 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah,1990)(hereinafter "Sahab"), p. 615.
106 See Matar, p. 18. See also Qasimiyyah, p. 120.
107 PFLP, Al-Istratii i w a h  al-Sivasiwah wa al-Tandhimiwah [The Political and Organizational Strategy! (No place of publication: Central Information Committee, 1983)(hereinafter "Strategy 1983"). pp. 43-46.
Matar, p. 24.
Matar, pp. 31-32.
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nationalism. Judaism, for example, was a national religion, and, 
as such, could become a basic nationalist element."^ Universal 
religions, such as Islam and Christianity, did not recognize 
national differences and could therefore weaken national 
solidarity."^
People, according to Husri, formed nations based on two 
principal factors: a common language and a common history.
Language provided the medium through which a nation's inhabitants 
communicated ideas to one another and by which its collective 
memory and self-consciousness were preserved. A nation's history 
was that very collective memory. A nation could lose its self- 
awareness by forgetting its history and regain it through a 
renewed interest."^
In addition to national cohesiveness, Husri outlined two 
additional requirements for a stable political community: 
territorial patriotism and loyalty to the state. A nation being 
a group of people sharing a common language and history, these 
people must inhabit a single territory, belonging to them and to 
no one else, and owe loyalty to a single government which 
represents their collective will. When this takes place, Husri !
n  ■ Iexplains, i
A notion with which Habash would undoubtedly feel uncomfortable, since it unwittingly conferred legitimacy upon the State of Israel.
Khadduri, pp. 202-203.
Sahab, p. 655. See also Khadduri, pp.. 203-204.
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. . . society is politically stable, and so arepolitical thoughts and feelings. There is no dispute or ambiguity, no self-questioning, no division of loyalties. When it does not exist, then political ideas are complicated and ambiguous, and there is a division of political beliefs which may be dangerous.
The emergence of Arab nationalism - and its subsequent 
application to the Palestinian context - was the result of a long 
historical process of growth, decline, réévaluation, and 
readjustment. The rise and expansion of Islam spread Arab 
language and culture throughout Arabia, the Levant, North Africa, 
and parts of Europe and, for a time, united its peoples under a 
single religious polity. The empire was militarily and 
politically strong and ruled its subjects through a stable legal 
system under which commerce and scientific research flourished. 
This stability weakened, in the Arab nationalist view, with the 
coming to power of the Ottoman Turks. The Turks,falthough 
Muslims, interpreted Islamic law in a manner intended to preserve 
their ruling status, rather than benefit society as a whole.
This approach weakened the Islamic polity to such an extent that 
its European rivals, whose legal systems and moral attitudes were
Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 313. The PFLP emphasizes the importance of presenting a unified political position as well and discourages open dissent within its ranks. See, e.g. G. Habash, [interviewed by T. Ahmad], "Fi Hadith Shamil hawlah A 'mal al- Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis li al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin: D. Jurj Habash: Al-Jabhah Wadhihah wa Mutamasikah wa Muwahhadah, wa Ian nakhdha'u li Ibtizaz wa Irhab Ahad [In a Comprehensive Discussion on the Activities of the Fifth National Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,Dr. George Habash: The Front is Clear, Solid, and United, and Will Never Yield to Anyone's Robbery or Terror]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1145, May 2, 1993, pp. 11-24.
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aimed improving their inhabitants' welfare, were able to 
penetrate and take over the Arab world economically and, as a 
result exert undue military and political influence over the 
region.
Arab nationalists, and those who preceded them, sought to 
explain this decline (mindful that the Arabs had not always been 
weak) and search for ways to correct the Arab world's weaknesses. 
Finally, they sought ways to take appropriate measures to restore 
the Arabs tOutheir previous position of strength, whereby they 
could stand on their own with little fear of infringement upon 
their independence and freedom of action by foreigners. The 
first step in this process involved the study of Arab history and 
language, in the hope of using these to demonstrate the Arabs' 
common past and destiny. The next step was for the Arabs to 
acqfuire the knowledge and ideas which had made their European 
rivals strong enough to threaten their independence. This 
involved the study of modern science and political concepts and 
applying them to Arab society in a way which would not radically 
alter its character. The final step was to use this knowledge to 
eliminate all hostile foreign elements in the area and prevent 
their return. This involved the training of scientists and 
technicians in European methods and the modernization of the 
region's military forces.
Arab nationalists viewed the modern Zionist movement's 
emergence towards the end of the nineteenth century as the latest 
- and most blatant- European attack on the region, because it
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sought to establish a westernized Jewish state on a portion of
what they regarded as Arab territory. The cause of the
Palestinian Arabs against the Zionist movement, then, was an 
opportunity to put into practice the nationalist concepts which 
had hitherto been only theoretical. The following chapter will 
survey the history of the Palestinian national movement and its
trends in terms of these concepts.
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Chapter 4; A History of Palestinian Nationalism
When the Palestinian national movement first emerged in the 
late nineteenth century, Arab nationalism was beginning to move 
from the theoretical to the activist stage and the Palestinian 
cause was widely regarded by Arab nationalists as an opportunity 
to apply the principles that had evolved over the past few 
decades. All of the elements in their theory were present as far 
as they were concerned: 1) An indigenous Arab population in the
process of redefining itself as a nation; 2) A 'settler colonial' 
element, supported by the European powers, attempting to deny 
them that identity; and 3) the emergence of a national resistance 
movement to combat the 'foreign invaders'.
Prior to 1918, the year in which British military forces 
occupied Palestine, the two factors which gave impetus to 
Palestinian Arab communal activity were: 1) fear of Jewish 
immigration to Palestine and its expected detrimental effect on 
the country's Arab population; and 2) the desire to be 
independent of foreign rule, although as part of a larger Arab 
national entity. There was, as yet, no distinct Palestinian 
national consciousness and no organized Arab body capable of 
either articulating these issues effectively to the governing 
authority or resolving them favorably through armed force.
Rather, the local Arabs (who would later be identified as 
Palestinians) considered themselves Ottoman citizens. With the 
enactment of the empire's constitution in 1876, they began
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sending representatives to the Ottoman Parliament in 
Constantinople.
In the wake of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's overthrow in 1908, and 
the political reforms which followed, the empire's Arab subjects 
expressed their fears of assimilation by the Turks, as well as 
the loss of their cultural identity, more openly. They demanded 
a decentralized regime which would grant the Arab areas semi­
autonomy."* Ironically, the Arabs' political revival coincided 
with the beginning of modern Zionism's organized endeavor to re­
establish a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.
As the modern Zionist movement began a concerted effort to 
resettle what was then Ottoman Palestine in the late 1870's, the 
Ottoman authorities' response wavered between measures which both 
encouraged and discouraged Jewish immigration and land purchases. j
I
The local Arab population expressed opposition through its ' i
Ireligious leadership, its intellectuals, its parliamentary j
representatives, the press, and intermittent public jIdemonstrations. In 1897, a Muslim commission, headed by the j
Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Tahir al-Husseini, investigated the i
Zionist movement's land-acquisition m e t h o d s . I n  18 98, the |
Cairo journal Al-Manar warned that the Zionist movement aimed "to '
take over Palestine'"" and expressed similar fears in 1902."'^ |
Khadduri, pp. 16-18.
115 W. Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876-1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984)(hereinafter, "W. Khalidi"), p. 37.
Id.
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A. Initial Stirrings
By 1908, Palestinian newspapers began to actively oppose the 
Zionist settlement effort. That year, Al-Karmil was founded in 
Haifa " . . .  with the purpose of opposing Zionist colonization .
. ." and in 1911, Filastin began publication, referring to its
readers, for the first time, as 'Palestinians.'"” In 1913, 
Filastin warned that " . . .  the Zionists will gain mastery over 
our country village by village, town by town.'"^” These proto­
nationalist stirrings reflected the local Arabs' uncertainty over 
the most effective means by which to confront Jewish immigration. 
Palestinians did not, however, perceive the threat as 
sufficiently acute to galvanize them into a high degree of 
activism and national consciousness. It was the diplomacy which 
took place during World War I, from 1914 to 1918, which both 
raised their hopës for independence and justified their fears 
that the Zionist enterprise might succeed - and thus impelled 
them to organize themselves politically.
In July 1915, the second year of the war, a correspondence 
began between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the 
British High Commissioner in Cairo. Following its conclusion in 
January 1916, Arab leaders interpreted the contents of the
. continued)W. Khalidi, p. 38.
Id. See also "Al-Karmil," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encvclonedia, Vol. 3 (Damascus: al-Hai'ah al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 642; "Filastin," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia, Vol. 3 (Damascus: al- Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 466-467.
W . Khalidi, p. 39. 73
exchange as British assurances of postwar independence for all
areas over which they claimed sovereignty, including Palestine.
In 1917, the British government seemed to contradict these
assurances with a message from Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur James
Balfour to Baron Lionel Walter de Rothschild, which pledged
British support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home
in Palestine.
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
These contradictory promises placed the British in a quandary, 
following their occupation of Palestine in 1918, over how to 
reconcile the two positions.
B . Formal Institutional Development: 1918-1947
From 1918 until 1947, the Palestinian movement first 
acquired organized nationalist attributes in the form of 
Palestinian national congresses. Held between 1919 and 1928, 
these congresses authorized Palestinian Arab delegations to 
present the community's fears and demands to the British 
mandatory authorities in Palestine, the British government in 
London, and international bodies elsewhere. Through the
Quoted in A. Frangi, The PLO and Palestine (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983)(hereinafter "Frangi"), p. 42. This is a general history of the Palestinian national movement by the PLO's representative in Germany.
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Executive Committee, they also authorized economic boycotts, 
general strikes, and political demonstrations.
The First Palestinian Congress met in Jerusalem, between 
January 27 and February 10, 1919. It sent two memoranda to the 
Paris Peace Conference demanding independence and rejecting the 
Balfour Declaration. The violence which broke out in the country 
prompted the British to prevent the second congress from 
convening in May of that year, but subsequent congresses engaged 
in similar activities.
The Third Palestinian Congress, held in Haifa in December, 
elected an Executive Committee, which controlled the Palestinian 
political infrastructure until 1935."^
In the 1930's, Palestinian Arabs began to form political 
parties, beginning with the pan-Arabist Istiqlal Party 
(1932),"” and followed by the National Defense Party,"* the
Muhafidh, pp. 532-535 
W. Khalidi, p. 89.
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, A Survev of Palestine: Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Jerusalem ?: Government Printer, 1946-1947)(hereinafter, "Survev of Palestine"), p. 30. This three volume study, which was prepared in December 1945 and January 1946, describes all aspects of life in the mandated territory from the British authorities' viewpoint. Its first volume contains a chronology of events - from the capture of Be'er Sheva' by British forces in 1917, until 1945, the year in which the report was prepared. The chronology is useful as a supplement to the antagonists' often conflicting accounts. See also "Al-Istiqlal (Hizb) [The Istiqlal (Party)," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia. Vol. 1 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 209- 210; Muhafidh, p. 53 5.
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Palestine Arab Party,"” the Arab Reform Party"” in 1934, and 
the National Bloc Party in 1935."^ In 1936, Palestinian 
political activity spread to the grass-roots level with the 
establishment of 'National Committees,' subsidiaries of the 
Nablus-based Arab National Committee, in the country's Arab towns 
and large villages."” The dominant parties, the National 
Defense Party and the Palestinian Arab Party, were led by the 
rival Nashashibi and Husseini families, respectively. They had 
". . . n o  internal,elections or western-style institutions, and
no dues, and were based on family and local affiliations and 
loyalties. Families, clans and villages rather than individuals 
were party members, with semi-feudal links of dependence and 
loyalty determining attachment." The two camps vied with each
"*{...continued)"4 "Al-Difa' al-Watani (Hizb) [National Defense (Party)]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 410- 412. See also Muhafidh, p. 53 5.
125 iiAl-Hizb al-'Arabi al-Filastini [Palestinian Arab Party] , " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah (Palestinian Encyclopedia) , Vol. 2 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 227-233. See also Muhafidh, p. 535.
"Al-Islah (Hizb) [Reform (Party)]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia]. Vol. 1 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 260-261. See also Muhafidh, p. 53 5.
Survev of Palestine, p. 32. See also "Al-Kutlah al- Wataniyyah (Hizb) [The National Bloc (Party)]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia! . Vol, 3, (Damascus : Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 633-634. See also Muhafidh, p. 535.
Survev of Palestine, p. 35. See also Muhafidh, p. 53 5.76
other for power and influence, competing for followers among the 
country's elite families."”
In the same year, the Palestinian political parties formed 
the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) to represent their common 
interests. The AHC, under Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini's 
chairmanship, authorized general strikes and boycotts, dealt with 
the Arab countries' leaders, and represented the Palestinian Arab 
community to the British government and the international 
community."”
193 6 also marked the beginning of a three-year period of 
Palestinian violence, known among Palestinians as either "the 
Great Rebellion""^ or "Thawrah 1936-1939 (the 1936-1939 
Revolution) . While there had been earlier
B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1987)(hereinafter "Morris"), p. 13. An unblinking examination by a politically moderate Israeli historian of the roles played by both the Israeli and invading Arab forces in the 1947-1949 flight of the Palestinian refugees. See also J. Peteet, Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)(hereinafter "Peteet"), pp. 54- 56.
Id. See also Survev of Palestine, p. 35; "Al-Lajnah al- 'Arabiyyah al-'Ulya li Filastin [The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastinivah, Vol. 4 (Damascus:Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 27-30; Muhafidh, p. 535.
131 W. Khalidi, p. 18 9.
132 "Thawrah 1936-1939 [The 1936-1939 Revolution]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah. Vol. I (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984)(hereinafter, "Thawrah 1936-1939"), p. 622 .
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'revolutions,'*”” they were generally localized violent 
disturbances, lasting only a few months at most, which stemmed 
from demonstrations that had developed into clashes with either 
Jews or British riot police. Poor coordination and haphazard 
leadership made them difficult to sustain and enabled the 
mandatory authorities to quickly suppress them. By April 1936, 
however, the National Committees had formed branches all over 
Palestine and by May, had combined to form the AHC, which was 
able to coordinate country-wide political activity.
The first stage of the violent three-year period lasted from 
April to December 1936. It began with a general strike in April, 
but this was soon followed by armed attacks and violence in 
May.*”* As the strike gave way to general violence, the 
traditional enmities between the Husseinis and Nashashibis - who
133 1920, 1929, and 1935.
*”* Survev of Palestine describes the escalation of violence in the following manner: i
During May and June the strike was effectively imposed; jJaffa port was put out of action; there were iintermittent local demonstrations and assaults on Jews; ithere was destruction of Jewish property and sniping at |Jewish settlements; sporadic attacks were made on the |railway lines, two trains were derailed, roads 1barricaded and telephone wires cut; and armed bands, ;swelled by volunteers from Syria and Iraq, made their |appearance in the hills. |
From 11th May onwards the military forces were Ireinforced from Egypt and Malta; until August, noattacks were made on the bands in the hills, the troopsbeing used for the defense of key points and the Ipatrolling of roads and highways. Arab agitators and :some of the Arab leaders were interned.
Survev of Palestine, p. 36. See also Muhafidh, p. 53 5.
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had joined forces at the beginning of the strike - re-emerged, 
with the Nashashibis representing those Palestinians who regarded 
the strike and rebellion as fruitless and the Husseinis 
representing those who wished to continue with it. Internecine 
violence ensued during which " . . .  [a]ssassination and
intimidation by the Husaynis decimated the Opposition ranks; 
terrorism, extortion, rapine and brigandage against villagers and 
town-dwellers by the armed bands and the inevitable search and 
destroy operations against the rebels by the British military 
alienated much of the population.""”
The official Palestinian version of the 1936 rebellion omits 
any mention of internecine killing. W. Khalidi maintains that 
all efforts at this time were directed toward enforcing the 
strike, which, according to the AHC, was aimed at compelling the 
British to halt all Jewish immigration."” When the British did 
not accede to this demand, the AHC officially announced the 
beginning of an 'armed rebellion' in May.
Following the AHC's announcement, armed units of Al-Jaish 
al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (Army of the Holy Jihad), under the command 
of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, began to operate against British 
army and police units - as well as against Jewish settlements - 
in the Jerusalem area. At first, these operations were limited 
to the Jerusalem and Jaffa areas, but were later extended to the 
rest of the country. The Jihad al-Muqaddas units were supported
Morris. , pp. 13-14.
" ” Thawrah 1936-1939, pp. 626-627
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by volunteers from Transjordan and Syria under the command of 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji."^
While sending in reinforcements in an attempt to quell the 
violence, the British simultaneously dispatched a commission of 
inquiry, led by Lord Peel, in order to ascertain its causes. The
governments of the neighboring Arab countries appealed to AHC to
halt the general strike and appear before the Peel Commission.
The AHC finally agreed to do so on October 11 and there was a 
brief cease-fire while the commission toured the country."”
On July 7, 193 7, the Peel Commission issued its report. The 
report attributed the hostilities to the Palestinian Arabs' 
desire for independence and their fear of continued Jewish 
immigration. It recommended that Palestine be partitioned into a 
Jewish State, an Arab state (to be incorporated into 
Transjordan), and Mandatory enclaves. The AHC found these f
recommendations unacceptable because they entailed recognition of 
Jewish claims to the country. It also feared that Arab-owned
Id. , p. 627. See also Survev of Palestine, p. 37; "Fawzi al-Qawuqji (1890-1977)," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia! (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 480-484; Muhafidh, p. 540.
Survev of Palestine, pp. 37-38. See also "Bil (Lajnah) [Peel (Commission) ] , " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia!, Vol 1 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 492-494; 'A. Yasin, "Al-Sihafah al-Arabiyyah fi Filastin [The Arabic Press in Palestine]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah, Vol. 4 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Yasin"), p. 446.
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land inside the Jewish areas would be confiscated and the Arab 
residents deported."”
Arab violence escalated as a result and in September, Arabs 
assassinated a senior British administrator in Nazareth."” The 
British responded by outlawing the AHC, as well as all other Arab 
political organizations. They arrested tens of Palestinian 
leaders, exiling five of them, and placed thousands of 
Palestinians into detention camps. The penalty for arms 
possession was death and towns and villages participating in the 
hostilities were punished collectively."*
While maintaining its efforts to suppress the violence 
militarily, the British government sent another commission of 
inquiry in April 1938, headed by Sir John Woodhead, to study the 
practical aspects of implementing p a r t i t i o n . T h e  Woodhead 
Commission's report, published in November 1938, concluded that 
partition was not feasible."” At the same time, the British 
government invited Zionist and Palestinian leaders, as well as
*”” W. Khalidi, pp. 189-190. See also Survev of Palestine, pp. 4 0-41; Yasin, p. 446.
**” W. Khalidi, p. 190.
*** W. Khalidi, 18 9-190. See also Survev of Palestine, pp. 42-43 .
142 Id., p . 44.
**” Survev of Palestine, pp. 46-48. See also "Wudhaid (Lajnah) [Woodhead (Commission) ] , " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encvclopedial (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 599-600; A. Tarabain, "Filastin fi 'Ahd al-Intidab al-Baritani [Palestine During the British Mandate]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Tarabain"), p. 1050.
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representatives of the surrounding Arab countries, to a 
conference in London. The conference, which lasted from February 
7 to March 27, 193 9, failed to produce an agreement acceptable to 
all parties."*
This failure to achieve an agreement prompted the British 
government to annunciate a new policy on Palestine, in May 193 9, 
in the form of a White Paper. The policy stated that Britain had 
fulfilled its obligation to create a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. Over the next five years, 75,000 more Jews would be 
allowed into the country, after which further immigration would 
be subject to Arab acquiescence. Jewish land transfers would be 
permitted in certain areas and prohibited in others and after ten 
years, an independent unitary state would be established, 
conditional upon satisfactory Arab-Jewish relations."”
While Arab leaders expressed some reservations about the new 
policy, which they did not believe went far enough, Jewish 
leaders accused the British government of reneging on its 
commitment to Jewish independence in an effort to appease the 
Arab side. A falling out between the Zionist movement and the 
mandatory authorities resulted."” The more extreme Jewish 
underground organizations - the Irgun Hatseva'i Hale'umi and 
later, the Stern Group - stepped up their attacks on British
"* W. Khalidi, pp. 190-191. See Survev of Palestine, pp. 4 851.
**” W . Khalidi, p. 191. See also Survev of Palestine, pp. 52-54. Document reprinted on pp. 90-99; Yasin, p. 447.
" ” I ^ ,  p. 54.
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p e r s o n n e l . These attacks escalated until 1947, when an 
exasperated British government turned to the United Nations to 
decide the fate of its Palestine mandate.
During the Second World War (1939-1945), the British 
mandatory authorities continued to consider the AHC an illegal 
organization. Its leader, Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, managed to 
flee the country in 1941 and spent the war years in the Axis 
countries. Efforts to disarm the Arab (as well as the Jewish) 
population continued and the British continued to detain 
Palestinians whom they suspected of subversion."”
In October 1944, Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Saudi, Syrian, 
Transjordanian, Yemeni, and Palestinian representatives held a 
preparatory conference on Arab unity in Alexandria, Egypt and in 
March of the following year, founded the League of Arab States. 
The League pledged to maintain Palestine's 'Arab character' and 
over the next few years, represented the Palestinian Arabs in the 
international arena."”
Although it has been generally established that the Irgun and Stern group were primarily responsible for attacks on British personnel and facilities, A Survev of Palestine does not name them specifically as the perpetrators.
" ” See generallv Survev of Palestine, pp. 56-70. See also Frangi, p. 76.
" ” W. Khalidi, pp. 242-243. The Arab League's Covenant noted that Palestine was the only territory in the Arab World whose right to independence had been called into question and pledged that "until that country enjoys effective independence the Council of the League should undertake the selection of an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work."
(continued...)
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C. Prelude to Collapse
The Arab League took its responsibilities one step further
in September 1947 when, in response to the United Nations'
recommendation to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish
states, it appointed a Technical Military Committee (TMC), to
oversee "Palestinian defense needs."*””
Many Palestinian historians believe that the Palestinian
forces and their Arab allies had no chance of victory over the
Zionist forces because the Arab states did not heed their own
experts' warnings of Zionist military superiority and did not
give the Palestinians sufficient support to overcome it.
The Palestinians looked to the Arab League to counterbalance Zionist military preponderance. But the league suffered from . . . constraints and divisiveness. . . . Its first tentative move to meet Palestiniandefense needs was made in September 1947 when it formed the Technical Military Committee, headed by an Iraqi former chief of staff. General Ismail Safwat, to report on Palestinian defense requirements. Safwat's first report, submitted on October 8, was somber and realistic. He accurately assessed Zionist strength and asserted that the Palestinians possessed nothing remotely comparable to the Zionist forces "in manpower, organization, armament or ammunition." Urging the Arab states to "mobilize their utmost strength" promptly and form a general command, he warned that the Palestinians
**”(... continued)Covenant of the Arab League (Cairo: March 22, 1945), quoted in Survev of Palestine, p. 78. See also "Munadhdhamah al-Tahrir al- Filastiniyyah [The Palestine Liberation Organization]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedia] (Damascus, Syria: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah,1984) (hereinafter "Palestinian Encvclopedia - PLO"), p. 313.
*”” W. Khalidi, p. 244. See also "Al-Lajnah al - ' Askariyyah al-Tabi'ah li Jami'ah al-Duwal al-'Arabiyyah [The League of Arab States Military Committee]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyvah (Palestinian Encvclopedia). Vol. 4 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 30-33.
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were in dire straits. The only Arab League reaction to Safwat's urgings was the allocation on October 15 of one million pounds sterling to the Technical Committee. *”*
The Arab League was hesitant about confronting Britain 
before the end of the Mandate on May 15, 1948. Arab leaders 
still held out hope that " . . .  somehow the justice of the 
Palestinian cause would be recognized and the Western powers 
would not allow the worst to befall the Palestinians."*””
In December 1947, the Arab League decided to supply the TMC 
with ten thousand rifles and three thousand volunteers. These 
formed an irregular volunteer force, whose members hailed from 
various Arab countries, known as the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) . 
However, it was not until the end of the British Mandate, on May 
15, 194 8 , that regular Arab forces from Lebanon, Syria, 
Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen entered the 
country. By that time, it was too late for them to be of any use 
to the Palestinians. The Arab governments " . . .  regarded the
*”* Khalidi, pp. 308-309.
*”” Id. , p. 309. The 1984 edition of Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia! offers a similar assessment citing "the inability of the Arab states to understand the strategies of the great powers controlling international policy, their trust in promises, and their acceptance of delays, which resulted in their weakness in rising to the level of confronting the dangers which threatened them, while World Zionism marshalled all of its local and international capabilities in support of its strategic aims in cooperation with the great powers themselves." "Harb 1948 [The 1948 War]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah, Volume 2 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984)(hereinafter "The 1948 War"), pp. 162-163; See also H. Kilani, "Hurub Filastin al-'Arabiyyah - al- Isra'iliyyah [The Arab-Israeli Palestinian Wars," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia], Volume 5 (Beirut: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990), p. 503.
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assessment of their military experts as exaggerated and 
unwarranted. They still could not contemplate intervention by 
the Arab armies before the formal end of the Mandate on May 15. 
And when the time for intervention came, a force less than half 
the minimum considered necessary was all that was sent."*””
Although it took the newborn State of Israel more than a 
year to drive out the Arab armies and gain control of the 
Palestinian areas, most Palestinian leaders and historians hold 
to this assessment of the reasons for Israel's victory in 1948- 
49.*54 Certainly, the new generation of Palestinian leaders, 
which arose from among the war's refugees, shared this view.
D. Postwar Palestinian Nationalist Trends
Following the Palestinians' 1948 defeat, three major 
political trends developed. Two of them, the Arab Nationalists
*”” W. Khalidi., p. 313. According to the Palestinian Encyclopedia (1984), there was a "superficiality in the information available in the apparati of the Arab army commands on the enemy forces while the Zionists knew much about the Arabs." It also describes "a lack of political participation by the military command in any discussion of the war. Its members were in a strange situation. They did not come to the decision to enter the war until a very short time before it broke out and they did not have the time to make the preparations necessary for organizing the forces." "The 1948 War," p. 162; See also Kilani, p. 502.
*" See, e.g., Frangi, p. 85; Abu lyad, Mv Home, Mv Land : A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Times Books, 1981)(hereinafter "Abu lyad"), p. 12. The late PLO leader's autobiography contains first person accounts of important events in the history of the Palestinian national movement. See generally "The 1948 War," pp. 162-163; Kilani, pp. 500-510.
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and the Ba ' thists, were pan-Arabist and the third, the Fatah 
movement, espoused a more localized nationalism. The other 
trends, however, continued to exist. The Arab Higher Committee 
continued to operate under al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini's direction 
until his death in 1974.*””
The Palestinian Communist Party - founded in 1924 - 
underwent a series of splits, the first of which took place in 
1943, and the last of which occurred in 1982. Immediately 
following the 194 8 war, the communist party concluded that Israel 
had become an established fact and that the Palestinians' battle
*”” The Ba'thist trend was nearly identical to that of the Arab nationalists. Both conditioned "Palestine's liberation" on the prior establishment of a unitary Arab state, both were secular movements, both blamed perceived Western domination of the region for the Arabs' problems, and both rejected any peaceful accommodation with Israel. Ba'th ideology differed from that of the Arab nationalists in that it contained the added dimension of social reform. The Ba'thists' influence on the Palestinian national movement was felt primarily in the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), which continue to be sponsored by the Ba'thist regimes in Syria and Iraq, respectively. The PLF, first conceived by the party's Iraqi branch in 1959, merged with the ANM's front groups in 1967 to form the PFLP. In August 1968, the PFLP's PLF faction split from the main group to form the PFLP-GC (General Command), under Ahmad Jibril's leadership. This organization split again in 1977, the breakaway faction once more adopting the name PLF.
N. 'Alush, "Fikr Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Filastiniyyah (1948- 1987): Nadhrah 'Amah [The Palestinian Resistance Movement's Ideology (1948-1987) : An Overview] , " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah (Beirut: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "'Alush"), pp. 909-911.
*56 "Muhammad Amin al-Hussaini (1890-1974) , " Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah (Damascus: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), Vol. IV, p. 142.
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had to be waged against colonialism in g e n e r a l . Subsequent 
offshoots were either integrated into Israel's political system 
or allied themselves with the most radical of the Palestinian 
nationalist organizations.^^®
Since the influence of these groups on the Palestinian 
national movement in general has been minor, this section will 
focus on the doctrinaire Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) and the 
more practical Fatah. Since the respective approaches of these 
organizations toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue were 
so markedly distinct from one another, their discussion is 
particularly useful in introducing the movement's major political 
trends.
E. The PFLP's Predecessor: The Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM)
The ANM originated in the 'Urwah al-Wuthqa ("The 
Indissoluble Bond") literacy society, affiliated with the 
American University of Beirut (AUB) The students who joined
it in the late 1940's - among them, George Habash, Wadi' Haddad, 
Hani al-Hindi, and Ahmad al-Khatib - later formed the ANM's core 
leadership. Habash and Haddad, both Palestinians, had been part
Matar, p. 31.
158 'Alush, pp. 948-952.
K. Qasimiyyah, "Al-Mudhakkirat wa al-Sir al-Dhatiyyah al Filastiniyyah [Treatises and the Course of Palestinian Identity] , " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [Palestinian Encyclopedia], Vol. 3 (Beirut: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Qasimiyyah - Treatises")," p. 821.
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of the mass exodus of Arab refugees from what had since become 
Israel.
In the wake of the 1948 defeat, the literary society 
expanded its horizons to include discussion of the " . . .  
necessity for revolution, armed action, and c o u p s  d'etat.
Al-'Urwah's members were particularly incensed by those whom they 
characterized as traitors and deserters, namely those who had led 
the fight against Israel and had failed, due to their 
incompetence or their apparent accommodation with the enemy.
They maintained that the only appropriate response to those whom 
they believed had betrayed the cause was death.
In March 1949, Habash and al-Hindi met with representatives 
of groups from Syria and Egypt with goals similar to theirs. The 
meeting resulted in the formation of Al-Kata'ib al-Fida' al- 
'Arabi (Al-Kata'ib). The group listed Arab unity and 'the 
liberation of Palestine' as its ultimate objectives. The 
Egyptian members, who had previously engaged in violent activity
160 Matar, p. 23.
Id.; B.R. Al-Kubaisi, The Arab Nationalists Movement 1951-1971: From Pressure Group to Socialist Partv (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1971)(hereinafter "Al-Kubaisi"), p. 37. Basil al-Kubaisi doctoral dissertation verifies other first-person and historical accounts of the ANM and offers detailed insight into its organizational structure and daily existence. Al-Kubaisi was an active ANM member and continued his association with its leadership as a PFLP operative after December 1967. His dissertation is based on interviews with former ANM members, many of whom later became PFLP leaders. Following al-Kubaisi's violent death in 1973, the PFLP lent further credibility to his dissertation by publishing an Arabic translation in its weekly magazine, Al-Hadaf. It also eulogized him as an important ANM and PFLP member.
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in their own country, provided the Kata'ib with its paramilitary 
organization, while those from Beirut and Damascus were 
responsible for its ideological f r a m e w o r k .
Under Al-'Urwah's organizational cover, the group trained in 
the clandestine use of explosives against civilian targets and 
carried out several successful attacks. By the summer of 1950, 
Habash realized that the Kata'ib's methods had failed to win them 
a mass following. Its organizational discipline showed signs of 
disintegrating. During an attempt on the life of the Syrian 
president. Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, the Kata'ib cell was 
captured and interrogated by Syrian intelligence. As a result.
162 Al-Kubaisi, p. 43. See also W. Kazziha, Revolutionarv Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism (New York: St. Martin's Press,1975)(hereinafter "Kazziha"), p. 21. Kazziha's work analyzes the ANM's history from its antecedents' emergence in the late 1940's and early 1950's through the founding of its successor organization, the PFLP, in 1967. With the United Arab Republic's establishment in 1958, the ANM, assisted by Egyptian President Gamal 'abd al-Nasir, focused its efforts on helping him to unite the Arab countries into a single nationalist entity, which it hoped would shun alliances with the Western powers and marshall its resources to remove Israel from the Middle East. In doing so, the ANM made use of its contacts in the area to establish cells of activists seeking to overthrow the pro-Western governments in their respective countries, particularly those on the Arabian Peninsula. Kazziha describes the mechanics involved in establishing the ANM's Persian Gulf network, as well as the ideological debates within the organization. A former member of the ANM's Lebanese branch, Kazziha relies on his past experience within the organization, as well as on interviews with ex­activists with whom he maintains contact, to provide the reader with a dispassionate and detailed history of the organization's efforts to unite the Arab World behind the recovery of land lost to Israel in 1948; 'Alush, p. 911.
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the group's core leadership, including Habash, was forced into 
hiding and the organization simply crumbled.
In early 1951, as part of his efforts to reconstitute an 
active organization, Habash proposed that a new nationalist 
clandestine organization be formed and that Al-'Urwah's executive 
committee members be its n u c l e u s . T h e  members agreed and set 
about formulating a political ideology.
From 1951 until 1956, the organization formed by Al-'Urwah's 
executive committee did not officially exist. It was known, 
depending on with whom it dealt, as the Arab Nationalist Youth, 
the Arab Nationalists, and the Organization for Resisting Peace 
With I s r a e l . it was not until 1956, the year of its first 
conference, that the organization came into the open as the
A U M .  166
From 1951 untfl 1954, the ANM advocated a two-phased 
political program. The first phase involved intensive political 
activity to eliminate 'Zionism and imperialism' from the Arab 
Middle East and to create a unified Arab state from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Persian Gulf. The second phase involved the
Al-Kubaisi. . p. 46. See also Matar, p. 29; Qasimiyyah, p120 .
164 Al-Kubaisi, p. 53. See also Kazziha, pp. 21-22.
'Alush, p. 911. See also Kazziha, p. 28; Qasimiyyah, pp 114 and 120.
Matar, p. 43. See also Kazziha, pp. 45-46. Kazziha and 'Alush give the year as 1958 (Kazziha, p. 21; 'Alush, p. 912), while Qasimiyyah maintains that it was 1957. See Qasimiyyah, p. 121.
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implementation of 'socialism and democracy' in the newly-created 
Arab s t a t e . W h i l e  ANM doctrine sounded appealing, its 
critics maintained that it was too simplistic. They argued that 
its evolution did not proceed according to a well-considered plan 
and that it did not identify its allies and foes.
F. The Rise of 'Abd al-Nasir
When on July 23, 1952, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir seized power in 
Egypt, Palestinian nationalists greeted him with caution, not 
knowing what to expect.^®® Up until 1956, 'Abd al-Nasir still 
had not formulated a pan-Arabist policy, concentrating instead on 
". . . rebuilding Egypt, including its military forces . . . "
and reacting to what he considered provocative Israeli raids into 
the Gaza Strip.
By the mid-1950's, 'Abd al-Nasir had adopted an 
unequivocally anti-Western and anti-Israel position. In 1955, he 
brought the Soviet Union into a hitherto Western-dominated Middle 
East with the so-called Czech arms deal, and in July 1956, he 
nationalized the Suez Canal. Although Egypt's armed forces were 
defeated in the successful Anglo-French-Israeli attempt to retake 
the canal in October, 'Abd al-Nasir became a hero in the eyes of 
nationalist Palestinians and others in the Fertile Crescent for 
having resisted the invaders at all. Their adulation grew as
Al-Kubaisi, p. 54. See also Kazziha, p. 62.
Id. , p. 55.
Brown, p. 164. 
'Alush, p. 912.
9 2
diplomatie pressure from the United States compelled the British, 
French, and Israelis to withdraw their forces altogether.
For 'Abd al-Nasir, the Suez Campaign highlighted the danger
posed by a Western alliance with Israel for the Arab world and he
consequently recognized the need to remove the Western presence 
and what he regarded as its foothold in the area, Israel. He
intended to accomplish this by unifying the Arab World -
physically and ideologically - against that p r e s e n c e . The 
ANM's move to Egypt in 1955, therefore, was a fortuitous event 
for both parties.
The ANM's sphere of operations spread to Egypt after ANM- 
affiliated students at AUB were expelled by the university 
administration for protesting the Baghdad Pact, an agreement 
which sought to unify a number of Middle Eastern countries in an 
anti-Soviet Military alliance. 'Abd al-Nasir ordered Egyptian 
universities to admit them, affording the ANM the opportunity to 
expand its operations, not only into Egypt, but throughout the 
Middle East.
G. At 'Abd al-Nasir's Service: The ANM Builds a Regional Network
The ANM organization at Cairo University was able to attract 
students from Libya, the Sudan, Iraq, North and South Yemen, and 
Bahrain. It saw in these students the opportunity to build ANM
Brown, pp. 164-165. See also Kazziha, p. 59.
'Alush, p. 913.
Al-Kubaisi, p. 77. See also Matar, p. 55; Kazziha, pp
4 3 - 4 4  .
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branches throughout the Middle East and North Africa and in 1959, 
brought them to Damascus for secret one-week courses on how to 
accomplish this. This resulted in the creation of armed 
insurgent groups in North and South Yemen, Libya, the Sudan, and 
Bahrain.
In February 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United 
Arab Republic (UAR). The ANM hailed this event as an important 
step towards an eventual unitary Arab state and became the UAR's 
enthusiastic instrument. Soon after the UAR's formation, the ANM 
moved its headquarters to D a m a s c u s , where its members 
received weapons and training from the Syrian government. It 
received the UAR's support in its efforts to help overthrow the 
Iraqi and Lebanese governments^"® and played an important role 
in the 1958 Lebanese civil war between the pro-Western government 
of Kamil Sham'un and local leftist o r g a n i z a t i o n s . !
Matar, pp. 56-57. See also Al-Kubaisi, pp. 77-78; J. Jabur, "al-Bu'd al-'Arabi li al-Qadhiyyah al-Filastiniyyah [The Palestinian Cause's Arab Dimension]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial . Vol. 5 (Beirut: al- Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Jabur"), p. 787.
Al-Kubaisi, p. 84. Kazziha contends that it was Beirut(p. 70) .
Al-Kubaisi, p. 85.
Id. , p. 86. See also L. Khaled, Mv People Shall Live : The Autobiography of a Revolutionary (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973)(hereinafter "Khaled"), pp. 45-46. This is an emotional and doctrinaire memoir by one of the PFLP's most celebrated 'foot- soldiers'. She is best known for her role in the hijacking of a TWA airliner to Damascus in 1969 and the unsuccessful attempt to hijack an El Al airliner in 1970. In addition to outlining the PFLP's ideology, Ms. Khaled recounts her experiences as an ANM(continued...)
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In September 1961, Syria seceded from the UAR. The ANM 
blamed the secession on the " . . .  feudalist-bourgeois alliance .
. " in the Syrian government (which, by definition, was opposed 
to Arab unity)
On July 23, 1962, the anniversary of his rise to power, 'Abd
al-Nasir called for ". . . a unified Arab nationalist movement .
. ." which would incorporate all existing movements of the ANM's
disposition. "^9 The ANM responded by placing its hardcore
nucleus at 'Abd al-Nasir's disposal. Over the next few years, it
was involved in efforts to unify Arab nationalist groups all over
the Middle East under the Nasserist banner.^®
H. The ANM's 1963 Ideological Split: Pan Arabists versus Palestinian Provincialists
As far as its battle with Israel was concerned, however, the 
ANM acted independently of Egypt at this stage. This was due to 
an ideological split within its ranks at the 1963 ANM Congress, 
at which two factions formed. Non-Palestinians favored 
perpetuating the organization's alliance with Egypt, while 
Palestinians, disillusioned by the 1961 UAR schism, favored
( . . . continued)activist in Lebanon and Kuwait in the 1950's and early 1960's and describes the process involved in building the PFLP's organization in Kuwait in late 1967 and early 1968.
Al-Kubaisi. pp. 91-92.
Id. , p . 93.
Id. , p. 95.
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breaking with 'Abd al-Nasir and refocusing the ANM's efforts 
primarily on the Palestinian issued®^
I. 1967: The ANM's Break with 'Abd al-Nasir and the Development of the 'Palestine First' Doctrine
The May 1964 ANM Congress resolved the dispute by forming 
the . . Palestine Region of the ANM."^®^ The ANM
subsequently formed front groups to carry out armed actions and 
intelligence-gathering activities across Israel's borders. These 
organizations were known as Shabab al-Tha'ir (The Vengeance 
Youth) and Abtal al-'Awdah (Heroes of the Return).
The June 1967 war prompted the ANM to break with 'Abd al- 
Nasir completely. The ANM had initially embraced Nasserism as a 
means to unite the Arabs in an effort to recover what was
®^^  Id. , p. 147. See also "Interview With Comrade George Habash," Democratic Palestine, No. 27, December 1987, p. 12; Qasimiyyah, p. 128; A. 'Abd al-Rahman, "Al-Nidhal al-Filastini fi Itar Munadhdhamah al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah [The Palestinian Struggle Within the PLO Framework]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial . Vol. 5 (Beirut: Hai'ah Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "'Abd al-Rahman"), p. 173.
®^^  J. Amos, Palestinian Resistance, Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980)(hereinafter "Amos"), pp. 72, 77. This is a comprehensive, if outdated survey of the Palestinian national movement which describes in detail its constituent organizations and their interactions with one another. Amos' introductory thumb-nail history of the Arab- Israeli dispute is particularly useful to this study. The conflict's characteristics, which he outlines, remained (at least through 1993) constant since Zionism's resurgence in the late nineteenth century and his presentation of them enhances the reader's understanding of the PFLP's ideological roots.
Kazziha sees an additional reason for the formation of the Palestine Region in the challenge to its influence among Palestinian refugees that the ANM saw in rival Palestinian organizations such as Fatah. Kazziha, p. 83-84.
®^^  Id. , p. 84. See also 'Abd al-Rahman, p. 177.
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formerly Palestine. In the ANM's view, the Arabs', and 
particularly Egypt's defeat was glaring proof of 'Abd al-Nasir's 
inability to 'deliver Palestine.'
Immediately after the war, the ANM's executive committee met 
in Damascus and issued a statement which, while not referring to 
Egypt directly, criticized unnamed Arab governments for betraying 
the Palestinian cause by their apparent willingness to negotiate 
with Israel. It called upon Arab states to rearm and called for 
the arming of the general Palestinian population. The statement 
represented a complete break with 'Abd al-Nasir.
Both the ANM and Ba'th organizations represented the pan- 
Arabist trend, which conditioned Palestine's recovery on the 
formation of a unitary Arab state spanning the entire Middle East 
and North Africa. The support of such a state, they believed, 
would guarantee their success in this endeavor. With Israel's 
defeat of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armed forces in 
June 1967, the disillusioned pan-Arabist Palestinians set about 
re-evaluating their strategy. Instead of subordinating their 
efforts to recovering their lost territory to establishing a 
unified Arab state, they instead advocated directing them 
exclusively towards eliminating Israel and establishing a 
sovereign Palestinian government in its place.
184 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Central Information Department, "Bayan al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyyah li al- Harakah al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab [Statement of the ANM Executive Committee] ," Sin il al-Khalidin [Register of the Immortals! ; Volume I 1964-1970 (Beirut: Mu'assasah 'abd al-Hafidh al-Basat, undated), pp. 29-32.
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The 'Palestine first' doctrine, however, was not new in 
Palestinian politics. It had first been proposed by Fatah in its 
1959 founding statement. Fatah believed that the Palestinians 
had the right to act independently of the Arab countries. They 
had to play a fundamental role in liberating their country and 
ensure that the Arab states did not ignore their cause. The 
doctrine further held that the Palestinians had the right to a 
piece of territory on which they could establish a government.
It considered ", . . the parts of Palestine still under Arab
control . . . "  (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) suitable for 
establishing a temporary entity from which it could liberate the 
rest of Palestine from Israeli rule. The Palestine
Liberation Organization would not officially endorse this notion 
until 1974.
" Fatah regarded " . . .  armed struggle as the only means to 
restore Palestine and long-term popular liberation war as a 
method for pursuing this means. This concept was later
adopted by the PFLP in 1967. Fatah's first strike against Israel 
occurred on December 31, 1964, against a pumping station of 
Israel's National Water Carrier. The next day, Fatah, using the 
cover-name Quwwat al-'Asifah (The Storm Forces), claimed
185 'Alush, p. 915. i
Id. I
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responsibility and announced the beginning of its armed 
activities.
The number of Al-'Asifah's communiques for 1965 reached 39 
and its operations, together with those of other Palestinian 
groups continued intermittently during 1966 and the first half of
1967. These attacks, together with Israel's retaliatory strikes 
against the Arab countries where they had originated, elevated 
tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors and led to the 
outbreak of the war, in June 1967,^®® which would result in 
major changes in the Palestinian national movement's strategy and 
operating methods.
187 iiHarakah al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini [The Palestinian National Liberation Movement," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah,1984)(hereinafter "Fatah"), p. 204.
®^® H. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization:People. Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)(hereinafter "Cobban"), pp. 34-35. This is a general history of the PLO - and the Palestinian national movement - from1948-1983. It describes the intra-organizational links among its components, as well as links with both the Arab and non-Arab states. Cobban has produced a well-documented and informative work which leaves the reader with a better understanding of both the organization's inner workings and its external relations.
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Chapter 5: The PFLP Succeeds the ANM and Competes with the Dominant Fatah Movement
Following the 1967 war, both Fatah and the secular radical 
trend represented by the PFLP and its offshoots abandoned the 
concept that Palestine would be recovered through Arab unity and 
instead operated under the notion that Israel's destruction, and 
replacement by a Palestinian state, would bring about Arab unity. 
Instead of offering their services to a specific Arab country, 
the Palestinian organizations within these trends expected the 
full support of the Arab governments in achieving their aims. 
These expectations frequently conflicted with the Arab countries' 
policies, resulting in (often violent) confrontations with their 
regimes.
This section will examine, primarily, the evolution of the 
mainstream Palestinian movement, which has been dominated by 
Fatah since 1968. The PFLP's ideological evolution will be 
discussed when this study examines that organization's doctrine 
in detail. Briefly, however, the PFLP evolved from a pan-Arabist 
organization to a Marxist one over a twenty-year period. During 
the course of this evolution, a number of schisms occurred which 
resulted in the creation of break-away groups. Many of these 
groups did not survive the first few years of separation, but 
others, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) continue to operate and have 
played prominent roles in the Palestinian movement's secular 
radical wing.
1 0 0
Fatah has dominated the Palestinian movement's umbrella 
organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), since
1968. The PLO was founded in 1964 at the initiative of Egyptian 
President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir.^®® Its first chairman was Ahmad 
Shuqairi, a confidant of 'Abd al-Nasir's, under whose leadership 
the organization appeared to be little more than a verbal outlet 
for Palestinian leaders and served only to enable 'Abd al-Nasir 
to exercise some control over the Palestinian movement. The 
members of its military arm, the Palestinian Liberation Army 
(PLA), were integrated into the various Arab armies and had yet 
to launch an attack against Israel.^*® Nonetheless, the PLO 
drafted an early version of its covenant and established a 
decision-making structure, under which the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC) served as a quasi-parliamentary body and the 
Executive Committee carried out the PNC's decisions.
i®9 Frangi, p. 99. 
Frangi, p. 100.
The 1984 edition of the Palestinian Encvclooedia describes the Palestine National Council as:
the Palestine Liberation Organization's highest authority, which establishes the PLO's policy and programs. The PLO's other institutions, particularly the Executive Committee, carry out these policies and programs. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization is also the highest executive authority, [whose members] are chosen entirely (since the Fourth Session in 1968) from the PNC . . . .
"Al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini [The Palestine National Council] " in Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial , Vol. 4 (Damascus : Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 94.
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A. The Palestinian National Covenant Articulates the Meaning of Palestinian National Identity
At this point, an overview and explanation of the 
Palestinian National Covenant is appropriate, since the PLO's 
current and former constituent groups, including the PFLP, regard 
it as that organization's fundamental policy d o c u m e n t . The 
Covenant was first drafted in 1964 and later amended in August 
1968 to reflect the sweeping ideological changes that had 
occurred within the PLO as a result of Israel's defeat of its 
Arab neighbors in the June 1967 war.
The primary difference in the orientations of the two 
versions lies in their respective titles. The 1964 document, Al- 
Mithag al-Oawmi al-Filastini, places the PLO' goals and 
operations within a pan-Arab context. Oawmi is translated as 
'national', but only when referring to the nationalism and common 
bond among A r a b s . I n  this version, the PLO places primary 
responsibility for the success of its cause on the Arab Nation as 
a whole, charging it with " . . .  mustering all of its military.
See "Munadhdhamah al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah [The Palestine Liberation Organization]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial , Vol. 4 (Damascus: Hai'ah al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 314. For the PFLP's position on the Covenant, see "PFLP Leader Says Palestinian Charter Cannot be Changed by 'Any Individual,'" Voice of the jPeople, 1052 gmt, May 11, 1989 in British Broadcasting Corporation; Summarv of World Broadcasts, May 13, 198 9, p.ME/0456/A/1; "Habash fi Muqabalah ma' Roitir hawla Mawdhu' al- iMithaq al-Watani: Sanunadhilu dakhil al-Mu'assasah wa fi Itar |Jamahirina li Fardh al-Mawqif al-Sahih [Habash in an Interview Iwith Reuters: We Will Struggle Within the Institutions and in the :Framework of Our Masses to Impose the Correct Stance]," Al-Hadaf. |No. 959, May 31, 1989, pp. 8-9. I
1See, e.g.. Haim, p. 39. |
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material, and spiritual capabilities on the path of liberating 
Palestine and it must, in particular, provide the Palestinian 
Arab people with assistance and support, and provide adequate 
means and opportunities to enable it to carry out its role in 
liberating its homeland. The PLO also undertakes to " . . .
cooperate . . . with the League of Arab States to the extent that
it can, and not intervene in the internal affairs of any Arab 
state.
The Covenant's 1964 version highlighted the inherent 
incongruity between the PLO's commitment to respect the Arab 
States' sovereignty and its long-range policy goals. This is 
most vividly illustrated in two contradictory provisions.
Article II defines Palestine's boundaries as those which " . . .  
existed during the British Mandatory period . . . , while
article XXIV - in apparent deference to the Jordanian, Egyptian- 
and Syrian governments' sensibilities - promises that ". . , this
organization will not exercise any local sovereignty over the 
West Bank, in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, 
and in the al-Hamah region [an area just south of the Golan 
Heights] . These areas were included within the British
194 «Al-Mithaq al-Qawmi al-Filastini (1964) [The Palestinian National Covenant (1964)]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial, Vol. 4 (Damascus: Al-Hai'ah al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984)(hereinafter "Palestinian Encvclopedia - 1964 Covenant"), p. 4 05.
195 Id. , P- 406
196 Id. , P- 404
197 Id. , P- 406
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Mandatory boundaries before 1948. This promise was dropped from 
the 1968 version - written in the wake of Palestinian post-1967 
disillusionment with Pan-Arab nationalism - due to the PLO's 
decision to assert its claim to these areas.
The changes which the Palestinian National Covenant's 1968 
version, al-Mithaa al-Watani al-Filastini, reflected the PLO's 
new attitude toward Pan-Arabism and the Arab countries. Like 
oawmi, watani also means 'national' in Arabic, but in the 
provincial s e n s e . I t  is the adjectival form of the noun 
watan, which means 'fatherland' or 'homeland', and is roughly 
equivalent to the French word patrie. The first of these 
changes appears in article I, which characterizes Palestine as ".
. . the homeland fwatani of the Palestinian Arab people,"
replacing the 1964 version, which described Palestine as ". . .
an Arab homelahd. Not only did the PLO proclaim the
primacy of the Palestinian cause, but made Palestine's liberation 
an obligation of the entire Arab nation, stating in article XV 
that " . . .  the Arab nation must rally all of its military,
198 iiAl-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini (1968) [The Palestinian National Covenant (1968)]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial . Vol. 4 (Damascus: Al-Hai'ah al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984)(hereinafter "Palestinian Encvclopedia - Covenant 1968"), p. 410. See also "Wathiqah: al- Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini li Munadhdhamah al-Tahrir al- Filastiniyyah [Document: The Palestinian National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1162,September 19, 1993, pp. 34-35.
Haim, p. 39, o p . cit. .
Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 80-81.
Palestinian Encvclopedia - Covenant 1968, p. 406.
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human, material, and spiritual capabilities in order to 
participate effectively with the Palestinian Arab people in the 
liberation of Palestine. It must, especially at the current 
stage of the armed Palestinian revolution, make every effort to 
give the Palestinian people all assistance and material and human 
support and provide it with all of the suitable means and 
opportunities to allow it to continue to carry out its vanguard 
role in pursuing its armed revolution until the liberation of its 
homeland.
While the PLO committed itself to cooperating with the Arab 
states to the extent that it could, this cooperation would be 
offered in light of its own needs (article XVII) It undertook, 
in the same article, not to interfere in their internal affairs. 
At the same time, the PLO insisted on being allowed to operate 
^independently, with article XVIII affirming " . . .  the firmness 
and independence of the [Palestinian people's] national 
revolution and rejects [sic] all forms of interference, tutelage, 
and dependency."^ *3
Apart from declaring its independence of the influence of 
Arab governments, the PLO also became more assertive in its 
embrace of the notion of 'liberating Palestine' through armed 
force. The addition of the principle that " . . .  armed struggle 
is the only way to liberate Palestine and is, therefore, a 
strategy and not a tactic . . . "  (article IX), reflected the
Id. . p. 408 
203 Id. , p. 409
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PLO's disillusionment with pan-Arabism, as well as its new-found 
confidence in Palestinian fighting capabilities - in the wake of 
what it perceived as a 'victory' of its forces over the Isi^aeli 
army at the battle of al-Karamah in March 1968 (see below) .2°^
When it adopted armed struggle as the only means of 
confronting and defeating Israel, the PLO also refused to concede 
Israel's right to exist in any form, rejecting, in article XI, ".
. . all solutions which are intended to replace the complete
liberation of Palestine and all enterprises intended to either 
liquidate or internationalize the Palestinian cause.'*205
In a similar vein, the 1968 version retained the 1964 
covenant's provisions that " . . .  the partition of Palestine in 
1948, and Israel's establishment, are null and void, whatever
time has elapsed, because they are at variance with the !Palestinian people's will and their natural right to their j
homeland, and contradict the principles embodied in the United 
Nations Charter, especially the right of self-determination 
[article XIX]" and that " . . .  claims of an historical or 
spiritual connection between the Jews and Palestine concur 
neither with the facts of history nor with the attributes of a 
state as these are correctly understood. The Jews constitute a 
revealed religion fdinan samawiwanl , and not a nationality with 
an independent existence. In addition, the Jews do not 
constitute a single branch [shu'bahl with an independent
2°4 Id. , p. 407.
2°3 Id. , pp. 408-409
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identity, but are citizens of the states to which they belong 
[article XX] . with these provisions, the PLO appeared to
reject any acceptance of Israel as an independent state with a 
legitimate Jewish national character.
Despite the Covenant's ostensible rigidity on these points, 
it contains an 'escape clause' which would allow the PLO to 
change its position on recognition of Israel. Article XXXIII 
states that " . . .  this covenant cannot be amended except by a 
two-thirds majority of the members of the PLO's Palestinian 
National Council, at a special session called for that 
p u r p o s e . "2°'^ When, in May 1989, PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat 
vaguely implied that the Covenant was void or obsolete, he 
appeared to be doing so in order to assuage American and Israeli 
concerns that the PLO had, in truth, not recognized Israel, 
despite its formal statement of recognition in January.
Adding to the confusion was a statement by the PLO's 
'ambassador' to Tunisia, Hakam Bal'awi, reported by KUNA on May 
5, 1989:
In an interview with the Tunisian paper AL-SABAH today, he said that 'Arafat's use of the French word 'caduque,' which means null and void, obsolete and antiquated, when talking about the Palestinian National Charter to the French media did not at all mean the nullification of the charter.
He added that the word had various established definitions in the dictionary and that it was up to the West to choose which one it wants. He said that the Palestinian leadership has the right to stick to the
2®® Id. , p. 408 
2®"" Id. , p. 410
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definitions that it believes are correct and which embody the meanings it wants to convey.^®
Nearly one year later, 'Arafat effectively retracted his
renunciation of the Covenant when he affirmed " . . .  the
necessity of aiding and supporting the Palestinian Arab people's
struggle until the complete liberation of Palestine from the
river to the sea."2°®
The exact meaning of 'Arafat's apparent renunciation of the
Covenant was not clear at the time. It certainly did not carry
the import of a formal renunciation since no special PNC meeting
had been called. Whether or not 'Arafat would have obtained the
two-thirds majority vote required to amend the Covenant is also
unclear. On September 10, 1993, as Israel and the PLO moved
closer to signing an agreement on the framework for negotiations,
'Arafat sent Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin a letter which,
among other things, renounced the use of terrorism and violence
in resolving Palestinian differences with Israel. This
renunciation was made without the PNC's approval, prompting
2°® Kuwait KUNA in Arabic, 1325 gmt. May 6, 1989 in FBIS-NES- 89-087. May 8, 1989, p. 3.
2®® "Bi Ihtifal fi Libya bi Dhikra 'Abu Jihad' : 'Arafat yad'uli Tahrir Filastin min al-Nahr li al-Bahr. Al-Munadhdhamah tutalibu Urubba bi al-Tasdi li al-Qam' al-Isra'ili [At a Celebration in Libya Commemorating 'Abu Jihad': Arafat Calls for the Liberation of Palestine from the River to the Sea. The PLO Asks Europe to Resist Israeli Repression]," Al-Ittihad. May 2, 1990, p. 7.
2^ ° See Letter from Y . 'Arafat to Y. Rabin (September 9,1993)(recognizing Israel's right to exist and renouncing the use of terrorism). See also "Text of Rabin Remarks at Signing Ceremony," Reuters. September 10, 1993.
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the PFLP's withdrawal from the PLO and its characterization of 
the organization as illegitimate under 'Arafat's leadership and 
capitulatory to the enemy.
'Arafat's 1990 affirmation of the need to liberate Palestine 
in its entirety expressed sentiments similar to those which he 
held when he assumed the chairmanship of the PLO in 1969.
Between the summers of 1967 and 1968, Palestinians underwent a 
transformation in their self-perception. Israel's victory in 
June 1967 had discredited 'Abd al-Nasir's leadership and, because 
of his ties to 'Abd al-Nasir, Shuqairi's as well. Shuqairi's 
successor Yahya Hammudah fared no better and was replaced at the 
Fifth PNC - held in Cairo in February 1969 - by 'Arafat, who
remains the PLO's chairman.
B. Fatah Takes Control of the PLO; the PFLP Vies for Attention Through Spectacular Operations ^
The event believed most directly responsible for Fatah's 
ascension within the PLO to dominate that organization is the 
battle between IDF units and Palestinian combatants at the 
Jordanian border town of al-Karamah in March 1968. According to 
official Palestinian historical memory, it was at al-Karamah that 
armed Palestinians engaged the Israelis, who had come to destroy 
their positions and fighting capabilities, and drove them back
2^  ^ "Radicals Praise Fatah Dissidents," Reuters. November 30, 1993. See also "Palestinian Groups Opposed to Autonomy Accord Form New Alliance," Agence France Presse. December 16, 1993.
212 "Al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini [The Palestinian National Council]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial, Vol. 4 (Damascus: al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), pp. 101-104. See also Abu lyad, p. 65.
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after inflicting heavy losses on them. The Palestinian refugees, 
who had hitherto considered themselves powerless before Israel's 
military might, experienced a surge in self-confidence and 
enlisted in Fatah combat units in d r o v e s . T h e  tremendous 
increase in manpower enabled Fatah to expand its power-base and 
set up combat facilities (together with the support services that 
these r e q u i r e d )  ,2^ “^ in Jordan, which shared the longest border 
of any Arab state with Israel.
C. Expulsion from Jordan
Almost from the beginning, the Palestinian organizations in 
Jordan sought to increase their degree of autonomy and freedom of 
action within the country so that, eventually, they were 
effectively an authority unto themselves. Tensions climaxed in 
September 1970, when the PFLP simultaneously hijacked four
2" "Al-Karamah (Ma'rakah -) [Al-Karamah (Battle -)]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984), Vol. 3, p p . 636-638.
According to Abu Ahmad Fu'ad, head of the PFLP's armed operations, " [t]his battle constituted a watershed in the activity of the resistance and brought from its partial openness to complete openness. It constituted the first great victory in terms of guerrilla warfare and widened the masses' embrace of [guerrilla warfare as a means of struggle]." See Abu Ahmad Fu'ad, "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin: 'Ishrun 'Aman'ala Tariq Harb al-Sha'biyyah Tawil al-Amd [The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Twenty Years on the Road of Long­term Popular Liberation War]," Al-Hadaf, No. 892, December 21, 1987, p. 97 (hereinafter "Abu Ahmad Fu'ad).
2^  ^ Frangi, pp. 110-112. See also 'A. Hamdan, "Ashkaliyyah al-Watani wa al-Qawmi fi Masar al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyyah al- Mu'asirah [The Modern Palestinian Revolution's Nationalist and Pan-Arab Ambiguities]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1082, December 22, 1991, p. 70 (hereinafter "Hamdan").
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its Lebanese supporters within its territory which supported the 
cross-border attacks against Israel.
The Cairo agreement, signed in November 1969, was designed 
to regulate the PLO's presence and actions in Lebanon, but in 
reality, only increased the PLO's freedom of action without 
safeguarding Lebanon's sovereignty. A cursory glance at the 
agreement's main provisions confirms this. First, it legitimized 
Palestinian civilian presence in the refugee camps in southern 
Lebanon. While the refugees' movements had previously been 
restricted to the region - and closely monitored and controlled 
by the Lebanese Deuxieme Bureau counterintelligence organization 
- Palestinian civilians were now permitted to move freely about 
the entire country. Secondly, the agreement allowed Palestinians 
living in Lebanon to join ". . . resistance organizations." This
provision included the right to engage in operations against 
Israel from Lebanon. The Lebanese government agreed to all of 
this with the understanding that the Palestinian organizations 
would not violate Lebanese sovereignty.^^ The PLO, however.
23-6 I. Rabinovitch, The War for Lebanon; 1970-1985 (London: Cornell University Press, 1985)(hereinafter "Rabinovitch"), p.41. Formerly an academic at the University of Tel Aviv - and currently Israel's ambassador to the United States - Professor Rabinovitch traces the Lebanese Civil War's roots and development and analyzes the PLO's role in the conflict. See also J. and J. Wallach, Arafat : In the Eves of the Beholder (New York: Carol Publishing Company, 1990)(hereinafter "Wallach and Wallach), pp. 219-220.
2^"^ G. Bekhor, Leksikon Ashaf : Ishim. Irounim ve Eru'im [The PLO Lexicon: Personalities, Organizations and Eventsi (Tel Aviv : Misrad Habitahon - Hahotsa'ah La'or [Ministry of Defense - Publishing], 1991)(hereinafter "Bekhor"), pp. 297-298. This(continued...)
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effectively established a mini-state in southern Lebanon and 
assumed quasi-governmental powers which included law-enforcement, 
provision of social services, and even tax collection. PLO 
decrees applied to the area's Lebanese, as well as Palestinian 
residents. 2^ ®
The Palestinian organizations (particularly the PFLP) also 
became involved in Lebanese politics, siding with Sunni Muslim 
and leftist Lebanese, who strongly supported the Palestinian 
c a u s e . 23-® This further polarized Lebanese society, which was
23-'7 (. . . continued)reference work contains descriptions and histories of all of the Palestinian national movement's factions and leaders, as well as articles on related diplomàtic, cultural, military, and political issues. Bekhor's style is detached and analytical as he attempts to explain the Palestinian viewpoint to his fellow Israelis. The fact that the Israeli Defense Ministry published the Lexicon has not diluted its objectivity and Bekhor's conclusions are, in many cases, at variance with the government's official position. See also F . Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics," in W. Quandt e t . al.. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (London: University of California Press, ;1973)(hereinafter "Jabber"), p. 193. |
23-® G. Bekhor, Leksikon Ashaf: Ishim, Iraunim ve Eru'im [The IPLO Lexicon: Personalities. Organizations, and Eventsi (Tel Aviv: |Misrad Habitahon -Hotsa'ah La'or [Ministry of Defense - jPublishing], 1991)(hereinafter "Bekhor"), p. 297. |
i23-® While Fatah sought only to extend its freedom of action iin Lebanon (and negotiated with the Lebanese Phalangist Îgovernment for the right to do so See Abu lyad, p. 161), the PFLP !called for its overthrow. See "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah wa Ahdath 1Tishrin al-Lubnaniyyah wa Qadhaya al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyyah [The Popular Front, the October Lebanese Events, and Issues of |the Palestinian Revolution]," Al-Hadaf. No. 19, November 29, 11969, p. 9.  ^ J
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already deeply divided among these groups, pro-western Maronite 
Christian organizations, and the Shi'ite community.
Lebanon, unlike Jordan, did not possess a cohesive 
government, a strong army, and a reliable source of outside 
support, such as the United States or Britain. Israel's 
retaliation for PLO attacks originating in Lebanon divided the 
population among those who supported the Palestinians against 
Israel and those who blamed them for Israel's retaliatory strikes 
and wanted their activities severely curbed. These local 
factors, combined with the new diplomatic situation which the 
October 1973 war brought about (the PLO's rising international 
status, the prospects for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and
R. Khalidi, Under Siecre; PLO Decisionmaking Purina the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)(hereinafter "R. Khalidi")/ p. 20. University of Chicago professor and Palestinian-American Rashid Khalidi describes the PLO's involvement in the events which led to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and analyzes the organization's decisions and actions in combatting it. See also F. Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics," in W. Quandt et.al.. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (London: University of California Press, 1973)(hereinafter "Jabber"), pp. 193-194.
Following the 1958 civil war, Lebanon's new president, Fu'ad Shihab, kept the peace between the country's pro-Western Maronite Christians and its pan-Arab nationalists by virtue of his personal prestige, charismatic personality, military power base, and neutral political posture. Despite his Maronite background, he managed to maintain a balance between his country's Christian and Arab nationalist orientation. Charles Hilu, who succeeded Shihab in 1964, did not have his predecessor's dominant personality. Hilu was unable to maintain a stable majority in parliament and his relationships with that body and his prime minister were insufficiently strong for him to be an effective president. Rabinovitch, pp. 28-31. Hilu's presidency, under which affairs were decided "through manipulation and intrigue," (Id., p. 39) ended in 1970, by which time the PLO managed to establish a strong military presence in Lebanon.
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inter-Arab disputes) raised the level of Lebanon's internal 
tensions and created the conditions for the beginning of its 
civil war in 1975.^^^
E. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Prelude to Palestinian Diplomacy
The October 1973 war between Israel and its immediate 
neighbors, Egypt and Syria resulted in disengagement accords in 
both the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights and signaled the 
beginning of a process which would produce an Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaty in 1979. Following Anwar al-Sadat's surprise attack 
on Israel on October 6, the PLO's dominant Fatah faction realized 
to its dismay that the Egyptian leader had not intended to 
liberate Palestine, but only to create the conditions which would 
prompt the Israeli government to negotiate with him for the 
return of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. It became clear to 
the Fatah leadership that the Arab states were either unable or 
unwilling to defeat Israel through armed force and that it would 
have to achieve its objective through the peace process 
itself.
The process, based on the notion of 'territory for peace' - 
which Arab governments interpreted as Israel's withdrawal from 
the territory which it captured during the 1967 war in exchange 
for peace treaties - offered certain advantages which the 
Palestinian organizations could exploit politically and 
militarily.
Rabinovitch, pp. 42-43. 
Cobban, p. 61.
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The Twelfth PNC, held in the summer of 1974, recognized 
these advantages in clause two of the ten point program which it 
adopted :
The PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated. This requires the creation of further changes in the balance of power in favour of our peopleand their s t r u g g l e .
Based on this ten-point program, in which the PLO accepted the 
notion of-a negotiated Israeli withdrawal, the October 1974 Arab 
Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco recognized the PLO as the 
Palestinians' sole legitimate representative .
The PLO's new status, however, was not inviolable. The 1978 
Camp David accords, signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United 
States, produced a situation in which the PLO was effectively 
exdluded from participating in any peace arrangement with Israel 
involving the Palestinians, specifying that the Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would govern themselves in 
all areas except for defense and foreign affairs. Israel, in 
turn, would withdraw from the territories' populated areas to 
mutually agreed-upon strategic locations. The accords did not 
specify the fate of either the PLO or Palestinians living outside
Quoted in Cobban, p. 62, in Palestinian Encyclopedia - PNC, pp. 112-113, and in D.L. Price, Jordan and Palestinians: The PLO's Prospects (Appendix A), No. 66, (December 1975), p. 14.
Cobban, p. 62. See also Hamdan, p. 72.
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those areas. Predictably, both Fatah and the PFLP rejected the 
Camp David formula.
F. The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Forces Palestinian Organizations to Relocate Once More; Limits Their Ability to Exercise the Military Option
The 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon further weakened the 
PLO by denying it a base from which to direct its operations. 
Fatah's relocation to Tunis and the PFLP's move to Damascus 
distanced both organizations from Israel's northern border, 
although their units continued to operate in the country, and 
Lebanese Shi'ite groups - which had hitherto been hostile to the 
Palestinians and tolerant of Israel - attacked Israeli forces and 
shelled northern towns more zealously than the PLO ever had.
From 1984 until 1986, 'Arafat, with few options remaining, 
explored the possibility of establishing a Palestinian 
confederation with Jordan on the West Bank. The PFLPJ however, 
regarded this as treason and took steps to torpedo the process by 
denouncing 'Arafat as a traitor and carrying out a campaign of 
intimidation and assassination against West Bank Palestinian 
leaders who favored the concept.
The Camp David accords, signed on September 17, 1978, were rejected unanimously, on the following day, by the PLO's executive committee and " . . .  that even the more moderate PLO figures who had been hoping for some role in the peace initiative launched by Mr. Sadat, were convinced by the terms of the Camp David declarations that the initiative offered them no benefits." Cobban, p. 100. In March 1979, Fatah's Salah Khalaf rejected the Camp David formula even more emphatically, stating; "It's not just that we won't participate! We will sabotage the self-rule scheme and we will sabotage the whole results [sic] of Camp David." Id., pp. 102-103.
1 1 7
The Palestinian cause appeared inert, its leadership 
apparently weak and divided. This began to change at the 
beginning of 1988, when world attention shifted to the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who by then 
were rioting on a massive scale against the Israeli presence in 
those territories.
These riots differed from those which confronted Israel in 
the past in that they were guided by an underground leadership 
composed of the four predominant secular Palestinian groups in 
the area (Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the Palestinian 
Communist Party) and a separate Islamic wing, under the 
leadership of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement or 
Hamas. They were to be commonly known as the intifadah, or 
uprising.
1 1 8
Chapter 6: The Palestinian National Movement Since 1988
The uprising, by shifting world attention to the Palestinian 
leadership developing in the territories, prompted the PLO to 
take steps to recover its pre-eminent role in the Palestinian 
movement. The Palestinian population in the territories, 
despairing of any progress by the PLO in advancing their cause, 
had apparently taken matters into their own hands when they began 
their revolt. There were a number of reasons for this. To begin 
with, there was a discernible lack of progress in advancing the 
Palestinian cause in the international arena. From the 
Palestinian point of view, the United States was displaying its 
usual inflexibility in its unwillingness to pressure Israel into 
making concessions. The Soviet Union was preoccupied with other 
matters, such as contending with the Strategic Defense Initiative 
and negotiating nuclear arms reductions with the United States' 
Israel continued to reject the convening of an international 
Middle East peace conference. The Arab countries, for their 
part, no longer attached the same importance to the Palestinian 
cause that they once had, confining their support for it to 
declarations. Furthermore, the outside leadership's seeming 
inability to help them engendered the belief among Palestinians 
in the territories that they were truly isolated from the rest of 
the world and that any improvement in their circumstances would 
result from their initiative alone.
S. Al-Hut, "Mulhaq: Al-Intifadhah wa Tatawwur al- Qadhiyyah al-Filastiniyyah (1987-1988) [Appendix: The Uprising(continued...)
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The Palestinians who led the uprising differed from their 
elders in that they had known only the Israelis as occupiers. 
Their parents, who, prior to 1967, had lived under Jordanian rule 
in similar circumstances, had learned to live with the Israeli 
occupation as well.
As early as 1986, this new generation, alarmed at the 
growing number of Israeli settlements in the territories and 
frustrated by the government's restrictions on their physical 
movement and economic opportunities, began, at their own 
initiative, to commit violent acts against Israeli citizens and 
Arabs whom they accused of collaborating with the authorities. 
Palestinians in the territories were encouraged by the Lebanese 
National Resistance Front's (LNRF) successful operations against 
Israeli forces and their Lebanese allies in southern Lebanon in 
the summer bf 1987. They were also heartened by the PFLP-GC's 
hang-glider infiltration of an operative over the Lebanese border 
in November of that year. The PFLP-GC operative succeeded in 
killing six Israeli soldiers and wounding nine before Israeli 
soldiers shot him dead. These incidents undermined the 
Palestinians' perception of the IDF as an infallible and 
invincible force. Increased confidence, as well as a strong 
desire to rid themselves of Israeli rule, motivated the
227(... continued)and the Development of the Palestinian Cause (1987-1988)]," Al- Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia! , Vol. 6 (Beirut: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "Al-Hut"), p. 9 93.
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Palestinian residents of the territories to revolt against 
Israel's presence there.
A. Causes of the Palestinian Uprising
There is some controversy over whether or not the PLO's 
diaspora leadership was either wholly or partially responsible 
for the uprising's outbreak on December 9 and its conduct during 
the months that followed. Israeli analysts and intelligence 
officials maintain that the riots which sparked it were 
spontaneous, although they concede that the underground 
Palestinian leadership in the territories had been planning some 
kind of revolt for months in a d v a n c e . N e i t h e r  the local 
leadership nor the PLO, they maintain, knew exactly when the 
revolt would commence and in any case, the local PLO leadership 
had made its plans independently of the decision-makers in the 
d i a s p o r a . S h a f i q  al-Hut, however, writing for the PLO- 
financed Palestinian Encyclopedia, holds that the local PLO 
leadership had coordinated its activities and statements with the 
PLO in Tunis from the very beginning and accuses Israel of 
attempting to separate the diaspora leadership from the 
Palestinian leadership in the territories
228 Al-Hut, pp. 995-996. 
228 Bekhor, p. 41.
230 Id., p . 42.
22^  Al-Hut, pp. 1000-1001. Dr. Ariel Merari, of the University of Tel Aviv, points out that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat admitted, in late December 1987, that "the PLO could not claim to be the initiator of the uprising, rather it should be(continued...)
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Whichever argument has greater merit, there was a clear 
separation between the Palestinians in the territories who made 
up the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNL) - those 
who directed the revolt 'on the ground' - and the PLO in Tunis, 
which seemed to be outlining the uprising's broad strategy. The 
UNL consisted of local representatives of the organizations which 
sat on the PLO's Executive Committee in the diaspora: Fatah, the 
PFLP, the DFLP, and the Palestinian Communist Party. Also 
involved in the uprising, but distancing itself from the UNL and 
the PLO in general, was the Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas, 
which rejected compromise not only with Israel, but Jews in 
general. Hamas resisted joining the UNL because of the umbrella 
organization's secular orientation (See b e l o w ) . whether or 
not the PLO leadership in Tunis was involved in the uprising's 
outbreak, it quickly strengthened its ties with the local 
leadership by establishing direct contact with them, rallying 
both Arab and world support for the activists, funneling money to 
them, and broadcasting statements intended to raise their 
morale.
23i(... continued) credited 'to the people' (Some of Arafat's later declarations, however, contradicted this statement.)." A. Merari, e t . al., "The Palestinian Intifada : An Analysis of a Popular Uprising After Seven Months," Terrorism and Political Violence, 1989, Vol 1, No. 2, pp. 177-201, citing Ha'aretz, December 30, 1987.
222 Bekhor, pp. 43-44.
223 Al-Hut, p. 1001.
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B. Declaration of a Palestinian State (November 1988)
It is generally agreed that the November 1988 PNC session in 
Algiers was a culmination of the PLO's efforts to register some 
sort of political gain for the Palestinian cause after nearly a 
year of violence and unrest in the territories. There the PLO 
declared itself a government in exile and announced the birth of 
the 'State of Palestine'.
Conventional wisdom among Israeli analysts holds that the 
•members of the PLO leadership declared Palestinian statehood in 
response to pressure from their counterparts in the territories 
for a tangible achievement to justify the sacrifices which the 
Palestinians had made there since the previous December. The 
PLO, out of fear that it might lose its primacy in the 
Palestinian national movement, complied. In August, Faisal al- 
Husseini, head of the Arab Studies Center in Jerusalem, published 
a document which called for the declaration of Palestinian 
independence based on co-existence with Israel. At first, the 
PLO derided it as ". . . intellectual amusement," but later
adopted its principles in their entirety, recognizing UN Security 
Council Resolutions 181 (the 1947 proposal to partition Palestine 
into Arab and Jewish states) and 242 (which calls for Israel's 
withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 in exchange for 
peace) as the bases for negotiation with I s r a e l .
Al-Hut mentions no such pressure. Rather, he holds that 
there was collective discussion among all of the PLO's components
22^  Bekhor, pp. 83-84.
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(without distinguishing between those inside or outside of the 
territories). He does not mention al-Husseini's role and 
additionally maintains that the PLO's Central Committee had 
discussed re-examining Resolution 242, well before the November 
PNC, at its session in Baghdad in January 198 8
While all Arab countries and most third world nations 
recognized the Palestinian 'state', most Western European 
countries withheld their recognition since it did not control a 
piece of territory. It did, however, enhance the PLO's status 
and prompted the United States to announce its willingness to 
begin a dialogue with the PLO if the organization recognized 
Israel's right to exist and renounced the use of terrorism.
While the PLO maintained that it had implicitly done this in 
its declaration of independence, the United States insisted that 
it do so explicitly. The PLO accomplished this, to the 
satisfaction of the United States, in December 1988^2^ and a
235 Al-Hut, pp. 1039-1040.
228 The PLO had implicitly favored Palestinian participation in the peace process since the 1974 PNC, when it vowed that it would ". . . continue, by all means, primarily armed struggle, toliberate the Palestinian land and to establish an independentnational authority on any part of the Palestinian land liberated." "Al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini [The Palestinian National Council]," Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia]. Vol. 4 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 112. With the advent of the Palestinianuprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987, however, theissue of recognizing Israel took on vital importance when it became clear to the PLO leadership that the residents of these areas (who were now on the front lines in the struggle against Israel) would no longer take them seriously if they did not achieve immediate political gains for the Palestinian cause. The residents of the territories realized, even if the PLO leadership(continued...)
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dialogue began. This dialogue lasted until the spring of 1990, 
when the PLF, a PLO faction, attacked a crowded Tel Aviv beach 
with automatic weapons. When the PLO failed to denounce the 
attack, the United States interpreted this as advocacy by the
228 (. . .continued)did not, that Israel was a fact of life in the Middle East with which peace had to be made. Bekhor, p. 168. The first public expression of this sentiment came from Palestinian political activist Faisal al-Husseini, who, in August 1988, spoke of declaring Palestinian independence and negotiating with the Israeli government in order to determine the final borders between the Palestinian state and Israel. % d . In November 1988, the nineteenth PNC first recognized that UN resolution 181, which in 1947, called for Palestine's partition into Arab and Jewish states, " . . .  continues to provide the condition for international legitimacy which includes the Palestinian Arab people's right to national sovereignty and independence," "I'Ian al-Istiqlal [The Declaration of Independence]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia] , Vol. 6 (Beirut : Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990), pp. 1062-1063. Although this recognition appeared to violate article XIX of the Palestinian National Covenant, which voided this resolution, it was further indication of the PLO's desire to be part of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The PNC also recognized UN resolutions 242 and 33 8 as ". . . the basis for convening theinternational [Middle East peace] conference," as well as Israel's right to secure and recognized borders within the framework of peace. Bekhor, pp. 168-169. See Al-Hut, pp. 1042- 1043. In the view of the United States government, however, the PLO had still not explicitly recognized Israel's right to exist and during the next month, indirectly prodded the organization, through the Swedish government, to unequivocally recognize the Jewish State. On December 13, 1988, at a special session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva, PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat declared his organization's readiness to work for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict encompassing all parties, " . . .  including the State of Palestine, Israel, and the other neighbors, within the framework of the international peace conference, based on resolutions 242 and 338 . . . whilerespecting everyone's right to exist in peace and security." Bekhor, p. 169. See Al-Hut, pp. 1045-104 8. The next day, the United States began direct political discussions with the PLO.
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organization of terrorism as a legitimate means to achieve its 
aims and broke off direct contact with it .22?
The PLO's political position was further weakened that year
when it openly supported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August.
The PLO continued its support for Iraq even after the United
States began its armed offensive to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty.
C. The Effect of the 1990-1991 Gulf War on the Middle East in General and the PLO in Particular
At war's end, the PLO had no effective means at its disposal
to force Israel to withdraw from the territories. No Arab 
country would allow the use of its territory for armed attacks 
against Israel and the Israelis had weakened the Palestinians' 
ability to conduct an effective resistance campaign in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The PLO's international standing had also 
declined significantly because of its support for Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait.
The Soviet Union's dissolution also had a tremendous impact 
on the Middle East political equation. Not only had the radical 
Arab states and the Palestinian organizations lost their 
principal patron, but Israel's role as an anti-Soviet outpost for
22"^ G. Mas'ud, "Ta'liq al-Hiwar al-Amriki - al-Filastini: Ab'ada min Idanah 'al-Irhab' wa aqraba ila I'Ian al-Nafir [Commentary on the American-Palestinian Dialogue: Moving Away from 'Terrorism' and Moving Closer to a Call to Battle]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1012, July 1, 1990, pp. 6-7. See also "Israel Killsat Least Two Arab Guerrillas North of Border," June 23, 1990;S. Gabai, "Hamlatzah Be'ashaf: Lesaleq et al-'Abbas mi Tzameret Ha'irgun Biglai Ahraiyuto Lefigu'a Hakoshel Behof Nitzanim[Recomendation in the PLO to Expel al-'Abbas from theOrganization's Top Leadership for his Responsibility for the Failed Attack on Nitzanim Beach]," M a 'ariv, September 11, 1991, p . A2 .
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the West had become obsolete. Although Israel remained a source 
of intelligence on anti-Western political movements in the area, 
the removal of the Soviet element substantially reduced the 
Jewish State's strategic value for the United States. During the 
Gulf war, the United States feared that Israel's entry into the 
battle would prompt key Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition 
to either withdraw or switch sides and in that sense, regarded 
Israel as a liability. While previous U.S. presidents had 
refrained from applying effective pressure on Israel on issues 
such as Israel's settlement policy in the territories, George 
Bush used the prospect of denying Israel's request for badly- 
needed loan guarantees (ultimately unsuccessfully) in an attempt 
to enjoin the Israeli government from constructing new 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With Israel and 
its Arab neighbors uncertain of whether or not they would receive 
outside support for their current policies, the United States 
believed that it would be able to persuade them to change those 
policies and negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement.
Despite pressure from the United States to moderate its 
negotiating stance, Israel was able to adhere to its position of 
refusing to negotiate with the PLO; and despite the Labor Party's 
victory in 1992, the Israeli government did not alter its 
position and continued to consider the PLO a terrorist 
organization bent on its destruction. It continued to insist on 
dealing only with representatives of the Palestinians living in 
the territories. These representatives, however, since the start
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of the peace negotiations in Autumn 1991, maintained that they 
took direction from the PLO. Consequently, the PLO, its 
constituent groups, and the organizations which opposed the peace 
talks continued to be important factors in the outcome of the 
negotiations.
D . The Palestinian Organizations on the Eve of the 1991 Madrid Conference
The Palestinian organizations, at the time, represented a 
broad spectrum of views on what Palestinians were entitled to 
receive in a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These 
ranged from advocacy of Israel's disappearance - and repossession 
by the Palestinians of all Israeli-controlled territory - to 
sovereignty over a portion of the Palestinians' territorial 
claims and peaceful coexistence with Israel.
It is difficult to place any single Palestinian group's 
position, at the time, firmly within either of these extremes or 
even within one of the intermediate shades of opinion. While an 
organization may have appeared to espouse one viewpoint, it may 
also have had a hidden agenda with an entirely different aim. An 
organization's doctrine, therefore, deserves close examination 
before conclusively identifying its position on a given issue.
Each of the numerous Palestinian organizations claimed to be 
working to regain land lost to Israel over the past four decades 
and to establish an independent Palestinian state on it. Whether 
viewed as moderate or extreme, almost every organization 
maintained an armed force subject to no authority other than that 
of its leadership. It would have been very difficult, for
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example, for Yasir 'Arafat to prevent the fiercely independent 
George Habash from ordering his PFLP operatives to attack a given 
target and Habash (a Marxist) had no influence over the actions 
of Hamas operatives (who are devout Sunni Muslims). While most 
of the organizations regularly sent solidarity greetings to one 
another, and often issued joint statements when their interests 
o v e r l a p p e d , 228 each jealously guarded its freedom of action.
When their interests did not overlap, violent clashes sometimes 
occurred. 228
228 s. Aboudi, "Radical Arabs Step Up Opposition to Mideast Conference," Reuters. October 21, 1991; "Fundamentalists, PLO Radicals Reject Peace Talks," Reuters, October 21, 1991; P. Bakogeorge, "Middle East Conference: Tensions Rise as Israel Accepts Talks," Ottawa Citizen, October 21, 1991, p. A l ; "One Palestinian Killed, 35 Wounded in Clashes With Israeli Troops," Agence France Presse, October 30, 1991; "Palestinians Strike Second Day Against Conference," Agence France Presse. October 31, 1991.
228 On April 3, 1990, for example, Fatah and PFLP activists came to blows in the West Bank village of 'Awarta, outside Nablus, which culminated in the gutting of six Arab-owned houses by the PFLP.
S. Aboudi, "Palestinians Challenge Israel to Accept Peace Conference," Reuters, April 4, 1990. See also "Palestinian Nationalists Torch West Bank Houses," Reuters, April 4, 1990; J. Diehl, "Palestinians Split on U.S. Plan for Talks With Israel," Washington Post, April 14, 1990, pp. AlO and A12.
Following the signing of an Israeli-PLO draft accord on autonomy for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, clashes broke out on September 3, 1993 between Fatah and PFLP supporters in Rafah when " [t]he Fatah Hawks group shot at the Red Eagles band of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who had painted graffiti opposing any agreement with Israel."
S. Saxe, "Arab Violence Erupts against Peace with Israel,"Reuters, September 3, 1993. See also "Hamas will not Attack PLO over Deal with Israel," Reuters, September 4, 1993; "PLO Leader(continued...)
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Consequently, when one organization, or coalition of 
organizations, made a decision, it did not necessarily apply to 
all Palestinian groups. In the aftermath of the PNC's decision 
to go to the 19 91 peace conference, organizations, both inside 
and outside the PLO, dissociated themselves from the conference, 
vowing to combat it.2^ ° This trend, which persists to the 
present, minimizes the likelihood that dissenting Palestinian 
organizations will abide by any peace agreements which the 
continuing negotiations may produce.
The Palestinian national movement's components were divided 
into three categories; Organizations which accepted the PLO's 
authority, organizations which did not, and individual 
Palestinians whose views may have reflected the position of a 
certain organization, but who chose not to belong to that group.
228 (. . . continued) warns against Hasty Peace with Israel," Reuters, September 4, 1993; P. Smerdon, "PLO-Israeli Pact corners Radicals, Fundamentalists," Reuters, September 10, 1993.
2^ ° On October 21, 19 91, the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Hamas issued a joint communique which stated, in part that "we proclaim our categoric [sic] rejection of the American liquidation project and we rise up to combat it."
Reuters, October 21, 1991.
On the same day, PFLP-General Command leader Ahmad Jibril stated, at a Teheran conference, that "these people, who have been chosen by Israel and the United States, are agents. The United States will not be able to protect them."
"Many Opposed to Peace Conference, Some Threaten Attacks," Agence France Presse. October 21, 1991.
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In 19 91, the representatives of seven armed organizations 
sat on the PLO's Executive Committee^^: Fatah, the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF) 2^ 2  ^ both factions of the Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Iraqi-supported Arab 
Liberation Front (ALF), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the 
Palestinian Communist Party. Of these, only Fatah, the DFLP's 
splinter faction headed by Yasir 'Abid Rabbuh, and the 
Palestinian Communist Party supported the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. The rest did not. Both the PFLP and Nayif Hawatimah's 
DFLP faction declared their opposition to the U.S.-sponsored 
negotiations, going so far as to issue a joint condemnatory 
statement with the Islamic fundamentalist group, Hamas. The PSF, 
ALF, and PLF each issued statements condemning the negotiations
as well.2*^2
2"^2 The eighteen member body includes non-militant organizations as well as independent members.
"PLO Executive Committee Confirmed," September 28, 1991.
The PLO's approval of autonomy discussions between it and the Israeli government led to the withdrawal of the PFLP and DFLP- the two constituent organizations opposed to the peace process- from its Executive Committee on September 10, 1993.
"PFLP, DFLP Resign from PLO Executive; Say Accord with Israel not Binding," Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, 0948 gmt, September 1993, in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts, September 11,1993, p. ME/1791/MED. See also "Hourani Quits PLO Executive,Fifth to Leave," Reuters. September 11, 1993; Y . Ibrahim,"Mideast Accord: The PLO; Arafat Weighs US Trip to Sign Pact withIsrael," New York Times, September 11, 1993, p. A 5 .
2^ 2 Headed by Muhammad Abu Al-'Abbas.
2"^2 "Palestinian Affairs in Brief: PSF Rejects Talks and Pledges to Continue Struggle," Iraqi News Agency in Arabic, 103 0(continued...)
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The organizations which did not accept the PLO's authority 
could be divided into secular and Islamic fundamentalist
2^ 2 (, , , continued) gmt, October 16, 1991 in British Broadcasting Corporation:Summarv of World Broadcasts. October 18, 1991, p. ME/1206/A/1; "Palestinian Affairs in Brief: PSF Criticises its Secretary- General on PNC Resolutions Al-Ouds Radio Report," Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio, 1730 gmt, October 14, 1991 in British Broadcasting Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts, October 18, 1991, p. ME/1206/A/1. See also "Palestinian Broadcast From Iraq Says Arab Liberation Front Rejects Conference," Voice of Palestine (Baghdad), 1646 gmt, October 20, 1991 in British Broadcasting Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts, October 22, 1991, p. ME/1209/A/1; "Abu Abbas Says He Plans to Leave PLO Executive," Reuters, September 26, 1991.
On September 21 of the following year, the PFLP and DFLP politburos, concerned that the negotiating process in Washington ". . . i s  moving rapidly in the direction set for it by the USA,"discussed ways ". . . t o  consolidate their bilateral ties andupgrade their militant cooperation and joint action to ensure the widest possible mobilisation of the Palestinian masses facing the risks involved in the liquidatory solutions that are being floated." The meeting resulted in the creation of "a unified command structure to steer joint action between them in various political, popular and militant spheres within the framework of the struggle to frustrate the administrative self-rule plan . . .." "DFLP, PFLP Statement Calls for Observance of General Strike Call," Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio, 1730 gmt, September 22, 1992 in British Broadcasting Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts. September 24, 19 92, p. ME/149/A/l; See also "Al-I'lan 'an Tashkil Hai'ah Qiyadiyyah Muwahhadah li al-Jabhatain al- Sha'biyyah wa al-Dimuqratiyyah [The Announcement of the Formation of the United Leadership Body of the Popular and Democratic Fronts]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1118, September 27, 1992, p. 6; "Radical PLO Factions Oppose Israeli Offer for Self-Rule," Xinhua General Overseas News Service. September 22, 1992, Item No. 0922279; "Radical Palestinians Protest Arab-Israeli Peace Talks," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, September 23, 1992, Item No.0 923185; "PFLP and DFLP Reportedly Form 'Unified Command' to Confront 'Self-Rule,'" Radio Monte Carlo. 2000 gmt, September 21, 1992 in British Broadcasting Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts, September 23, 1992, p. ME/1493/A/1; "Radical Palestinians Call for One-Day Strike," Reuters. September 22, 1992; "PLO Groups Unite," Jerusalem Post, September 22, 1992;"Two Radical PLO Factions Challenge Arafat Leadership," A P , September 22, 1992; I. Hamza, "Two Radical PLO Groups AnnounceJoint Leadership," Reuters, September 21, 1992.
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organizations. The Palestinian fundamentalist organizations - 
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad - sought to replace Israel with an 
Islamic s t a t e . T h e  secular organizations sought to replace
Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism's ideological roots can be traced to the time of medieval philosopher Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah, who maintained that all Muslim rulers whose laws were based on God's commands and ensured the community's spiritual welfare should be obeyed. This implied, conversely, that rulers whose actions violated Islamic precepts should be overthrown.This principle was first applied in the early eighteenth century by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab who, inspired by Ibn Taimiyyah's teachings, joined forces with the Sa'ud family to stamp out the pre-Islamic practices which had crept back into the Arabian Peninsula since Islam's emergence and to restore the religious and ethical practices which prevailed during the time of the prophet Muhammad and his successors.
The tradition of rebellion against an 'unjust' Islamic ruler continued in the 1870's and 1880's under the guidance of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who, instead of opposing local pre-Islamic practices, fought against what he considered the undue influence of Western ideas and governments in the Middle East and North Africa by calling for the overthrow of their Ottoman allies.
In 1928, the founding in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood [al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin] by Hassan al-Banna translated these notions into formal organization and concrete action. Having established branches throughout the region, the Brotherhood's adherents sought the establishment of an Islamic state similar to the one which existed during the time of the prophet Muhammad and his successors, that is, one whose policies were based on the shari'ah . or Islamic legal code. See R. Shaqed and A. Shabi, Hamas: Mi Emunah Be'allah Laderekh Ha Teror [Hamas: From Faith in Allah to the Path of Terrorism! (Jerusalem, Israel: Keter Hotsa'ah La'or, 1994)(hereinafter "Shaqed"), p. 37. This did not mean a literal revival of the customs of those days, but rather the building of a ". . . society operating according to Islamicnorms and values," Id., p. 38. A ruler (Muslim or non-Muslim) whose actions were based on any other standard was considered an infidel (kafir) and therefore had to be removed.
Foreign governors (in the case of mid-twentieth century Egypt, the British) and Arab rulers closely allied with the West had introduced ideas and practices into the region which the Brotherhood's adherents believed weakened the moral fiber of Arab society and diluted the Islamic moral base which had given it strength in ages past. They maintained that western ideas had(continued...)
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Israel with a 'secular democratic' state. They included the 
PFLP-GC, Fatah - the Revolutionary Council, Fatah - the Uprising, 
Al-Sa'iqah, and the PLF's Tal'at Ya'qub Faction.
The members of the third category, those unaffiliated with a 
particular organization, included those whom Israel would have 
deemed acceptable negotiating partners at the time, ie., non-PLO 
m e m b e r s . W h i l e  they never had any real authority 
individually, both they and the PLO were able to claim that the
. continued)fostered the growth of, among other phenomena, licentiousness, materialism, socialism, and nationalism - the last two of which are humanist concepts which place man at the head of one's priorities rather than God.
In the 1950's, the concept of resisting a kafir"ruler was further institutionalized by Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid al-Qutub, who maintained that an Arab leader whose actions were not guided by the shari'ah was a legitimate target for iihad. or holy war. This was in stark contrast to the position adopted by traditional Sunni Islam, which - in light of the " . . .  trauma of the fitna (the civil war which broke out following Muhammad's death) . . ." - expressly forbade any rebellion against theauthorities. Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981 by the Jihad al-Islami organization was guided by the notion that violent opposition to a ruler whose actions contravened Islamic interests was legitimate. Id., p. 39.
Hamas, whose ideological roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood, applied the concept of violent resistance to an infidel government - and its replacement by a shari'ah-based state - to the Palestinian struggle against Israel. Unlike Fatah, Hamas has no doctrinal provision for coexistence with the non-Muslim Israelis and, unlike the PFLP, rejects the notion of a 'secular, democratic state'.
These should be distinguished from individuals who sit on the Palestine National Council and PLO Executive Committee - who are official PLO members.
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PLO had given them the authority to negotiate with Israel on the 
Palestinians' behalf.
The Palestinian organizations which supported negotiations 
with Israel perceived a fundamental change in the United States 
government's attitude towards that country and believed that 
American pressure on Israel would secure for them their minimal 
aims. Palestinian organizations opposed to the negotiations, 
both in and out of the PLO, acknowledged no such change.
Both the PFLP and rejectionist organizations outside the PLO 
rejected the peace conference as a capitulation to U.S. and 
Israeli i n t e r e s t s . T h e  PFLP, however, although it froze its
M. Al-Sa'id, [Interview With Faruq Qaddumi] , Al-Safir (Beirut), October 11, 1991, p. 12; [Al-Husaini, 'Ashrawi Comment After Jordan Talks], Amman Radio (Jordan), 1208 gmt, October 15, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report; Near East and South Asia. FBIS-NES-91-200, October 16, 1991, pp. 1-2,4 .
Voice of Palestine (Algiers) in Arabic, 1702 gmt, September 26, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Near East and South Asia. FBIS-NES-91-188, September 17, 1991, pp. 3-4; C. Murphy and J. Diehl, "Delegates Will Strive to Gain Early Bargaining Concessions," Washington Post, October 30, 1991, p. A33.
Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, 1750 gmt, October 16, 1991 in, FBIS-NES-91-201. October 17, 1991, pp. 1-2.See also "Mahma 'adhamat al-Masa'ib Ian nuta'ti' Ru'asa'ana [No Matter How Great the Misfortunes, We Will Never Bow Our Heads]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1064, August 11, 1991, pp. 4-5; S. Aboudi, "Radical Arabs Step Up Opposition to Mideast Conference," Reuters, October 21, 1991; "Fi Bayan Sadr 'an al-Sha'biyyah wa al-Dimuqratiyyah wa 'Hamas' fi Dawlah Filastin: Sha'buna yaqulu 'la' Qati'ah li al- Mu'tamar al-Tasfawi al-Amriki [In a Statement issued by the PFLP, DFLP, and Hamas: Our People Decisively say 'No' to the Capitulatory American Conference]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1075, October 27, 1991, pp. 12-13; "Fundamentalists, PLO Radicals Rejects Peace Talks," Reuters, October 21, 1991; P. Bakogeorge, "Middle East Conference: Tensions Rise as Israel Accepts Talks," Ottawa(continued...)
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membership on the PLO's Executive Committee following the Madrid
. . . continued)Citizen, October 21, 1991, p. Al, o p . cit..
The PFLP punctuated its opposition to the conference with an attack on an Israeli bus carrying civilian passengers from Shilo, on the West Bank, to Tel Aviv, in which its operatives fired upon the bus with automatic weapons, killing two and wounding six.
R. Yoeli, "Israeli Victims of Bus Attack Buried," October 29,1991; S. Abi Assi, "Three Israelis Killed in South Lebanon Bomb Attack," October 29, 1991; S. Shargorodsky, "Israel ClosesJerusalem to Residents of Occupied Lands After Attack," A P . October 29, 1991; R. Barr, "Arabs, Israelis Both Conciliatory on Eve of Talks," October 29, 1991; M. Eliason, "Shamir Feels'Tension and Hope' Arriving for Peace Talks," October 29,1991; R. Sinai, "Bush, Gorbachev Pledge Not to Sit on Sidelines in Peace Process," October 29, 1991; R. Sinai, "Peace TalksStill on Track Despite Snags, Violence," October 29, 1991;"Mideast Israel Claim," Agence France Presse, October 29, 1991; "Three Israeli Soldiers Reported Killed Ahead of Conference," Agence France Presse, October 29, 1991; "Israeli Helicopters Attack Refugee Camp," Agence France Presse, October 29, 1991; "Violence Surges in Mideast on Eve of Historic Peace Forum," Agence France Presse, October 29, 1991; "Reuter Middle East News Highlights 1900 gmt Oct 29," Reuters, October 29, 1991; "PLO Radical Group Says It Ambushed West Bank Settlers," Reuters, October 29, 1991; A. Ajami, "Lebanese Guerrillas Attack Israel to Thwart Madrid Talks," Reuters, October 29, 1991; P. Bakogeorge, "The Search for Middle East Peace: Violence Sours Mood at Peace Talks," Ottawa Citizen. October 29, 1991, p. A 6 ; M. Kuli, "Wave of Violence Sweeps Lebanon on Eve of Madrid Conference," Reuters, October 29, 1991; A. Meisels, "As Talks Near, Terrorists Strike," Washington Times, October 29, 1991, p. Al; W. Tuohy, "Guerrillas Step Up Attacks on Israelis. Lebanon: Three Soldiers Are Killed in Two Incidents as Arab Radicals Try to Disrupt the Peace Talks in Madrid," Los Angeles Times. October 30, 1991, p. A7; M. Kuli, "Wave of Violence Sweeps Lebanon on Eve of Madrid Conference," Reuters, October 30, 1991; C. Haberman, "The Middle East Talks:At Israel Funeral, Mood is Defiant," New York Times, October 30, 1991, p. A12; Antenne-2 Television Network (Paris), 1900 gmt, October 31, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report, FBIS-NES-91-212, November 1, 1991, p. 38.
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peace conference, continued its participation in the PLO despite 
that organization's endorsement of the peace p r o c e s s .
Many of the groups mentioned so far claimed to represent the 
majority of Palestinians. At the time, however, no poll had been 
taken which accurately reflected the degree of support the
On October 31, 1991, Le Figaro published an interview with George Habash who stated that he would propose to his PFLP colleagues that the organization withdraw from the PLO's Executive Committee, which implements the PNC's resolutions, because of its endorsement of Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace conference. His principal objections were that the PLO had agreed to participation without receiving firm prior commitments on the settlements issue, independent Palestinian representation, and the status of East Jerusalem. He added, however, that he would leave it up to the Central Committee to either accept or reject his organization's proposal. He did not indicate whether the PFLP intended to pull out of the PLO entirely. Le Figaro did not specify when the interview had occurred and Habash further obfuscated the matter by stating that a decision would be made before October 30.
"Georges Habache: 'Le Danger Est Le Sionisme'," Le Figaro,October 31, 1991, p. 5.
On November 6, Habash officially announced the freezing of the PFLP's membership on the Executive Committee stating that "we will exercise our role once again within the framework of the Executive Committee, once it goes back on this policy and commits itself to the national constants endorsed by consecutive PNC sessions."
Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio (Clandestine), 1118 gmt, November 6, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report. FBIS-NES-91-216, November 7, 1991, pp. 10-12. See also "Bi Sabab Mu'tamar Madrid: al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah tansahibu min al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyyah li Munadhamah al-Tahrir [Because of the Madrid Conference: The Popular Front withdraws From the PLO Executive Committee]," al-Ra'i, November 1, 1991, p. 15.
On September 11, 1993, in response to PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat's declared intention to recognize Israel, the PFLP again withdrew its representatives from the Executive Committee.
Y. Ibrahim, "Mideast Accord: The PLO; Arafat Weighs US Trip to Sign Pact with Israel," New York Times, September 11, 1993, p.A l .
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various Palestinian organizations enjoyed among the general
population. Instead, other indicators had to be examined. For
example, the number of seats which an organization held in the
PNC signified the extent of its influence within that body. It
did not present a complete picture, however, since many
Palestinian organizations, such as the PFLP-GC, were not PNC
members. There was also some question as to whether or not the
PNC accurately represented the general cross-section of
Palestinians. PFLP Secretary General George Habash even went so
far as to say that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat was the final
arbiter of the number of representatives each organization was
entitled to send.
Generally, the PNGs have not come into existence as a result of elections, and they are not formed on the basis of specific criteria. Allow me [to be frank]. jRegrettably, these councils are formed by Yasir i'Arafat. Consequently, it is accepted that the PFLP be !represented by 10 percent or 20 percent. When our head . |of state forms these councils, he keeps in mind that ■they should be obedient and should move according to jhis w i s h . I
Apart from the PNC, other indicators might be found in the j
local administrative bodies which Palestinians in the West Bank !
and Gaza Strip might elect as a result of the peace negotiations I
by examining the political views of the elected members. j
Regrettably, these freely-elected administrative bodies do not I
H. Al-Husayni, "Dr. George Habash on Madrid Peace Conference, Just Peace: I Am For Peace, Repatriation Right, Jerusalem, and State; We will Stay Within PLO Framework Through National Council," Al-Share al-Awsat, November 1, 1991, p. 5 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report. FBIS-NES-91- 220, November 14, 1991, pp. 5-7.
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yet exist and analysts will have to await the outcome of the 
negotiations before studying them.
Palestinian nationalist organizations who rejected the 
current Arab-Israeli negotiations were by no means monolithic.
The degree of rejection varied, as did the reasons for doing so.
Some organizations, such as the PFLP-GC and Hamas, were quite 
explicit in their rejection while others, such as the DFLP and 
the PFLP, cloaked their rejections in qualifiers and theoretical 
explanations. In order to appreciate the diversity of the 
Palestinian rejectionist movement at the time, a closer 
examination of the positions of these four groups is in order.
The PFLP-GC's strident and unequivocal opposition to any 
sort of peace agreement with Israel contrasted sharply with the
PFLP's reasoned consideration of all alternatives and the DFLP's !
Ireluctant rejection of the current peace talks. Of the four i
■ iorganizations, its position most closely resembled that of Hamas, |
the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, whose rejection of I
peace with Israel was just as explicit, but whose target audience i
was the Palestinian Muslim community. Unlike Hamas, the PFLP-GC 
directed its message at all Palestinians. |
For the PFLP-GC, the only significant issue in the Arab- ;
Israeli conflict was whether or not Israel should exist, rather \
than where the borders with it should be drawn. It advocated i
continuing the struggle against Israel as opposed to concluding I
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agreements with its enemy, however temporary. The PFLP-GC 
viewed the Madrid conference as total capitulation to United 
States and Israeli interests. Its leader, Ahmad Jibril, on 
October 21, 1991, charged the Palestinian delegates with being 
agents of those countries. Condemning them to death, Jibril 
warned that " . . .  the United States will not be able to protect 
them, neither in Madrid nor elsewhere.
E. Hamas as the PLO's Primary Competitor
While the PFLP-GC directed its message to Christian, Muslim, 
as well as secular Palestinians, Hamas sought to establish an 
Islamic state on the territory now controlled by Israel. In 
contrast to the PFLP-GC, whose presence in the West Bank and Gaza 
was negligible, Hamas was the PLO's primary competitor in those
251 npFLP-GC Leader Jibril Praises Iranian Support in Struggle Against Israel," Voice of the Oppressed. 0530 gmt, October 14, 1991 in British Broadcastincr Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts, October 15, 1991, p. ME/1203/A/1.
"Palestinian Peace Delegates Condemn Themselves to Death, Jibril Says," Agence France Presse, October 21, 1991. See "Many Opposed to Peace Conference, Some Threaten Attacks," Agence France Presse, October 21, 1991. Following the official announcement of the Israeli-PLO dialogue over the Gaza/Jericho autonomy plan, the PFLP-GC made similar threats on 'Arafat's life, reminding him " . . .  that he personally and those who are with him . . ." would be targeted. See "Palestinian RadicalsThreaten Arafat with Death," Reuters, August 30, 1993/ L. Adoni, "Israeli Deal Stuns Palestinians," Christian Science Monitor. September 1, 1993, p. 2; A. Darwish, "Middle East: 'Hot Embers' Dropped in Yasser Arafat's Lap; Mixed Reaction among Arab Leaders," The Independent, September 1, 1993, p. 6; "Dissident Palestinian Leaders tell Iranian Envoy of PLO 'Treachery'," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Persian, 03 3 0 gmt, September 3, 1993 in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts. September 4, 1993, p. ME/1785/MED.
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a r e a s . 253 Although the PLO attempted to bring Hamas into its 
organization, Hamas resisted and, apart from its joint statement 
with the PFLP and DFLP mentioned earlier, showed only disdain for 
the secular-nationalist organizations which comprised it. 
According to one Palestinian journalist, Hamas operatives in
253 In recent elections to Palestinian quasi-governmental bodies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hamas achieved respectable results against the so-called nationalist bloc (which Al-Fatah, the PFLP, and the DFLP comprise), and in the March 1992 elections to the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce, defeated the nationalist bloc in a clean sweep of all eleven seats. The nationalist bloc succeeded in placing a single member in the chamber when the Israeli military government disqualified the fundamentalist candidate for security violations. Fundamentalist candidates received ten percent of the vote in the Gaza Bar Association elections in March and forty-two percent of the vote in the Gaza Medical Association elections in February, although they did not do nearly as well in the November 19 91 Gaza Chamber of Commerce elections. While these results reflect only the degree of support the various Palestinian groups in the territories receive within a specific sector of society, they are, unfortunately, the best indicators available.
See "The PLO Exposed," Jerusalem Post, March 6, 1992, no page number; "Hamas Victory," Independent, March 5, 1992, p. 10; J. Immanuel, "Ramallah an 'Islamic Republic' After Fundamentalist Victory," Jerusalem Post. March 5, 1992, no page number; J. Immanuel, "Pro-PLO List Suffers Heavy Setback in Ramallah Election," Jerusalem Post, March 4, 1992, no page number;"Islamic Candidates Stun PLO in West Bank Vote," Reuters, March 4, 1992; "Fourth Poll Victory for Pro-PLO Candidates in the Strip," Middle East News Network. March 2, 1992; "Moslem Fundamentalists Lose Election in Gaza," Reuters, February 1,1992; "Moslem Fundamentalists Lose Election in Gaza Strip," Reuters, January 24, 1992.
More recently, Hamas candidates for seats in the Accountants Association in the Gaza Strip defeated a combined list of Fatah and PFLP candidates to take control of that organization, reflecting a change from previous years when pro-PLO contenders were able to maintain at least a narrow majority.
"Militant Islamic Hamas Defeats PLO in Gaza Vote," Reuters. June 24, 1993. See also R. Marcus, "Gunmen Open Fire at Soldiers in Gaza, One Lightly Wounded," Jerusalem Post, July 23, 1993, no page given.
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Nablus " . . .  captured a [PLO] activist wanted by the Israeli 
army for more than three years, stabbed him 17 times, then left 
him bleeding in the street. The man was transferred to the local 
hospital and later arrested by Israeli s o l d i e r s . Hamas's
differences with the PLO were highlighted in 1991 when the PLO's 
support for the Madrid conference resulted in violent clashes 
between Hamas and Fatah activists on the Gaza Strip, in which 
forty people were w o u n d e d .
Unlike its secular counterparts, Hamas saw the Arab-Israeli 
dispute as an eternal conflict between Muslims and Jews, which 
began with the prophet Muhammad and which it believed would 
continue for as long as necessary. It considered the uprising 
part of ". . . a n  Arab-Islamic-Palestinian renaissance . . . "  and
254 g _ Fraitekh, "Intifada; Now the War Among the Palestinians. The Secular-Fundamentalist Schism on the West Bank," Washington Post, November 24, 1991, p. C 2 .
255 G. Frankel, "Talks Please Palestinians - So Far; Expectations Remain Low that Israel Will Grant Concessions," Washington Post. November 4, 1991, p. A17.
More recently (March 13, 1992), clashes broke out between Fatah and Hamas supporters in Ramallah in which around "fifty youths on each side engaged in fistfights."
J. Immanuel, "Ramallah Restaurant Torched in Apparent Hamas-PLO Dispute," Jerusalem Post, March 16, 1992, no page number. See also D. Regev, "Mefaqed Hulyat 'Hanesher Ha'adom' Vesgano nilkedu biretsu'at 'Azah [The 'Red Eagle' Cell Commander and his Deputy are Captured in the Gaza Strip]," Yedi'ot Aharonot. July 14,1992, p. 14.
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an important stage in its protracted, multi-generational war 
against Israel.
The DFLP's Hawatimah faction, although it joined the PFLP 
and Hamas in condemning the current negotiations, did not oppose 
a peace treaty with Israel in principle, but appeared to object 
only to the fact that the United States and Israel did not 
recognize the PLO as the Palestinians' official
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .257 Like its counterparts, i t  favored continued 
armed violence against Israel, but now advocated targeting 
Israeli soldiers o n l y . 25®
In common with the PFLP-GC and Hamas (but in contrast to the 
DFLP), the PFLP also stubbornly refused to accept Israel's 
continued existence. In principle, however, the PFLP did not 
oppose a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as 
long as that solution resulted in Israel's disappearance. It 
realistically concluded that force alone would not defeat Israel
255 [Interview with official Hamas Spokesman Ibrahim Ghawshah by Radio Monte Carlo's Salah Salamah and Widad 'Alam Al-Din], Radio Monte Carlo (Paris), 1950 gmt, October 31, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report. FBIS-NES-91-212, November 1, 1991, pp. 37-38.
257 "DFLP Threatens Boycott of Palestinian Parliament," Reuters, September 20, 1991. Although both Israel and the United States recognize the PLO as the Palestinians' representative, the DFLP nevertheless opposes the agreements and arrangements which resulted from the Israeli-PLO negotiations in 1993 and 1994 based on its belief that Israel retains effective control over the autonomous Palestinian areas. See, e.g. Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, 1630 gmt, September 17, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-182. September 20, 1994, p. 7.
25® MBC Television (London), 1800 gmt, November 9, 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report. FBIS-NES-91- 218, November 12, 1991, p. 9.
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and that territory recovered through diplomacy could be used as a
staging area for further attacks on the Jewish state.
F . The PFLP's Conditions for Peace
In November 1988, when the PLO implicitly recognized Israel
by accepting United Nations Resolutions 242 and 33 8, George
Habash held a press conference in Algiers at which he outlined
the PFLP's position on international peace conferences and
recognition of Israel.
Habash was quick to point out that the PNG's recognition of
Resolutions 242 and 338 did not imply that it had recognized
I s r a e l . 25® He distinguished the uprising's present goals from
the goals which the Palestinians would pursue at an
'authoritative' international peace conference:
The goal of the uprising now is to remove the occupation from the areas/which it occupied in 1967.We cannot shoulder it witii the responsibility of liberating all Palestinian objectives, namely Palestine from the river to the sea. This is more than what is required.
25® Habash stated that in his opinion, " . . .  there is a great difference between recognizing Israel and adopting Resolutions 242 and 33 8, assuming that we add to them of the right to self-determination and for this reason, I do not believe that the national conference recognized Israel."
"Habash fi Mu'tamar Sahafi 'aqadahu bi Qasr al-Mu'tamarat fi Nadi al-Sanawbar bi Al-Jaza'ir: Al-Intifadhah faradhat Istimrar Wahdatina raghim al-Khilaf 'ala Qadhiyyah Mufassiliyyah [Habash at a Press Conference Which He Convened in the Conference Palace at the Al-Sanawbar Club in Algiers: The Uprising Has Compelled [Us] to Perpetuate Our Unity Despite Differences on a Controversial Issue]," Al-Hadaf. No. 936, November 20, 1988, pp. 7-10 .
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At the international conference, the Palestinian issue will be discussed in all its aspects and not only from the standpoint of 1967.25°
Later during the press conference, Habash was asked whether
the PFLP would honor a peace agreement with Israel in which the
Palestinians established a state on the West Bank and Gaza, with
East Jerusalem as its capital. His answer was conciliatory but
non-committal :
I will answer you and I do so with a deep feeling of responsibility. I am now more than sixty years of age,I have children, and I know the meaning of life . . . .I know that in Palestine, there are more than three million Jews and around one million Palestinians, in addition to three million outside Palestine.
I say, come let us sit down at the international conference to discuss the matter of our children and your children from every angle. I believe that I have the right to present my view of the solution which will serve the coming generations . . . our children asPalestinians and Jews. I am absolutely convinced that
25° Id. Habash reiterated this shortly thereafter in a December 1988 speech commemorating the PFLP's twenty-first anniversary:
We all know that the uprising is now taking place on the Palestinian Bank and the Gaza Strip - that is to say, the areas occupied since 1967 - and we cannot burden our Palestinian masses there, and particularly at this stage, with the responsibility of liberating all Palestinian national soil. This is the responsibility of all of the Palestinian masses . . .the masses of the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev . . . the masses of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,and the Palestinian masses in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Diaspora . . . .  Not only this, but it is also the responsibility of all Arab masses.
"Al-Rafiq Jurj Habash: Sanabqa na'milu li Istimrar al-Intifadhah li Tas'id al-Intifadhah . . . li Tajdhir al-Intifadhah . . . liImtidad al-Intifadhah [Comrade George Habash: We Will Continue to Work to Perpetuate the Uprising, to Escalate the Uprising . . .to Cause the Uprising to Take Root . . .  to Prolong the Uprising]," Al-Hadaf. No. 941, January 1, 1989, p. 6.
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we must seriously consider setting up a democratic state in which everyone will coexist in peace.Moreover, we, at the international conference, will listen to what you have to say in all its aspects.What we aspire to now, at this moment, is a Palestinian state. Afterwards, we shall discuss our right to return. . .
After Habash reminded the United Nations of its
responsibility to convene such a conference, a reporter pressed
him to answer the question directly. Habash responded testily:
After Israel answers these questions, you will have the right to put them to me. I cannot understand the logic of this question . . . I am a displaced person and arefugee and you want me to recognize Israeli
This interview illustrates two important points. First, the 
PFLP had no objection to an international Middle East peace 
conference per se. provided that it presented a comprehensive 
solution; in this case, one in which Israel no longer existed. 
This is what he most likely implied in his proposal for a bi­
national state. Second, the PFLP was a relatively pragmatic 
organization. When he limited the uprising's goals to recovering 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, Habash 
probably realized that the Palestinians were, for the moment, too 
weak to recover all of their claims ("We cannot shoulder [the 
uprising] with the responsibility of liberating all Palestinian 
objectives, namely from the river to the sea.").
The notion of 'liberating Palestine in stages' was not new 
to the PFLP. It was enshrined in the organization's ideology in
25" Id.
252 Al-Hadaf, November 20, 1988, op. cit
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1981 when the PFLP held its Fourth National Congress. The 
congress' political report states that the idea of gradual 
liberation was first proposed at the twelfth PNC, held in Cairo 
in June 1974, although, as this study demonstrated earlier, 
this is incorrect.
Article 4 of the PLO's 1974 Political Program states that ".
. . the PLO regards every act of liberation of Palestinian
territory as a step on the path to the realization of its 
strategy, the establishment of a democratic Palestinian State as 
laid down in previous congress resolutions of the Palestinian 
National C o n g r e s s . T h e  PFLP supported the idea in principle 
because it believed that it would help to win international 
support for the Palestinian c a u s e . However, it objected to 
the PNC's political program because " . . .  it was evident that 
Arab reaction and a section of the Palestinian bourgeoisie were 
ready to settle the conflict on this basis. It was also clear 
that the 'peace' referred to was a serious one with a good chance 
of being implemented. "25°
Later that summer, the PFLP and similarly inclined 
Palestinian organizations formed the Rejection Front, which 
shunned United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, but accepted the
263 pFLp^ Political Report of the PFLP's 4th Congress (Damascus: Central Information Committee, 1986)(hereinafter "4th Congress"). p. 201.
264 F3-angi, p. 141.
255 4th Congress, p. 202.
255 4 t h  C o n g r e s s , p .  2 0 1 .
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notion of establishing a ". . . Palestinian state on any portion
of Palestinian land liberated in this phase, ^he Front also
". . . categorically rejected the idea of recognition,
reconciliation or negotiations with the Zionist enemy,
In defining the term 'liberated areas', the political report
outlined a scenario of how the Palestinians would gradually
recover everything they had lost to Israel:
What are liberated areas? They are areas controlled by the revolution. When the revolution takes control of such an area, it will, of course, establish its authority there. Thus, from a military viewpoint and according to the strategy of popular liberation war, the Palestinian revolution will pass through the phase of establishing the revolution's state in the liberated Palestinian land. From this follows the interim slogan of an independent Palestinian state to be established, without conditions, on any liberated portion of Palestinian land. This slogan specifies a definite interim goal that guides the revolution's struggle; it constitutes a link between the current phase of steadfastness, the phase of creating a ^supportive operational base and the phase of full ^liberation and
257 4th Congress, p. 203. As the Israeli-PLO dialogue over the Gaza/Jericho autonomy proposal began in August 1993, George Habash restated this position. "In principle," he said, "the PFLP cannot object to any Israeli withdrawal from any Palestinian land. This issue, however, should not be viewed in principle only, but also in terms of the agreement that was reached, or the bargain that was reached, between the PLO leadership and Israel." "PFLP's Habash on Gaza-Jericho First; Says Palestinian Uprising to Continue," Radio Monte Carlo - Middle East in Arabic, 194 0 gmt, August 29, 19 93 in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts. August 31, 1993, p. ME/1781/MED. A spokesman for the Hawatimah wing of the DFLP echoed this sentiment when he stated that " . . .  [w] eare not against the withdrawal of Israeli forces but we want that withdrawal to be a part of a continuous withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian territories." B. Hajj, "Palestinian hardliners attack Gaza-Jericho Plan," Reuters, August 30, 1993.
25® 4 t h  C o n g r e s s , p .  2 0 3 .
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J
establishing a popular democratic state in all of Palestine.
Despite the peace conference's drawbacks for the Palestinian 
side, it did offer the possibility of a " . . . peaceful transfer
of rule . . ." in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip " . . .  from
Israel to the Palestinians. "27° The independent Palestinian 
state in those territories to which the PLO aspires would allow 
the PFLP to establish at least a clandestine armed presence in 
the 'liberated areas', whence it could continue to carry out 
operations against Israel.
There are indications that the PFLP realized this.
Immediately following the naming of the Palestinian delegation to 
the Madrid conference on October 22, 1991, the PFLP's chief 
supporter in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Riyadh Al-Maliki 
promised to apply pressure on the delegation members, but stated i
Îi
25® Id. , p. 207. The PFLP reaffirmed this strategy as late as March 1990:
If we discuss the Palestinian general consciousness - as a consciousness of the entire people - we must grasp the unquestionable common element in this consciousness, which is Palestine's total liberation and the establishment of a state for all Palestinians on the entire land of Palestine.
A. Barqawi, "Al-Dawlah al-Filastiniyyah al-Manshudah wa Mustaqbal al-Nidhal al-Watani al-Filastini [The Sought-After Palestinian State and the Future of the Palestinian National Struggle]," Al- Hadaf . No. 999, March 18, 1990, p. 8.
27° This was stated in the United States government's "letter of intent" to the Palestinian delegation, as summarized in the Israeli daily Yedi'ot Aharonot. October 14, 1991, p. 2 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Dailv Report : Near East and South Asia, FBIS-NES-91-199, October 15, 1991, pp. 44-45.
1 4 9
that he and his supporters would not physically prevent them from
going. 271
While this approach did not support the notion that the PFLP
might settle for a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, it appeared to verify the PFLP's doctrine, first
articulated in 1981, that the 'interim solution' which the
Palestinian entity alongside Israel would serve the
organization's ultimate aim of Israel's total elimination.
We are, of course, aware that this interim slogan does not present a final, magical solution to the existing discrepancy between the strategic goal of the revolution and the international legitimacy gained by the Zionist entity. We realize also that some international forces will support us in achieving this interim goal, but not based on our own frame of reference. We also realize that while achieving any interim goal, the revolution will come under considerable pressure to recognize the Zionist enemy and coexist with it. Yet the slogan will receive the support of the forces of socialism and liberation, and broad sections of international public opinion, for a long time to come.2’^2
The 1991 Madrid Conference transformed the peace process 
from one in which the parties negotiated through intermediaries 
to one in which all of the parties (excluding the PLO) faced each 
other directly. The negotiators' ability to make the concessions 
required for an agreement, however, was severely hobbled both by 
excessive devotion to historical claims and the fear of angering 
domestic political opponents.
2"^" R. Beeston and G. Brock, "Palestinian Team Meets Approval of Israeli Delegation," The Times. October 23, 1991, no page number given.
2"^ 2 4 t h  C o n g r e s s , p .  2 0 7 .
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The Israeli negotiating team represented a government, 
headed by the Likud Party, whose leadership was absolutely 
opposed to making the concessions demanded by its Arab 
counterparts. While it favored, in principle, the conclusion of 
peace treaties with its neighbors and the establishment of a 
permanent arrangement with the Palestinian residents of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the Likud government was loathe to take 
measures which would compromise Israeli security in any way or 
cede territory which it regarded as
part of Israel. It also absolutely forbade any direct 
negotiations with the PLO, meeting instead with Palestinians from 
the territories with no apparent connections with the 
organization. Following his defeat in the June 1992 elections, 
former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir admitted that his 
strategy was simply to drag out the negotiations with the 
Palestinians in order to buy enough time to continue to establish 
settlements and to render the Jewish presence in the territories 
an irrevocable fact.^^®
273 Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace," Foreign Affairs, 1992-1993: America and the World
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27^  Id. See also "Israeli News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., Monday, September 13, 1993," Federal News Service, September [14 ?] , 1993.
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Chapter 7; Towards an Israel-PLO Accord
Yitzhaq Rabin's election, however, brought significant 
changes to Israel's negotiating position regarding the 
territories' ultimate fate. The Labor government, in contrast 
with Likud, viewed the settlements in a security-related, rather 
than political, context; their purpose being to hold 
strategically vital locations, as opposed to changing the area's 
demographic composition. It also lifted the ban imposed by the 
Likud government on meetings between Israeli citizens and PLO 
members, although the Israeli leadership continued to refuse to 
meet with PLO officials.
With Bill Clinton's assumption of the presidency in the 
United States, Israel faced the prospect of dealing with an 
administration which focused efforts on domestic, rather than 
foreign issues and therefore reluctant' to risk scarce financial !
• iresources on aid to countries whose policies appeared to be j
incompatible with United States interests. Recalling the tension ;
which developed between the United States and Israel over the I
Likud's insistence on continuing the building of 'political 
settlements' in the territories, the Rabin government sought to 
avoid further crises with Israel's principal financial backer and I
severely scale back the settlement program in a manner consistent !
with its security requirements . 27^  i
The PLO, on the other hand, had no sources of monetary 
support and by the middle of 1993, was on the verge of 
bankruptcy.275 The financial aid that it had traditionally 
received from Saudi Arabia and other conservative Persian Gulf 
states in the 1980's had been cut off as a result of the 
organization's support for Iraq during the 1990-1991 war. By 
August, the PLO was seeking loans from western governments and 
selling off some of its real estate holdings in order to raise 
cash to finance administrative functions and pay salaries.27° 
Apart from its financial difficulties, the PLO was also 
losing the confidence of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in its 
ability to achieve meaningful results in its indirect 
negotiations with Israel and as a result, viewed its declining 
popularity compared to Hamas and other radical Palestinian 
organizations with a l a r m . R e c o g n i t i o n  by Israel and the
275 c. Haberman, "How Israel Made its Deal with the PLO, " Irish Times, September 11, 1993, p. 9.
275 Agence France Presse, 0914 gmt, August 26, 1993; Al- Dustur, August 26, 1993, pp. 1 and 24 in FBIS-NES-93-164, August 26, 1993, pp. 1-2. See also "Palestine Liberation Organization Rift Surfaces as Israel Accepts PLO Presence in Talks; Dissatisfaction with Arafat Grows," Facts on File World News Digest, August 26, 1993, p. 621 Al.
277 Beirut, Voice of Lebanon in Arabic, 0542 gmt, August 21, 1993 in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts, August 24, 1993, p. ME/1775/A. See also S. Helm, "Arafat Seeks Student Support," Independent, November 13, 1992, p. 16; J. Immanuel, "PLO List Wins in Bir Zeit Election," Jerusalem Post. November 13, 1992; J Wallach, "Israel's Rabin Should Meet PLO's Arafat," Newsdav, November 12, 1992, p. 103; "PLO Unites to Block Fundamentalists at University," Reuters. November 12, 1992; R. Marcus, "Gunmen Open Fire at Soldiers in Gaza, One Slightly Wounded," Jerusalem Post, July 25, 1993. Ironically, Rabin shared 'Arafat's fear of(continued...
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United States of the PLO as the Palestinians' official 
representative would be perceived by its constituents as a 
substantial diplomatic gain.
A. Initial Contacts
From January through September 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations proceeded on overt and covert tracks. The overt 
negotiations appeared to demonstrate no changes in the manner in 
which they had been conducted since the 1991 Madrid conference. 
The Israeli government, despite having lifted the ban on meetings 
between Israeli citizens and PLO members, continued to refuse 
direct negotiations with the organization. The PLO's failure to 
remove the clauses from its covenant calling for Israel's 
destruction and its refusal to renounce the use of violence 
prevented the Rabin government from openly recognizing it.
The government's uncertainty over the future Palestinian 
authority's ability to deter opponents of the peace process from 
carrying out violent actions against Israeli citizens rendered it 
less willing to accord the Palestinians too much authority.
While the PLO actively sought direct negotiations with
2"^"^ (. . . continued)Hamas and was, consequently, persuaded to deal with the PLO as the preferable alternative. See M. Colvin, "Can These Hands Clasp in Peace?" Sunday Times, September 5, 1993; "Israeli News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., Monday September 13, 1993," Federal News Service. September [14 ?], 1993; P. Jacobson, "'The PLO Flag was Trampled in the Dust as a Symbol of Surrender,'" Sunday Times, September 5, 1993.
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I s r a e l , 2 7 8  it: was nevertheless reluctant to remove its 
covenant's provisions calling for Israel's destruction - 
principles which the member organizations opposed to the peace 
talks considered fundamental principles.
Paralyzed by their traditional mind-sets, neither side was 
capable of openly making the concessions necessary in order to 
arrive at an agreement. The negotiators required a framework in 
which they could engage in a free exchange of ideas without the 
danger of public embarrassment. Beginning in January 1993, a 
series of thirteen secret negotiating sessions were held in 
Norway under the mediation of Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan 
Jorgen Holst.27®
Having participated in all United Nations peacekeeping 
operations since they began in the 1950's, and having sponsored 
numerous foreign aid projects in the region, the Norwegian 
government had acquired an intimate familiarity with the 
conflict's issues and had developed close relations with all of 
its parties. These qualifications, as well Norway's unfamiliar
2'^® Jerusalem, Ool Yisra'el, 1700 gmt, February 13 , 1993 in FBIS-NES-93-02 9 . February 16, 1993, p. 5. See also D. Nascetti, Interview with PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, L 'Espresso. February 7, 1993, pp. 80-83 in FBIS-NES-93-025, February 9, 1993, pp. 4-5; Per Spiegel, February 8, 1993, pp. 142-143 in FBIS-NES-93-025, February 9, 1993, pp. 5-6.
2’^® An insider's account of these sessions can be found in the transcript of a press conference given by Foreign Minister Holst on October 4, 1993. See "National Press Club Morning Newsmaker Johan Jorgen Holst, Norwegian Foreign Minister,National Press Club, Washington, D.C.," Federal News Service, October 4, 1993.
1 5 5
and unexpected role as a venue for such talks, ensured their 
success and the preservation of their secrecy.
B. September 13, 1993: Declaration of Principles (DOP) Signed
The negotiations began as exploratory discussions between 
Israeli academics with government connections and PLO officials. 
By April, the Israeli government had authorized official 
negotiations, eventually involving Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shim'on Peres. By the end of August, the negotiators had 
secretly initialed a declaration of principles and on September 
10, Holst was able to obtain Rabin's recognition of the PLO as 
the representative of the Palestinians, as well as the PLO's
renunciation of terrorism and commitment to revoke the articles
of its covenant which denied Israel its right to exist.2®° On 
September 13, 1993, Rabin and 'Arafat signed a Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) , which establi!shed the framework for 
negotiations between Israel and the PLO.
Even before its formal signing, the issues embodied in the
DOP were already being formally discussed. In early June,
2®° Letter from Y. Rabin to Y. 'Arafat (September 10,1993)(recognizing the PLO as respresentative of the Palestinian jpeople); Letter from Y . 'Arafat to J. Holst (September 9, j1993) (renouncing terrorism) . See also "Israeli News Conference Iwith Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon !Peres, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., Monday, September 13, I1993," Federal News Service, September [14 ?], 1993; C. Haberman, j"How Israel Made its Deal with the PLO," Irish Times, September I11, 1993, p. 9; "Ba'da 29 'Aman min al-Muwajahat Munadhdhamah al- Tahrir wa Isra'il tatabadilan al-I'tiraf. Tal Abib tutalibu |'Arafat bi Waqf al-Intifadhah. Ittifaq al-Hukm al-Dhati yuwaqqa'u al-Ithnain al-Qadim [After 2 9 Years of Conflict, the PLO and Israel Recognize Each Other. Tel Aviv Demands that 'Arafat Halt the Uprising. The Autonomy Agreement Will Be Signed 'Next Monday]," 'Uman, September 10, 1993, p. 1.
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Shim'on Peres proposed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
Gaza Strip and the transfer of authority to the Palestinians.
This, however, was insufficient for the PLO, since it implied a
willingness to forego its claims to the West Bank. In response
to Peres' suggestion, 'Arafat countered, on June 11, with the
idea of PLO authority over the Gaza Strip and a part of the West
Bank - Jericho, for example - in an interview with the Israeli
daily Ha'aretz;
Give me the Gaza Strip. I can restore order there as I did in Lebanon where the situation was far more complicated. The situation is simpler in Gaza and will improve because we will receive financial aid. This would be a good start for the whole peace process . . .I also need somewhere in the occupied West Bank. It could be Jericho or elsewhere. I cannot let it be said that I sold out the West Bank for Gaza. Obviously a corridor would have to be set up between the two areas under international c o n t r o l . 2®"
By July 2 9 - following reports of secret meetings with PLO 
leader Mahmud 'Abbas in Alexandria, Egypt2®2 - Peres indicated 
Israel's willingness to offer the Palestinians control over ", .
. Gaza plus something . . . . , "2®® and by mid-August, stated
that a Palestinian authority in Jericho, as well, would be 
acceptable to Israel.2®^
2®" Quoted in "Palestine - Part 3A - the PLO Leadership Structure," APS Diplomatic Fate of the Arabian Peninsula (Arabic Press Service Organisation), No. 6, Vol. 25, June 28, 1993.
282 IIPeres Said to Hold Secret Talks with a PLO Leader, " Agence France Presse, July 16, 1993.
2®3 IIigY-eel Studying PLO Idea on Peace Talks - Peres," Reuters, July 29, 1993.
284 IIJericho, Gaza Strip Could be Pilot Projects for Autonomy: Peres," Agence France Presse, August 16, 1993.
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The Declaration of Principles signed on September 13 
stipulated the following: 1) No more than four months after the 
signing of an agreement, Israel will withdraw its forces from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho area (Annex II). The withdrawal would 
signal the beginning of a five-year transitional period for the 
transfer of the areas' administrative bodies to Palestinian 
authority (Article V ) ; 2) Within nine months of the Israeli 
military withdrawal, Palestinians throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip would hold internationally supervised elections to 
replace the Israeli military administration and the temporary 
Palestinian authorities set up in Gaza and Jericho (Article III 
and Annex I); 3) Following the elections, the Israeli forces 
would have redeployed outside all Arab population centers in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Article XIII); 4) The Palestinian 
administrators would have authority over tax collection, the 
school system, hospital administration, the courts, and the 
police force (Article VI); 5) Israel would have continued 
responsibility for external defense and be responsible for public 
order among the territories' Israeli residents (Annex II); 6) 
Israel and the PLO would establish a joint liaison committee for 
resolving disputes over the agreement's implementation (Article 
XV); 7) Issues, such as water rights, electric power, energy and 
industrial development, finance, and transportation, would be 
dealt with through a Committee for Economic Cooperation (Article 
XI); 8) Within two years of the signing of the agreement on Gaza 
and Jericho, the PLO would begin discussions on the final status
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of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Issues on which the two sides 
continue to find difficult to resolve, such as Jerusalem's 
status, Israeli military deployments, and the status of the 
Jewish settlements, would be resolved by the end of the five-year 
transition period (Article V ) ; 9) Israel would consider 
permitting Palestinians who fled the West Bank following the 1967 
war to return to their homes there (Article XII); 10) Israel 
would use its influence to obtain more international aid for the 
territories (Annex IV) . 2®5
C. The Accord's Impact on the Middle East
The negotiations which followed the September 13 signing 
ceremony changed the Middle Eastern political climate forever.
For the cash-poor Palestinians, this was an opportunity to obtain 
the financial aid required to build a strong economy in the 
territories, aid which the United States and the European 
community were all too happy to provide. The PLO also saw the 
Gaza-Jericho framework as a first step to full Israeli withdrawal 
from the territories and the establishment there of a ". . .
complete Palestinian national authority, For the Israelis,
2®5 See "The Heart of a Deal," U.S. News & World Report. September 13, 1993, pp. 24-25. See also Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-rule Arrangements. September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
2®5 "Arafat Interviewed on Agreement, Other Issues 3 Sep,"Al-Musawwar, September 10, 1993 in Middle East Intelligence Report, September 10, 1993. See also "News Conference with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of State Lloyd Bentsen, and Various Other Conference Participants at the Conclusion of the Conference to Support Middle East Peace, Department of State, Washington, D.C.," Federal News Service.(continued...)
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it was an opportunity to reduce tension in the area and rid 
itself of the economic burden and drain on morale associated with 
ruling a hostile population. This would allow it to shift its 
focus from the headaches accompanying the administration of the 
territories to economic development. The DOP framework was 
attractive to Prime Minister Rabin because it postponed 
resolution of difficult political and security issues while 
progress was made on matters of common a g r e e m e n t . 2°^ all
went smoothly, it was generally believed, most Israeli- 
Palestinian differences could be resolved peacefully to the 
benefit of all parties, and for those which seemed unresolvable, 
reasonable compromises could be found.
Not all segments among Palestinians and Israelis were 
interested in compromise, however. The Arab-Israeli conflict had 
originally stemmed from the diametrically-opposed claims of Arabs 
and Jews to the same piece of land. Each side had made 
sacrifices and endured hardships in defending those claims and
2®5 {. . . continued) iOctober 1, 1993; "State Department Background Briefing Topic: !Conference to Support Middle East Peace," Federal News Service. iSeptember 20, 1993; E. Sciolino, "U.S. to Contribute $250 Million {in Aid for Palestinians," New York Times. September 21, 1993, p. jA l ; "Middle East: The World Reacts - Peace Agreement," Middle iEast Economic Digest. September 20, 1993; "Substantial Aid Promised to the Palestinians," Agence France Presse. October 1,1993; "Donors Pledge Two Billion Dollars for Palestinian iEconomy," Agence France Presse. October 1, 1993; "EC/Middle East: :Parliament Welcomes Council Move But Asks for More Money," ■European Information Service European Report. September 22, 1993. j
287 I Israeli News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Mayflower Hotel,Washington, D.C., Monday, September 13, 1993," Federal News Service. September [14 ?] , 1993.
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the Gaza-Jericho framework's proposed compromises fell short of 
the expectations of those who still insisted on exclusive 
possession of the disputed territory.
D . The PFLP Scrambles for a Toehold
The Palestinian organizations opposed to the peace process 
had begun to form a loose coalition, shortly after the 1991 
Madrid conference, known informally as the " . . .  ten 
f a c t i o n s . "288 The loss of the Soviet Union - and implicitly 
Syria - as benefactors compelled secular radical organizations 
like the PFLP to form alliances with organizations with which it 
had little in common, apart from an implacable hostility towards 
Israel. They consequently forged working relationships with 
Islamic fundamentalist organizations, such as Hamas and 
H i z b u l l a h , 25® not only in a desperate search for allies, but in
2®® I. Hamza, "Palestinian Radicals Urge Boycott of Moscow Talks," Reuters. January 26, 1992. See also "Fasa'il Filastiniyyah tarfudhu al-Muqarrarat al-Akhirah li al-Majlis al- Markazi al-Filastini [Palestinian Factions Reject the Latest Palestinian Central Committee Resolutions]," Al-Dustur. October 10, 1992, p. 25. According to Al-Hadaf. these organizations included: the PFLP, Hamas, the DFLP, the PFLP-GC, Fatah (presumably 'Abu Musa'), the Islamic Jihad, Fatah - the Revolutionary Council, al-Sa'iqah, the PSF, and the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party. See "'Asharah Fasa'il Filastiniyyah tad'u li Muqata'ah Mu'tamar Madrid [Ten Palestinian Factions call for Boycotting the Madrid Conference]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1076, November 3, 1991, p. 27; "Liqa'at Mukaththafah li 'Asharah Tandhimat Filastiniyyah Munahadhah li al-Hall al-Tasfawi [Intensive Meetings Among Ten Palestinian Organizations Opposed to the Liquidatory Solution]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1117, September 20, 1992, p. 7.
289 "Al-Fasa'il rafadhat Mashru' Ghazzah-Ariha: li al-Insihab Fawran min Hadha al-Mijra [The Factions Reject the Gaza-Jericho Plan: Withdraw Immediately from this Framework]," Al-Nahar.August 31, 1993, p. 5. Prior to the Soviet Union's dissolution -(continued...)
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order to counter what they regarded as Fatah's abandonment of the 
battle against Israel and to back with numerical strength their 
demand that the Palestinian delegation's withdrawal from the 
peace t a l k s . 2®° At its Fifth National Congress, called in order 
to propose solutions to its predicament, the PFLP affirmed ". . .
the positive nature of dealing with the Islamic f o r c e s .  "2®i
The need for such an alliance grew when, in recognition of 
the inevitability of direct Israeli-PLO negotiations, the PFLP 
suspended its membership on the PLO's executive c o m m i t t e e . 2®® 
Following the September signing of the DOP, the PFLP, by 
boycotting " . . .  any meetings called by 'Arafat . . .",
2®® ( . . . continued) and the Madrid conference - the PFLP regarded Hamas with suspicion, fearing persecution of its secular constituents by the rulers of the Islamic Palestinian state sought by the latter.The PFLP's suspicion persists to this day, but the organizations continue their arms-length alliance for want of a better alternative. See "The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Palestine: Focus on Hamas," Democratic Palestine, No. 51 (July- August -September , 1992), pp. 12-16.
2®° "Bi Ism Allah al-Rahman al-Rahim - Bayan Siyasi Ham Sadr 'an al-Fasa'il al-Filastiniyyah al-'Asharah: Li yakun Yawm al- Thamin wa 'Ishrin min Tishrin Awwal Yawman li al-Ghadhab al- Jamahiri dhidda Masirah al-Tasfiyyah wa al-Istislam: Na'm li al- Insihab al-Fawri min al-Mufawadhat [In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate - An Important Political Statement issued by the Ten Palestinian Factions : Let the Twenty-Eighth Day of October be a Day of Popular Anger Against the Path of Settlement and Surrender: Yes to Immediate Withdrawal from the Negotiations]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1123, November 1, 1992, pp. 18-19.
291 pFLp^ "Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi: al-Juz' al-Thalith [The Political Report: Part Three]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1150, June 13,1993, pp. 23-38.
2®2 Al-Dustur. August 26, 1993, p. 28 in FBIS-NES-93-164. August 26, 1993, p. 3.
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effectively withdrew from the PLO and vowed to establish an
alternative framework to the umbrella organization.2®®
E. The PFLP Opposes the DOP and Forms an Opposition Alliance With Palestinian Leftist and Islamic Organizations
The PFLP characterized the agreement as ". . . the biggest
blow to the Palestinian national struggle in its history because 
it does not provide answers regarding the issues of the 
settlements, Jerusalem, and 4 million Palestinians in the 
diaspora, and it means the total collapse of the PLO leadership 
because of that plan." It reaffirmed the need to strengthen ". .
. the broad front of democratic Islamic, and national forces . .
. "2®^  and established an alternative uprising leadership 
organization to the one in which Fatah participated. 2®®
By the middle of December 1993, the coalition's 
organizations - under the PFLP's leadership - had formalized 
their cooperation with the establishment of the Alliance of
2®® R. Mansur, Interview with Nayif Hawatimah, Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Sawt al-Sha'b. September 28, 1993, p. 6 in FBIS-NES-93-18 6 . September 28, 1993, p. 5. Opposition to the Israeli-Palestiniannegotiations among the PFLP, DFLP, and Hamas remained firm at the grass-roots level, as demonstrated by the victory of their supporters in a coalition against the dominant Fatah faction during the November elections to the Bir Zait University student council. See R. al-Husri, "Intikhabat Majlis Tulbah Jami'ah Bir Zait; al-Nata'ij Qad tansahibu 'ala Qadhaya Siyasiyyah [The Bir Zait University Student Council Elections: The Results are Applicable to Political Issues]," Al-Havah. November 26, 1993, p. 6 .
2®^  Al-Wasat. September 13-19, 1993, pp. 25-29 in FBIS-NES-93 -170 , September 17, 1993, pp. 7-8.
295 I PFLP Official Resigns as Deputy Speaker, " Jordan Times. October 81, 1993 in Middle East Intelligence Report. October 8, 1993 .
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Palestinian Forces in Damascus. At year's end, the 
Alliance's secular organizations were calling for the convening 
of a National Congress in order to draft the new organization's 
bylaws and establish a command structure.
In addition to forming coalitions, both the PFLP and Hamas 
carried out armed attacks in Israel and the territories against 
Israeli civilians in an effort to undermine public support for 
the peace process; among the most heinous of which included the 
killing (and subsequent disfigurement) of two Israeli hikers in 
Wadi Qelt on the West Bank by PFLP operatives^®® and the 
shooting attack on three Israelis near al-Birah by members of 
Hamas.
"Palestinian Groups Opposed to Autonomy Accord Form New Alliance," Agence France Presse, December 16, 1993. ,The alliance was composed of the PFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad; Hizbullah - Palestine, Fatah - the Uprising, the PLF, the ALF, and Fatah - the Revolutionary Council. "Radi[c]al Palestinian Groups Meet to Organize Alliance," December 30, 1993.
Al-Sharg al-Awsat, December 31, 1993, p. 3 in FBIS-NES- 94-003, January 5, 1994, p. 6. By the end of February, the factions still had not reached an agreement. "Pilgei Ha'opozitsiah Hafalastinit Sheh Hitkansu Bedameseq lo Higi'u Lehaskamah 'al Tokhnit Pe'ulah [The Palestinian Opposition Factions Meeting in Damascus Have Not Arrived at an Agreement on a Program of Action]," Ha'aretz, February 25, 1994, p. A4.
"Damascus Group Says It Killed Israeli Hikers," Reuters, October 10, 1993. See also S. Maligorne, "Deux Israéliens Tues par Balles pres de Jericho en Cisjordanie [Two Israelis Killed by Bullets Near Jericho on the West Bank]," Agence France Presse, October 9, 19 93; "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin: al- Ghadhab al-Sati' . . . Atin [The Popular Front for the Liberationof Palestine: The . . . Coming . . . Radiant Anger]," Al-Hadaf.No. 1166, October 24, 1993, pp. 11-14.
Jerusalem Ool Yisra'el in Hebrew, 0700 gmt and 1100 gmt, December 1, 1993.
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Despite their best efforts, the 'Alliance' organizations 
were unable to undermine the negotiations. By the middle of 
February 1994, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were on 
the verge of agreement on coordination between the Palestinian 
police force and the IDF. They engaged in intensive discussions, 
as well, on the transfer of civilian authority in the 
territories^®® and there were reports, towards the end of 
February, of Israeli and PLO plans to sign a final agreement on 
this issue " . . . within a few weeks.
The durability of the peace process underwent its greatest 
test, however, following the February 25 massacre of 29 
Palestinian worshipers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. j
The perpetrator, Barukh Goldstein, was a Jewish resident of '
nearby Qiryat Arba' affiliated with Kakh. Kakh is a 1
fundamentalist movement dedicated to the expulsion of the Arab I
inhabitants of Israel and the territories and the replacement of i
Israel's liberal democratic government by a theocracy based on j
M. Salim, Agence France Presse, 1118 gmt, February 16, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-033. February 17, 1994, p. 1. See also CairoMENA in Arabic, 13 0 0 GMT, February 22, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-036,February 23, 1994, p. 1.
The Cairo daily Al-Akhbar, for example, reported that'Arafat and Rabin would " . . .  meet in Cairo within 15 days . . .to sign the final agreement to transfer civilian authority."Cairo MENA in Arabic, 2110 gmt, February 22, 19 94 in FBIS-NES-94- 036, February 23, 1994, p. 1.
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Jewish religious law. Goldstein was bludgeoned to death by the 
remaining worshippers.
Although Goldstein's action met with revulsion among most 
Israelis, he was considered a hero by many of the Jewish settlers 
on the West Bank, who had for many years been involved in an 
undeclared underground war with their Arab neighbors.®®®
Radical Palestinian organizations, particularly the Popular and 
Democratic Fronts, likewise attempted to exploit the incident to 
their advantage, threatening revenge and calling upon the PLO to 
halt its negotiations with Israel.®®^ Ibrahim Yazuri, a Hamas 
leader in Gaza " . . .  called the massacre a 'golden opportunity' 
for his group to win over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian 
public."®®® Indeed, the wave of Palestinian violence in the
®®® D. Hoffman, "Unanswered Questions Surround Massacre at Hebron Mosque," Washington Post. March 8, 1994, p. A12. For an in-depth discussion of the history and ideology of the Kakh movement, see R. Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs')," Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 44-66.
®®® L. Blumenfeld, "A Time to Kill: Baruch Goldstein Practiced Medicine - and Murder - By the Book," Washington Post, March 20, 1994, pp. FI and F 4.
®®^ See, e.g. "Rejectionist Groups Threaten Retaliation Against Israel and Arafat," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 28, 1994, p. ME/1933/MED; Y. Torpstein, "Kol Ha'irgunim Hafalastiniyim Beyeriho, Kolel Fatah, Tov'im Lehafsiq et Ha Moo'm [All Palestinian Organizations in Jericho, Including Fatah,Demand a Halt to the Negotiations]," Ha'aretz, March 3, 1994, p. A3 .
®°® S. Abu Ramadan, "Gaza Opposition Condemns Arafat's Decision to go to Washington," UPI, February 27, 1994.
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territories which followed the massacre seemed to indicate that
they might succeed.®®®
The PLO immediately broke off the talks taking place, at the
time in Paris, Washington, and Cairo, while Israel and the United
States scrambled to salvage the peace process. President Clinton
immediately called for the resumption of the talks in Washington,
D.C. and the PLO agreed provided that Israel disarmed the Jewish
settlers and permitted international protection for the
Palestinians. Israel had rejected these demands in previous
discussions . ®°’^ The Israeli government immediately condemned
the act and Rabin, in a February 28 address to the Knesset,
described Goldstein as a murderer who
. . . surfaced from within a small, limited political framework. He grew up in a morass whose sources existhere and overseas. They are foreign to Judaism; they; do not belong to us. To him and those like him, we say• today; You are not part of the people of Israel; youare not part of the national democratic camp in which all in this House are partners. Many among us despise you. You are not partners to the Zionist effort. You are an alien element; you are wild weeds. Sane Judaism vomits you out from its midst.®®®
In the same address, Rabin announced the government's 
decision to carry out administrative detentions against Jewish
®®® D. Hoffman, "Rioting Spreads into Israel; Peace Talks Jeopardized as PLO Recalls Its Negotiators," Washington Post, February 27, 1994, pp. Al and A24.
®®"^ Washington Post, February 27, 1994, on.cit. .
®08 "Address by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin to the Knesset Plenum on the 25 February Massacre in Hebron - Live," Jerusalem, Ool Yisra'el in Hebrew, 14 0 7 gmt, February 28, 1994 in FBIS-NES- 94-040, March 1, 1994, pp. 31-33.
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extremists in the territories, restricting their movements, and |
disarming them. He also directed the attorney general to ". . .
investigate the possibility of outlawing Kakh and [its offshoot] 
Kahana Hay."
This was carried out on March 13, when ". . . Israel banned
[Kakh and Kahana Hai], calling them 'terrorist' and saying it 
will use military and police powers to arrest their members and 
shut down their operations in the wake of the Hebron massacre." 
The ban extended to members, supporters, and financial backers, 
who were subject to prosecution and imprisonment.®®®
On March 7, Israeli and PLO negotiators in Cairo discussed 
the resumption of talks®^® and on March 19, both sides agreed to 
resume the negotiations following the passage of a U.N. 
resolution calling upon Israel to permit an international 
presence in the territories. The resolution did not specify the 
exact nature of the presence or whether or not it would be 
capable of protecting the Palestinian residents from armed 
attack; however, its vagueness allowed for either possibility and 
enabled both sides to resume the negotiations. Shimon Peres 
sounded an encouraging note when he stated that Israeli troop
®°® D. Hoffman, "Israel Bans Jewish extremists: Crackdown Affects 2 Settler Groups," Washington Post. March 14, 1994, pp. Al and A 1 5 .
®^ ° C. Murphy, "Arafat, Israeli Discuss Resumption of Talks," Washington Post. March 8, 1994, p. A12.
1 6 8
withdrawal could begin within six weeks following the resumption 
of talks.
F. Israel-PLO Accord on Palestinian Self-Rule Signed on May 4, 1994
The resumed negotiations bore fruit on May 4 when the PLO 
and Israel signed an accord granting Palestinians limited self- 
rule in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, with negotiations to 
take place at a later date to determine the permanent status of 
the territories as a w h o l e . T h e  PLO, charged with the task 
of establishing a government and infrastructure, was ill-prepared 
to carry it out.
The organization was plagued by intense infighting at the 
highest levels, making coordination of tasks difficult. Former 
Palestinian negotiators (including Hanan 'Ashrawi and Faisal al- 
Hussaini), on whom Arafat had counted to participate in the 
authority's governing council, refused partly because they 
believed that the self-rule agreement gave Israel undue control 
over its decisions and partly due to what they regarded as 
'Arafat's tendency to monopolize p o w e r . Y a s i r  'Abid Rabbu's 
Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA) was the only major 
Palestinian organization to join 'Arafat's coalition. All other
D. Hoffman, "Israel, PLO Prepare for Talks: Peres Says Troops Could be Out of West Bank, Gaza in Six Weeks," Washington Post, March 20, 1994, p. A33.
"Israel Prepares for Withdrawal," May 4, 1994.
S. Nasrawi, "Arafat Fails to Form Autonomy Cabinet," A P , May 8, 1994.
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Palestinian groups had so far d e c l i n e d . T h i s  lack of 
credible leadership was illustrated most graphically in the 
unavailability of Palestinian officials to manage such essential 
services as health care, water supplies, and electric power.
'Arafat's inability to recruit nationally recognized leaders 
was compounded by the threats of radical Palestinian opposition 
groups to undermine the peace process - threats that had 
afflicted the Israeli-PLO negotiations from the beginning. The 
PFLP, which had castigated the DOP, vowed to ". . . continue
attacks against the Zionist in all areas which are close to the 
self-rule areas in Gaza and Jericho, especially the settlements 
and military gathering points.
L. Adoni, "Opposition to Israeli Deal Undermines New Authority," Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 1994, p. 3.
M. Parks, "PLO Unprepared to Assume Authority Called for in Pact; Mideast: Officials have not yet been Selected to Run Essential Services. It will be Weeks Before Palestinian Police Officers are Deployed," Los Angeles Times. May 6, 1994, p. 4.See also D. Hoffman, "Health Care Shortfall - A Dose of Reality for Palestinians," Washington Post. May 8, 1994, p. A23.
K. Dozier, "PLO Faces New Task: Governing. New Police Force Lacks Funds, Gear," Washington Post. May 6, 1994, p. A30. The PFLP's attitude toward the Palestinian police force has been ambiguous. Because it does not acknowledge the autonomy agreement's legitimacy, the PFLP does not recognize the political legitimacy of the police force either. The PFLP, however, does view the police force as a guarantor of stability in areas abandoned by Israel ["Opposition Groups in Gaza Meet, Say They will not Challenge Palestinian Police," IDF Radio, in Hebrew,113 0 gmt. May 7, 1994 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. May 10, 1994, ME/1994/MED; S. Peri, "Biqoret Harifah Besuriyah 'Al Haheskem Veh 'Al 'Arafat [Sharp Criticism in Syria of the Agreement and of 'Arafat]," Yedi'ot Aharonot. May 6, 1994, p.2.], although it stated earlier that should the Palestinian police attempt to arrest its members, they would defend themselves. See "Radicals Say They will Step Up Attacks Against Israel," Reuters. May 5, 1994.
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Apart from their threats to violently undermine the Israeli- 
PLO arrangement, members of the PFLP-led leftist bloc circulated 
copies of the accord and highlighted its flaws. Chief among 
these was the existence of joint Palestinian-Israeli committees 
to oversee its implementation, which opponents believed would 
give Israel effective control over Palestinian affairs. Thus, 
they were able to create opposition among Fatah and unaffiliated 
Palestinian leaders whom 'Arafat might ask to join the embryonic 
authority. Despite their initial gain, however, these groups 
have yet to reach a consensus on a viable alternative to autonomy 
and the new authority's ability to produce immediate tangible 
benefits for the resident Palestinian population will determine 
whether or not they are ultimately successful in undermining the 
agreement.
G, The Palestinian National Authority's Financial Difficulties
The unstable political climate these events generated 
worried the donor countries (the United States, the European 
Union member nations, and Japan) who, following the September 
1993 signing of the DOP, had pledged an initial installment of 
$1.2 billion in financial aid to the future Palestinian 
authority,®^®. By the time the autonomy agreement was ready to 
be implemented, little of the money pledged had actually been
317 Christian Science Monitor. May 9, 1994, op. cit.
®^® T. Lippman, "World Bank Package Holds $1.2 Billion for West Bank, Gaza," Washington Post. May 3, 1994, p. A15.
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received.®’-® In the crucial area of law enforcement, the 
Palestinian Police Force - charged with maintaining public order 
and forestalling violence by Palestinian organizations opposed to 
the agreement - had received only $20 million of the $47 million 
pledged for its start-up costs. This was apart from the police 
force's projected $90 million annual operating budget.®®®
The donor nations' reluctance to fulfil their promises of 
aid was prompted, in part, by a lack of confidence in the 
agreement's durability, as well as by concern over the fledgling 
Palestinian authority's ability to spend the funds efficiently. 
They additionally viewed with alarm what they considered the 
authority's lack of accountability for the manner in which the 
funds were spent.®®’ These concerns, while justified, ignored 
the fact that there is an element of risk in every investment.
®’® B. Burston, "Israel, PLO Join in Seeking International Aid," Reuters, May 6, 1994. The PLO estimated that $13.4 billion dollars would be needed to finance the first five years of self- rule. See K. Murphy, "Palestinians are Feeling the Money Squeeze, Security: Aid Coordinators have Gathered only $20 Million of the $90 Million They Estimate it will Take to Operate Police Force," Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1994, p. 4.
®®° Washington Post, May 6, 1994, p. A30, on. cit.
®®’ Washington Post, May 8, 1994, p. A23, o o . cit. Donornations were disturbed, as well, over 'Arafat's tendency to monopolize power and were concerned over the possibility of corruption and political favoritism in the Palestinian authority's budgeting of the donated funds. Confidential sources reported to the Washington Post that 'Arafat was seeking ways to bypass the restrictions imposed by the World Bank and the donor countries by dealing directly with individual firms interested in concluding contracts with the PLO. See D. Hoffman, "Flood of Money Promised Palestinians Barely Trickling In," Washington Post, May 29, 1994, pp. Al and A52; See also T. Lippman, "U.S. Officials Reject Arafat Terms for World Bank Aid," Washington Post, July 8, 1994, p. F3.
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While the risks accompanying payment of pledges to the 
Palestinian authority were especially great in this case, not to 
do so carried the certainty of continued turmoil and increased 
instability in the territories.
The Palestinian national movement's struggle against Zionism 
was widely regarded as Arab nationalism's first 'test case'. All 
elements of the rivalry between the Arabs and their European 
opponents were present. Palestinian Arabs, as with Arabs living 
elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa, had rediscovered 
their historical and cultural identity and were in the process of 
redefining themselves as an independent nation. The Zionist 
movement, which they regarded as European, sought to deprive them 
of their independence by establishing a Jewish commonwealth on 
what they viewed as their homeland exclusively.
• Until very recently, Palestinian ideology and strategy had 
been predicated on asserting the legitimacy of their claims to 
the disputed territory and denying those of their opponents. As 
long as they received the support of their compatriots in the 
neighboring Arab countries - and of at least one of the 
superpowers - this strategy was a feasible one. The loss of this 
support, following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, dashed all hopes 
among the Fatah-dominated mainstream Palestinian leadership of 
defeating Israel by force. They were compelled to accommodate 
themselves to their enemy's existence, while attempting to 
salvage at least a piece of their lost homeland.
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The Alliance of Palestinian Forces, wedded to the hope of 
eventually reclaiming all land under Israeli sovereignty, have 
vowed to continue the struggle until they achieve their goals. 
The PFLP, which dominates the Alliance, will continue to compete 
for public support with Palestinian organizations favoring the 
peace process, attempting to preserve the purity of the ideology 
which sustained it throughout its years of struggle. It is that 
ideology which this study will now examine in detail.
1 7 4
Part Two: The PFLP's Ideology, Structure, and Operations 
Chapter 8 : Ideology
PFLP doctrine is based on three fundamental concepts: 1) the 
existence of a rivalry between the Western nations and the Arab 
World, in which the West seeks to exploit the Arab World's 
resources either through economic influence or physical 
occupation of territory; 2) Israel's role as the West's primary 
regional partner in that process; and 3) the need for an 
ideological and organizational framework to guide Palestinians in 
combatting this trend " . . .  with revolutionary professionalism .
. ." and achieving their national aims - even over a period of
generations. ®®®
The PFLP leadership came to this conclusion while 
formulating the policies of the ANM, the PFLP's predecessor. 
Although they sought to create a distinctly Arab liberation 
ideology, based on what they considered their unique situation, 
they concluded there were only two doctrines in the world in the 
1950's: capitalism and Marxism®®® and it was Marxism-Leninism 
which opposed the West and offered the framework best suited for 
carrying out a successful, long-term revolution.®®^
For the moment, however, the ANM concentrated its efforts on 
establishing the widest possible support base - and although it 
did not yet consider itself a Marxist-Leninist organization.
®®® Matar, p. 34. 
®®® Matar, p. 45. 
3®4 Matar, p. 73.
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adopted the Leninist principle of ". . . concluding alliances
with any political position, whatever the factions are . . .
."325 Under the general nationalist slogan, "Unity. Liberation. 
Revenge," the ANM attempted to form working ties with all 
segments of Palestinian society, including the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other Islamic movements.®®® It also developed a pyramidal 
organizational structure, which conformed to that prescribed by 
Lenin for revolutionary activity.®®’’ The ANM, and later PFLP 
leadership came to rely increasingly on Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy and the PFLP eventually adopted it officially at its 
1969 National Congress, characterizing itself from then on as a 
". . . fighting Marxist-Leninist organization."®®® Marxism-
Leninism has continued to guide the PFLP since then, despite the 
drastic political changes which have occurred.®®®
  : 1
®®® Matar, pp. 46-47. • I
®®® Matar, p. 45. ;
®®’ Matar, pp. 50-54.
®®® "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin [The Popular iFront for the Liberation of Palestine]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- IFilastiniwah [The Palestinian Encyclopedia] , Vol. 2 (Damascus:Al-Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1984)(hereinafter"Palestinian Encyclopedia - PFLP"), p. 15. ;
®®® In the months following the PFLP's Fifth National Congress in February 1993, George Habash reaffirmed hisorganization's continued reliance on " . . .  historical idialectical materialism as the essence of Marxism-Leninism and 'its regulating law and not viewing it as a theory of unchanging jdogma . . . " (G. Habash [Interviewed by T. Ahmad], "Fi HadithShamil hawlah A'mal al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis li al-Jabhah îal-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin: D. Jurj Habash: Al-Jabhah Wadhihah wa Mutamassikah wa Muwahhadah, wa Ian nakhdha'u li Ibtizaz wa Irhab Ahad [In a Comprehensive Discussion on the(continued...)
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A. Marxist-Leninist Theory Explained
Marxist philosophy describes the interactions between man 
and society which it believes will eventually result in a 
community free of class distinctions. It employs dialectical 
materialism as a method of analysis and studies the relationships 
of society's various social and economic classes to the means of 
production and the level of the productive forces.®®® Karl 
Marx's Communist Manifesto, published in 1848, views history as a 
struggle in which " . . .  oppressor and oppressed . . . stood in
constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, 
now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either 
in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes."®®’
®®®(... continued)Activities of the Fifth National Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Dr. George Habash: The Front is Clear, Solid, and United and Will Never Yield to Anyone's Robbery or Terror]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1145, May 2, 1993, pp. 11-24), as an intended demonstration of the doctrine's high degree of adaptability.
®®® T. Bottomore et al., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1983)(hereinafter "Bottomore"), p. 279.
Dialectical materialism holds that historical change stems from the clash of two contradictory ideas or forces (thesis and antithesis), in which one idea or force negates the other and results in a higher plain of historical development which fuses the two elements, preserving the best of both (synthesis). See Bottomore, p. 121.
®®’ D.A. Drennen, ed. , Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto: A Full Textual Explication (Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1972)(hereinafter "Drennen"), p. 146.
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Leninism, the second component of Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
is the practical application of Marxist revolutionary theory. 
Bottomore describes Leninism as ". . . a n  approach to the seizure
of power for and by the proletariat and the building of socialist 
society, which legitimates revolutionary action by the party on 
behalf of the working class." Lenin believed that the members of 
the working class, in the absence of anyone to enlighten them, 
were unaware of the circumstances of their exploitation by those 
who controlled the means of production (the managers and 
businessmen, or 'bourgeoisie'). It was the role of the tightly- 
knit party to teach the 'exploited masses' of the working class 
the principles of revolutionary theory and political 
organization. ®®®
Lenin's theory of revolution emphasizes the centrality of 
class struggle, led by the party, as well as a theory of 
imperialism. Imperialism, in his view, was capitalism's final 
stage - a stage laying the groundwork for an international 
proletarian revolution, to be forcefully initiated and maintained 
through a ". . . transitional dictatorship of the
proletariat. "®®®
Lenin believed that the imperialist system had divided the 
world between the advanced industrial nations and the 
underdeveloped colonial societies.®®^ Members of 'Third World'
®®® Bottomore, p. 279,
®®® Id. , p. 277.
®®^ Id. , p. 280.
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Marxist-Leninist organizations like the PFLP view themselves as
the inheritors of the consequences of the imperialist system and
have developed their ideologies accordingly. For them, " . . .
the central questions have concerned the impact of metropolitan
capital [originating in the advanced industrialized nations] on
pre-capitalist social structures [in the underdeveloped
countries], the emergence of new classes, and the resulting
patterns of class alignments and class contradictions that
underlie the development of those societies and the conditions of
revolutionary struggle."®®® Simply put, these organizations
believe it to be in imperialism's interest
. . . to plunder the backward countries' resources, tobuy them at the lowest prices, to turn them into manufactured goods, and then to sell them in the markets of these countries at the highest prices.Through this process, imperialism reaps exorbitant profits and increases its capital at the expense of the people, [resulting] in their poverty, despair, and misery. ®®®
The PFLP " . . .  embraces Marxist-Leninist theory as a 
fundamental strategic line . . . "  and, like Lenin, seeks to 
employ it in order to ". . . rally the masses to gear their
efforts in a unified direction to create from this a strong force 
capable of attaining victory. "®®^  It believes in the necessity 
of ". . . a scientific revolutionary ideology . . ." to enable
the masses to ". . . understand their enemy, its strong and weak
335 Id., p. 312.
®®® strategy 1983, p. 51. 
Id., p. 131.
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points, and the forces which aid it and are allied with it," as 
well as their own capabilities.®®® An ideology explains past 
failures to the revolutionary party's constituents, outlines 
future goals, and provides a program for attaining them. In 
short, the party and its ideology constitute both a source of 
information and a guide for action against the enemy.®®®
The absence of an ideology to guide one's actions, according 
to the PFLP, " . . .  means that we fight in an improvised manner, 
that we make mistakes without being aware of their danger and the 
method for correcting them, that we delineate our political 
positions haphazardly without a clear view, the result of which 
is preparing them once again. "®‘’° The PFLP believes that this 
lack of unified guidance explains Palestinian nationalism's past 
defeats and it offers its program as a means to avert future 
failures.®^’ |
B. Identifying Friend and Foe
At the core of the PFLP's guidance program is an assessment 
which separates the organization's friends from its enemies. The 
late Mao Zedong, who was perhaps the best known Asian Marxist 
leader, first articulated this concept in his 1926 "Analysis of II
the Classes in Chinese Society," where he stressed the importance |
of ". . . uniting with our real friends in order to attack our i
®®® Id. , p. 44.
®®® Id. , page 4 6.
®^ ® Id. , p. 45.
®^ ’ Id. , pp. 43-44.
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real enemies . . . "  and distinguishing " . . .  real friends from 
real enemies."®^® While Mao confined his analysis to China, the 
PFLP extended it to include the rest of the world.
The PFLP expanded Mao's analytical scope because it believed 
that there were components of the enemy camp which its 
Palestinian constituents had overlooked. This allowed them, at 
times, to be overconfident in their abilities to contend with the 
enemy and, at other times, to unjustifiably regard the enemy as 
invincible.
When we achieve a few partial victories, a general climate prevails among the masses which belittles the adversary's forces, shows contempt for them, and imagines that the battle is easy and quick, and that we can achieve within a short time. When the enemy delivers strong blows against us, we sometimes become fatalistic about our enemy's victories, as if it were an unconquerable force.®'’®
C. The Enemy Camp's Components
In its assessment of the enemy camp, the PFLP names the major 
components (Israel, World Zionism, World Imperialism, and Arab 
Reaction), explains the threat which these elements pose to the 
Palestinian cause, and analyzes their strengths and weaknesses.
The PFLP regards Israel as its most immediate enemy, blaming 
it for having driven the Palestinians from their homes in the 
territory it now controls, and viewing it as the chief impediment
®^ ® Mao Zedong, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," (March 1926), Selected Works. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964, pp. 13-19, reprinted in M. Rejai, ed., Mao Tse-Tuna on Revolution and War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969)(hereinafter "Rejai"), pp. 138-143.
®^ ® Strategy 1983, p. 48.
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which the Palestinians face in recovering what they regard as 
their usurped homeland. The PFLP believes that Israel's primary 
strengths lie in its ability to mobilize its citizens militarily, 
and to a high degree, ". . . as a result of its perception that
it is fighting a life or death battle and that it has no choice 
but to defend itself to the last soul." It also notes Israel's 
" . . .  clear technological superiority, which is reflected in the 
level of its armaments and training, and in the dynamics of its 
movement. "
The PFLP considers Israel a product of the World Zionist 
movement - dependent upon, and integrally linked with it. It 
sees World Zionism ". . . as a racist religious movement, [which]
attempts to organize 14 million 'Jews' all over the world in 
support of Israel, in support of its aggressive presence."®’®
Apart from the moral support which Israel receives from the 
Zionist movement, the PFLP also perceives a physical threat to 
Palestinians - and Arabs in general - in the form of ". . .
manpower, money, weapons, technological and scientific expertise,
®” Id., p. 49. See also PFLP Central Committee, "Mashru' al-Barnamij al-Siyasi al-Muqaddim li al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al- Khamis li al-Jabhah [The Draft Political Program in Preparation for the Front's Fifth National Congress]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1019, August 26, 1990, (hereinafter "Fifth Congress Draft"), pp. 16-17;G. Khurshid, Palestinian Book Series - 32: A Handbook of the Palestinian Resistance Movement FSilsilah Kutub Filastiniwah - 32: Dalil Harakah al-Mugawamah al-Filastiniwah]. "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," (Beirut : The PLO Research Center, 1971)(hereinafter "Khurshid"), pp. 132-133.
®’® Strategy 1983. p. 49.
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and alliances concluded under its influence, in addition to 
propaganda support all over the world."®’®
The PFLP advocates the study of both Israel and the Zionist 
movement in great detail in order to identify their weaknesses 
and " . . .  turn them to the advantage of the liberation 
battle."®’’ One of these is the disparity of views between the 
World Zionist and Israeli components, which the PFLP believes it 
can exploit to its advantage. At present, however, the 
differences of.opinion are not great enough to damage their 
relationship " . . .  since the enemy's image in this camp [sic] 
remains mobilized and cohesive due to the high-level of technique 
and precise organization which totally mobilizes the residents of 
Israel and the Jews of the world to face us in battle."®’®
The PFLP's hostility towards Israel and the Zionist movement 
explains its current attacks on targets within Israeli-held 
territory and past attacks on people and institutions associated 
with the Zionist movement in Europe and elsewhere outside the 
Middle East.®’® Its enmity towards the United States and other
®’® Id. , pp. 49-50. See Fifth Congress Draft, p. 17; PFLP, "Al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis - Shubbat 1993 [The Fifth National Congress - February 1993]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1146, May 9,19 93, p. 10; PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Ragm (206) hawla 'Amaliyyat al-Jabhah al-Sha'b i w a h  fi Landan [Operations Statement No. 206 on the Popular Front Operations in London]. (Leaflet), August 26, 1969.
®’’ Strategy 1983. . p. 51.
®’® Id.
®’® PFLP's attempt on the life of British businessman and Zionist, Edward Sieff, in December 1973 is a salient example.
1 8 3
Western industrialized nations, as well as their Arab allies, 
stems from the threat which it perceives in the remaining two 
elements - 'World Imperialism' and 'Arab Reaction'.
As noted earlier, the PFLP believes that the 'imperialist' 
countries (the United States and the Western industrialized 
nations)®®® seek to import the natural resources of the 
underdeveloped nations - after purchasing them at low prices - 
turn them into manufactured goods, and sell those goods at 
enormous profit. In this way, the imperialist countries increase 
their " . . .  capital at the expense of the people [resulting] in 
their poverty, despair, and misery."®®’
The PFLP considers the Arab World an important target for 
the industrialized countries because it ". . . contains great
quantities of resources, the most important of which is 
petroleum, and is considered a wide market for manufactured 
goods. For this reason, imperialism seeks to preserve this 
situation so that it can continue the process of accumulating its 
resources . . . . "®®® The area's anti-Western movements, of
which the PFLP is one, can potentially hinder the industrialized 
nations' pursuit of this objective and consequently, they are ".
. . determined to strike at, and bring down, any revolutionary
®®® 4th Congress, pp. 240-241. 
®®’ Strategy 1983. p. 51.
®®® Id.
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movement which seeks to liberate our homeland and people from
this exploitation process."®®®
The PFLP views Israel as World Imperialism's local
surrogate, through which it suppresses the Arab World's anti-
Western movements, thereby preserving the status quo of Western
domination. ®®’
Israel is becoming the force and base with which colonialism defends its presence and interests in our homeland. This sort of situation creates an organic cohesion between Israel and the Zionist Movement on the one hand, and World Imperialism on the other hand, since they all have a common interest, namely to strike at the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement. ®®®
®®® Id. , p. 52. See Fifth Congress Draft, p. 18. See also 'A. Al-Qaisi, "'Ala Hamish Azmah al-Khalij: Tawilah Mustadirah fi Niyu Yurk. Mufakkirun Amairkiyyun wa 'Arab li Al-Hadaf; Al-Naft Silah al-Wilayat al-Muttahidah li al-Saitarah 'ala al^Nidham al- Dawli al-Jadid [In the Wake of the Gulf Crisis: A Round Table Discussion in New York. American and Arab Intellectuals to Al- Hadaf : Oil is the Weapon of the United States for Gaining Control of the New International Order]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1035, December 23, 1990, pp. 112-121; "Bi Munasabah Dukhul al-Intifadhah Shahriha al-Rabi' wa al-Thalathin: D. Jurj Habash yad'u li Sadd al-'Udwan al-Imbiryali 'ala Biladina [On the Occasion of the Entry of the Uprising into its Thirty-fourth Month: Dr. George Habash calls for blocking the Imperialist Invasion of Our Homeland]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1022, September 16, 1990, p. 17.
®®’ In February 1969, for example, the PFLP punctuated its bombing of the British Consulate in Jerusalem with the threat that it would "strike with the utmost severity at all who aid and support Israel and imperialist interests will be subject to the blows of our fighting units."PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliyyat Ragm (95) hawla al-Infiiar al-Kabir alati waqa'a fi al-Ounsuliwah al-Baritaniwah fi al-Ouds [Operations Statement No. 95 on the Big Explosion which Took Place at the British Consulate in Jerusalem!. (Leaflet), February 1969.
®®® Strategy 1983. p. 52. See also Fifth Congress Draft, p. 16; Al-Hadaf. May 9, 1993, p. 8.
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In practical terms, this relationship " . . .  means a great deal 
of weapons, support, and money to Israel. It means Phantom 
aircraft, the secrets of the nuclear bomb, and building an 
economy which can confront the state of siege and continuous war 
which we are trying to impose on it."®®®
Arab Reaction, the PFLP's fourth adversary, consists of Arab 
governments and individuals who benefit from cooperating with the 
industrialized nations in achieving their regional aims. It is 
represented by the local phenomena of ". . . feudalism and
capitalism."®®’ The PFLP derives its perception of 'Arab 
capitalism' from Lenin's characterization of the economic system 
in the underdeveloped countries as world-wide capitalism's 
'weakest link'. Lenin based his assessment on his belief that 
the bourgeoisie in those areas was weak, but that the local 
economies had been sufficiently industrialized to create a class­
conscious proletariat.®®® The PFLP also considers Arab 
capitalism a weak branch ". . . o f  World Capitalism, with which
it is interwoven and of which it is an integral part."®®®
In the PFLP's view, Arab capitalism's interests are 
dependent upon, and protected by, the pro-Western Arab 
governments, and its beneficiaries are consequently incapable of 
making independent political decisions. These beneficiaries are
®®® Strategy 1983 . , pp. 51-52. 
®®' Id.
®®® Bottomore, p. 280.
®®® Strategy 1983, p. 54.
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. . . the merchants, bank owners, feudalists, largelandowners, kings, princes, and sheikhs, [who] actually possess [their] millions because of their collaboration with World Capitalism. They came to possess these resources because they either own the commercial agencies for foreign capital goods, are partners in foreign banking institutions and insurance companies, or they are sheikhs, princes, or kings, heading regimes which defend and support colonialist interests, and strike at any mass movement which seeks to liberate our economy from this usurper influence.®®®
It is in the interest of these sectors, therefore, to continue
petroleum exports to the West and to ensure that their countries
remain markets for 'foreign goods and capital.'
At most, the PFLP believes, the Arab capitalist stratum can
be expected to pay lip service to the local nationalist
movements' anti-Zionist and anti-Western positions in order to "
. . resolve some of their partial contradictions with Israel or
World Imperialism in their favor." Fundamentally, however, the
forces of Arab capitalism have no choice but to oppose " . . .  =
every national liberation movement which seeks to uproot
imperialism from our homeland and build the liberated economy
which will serve the interests of the masses . . . ," and are
consequently irredeemable.®®’
360 Id.
®®’ Id. The Saudi Communist Party, for example, complained in Al-Hadaf. in 198 8, that "the Saudi authorities have resumed their attack on the nationalist forces in our country and have waged a concentrated arrest campaign, to include all of the nationalist groups, in order to silence the opposition forces." See "Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i fi al-Su'udiyyah: Hizbuna yunadhilu bi Thabbah dhidda al-Tawajud al-Amairki wa al-Atlasi fi al-Khalij [The Communist Party in Saudi Arabia: Our Party Struggles Resolutely Against the American and NATO Presence in the Gulf]," Al-Hadaf. No. 894, January 4, 1988, p. 61.
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The PFLP considers the capitalist stratum an elite minority 
in the pro-Western Arab countries and that any " . . .  growth of 
the people's authority . . . "  will necessarily lead to the 
elimination of its privileged status. Whatever conflicts this 
sector may have with Israel and the West, they are secondary to 
the more immediate threat which it faces in ". . . the mass 
movement, which seeks the total downfall of its interests and 
authority."®®® In the PFLP's view, whether or not the groups
®®® Strategy 1983. p. 55. As if to illustrate the Bahraini government's concern in this regard, the Bahraini National Liberation Front thanked the PFLP, in a 198 8 telegram to Al- Hadaf , for " . . .  your solidarity with our party in its struggle against the reactionary Bahraini authorities, your condemnation of the campaign of arrests carried out by the Bahraini intelligence services against the strugglers of our party and the unjust verdicts which they handed down lately to our comrades."
"Jabhah al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Bahraniyyah: Natamannu Mawqif Jabhatikum^Iza' Nidhal Shu'ub Mintaqah al-Khalij wa al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah [The Bahraini National Liberation Front: We Are Grateful for the Stance of Your Front Regarding the Struggle of the Peoples of the Gulf Region and Arabian Peninsula]," Al-Hadaf. No. 8 94, January 4, 1988, p. 61.
The Saudi Communist party sent a similar telegram to Al- Hadaf in 1986, complaining that the Saudi authorities were ". . .carrying out repression and terror against the rights of our people and the flower of its sons, who face prosecution, prison, and torture until death in the Saudi prison cells."
"Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i fi al-Su'udiyyah: Qararat al-Dawrah 16 wa Ittifaq 'Adin-Al-Jaza'ir min Ahm al-Qawa'id li Isti'adah Wahdah al-Munadhdhamah [The Communist Party in Saudi Arabia: The 16th Session Resolutions and the Aden-Algiers Agreement are Among the More Important Foundations for Restoring the PLO's Unity]," Al- Hadaf , No. 846, December 29, 1986, pp. 7-8.
In the same year, Al-Hadaf reported the arrest and torture of a number of anti-government activists by the Bahraini authorities. See "Kull al-Tadhamun ma' Nidhal al-Sha'b al- Bahrani [We are in Complete Solidarity with the Bahraini People's Struggle]," Al-Hadaf, No. 829, August 18, 1986, p. 31.
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which it places under the category of Arab Reaction wish to admit 
it, their interests converge with those of Israel and the West 
and consequently, they must be considered enemies of the 
Palestinian national movement to the same degree.
D . Levels of Confrontation
In addition to defining the Palestinian movement's enemies, 
PFLP doctrine also describes the three levels at which they must 
be confronted: the Palestinian, the Arab, and the international. 
At each level, it identifies specific governments, organizations, 
classes, or individuals as either friend or foe and suggests how 
the movement might advantageously exploit the characteristics of 
each.
- The Palestinian Level
At the Palestinian level, it carries out this identification
through class analysis:
One must define the forces of the revolution at the Palestinian level from a class point of view. To say that the Palestinian people, in all of its classes, is in the same revolutionary situation towards Israel and that all of the Palestinian people's classes have the same revolutionary capacity, in view of their existence without territory and outside their homeland, is idealistic and unscientific. It would be correct to say this if the entire Palestinian people lived under the same conditions, but their living conditions can be distinguished from one another and we cannot ignore this fact. Consequently, one must take note of these
Strategy 1983, p. 62. See Fifth Congress Draft, p. 18.See. e.g. PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Raam 129 hawla Nasf Khatt Anabib al-Batrul (al-Tablain) fi al-Jawlan [Statement No. 129 on the Blowing Uo of the Petroleum Pipeline (Tapline) in the Golanl, (Leaflet), May 31, 1969.
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distinctive conditions and their role in deciding whether to adopt or abandon positions.
The PFLP derived its class-based analysis of its environment 
from Mao's writings. In his "The Chinese Revolution and the 
Chinese Communist Party," written in 1939,^®® Mao identified six 
broad classes in Chinese society, all but one of which have 
parallels in the PFLP's observations.
The first of these, the landlord class, " . . .  forms the 
main social base for imperialist rule in China; it is a class 
which uses the feudal system to exploit and oppress the peasants, 
obstructs China's political, economic, and cultural development, 
and plays no progressive role whatsoever." It is, therefore, a 
'target for the revolution'.^®®
The second class which Mao identifies is the bourgeoisie - 
the middle or managerial,class. He subdivides it into the 
comprador class or haute bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, 
and the petite bourgeoisie. Mao charges that the haute 
bourgeoisie directly serves " . . .  the capitalists of the 
imperialist countries . . . "  and is sustained by them. 
Consequently, it is a 'revolutionary target'. He distinguishes 
among its subgroups only to the extent that they serve different
364 Strategy 1983. p. 59.
365 Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"(December 1939), Selected Works. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 319-326 in Rejai, pp. 144-150. See also 'Alush, p. 936.
3®® Id. , p. 144 .
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imperialist powers, whose governments set them against one 
another in order to advance their own interests.
Mao ascribes a 'dual character' to the national bourgeoisie. 
"On the one hand," he writes, "it is oppressed by imperialism and 
fettered by feudalism and consequently is in contradiction with 
both of them. In this respect, it constitutes one of the 
revolutionary forces."^®® However, this class lacks the will ".
. . to oppose imperialism and feudalism thoroughly because it is
economically and politically flabby and still has economic ties 
with imperialism and feudalism." Since this class' primary 
concern is its economic survival, expediency alone will determine 
whether it allies itself with the haute bourgeoisie or the 
revolutionary f o r c e s .
Mao divides the third class of society (the petite 
bourgeoisie) into four sub-groups: intellectuals, small 
businessmen, craftsmen, and professionals. Members of this class 
" . . .  all suffer under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, 
and the big fhautel bourgeoisie, and they are being driven ever 
nearer to bankruptcy or destitution." For this reason, Mao 
considers them - as long as they are under proletarian leadership 
- ". . . one of the motive forces of the revolution . . . "  and ".
. . a reliable ally of the proletariat."^'®
®^'' Id., p. 145 
®^® Id.
3®^  Id. , p. 146 
Id.
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Mao includes student youth in his intellectual sub-group.
In 1939, he characterized them as living . . i n  fear of 
unemployment or having to discontinue their studies," and as 
such, they " . . .  tend to be quite r e v o l u t i o n a r y . B e c a u s e  
intellectuals possess 'bourgeois' scientific knowledge and ". . .
a keen political sense," which they can use to organize and lead 
revolutionary activity, as well as disseminate Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, no revolution can succeed without them.^ "^  ^ Mao faults 
them, however, for tending ". . . to be subjective and
individualistic, impractical in their thinking, and irresolute in 
action . . . ." Until they have totally committed themselves to
the revolutionary cause, there is always the danger that the 
intellectuals might " . . .  drop out of the revolutionary ranks at 
critical moments.
The small businessmen employ fcew or no workers and are 
constantly at the edge of bankruptcy ". . . as a result of
exploitation by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie, and the 
usurers." The relatively numerous craftsmen also employ few or 
no workers and ". . . possess their own means of production."
Professionals experience similar conditions. Because the members 
of these sub-groups are not in a position to exploit the 
proletariat, and are themselves taken advantage of, they are 
among the revolution's potential allies." Mao faults them for
Id. , p. 147 
Id.
Id.
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being " . . .  easily influenced by the bourgeoisie . . . "  and that 
" . . .  consequently, we must carry on revolutionary propaganda 
and revolutionary work among them.
Mao divides his fourth social class into three sub-groups : 
the wealthy, middle-class, and poor peasants. The wealthy 
peasants constitute " . . .  the rural bourgeoisie . . ." and most
of them " . . .  are semi-feudal in character, since they let a 
part of their land, practice usury, and ruthlessly exploit the 
farm laborers." Despite this similarity to the social classes 
which the revolution seeks to eliminate, the wealthy peasants 
redeem themselves in Mao's eyes because generally, they too 
perform manual labor. They serve a temporary purpose in anti­
imperialist and can be expected to at least remain neutral in the 
struggle against the landlord class. One should not regard them, 
then, ". . . a s  belonging to the same class as the landlords and
should not prematurely adopt a policy of liquidating the rich 
peasantry,
Although the members of the middle-class peasantry are 
economically self-sufficient, they, unlike the wealthy peasants, 
can only put money aside in plentiful years and only occasionally 
hire labor. Like the petite bourgeoisie, Mao considers the 
middle-class peasants to be ". . . exploited by imperialism, the
landlord class, and the bourgeoisie." Possessing no political 
rights, " . . .  [n]ot only can the middle peasants join the anti-
Id.
I d .  , p .  1 4 8
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imperialist revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, but they can 
also accept socialism," which, in the peasantry's case means 
collectivization. Consequently, " . . .  the whole middle 
peasantry can be a reliable ally of the proletariat and . . .  an 
important motive force of the revolution."^'®
Landless tenant farmers form the poor peasantry, according 
to Mao, and constitute the urban proletariat's rural counterpart, 
its " . . .  natural and most reliable ally," and " . . .  the main 
contingent of China's revolutionary forces.
Bankrupted peasants constitute the bulk of the Chinese 
proletariat, which makes them natural allies. Mao includes large 
and small-scale industrial workers - as well as farm laborers - 
within this class. Its members possess qualities which Mao 
believes render them capable of forming the vanguard of the 
revolution. Of all the sectors of his revolutionary front, Mao 
considers the proletariat the class most likely to persist in the 
struggle " . . .  because it is subjected to a threefold oppression 
(imperialist, bourgeoisie, and feudal) which is marked by a 
severity and cruelty seldom found in other countries." Mao 
further claims that the proletariat has been led by the communist 
party since it ". . . appeared on the revolutionary scene . . . "
and is consequently " . . .  the most politically conscious class 
in China.
'^^® Id.
Id. , p. 149
Id. / p. 149.
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Despite its weaknesses (relatively small size, youth, and 
low educational level), the proletariat constitutes the 
revolution's primary force. Mao believes that ultimate success 
requires the proletariat to unite in a common front with other 
classes in Chinese society who have an interest in changing the 
established order: "Among all the classes in Chinese society, the 
peasantry is a firm ally of the working class, the urban petty 
bourgeoisie is a reliable ally, and the national bourgeoisie is 
an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent. As the
revolution's driving force, the proletariat is also its focus.
For Mao, this sector is the revolution's primary beneficiary and 
he analyzes the petite bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie 
in terms of their utility to the working class.
The final societal class which Mao analyzes is the vagrant 
class. He blames its existence on ". . . China's status as a
colony and semicolony." Because its members are denied 
legitimate employment, they are forced to earn a living by 
illegitimate means as ". . . robbers, gangsters, beggars, and
prostitutes . . . ." He considers this sector unstable and 
believes that its members are just as likely to be co-opted by 
the enemy as they are to fight against it. Even if they do join 
the revolution, vagrants " . . .  become a source of roving-rebel 
and anarchist ideology . . . "  and therefore, one must attempt to
I d . ,  p . 1 5 0 .
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remold them and ". . . be on guard against their
destructiveness."^®
The PFLP's own class analysis, of course, differs with Mao's 
in a number of important respects for the simple and obvious 
reason that the Palestinians do not live under the same 
circumstances as China's inhabitants did in the late 1930's and 
early 1940's. Mao analyzed a Chinese society whose members 
occupied well-defined social and economic castes. Palestinian 
society, on the other hand, had been altered by the 1948 exodus. 
The refugees' loss of property and economic status temporarily 
blurred class distinctions and the Palestinian social structure 
is still in the process of reconstituting itself. Consequently, 
the PFLP's analysis of the Palestinian class structure 
necessarily involves fewer sectors than did Mao's examination of 
Chinese society. f
The PFLP identifies three distinct classes at the 
Palestinian level: the proletariat (workers and peasants), the 
petite bourgeoisie, and the haute bourgeoisie. As in Mao's 
assessment, the workers and peasants are the revolution's 
vanguard^i and primary beneficiaries, while the petite 
bourgeoisie plays a supportive role. The PFLP considers the 
haute bourgeoisie an ally of imperialism - and therefore an enemy
3®® Id.
See. e.g. S. Ahmad, "Dawr al-Tabaqah al-'Amilah wa al Harakah al-Niqabiyyah fi al-Intifadhah [Role of the Working Class and the Union Movement in the Uprising]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1082, December 22, 1991, pp. 78-81.
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of the revolution - but perceives within it latent anti-Israel 
sentiments which can be aroused, at the appropriate time, to 
serve the revolution.
For the PFLP, the workers and peasants are " . . .  [t]he 
material of the Palestinian revolution, its pillar, and its 
fundamental forces . . . . included in this sector are the
". . . . impoverished petite bourgeoisie."®®® Members of this
class form the destitute majority of Palestinians who " . . .  fill 
all the camps, villages, and poor sections of the cities." It is 
this environment which, in the PFLP's view, prepares them 
mentally and physically to persist in what it expects will be a 
long, drawn-out struggle. Like Mao, the PFLP believes that the 
" . . .  debilitating daily living conditions . . . "  under which 
the workers and peasants live motivate them ". . . t o  fight and
die," and that consequently, their continued participation in the 
revolution is assured.®®^
The PFLP considers itself the tightly-knit party which, like 
Lenin's, seeks to provide a clearly defined program to guide the 
workers and peasants and " . . .  arm them with the awareness, 
organization, and means to fight . . . ." It characterizes the
proletariat as the " . . .  backbone of the revolution . . . "  and
®®^  Strategy 1983. p. 64. 
®®® Id. , p. 63 .
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takes it upon itself to protect its members from " . . .  
oscillation, deviation, or miscarriage."®®®
The PFLP, like Mao, considers the professional and 
intellectual members of the petite bourgeoisie allies of the 
worker and peasant classes and has temporarily assigned them to 
lead the revolution until the proletariat is ready to assume the 
task.®®® Because the economic future of the petite 
bourgeoisie's members is uncertain - in that some of them will 
prosper and become part of the haute bourgeoisie while others 
will not and remain allies of the workers and peasants - it is at 
times in their interest to support the revolution and at others, 
to oppose it, depending on how this will affect their 
interests. ®®"^
The PFLP finds the possibility that the petite bourgeoisie 
might subordinate the proletariat's interests to its own - while 
leading the revolution - particularly worrisome. It fears the 
petite bourgeoisie's " . . .  clever ability to benefit from this 
alliance [with the working class] by infiltrating the 
revolution's leadership position, as long as the revolution's
®®® Strategy 1983.. p. 65. See Fifth Congress Draft, p. 2; H. S. al-Maw'id, "Bi Munasabah al-Awwal min Ayar: Lamahat min Nidhal al-Tabaqah al-'Amilah al-Filastiniyyah [On the First of May: Glimpses of the Struggle of the Palestinian Working Class]," Al- Hadaf , No. 1052, May 5, 1991, pp. 12-15.
386 Strategy 1983, p. 70. See Fifth Congress Draft, pp. 2 and
1 3  .
®®^  Strategy 1983. p. 71. See also Khurshid, p. 117.
1 9 8
classes, represented by the workers and peasants, do not possess 
awareness, organization, and competence."®®®
Because the petite bourgeoisie's support for the revolution 
is not consistent, its members must be replaced by members of the 
proletariat in the leadership as soon as they are capable of 
doing so. Once this occurs, the petite bourgeoisie can ". . . b e
organized within the Palestinian organizations [such as Fatah and 
the PLO's administrative apparatus] which content themselves with 
general liberation slogans, avoid ideological clarity, and live 
an organizational life which does not require it [sic] to go 
beyond its capabilities . "®®^
The proletariat (which, unlike the petite bourgoisie, is 
guided by a sound revolutionary theory) then, must seize control 
of the situation and ensure that the latter does not waver from 
the PFLP's program. The proletariat accomplishes this by 
cooperating with the petite bourgeoisie when their interests 
coincide and opposing it when they do not. This ensures the 
primacy of working class interests. The PFLP believes that ". .
. [a]lliance at the appropriate time, according to the programs, 
and conflict at the appropriate time, over a tangible position or 
issue, is the way to settle the matter of leadership in the 
Palestinian arena in the interest of the inhabitants of the camps
t|390
®®® Strategy 1983. p. 68.
®®® Id. , p. 89.
®®® Id. , p. 70.
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While the PFLP remains uncertain of the petite bourgeoisie's 
position towards the revolution, it has no doubt about where the 
interests of the Palestinian haute bourgeoisie lie. Like Mao, 
the PFLP characterizes the haute bourgeoisie as an ally of 
imperialist interests. The members of this class serve as 
middle-men " . . .  for foreign goods and foreign insurance 
companies and banks." Since the PFLP's goal is ". . . t o  put an
end to imperialism and its existence and interests in our 
homeland . . . "  and " . . .  inasmuch as our battle against Israel 
is simultaneously a battle against imperialism," the haute 
bourgeoisie has no choice but to oppose the revolution.®®^
The PFLP recognizes that there are members of the haute 
bourgeoisie, " . . .  living outside Palestine," who are motivated
by guilt and sentimentality to support " . . .  commando activity . 
. ." through monetary contributions. These exceptions, however,
" . . . d o  not mean that we should ignore the general law which
will control this class's general position on the 
revolution. "®®^
The PFLP's mistrust of the Palestinian upper classes is 
based on its perception - shared by Israeli historian Benny 
Morris - that it was the Palestinian Arab workers and peasants 
who fought and died against the British and the Zionists in the 
1930's and 40's, while the upper classes confined their 
resistance to civil protests.
®®" Id. , p. 72.
®®® Id. , p. 74. See Fifth Congress Draft, p. 13
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In the late 1940's, 28 of the 32 members of the AHC [Arab Higher Committee. See above.] were from these elite families, and the remaining four were bourgeoisie. None were peasants or proletarians. Some 24 were of urban extraction, and only four or five were originally from the countryside. There was, and remained through 1948, a wide gulf of suspicion and estrangement between urban and rural Arab Palestine, which was to underlie the lack of co-ordination between the towns and their rural hinterland during the hostilities. The elite families by and large had no tradition of, or propensity for, national service and their members did not do military service with the Turks, the British or neighboring Arab armies. Few of the military leaders of the 1936-8 rebellion were from the ruling families. It was mainly a peasant rebellion, with the town-dwellers restricting themselves largely to civil protest (demonstrations, riots and a general strike) and, at a later stage, to interfactional terrorism.®®®
This analysis of the Palestinian class structure prior to 1949 is
consistent with the PFLP's current perception of the lower
classes as the revolution's strike force, which is not only
capable of, but has an interest in, bearing the brunt of the
responsibility during the struggle. The upper classes, at best,
can be expected to assume less hazardous tasks, or at worst, ally
themselves with the revolution's enemies.
In conducting the revolution at the Palestinian level, the
PFLP has, in the past, sought to form an alliance between
proletarian forces like itself and organizations like Fatah and
the PLO's umbrella organization, in which each class operates
3®3 Morris, p. 12. See also Strategy 1983. p. 56; "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah fi al-Bahrain: Lan taflahu Juhud al-A'da' fi Iqtila' al-Thawrah al-Filastiniyyah [The Popular Front in Bahrain: The Enemy's Efforts to Uproot the Palestinian Revolution Will Not Succeed]," Al-Hadaf, No. 846, December 29, 1986, p. 9.
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according to its abilities and particular interests,®®^ but in 
which the proletariat exercises supreme authority.
- The Regional Level
In the Middle East, the PFLP divides the Arab countries 
between those with 'reactionary', pro-western governments and 
those with 'revolutionary regimes', who are anti-western and 
would support the PFLP's program.
The pro-western governments of countries such as Jordan and 
Lebanon, as well as Persian Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, continue, in the PFLP's view, to be ruled by " . . .  Arab 
capitalism and feudalism."®®® Their regimes' interests are 
linked with " . . .  world imperialism, led by the United States." 
While these countries are, to a certain extent, hostile towards 
Israel, the PFLP believes that this hostility is temporary and 
tactical, and never expressed at the expense of links with 
Israel's benefactors in the West.®®® Not only does the PFLP not 
view these governments as threats to Israel, but, as will be 
shown later, sees them as Israel's secret allies.®®"^
394 Strategy 1983. p. 80. See Fifth Congress Draft, pp. 14-15.
®®® Id. , p. 85. 
®®® Id. , p. 86.
®®'^ See, e.g. 'A. Al-Qaisi, "'Ala Hamish Azmah al-Khalij : Tawilah Mustadirah fi Niyu Yurk. Mufakkirun Amairkiyyun wa 'Arab li Al-Hadaf: Al-Naft Silah al-Wilayat al-Muttahidah li al- Saitarah 'ala al-Nidham al-Dawli al-Jadid [In the Wake of the Gulf Crisis: A Round Table Discussion in New York. American and Arab Intellectuals to Al-Hadaf: Oil is the Weapon of the United States for Gaining Control of the New International Order]," Al- Hadaf . No. 1035, December 23, 1990, p. 117.
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The PFLP regards the 'revolutionary regimes' as allies, due 
to their hostility . . t o  imperialism, Zionism, Israel, and 
Arab reaction . . . ," and because it believes that they have
transformed their societies' " . . .  economic structure in the 
direction of socialism." Their battle strategies " . . .  are 
those of the petite bourgeoisie class," which the PFLP identifies 
as occupying the leadership positions of these governments.®®®
This class, which does not possess the durability of the 
proletariat, proved itself incapable of confronting Israel during 
the June 1967 war and so the relationship with it, as with the 
petite bourgeoisie at the Palestinian level, " . . .  must be one 
of alliance and conflict at the same time; alliance with them 
because they are hostile to imperialism and Israel and 
contradiction with them over their strategy for fighting the 
battle." The PFLP opposes the petite bourgeoisie's strategy - 
which entails fighting Israel and imperialism through a 
conventional military structure and allowing for a peaceful 
solution to the conflict - while it advocates moving towards ". .
. a guerrilla war and a popular liberation war, which the masses, 
led by the working class, wage on the widest possible front."®®®
As this study will later demonstrate, the two strategies 
necessarily conflict, the former being appropriate for 
consolidating and maintaining political power, and the latter for 
attempting to seize it.
®®® Id. , p. 94 
®®® Id., p. 95
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The PFLP's strategy for 'confronting imperialism' at the 
international level, as outlined in the early 1980's, quickly 
became antiquated with the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. With 
the loss of the Soviet Union as its primary source of moral and 
material support for its efforts,^®® the PFLP has, for all 
practical purposes, been set adrift. With its headquarters 
located in Damascus, and its very existence currently dependent 
upon Syria's goodwill,^®®- the PFLP is in no position to carry 
out its strategy against Israel and the West unless its host 
allows it to do so. In apparent anticipation of an eventual 
Syrian-Israeli peace treaty, the PFLP stated in January 1994 that 
it had, in any case, shifted the bulk of its operations to 
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza and that any resulting reduction 
in Syrian support would oàly marginally affect its operational 
capabilities.^® Nonetheless, the PFLP continued to search for
®^° 4th Congress, p. 236. See also Khurshid, pp. 133-134.In a communication to the Bahraini National Liberation Front, published in Al-Hadaf in 1987, the PFLP promised that "the forces of the Arab National Liberation movement, in cooperation with the revolutionary forces, with the friendly and faithful Soviet Union at their vanguard [emphasis added], will thwart all [imperialist] plans." "Habash yahni'u bi Dhikra Ta'sis Jabhah al-Tahrir al- Watani al-Bahraini: Sanuwasilu al-Juhud li Isti'adah Wahdah M.T.F. 'ala Asas Wataniyyah [Habash Greets the Anniversary of the Founding of the Bahraini National Liberation Front: We Will Make Every Effort to Restore PLO Unity on a Nationalist Basis]," Al- Hadaf , No. 8 53, February 23, 1987, p. 16.
401 Id., p. 235.
U. al-Rantisi, Interview with 'Abd al-Rahim Malluh, member of the PFLP Politburo, Al-Mustacbal, January 13, 1994, p. 10 .
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alternative host countries, cultivating ties with Iraq, among 
others.^®®
Syria too must contend with its loss of Soviet support.
Since the Soviet Union's demise, it has reconsidered its policies 
towards the United States and its allies, to the point of 
participating in the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq in 1990 and 
1991 and taking the unprecedented step of negotiating directly 
with Israel, with the declared aim of concluding a peace treaty 
with its mortal enemy.
All of this, of course, directly contradicts the principles 
outlined in the PFLP's 1983 strategy, which views the United 
States as the head of the enemy imperialist camp and Israel as 
the usurper of its homeland - a foe which must be defeated, not 
accommodated. Yet, maintaining strong relations with the Syrian 
government has remained an important policy goal of the PFLP/ 
which seeks ". . . a close Palestinian-Syrian alliance on a clear
nationalist and pan-Arab basis in order to rally the forces of 
the Palestinian and Syrian peoples in confronting the Zionist- 
imperialist alliance and to guarantee common nationalist and pan- 
Arab interests." In the desperate hope that Hafiz Al-Assad's
4®® This process began shortly after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and has continued to the present. See "Fi Awwal Ziyarah mundhu 'Asharah A'wam: Habash yazuru Baghdad wa yajri fiha Muhadathat Hamah ma' al-Ra'is al-'Iraqi Saddam Hussain wa Taha Yasin Ramadhan wa Tariq 'Aziz [In his First Visit in Ten Years; Habash visits Baghdad holds Important Discussions with Iraqi President Saddam Hussain, Taha Yasin Ramadhan, and Tariq 'Aziz]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1021, September 9, 1990, pp. 10-11; Baghdad, INA in Arabic, 182 0 gmt, January 22, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-015. January 24, 1994, p. 35.
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government may have retained an ounce of Arab nationalist 
integrity, the PFLP now endeavored (prior to its split from the 
PLO in September 1993) to ". . . safeguard the right of the PLO
and its factions to engage in political, organizational, mass, 
and informational activity . . in Syria.
Syria's reluctance to permit the PFLP to engage in attacks 
on Israel extends to neighboring Lebanon, where it exerts a 
controlling influence over the government of President Ilyas 
Hi-rawi. In April 1991, the Lebanese government implemented a 
decision to extend its authority over all of Lebanon by ordering 
all unofficial armed groups to demobilize.^*® It lent 
credibility to this policy by capturing and trying four PFLP 
members, armed with automatic weapons, who were on their way to 
attack Israeli targets in southern Lebanon.^®®
Even pridr to this decisive action, the PFLP seemed to sense 
a deterioration in relations with its Lebanese hosts and outlined 
a proposal, in the preparatory document to its Fifth National
®^^  Fifth Congress Draft, p. 12.
®^® "Boueiz: D'Abord la Sourverainete et la Dignité du Liban [Boueiz: Before All Else, Lebanon's Sovereignty and Dignity],"L'Orient Le Jour. April 2, 1991, p. 3.
“^®® "Lebanese Troops Capture Guerrilla Squad, " Reuters. April 19, 1991; "Four Palestinians Arrested in South Lebanon," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, April 19, 1991. See also "Al- Rafiq Abu Ahmad Fu'ad yad'u li Waqf al-Qital wa Himlat al-I'tiqal wa al-Bad' bi al-Hiwar [Comrade Abu Ahmad Fu'ad calls for Halting the Fighting and Beginning the Dialogue]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1059, July 7, 1991; 'A. Sadiq, "Niz' al-Silah al-Filastini fi LubnanIan yu'addi ila Insihab Isra'ili min al-Janub! [Disarming the Palestinians will not Lead to an Israeli Withdrawal from the South]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1060, July 14, 1991, pp. 22-23.
2 0 6
ZfctitisUsîiiÂÈêAiSikidsisii.
Congress, which called for: 1) improving its ties with the 
Lebanese government; 2) making arrangements for continuing armed 
attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory and for protecting its 
camps from attacks by the Israelis and hostile Lebanese; 3) 
concluding agreements with the Lebanese government to guarantee 
freedom of movement, organization, and activity for Palestinians 
in Lebanon; and 4) strengthening alliances with nationalist 
organizations and forging ties with Islamic organizations.
These measures, if successful, would restore the PFLP to its 
semi-autonomous status in the country, enabling it to resume its 
cross-border attacks against Israel. For now, however, the PFLP 
must bide its time and wait.
- The International Level
During the 1980's, the PFLP regarded the Soviet Union as the 
principle benefactor of leftist national liberation movements 
world-wide and credited the Viet Cong's successes against the 
United States in Vietnam to Soviet support for that effort.^®®
It also considered the Soviet Union and the communist bloc a
Fifth Congress Draft, pp. 11-12. The PFLP defended its armed presence in Lebanon by claiming that its operatives " . . .  ne sont pas des milices engendrees par la guerre au Liban . . ., " but rather " . . .  [i]Is étaient presents dans ce pays bien avant la guerre, pour combattre l'ennemie sioniste et libérer la Palestine" and that the PLO ". . . n e  fera pas obstacle al'extension de l'authorite libanaise sur tout le territoire libanais." "'Les Palestiniens Decide a Garder Leurs Armes au Liban' Affirme Zeid Wehbe ['The Palestinians Decide to Retain their Arms in Lebanon', Zeid Wehbe Asserts]," L'Orient Le Jour. April 2, 1991, p. 3.
°^® 4th Congress, p. 23.
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deterrent to aggression by the United States and its allies 
against third world countries.^®®
The national liberation movements which formerly relied on 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for support 
sought, in the PFLP's view, to bring about a . . national
democratic revolution . . ." in Third World countries which
became independent following World War II. The PFLP considered 
this revolution necessary for the defeat of neo-colonialism, a 
euphemism for what it viewed as undue western influence over the 
economies of these nations. It was these liberation movements 
that would overthrow what it deemed the local bourgeois 
leadership that served as a mere agent for western capitalism and 
rendered the population " . . .  incapable of accomplishing the 
economic liberation of their countries.
In furthering its 'goal of combatting western economic and 
political influence in the Arab world, to which it attributed 
Israel's continued existence, the PFLP committed itself to ". . .
[c] ontributing actively, side by side with the forces of 
liberation, progress, peace and socialism, to the international 
struggle against imperialism, fascism and reaction."
Specifically, this meant " . . .  [c]ultivating and consolidating
relations with the national liberation movements in the 'Third 
World'," as well as ". . . with the progressive and democratic
forces, and the working class parties in the capitalist
®^® I d . ,  p. 2 1
""® I d . ,  p. 19
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countries. The PFLP's expressions of support for such
organizations as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in 
El Salvador^^®, the National Liberation Front in Bahrain^^®, 
and the Japanese Red Army^®^ are derived from this policy.
The PFLP's international strategy for the 1990's continues 
to advocate strengthening its alliance with " . . .  the socialist 
countries, the working class parties in the capitalist countries, 
the international forces of democracy and peace, and the 
nationalist and progressive parties, forces, and regimes in the 
third world countries on the basis of the goals of the common 
struggle.
Id. , p. 237. 
4^ Id., p. 240.
4^ ® Id., p. 242. See also "Saif Bin 'Ali, Al - Amin al - 'Am li Jabhah al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Bahraniyyah: Intilaqah al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah ashamat Kathiran fi Ta'miq wa Tawsi' Nidhalat al- Sha'b al-Filastini al-Batal [Saif Bin 'Ali, Secretary General of the Bahraini National Liberation Front: The Popular Front's Founding has Done Much to Deepen and Widen the Heroic Palestinian People's Struggles]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1035, December 23, 1990, p.32 .
414 Dhikra al-Hadiya wa al-'Ishrin li Intilaqah al-Jabhahal-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin: Al-Jaish al-Ahmar al-Yabani [The Twenty-first Anniversary of the Founding of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - The Japanese Red Army]," Al-Hadaf, No. 946, February 12, 1989, p. 24. See also "Al-Jaish al-Ahmar al-Yabani: Musammimun 'ala Ta'ziz al-Nidhal al-Mushtarak dhidda al-Imbiryaliyyah wa al-Sahyuniyyah [The Japanese Red Army: We are Determined to Invigorate the Joint Struggle Against Imperialism and Zionism]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1035, December 23, 1990, p . 35 .
4®-® Fifth Congress Draft, p. 23. See also Al-Hadaf. June 13, 1993, pp. 32-33.
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international bloc," served only to highlight its nomadic 
condition.
Despite the absence of a firm alliance with any government 
or organization capable of providing it with political and 
material support, the PFLP continues to search for a means to 
perpetuate its long-standing policy of opposing the United States 
and its allies. In the Middle East, the pro-western Arab states 
remain the objects of the PFLP's wrath for their alliance with 
the United States and their alleged complicity in that country's 
support for Israel, the Palestinians' primary foe in the region. 
The PFLP's efforts then, continue to focus on finding the means 
to eradicate Israel and strike at local western interests, rather 
than on altering its aims, in recognition of the limits imposed 
upon it by its newly-acquired itinerant status.
4^"^ Fifth Congress Draft, p. 24. See also Al-Hadaf, June 13, 1993, pp. 32-33.
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Chapter 9: Structure
While the PFLP's ideology defines its broad strategic aims, 
its structure and bylaws furnish it with the means to carry them 
out. The PFLP's Nidham Al-Dakhili or Internal Rules provides a 
comprehensive guide to its organizational structure and 
membership regulations. The 1973 edition, included in the 
English-language Tasks of the New Stage, and the 1981 edition, is 
published as a separate document by the PFLP's Information 
Department. A careful comparison of the two editions reveals 
significant disparities. For example, in the 1981 edition, the 
minimum period of PFLP membership, before being eligible for 
election to the Central Committee, was lengthened from three to 
ten years (Article 29) and the 1973 edition's maxim that " . . .  
every politically conscious member is a militant and every 
militant member is politically conscious . . . "  (Article 16) was 
dropped from the 1981 v e r s i o n . Consequently, this evaluation 
will refer to the 1981 edition in order to remain as current as 
possible, mindful that the PFLP may have issued subsequent 
versions of the Internal Rules.
A. Organizational Levels
The PFLP's organizational subdivisions are organized both 
geographically or functionally. They may pertain either to a 
geographic area or an area of responsibility (the External 
Branch, for example, which handles the PFLP's foreign 
operations). The PFLP's base organizations are circles and
418 This principle was retained, however, in Strategy 1983
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cells, which meet at members' homes or workplaces. These, in 
turn, are grouped into leagues, districts, regions, and branches. 
Thereafter, the PFLP is organized at what it calls the "national 
level," where the top leadership makes its decisions through the 
National Congress, the Central Committee, and the Politburo 
{Article 25(1)).
The National Congress is the PFLP's supreme governing body. 
The PFLP Central Committee is the PFLP's highest authority 
between National Congress sessions and the PFLP Politburo is its 
highest authority between Central Committee sessions (Article 
25(2) (a)) . The PFLP operates similarly at the branch, regional, 
and district levels. The congresses at these levels are called 
Supervisory Congresses, and Supervisory Commands govern the 
organization between Congress sessions (Article 25(2) (b)) .
Theoretically, PFLP members choose their leaâers through 
free elections (Article 25(3)). They vote for candidates by 
secret ballot and are permitted to criticize the candidates' 
positions (Article 25(4)). The PFLP holds its elections 
according to the principles of "democratic centralism." In terms 
of elections, this means that although voting occurs at the base 
level, the National Congress must approve the candidate lists.
It may even remove the names of candidates it does not like. 
Should the National Congress reject the entire candidate list, it 
may nominate its own. The National Congress may also censor the 
candidate lists at the supervisory levels (Article 25(5)).
2 1 3
At the Central Committee and Politburo levels, a certain 
percentage of the members are automatically "reelected," thereby 
satisfying the "continuity" principle (Article 25(6)). The PFLP 
also permits interim elections under certain circumstances, but, 
the Internal Rules do not specify what those circumstances are 
(Article 25(7)).
B. Chain of Command
Local PFLP organizations may decide on matters pertaining to 
the special conditions under which they operate. In case of a 
conflict between local-level decisions and those of the higher- 
level bodies, the letter's decisions prevail (Article 25(10)).
Democratic centralism permits free discussion of unresolved 
issues. However, once these issues have been settled, discussion 
ceases and PFLP members must adhere unfailingly to whatever 
decisions have been made. If a lower-level organizational group 
determines that a high-level decision does not apply to its 
particular situation, it must ask the higher-level organization 
to revise it. The higher-level organization, however, may compel 
the local organization to implement its decision nevertheless 
(Article 25 (11)) .
Higher-level PFLP organizations also have the final say on 
forming new PFLP cells and dissolving existing ones (Article 
25(12)) . All organizational levels may establish and operate 
whichever committees or organizations they deem necessary to help 
them to accomplish their missions (Article 25(13)).^^^
4^ ® Khurshid, pp. 114-115.
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As previously stated, the National Congress is the PFLP's 
supreme governing body (Article 27(1)). It is elected to a four- 
year term (Article 27(2)) and consists of elected representatives 
from the PFLP's organizational groups (Article 27(3)). The 
National Congress discusses and decides upon Central and 
Oversight Committee reports (Article 27(7)(a)), formulates and 
amends the PFLP's programs and internal rules (Article 27(7) (b)), 
discusses and decides upon "revolutionary issues (Article 
27(7)(c))," and elects Central and Oversight Committee members 
(Article 27 (7) (d)) .
The Central Committee is the PFLP's second-highest governing 
body whose members simultaneously serve in the National Congress 
(Article 27(4)). The Central Committee may appoint a limited 
number of "employee members (a'dha' 'Amilin)," as long as their 
number does not exceed fifteen percent of the elected members.
It may also appoint a certain number of observers as long as 
their number does not exceed one-third of the "employee members 
(Article 27(5))."
The Central Committee acts on the National Congress' behalf 
when the National Congress is not in session. It carries out the 
National Congress' and Politburo's decisions (Article 28(2)).
The National Congress elects the Central Committee to a four-year 
term, designates its members and their alternates, and fills 
empty seats with alternates. One must be a PFLP member for at 
least nine years to be eligible for Central Committee membership 
(Article 28(3)) .
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The Central Committee meets once every six months at the 
Politburo's invitation (Article 28(4)). It elects the PFLP 
General Secretary, Deputy-General Secretary, and the Politburo's 
members and alternates (Article 28(5)). Its primary task is to 
discuss and decide upon Politburo reports. It has the power to 
declare a state of emergency within the PFLP and to completely or 
partially suspend the Internal Rules (Article 28(7)).
The Politburo administers the PFLP between Central Committee 
-sessions (Article 29(1)) and implements the decisions of both the 
National Congress and the Central Committee (Article 29(2)) . The 
Central Committee elects the Politburo's members and fills its 
vacant seats. One must have been a PFLP member for at least ten 
years in order to be eligible to serve on the Politburo (Article 
29(3)).
The PFLP's control mechanisms at the branch, regional, and 
district levels are similar to that at the highest level in most 
respects. There are exceptions, however. The Branch Congress is 
elected to a two-year term and its members must have served the 
PFLP for at least five years (Article 30 (1) (a)) . It is convened 
at least once a year (Article 30(1)(c)). It also elects 
representatives to the National Congress (Article 30 (1) (e)) . The 
Regional and District Congresses are also elected to a two-year 
term (Article 31(1)(b)) and are convened at least once a year 
(Article 31(1) (c)) . The Regional and District Supervisory 
Commands are each elected to a two-year term (Article 31(2) (a)) . 
District Command members must have served the PFLP for at least
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three years and Regional Command members must have served at for 
least four years (Article 31(2) (b)) .
Circles and cells are the PFLP's base organizations. They 
may hold their meetings at members' homes or at their workplaces, 
as long as the group comprises at least three members (Article 
32(1)) . The circle, which numbers from three to ten people, is 
the level which prepares trainees to become full PFLP members 
(See section on membership, below). A cell is generally 
responsible for a circle and appoints one of its members to guide 
the trainees through their pre-membership period (Article 32(2)).
The cell numbers from three to ten members and constitutes 
the most basic PFLP level. Each cell has a leader and a deputy 
leader (Article 32(3)).
A group of three to five cells within a neighborhood, 
village, or workplace constitutes a league (Article 32(4)). A 
group of leagues within a certain geographical area constitutes a 
district (Article 32(5)).
The League Congress is attended by the members of all the 
cells that are affiliated with it. It elects the league 
leadership and representatives to the District Congress. Members 
of the league leadership must have served the PFLP for at least 
two years (Article 32(6)) . The league leadership confirms all 
cell decisions on membership and discipline (Article 32 (7)) .
C . Membership
The cells indoctrinate members through the study of PFLP 
literature and Marxist-Leninist theory (Article 32(8) (a)). The
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cells also instill habits in the members which they believe will 
prepare them to aid the PFLP in its cause. They train them ". .
. to be daring, to think scientifically, to maintain discipline, 
and to obey consciously." The cells discourage their members 
from adopting such traits as ". . . individualism, selfishness,
laziness, carelessness, deviance, and avoidance of facing their 
problems scientifically or enhancing their creative talents 
(Article 32(8) (b)) ." The cells recruit new members, collect dues 
(Article 32(8) (c)), impose PFLP discipline (Article 32(8) (d) ) , 
encourage members to engage in constructive criticism and to be 
selfless (Article 32(8) (e), remain in tune with the feelings, 
views, and demands of the 'masses (Article 32(8) (f)),' and 
organizing the 'masses' politically and economically (Article 
32 (8) (g) (h) (i) ( j ) ) .
The process of becoming a PFLP member is taken lightly 
neither by the organization nor by the candidate. The 
organization closely monitors each candidate, evaluating his or 
her personality, ability, and depth of commitment to the 
Palestinian cause as advocated by the PFLP. This monitoring 
occurs prior to the candidate's recommendation for training, 
during the training period, and during each of the stages which 
bring the candidate/member ever closer to the PFLP's inner 
circle. The following is a description of this process, as well 
as of the rules which govern a member's status once he has been 
accepted.
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To be considered for PFLP membership, the candidate must be 
a Palestinian and/or an Arab (Article 17(3))^^° who is at least 
sixteen years old (Article 17(3)(f)) and must accept the PFLP's 
political program and its internal rules (Article 17(3)(b)). The 
candidate must already be a participant in one of the PFLP's non- 
combatant organizations and must be prepared to participate in 
combat when asked to do so (Article 17(3)(c)). Once accepted 
into the PFLP's ranks, the candidate must pay periodic dues 
(Article,17 (3) (e)) and promptly execute all of the organization's 
decisions and orders (Article 17(3)(d)). The candidate must also 
be from one of what the PFLP defines as 'revolutionary classes' 
(Article 17 (3) (a)) .
The PFLP obligates each member to dedicate his entire being 
to achieving the organization's aims (Article 18(1)), mobilize 
and educate 'the masses' (Article 18(2)), study Marxist-Leninist 
principles (Article 18(3)), keep abreast of the Arab and 
Palestinian situations by reading all PFLP books, magazines, 
newspapers, statements, and communiques (Article 18(4)), work to 
maintain ideological unity and harmony within the PFLP (Article 
18(5)), carry out all PFLP orders promptly and completely 
(Article 18(6)), criticize the PFLP constructively (Article 
18(7)), serve 'the masses'' interests and maintain strong links 
with them (Article 18(8)), be candid with the PFLP (Article
420 paragraph's pertinent phrase reads "Every Palestinianand Arab .citizen who chooses the path of participating in the Arab revolution has the right to be a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine if the following conditions are Xmet
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18(9)), maintain all PFLP secrets in confidence (Article 18(10)), 
guard against being influenced by enemy propaganda (Article 
18(11)), eschew all perceived traits of the bourgeoisie. and 
adopt the traits of the working class^^^ (Article 18(12)).
The PFLP allows each of its members to elect representatives 
and to be elected (Article 19(1)), discuss all problems through 
organizational channels and make suggestions on an issue prior to
a final decision (Article 19 (2)), offer constructive criticism, |
jwithin the PFLP framework, against any PFLP leader (Article !
19(3)), defend himself against criticism before decisions are |
taken against him (Article 19(4)), and direct any problems, |
criticisms, or questions to any PFLP organizational unit, I
!including the central leadership (Article 19(5)). j
Once accepted into the membership process, the candidate is 
conferred the title of trainee (Article 20 (1)) . In order to be Î
regarded as a trainee, the candidate must submit an application 
and be recommended by at least two PFLP members. The candidate's 
application must be approved by a cell on a higher level than 
that of the members who recommended him (Article 20(2)).
Each recommending member must write a detailed report on the 
candidate in which he assesses the candidate's thought processes, 
capabilities and past history and behavior. The recommending
Selfishness, vanity, ostentation, individualism, pretentiousness, "routinism," disdain for mundane tasks, and vengeful behavior.
"the desire to learn, sincere comradery [sic] , and full involvement in the issues of the party and the revolution."
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member then explains the PFLP's political program and internal 
rules and regulations to the candidate and clarifies the 
candidates responsibilities and obligations to the PFLP. The 
recommending member is held personally responsible for having 
recommended the candidate (Article 20(3)).
D , Training
If the candidate has been favorably reviewed, the 
recommending member informs him of his acceptance to the 
organization as a trainee and explains to him the training 
program and its aims (Article 20(4)).
The training period lasts from six months to a year, 
although it may be prolonged in certain circumstances. During 
the training period, the trainees are grouped into circles and 
are taught the PFLP's political program, as well as its internal 
rules and regulations. The trainee is continuously observed and 
evaluated for qualification for full PFLP membership (Article 
20(5)). The trainee has the same rights and responsibilities as 
a full member and must pay dues. He is not allowed to vote 
however, and cannot be elected to a position of authority 
(Article 20(8)) .
At the end of his training period, the cell discusses the 
trainee's eligibility for full membership. If the trainee is 
accepted, higher levels of the PFLP must confirm his acceptance. 
At that point, he is a full member with all rights and privileges 
associated therewith.
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Likewise, if the trainee is deemed ineligible, higher levels 
must also confirm this. The trainee then either has his 
probationary period extended, is regarded as a friend of the PFLP 
without membership privileges, or is alienated from the 
organization (Article 20(6)).
This membership process is the only acceptable form of 
recruitment unless otherwise decided by the PFLP's regional and 
central commands (Article 20(7)).
Every member has the right to request departure from the 
PFLP. This request must be approved by his organizational level 
and must be confirmed by higher levels (Article 21).
If a member is ever absent for no legitimate reason, fails 
to participate in PFLP activities for four consecutive meetings, 
or fails to pay dues for three consecutive months his case must 
be discussed at his own organizational level.
If the member is found to have lost touch with the PFLP of 
his own free will, then his cell conveys its decision to remove 
him to higher PFLP levels for confirmation. The ex-member's name 
is then removed from the PFLP's records (Article 22).
The PFLP requires that the transfer of a member from one 
section to another take place in an orderly fashion. The 
organizational unit to which the member is transferred defines 
his responsibilities based upon his past experience. Either the 
member or his former unit may object to these responsibilities, 
whereupon the problem is discussed at higher organizational 
levels (Article 23).
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E. Penalties
Penalties vary according to the gravity of the violation.
The PFLP has established five penalty grades. They are: warning, 
probation, membership suspension and expulsion (Article 24(1)). 
"Membership suspension" means that the member is relegated to the 
status of a trainee (Article 24(2)).
The PFLP imposes penalties in order to strengthen 
organizational discipline and to ensure prompt execution of 
decisions and internal regulations. These penalties also serve 
to prevent ideological deviation and to discourage activities 
which might harm the organization, its members and its 
constituents. With the exception of expulsion, the PFLP imposes 
penalties in order to enlighten the member. It seeks to create 
within him a sense of discipline and to develop his consciousness 
and initiative (Article 24(3)).
Penalties are recommended by the member's unit and approved 
by the unit immediately above it. In the case of expulsion, 
approval must be secured from the unit immediately above that one 
(Article 24(4)) . Leading PFLP members who are recommended for 
expulsion are considered suspended until their expulsion is 
approved by the congresses which elected them (Article 24(5)).
A member who may be subject to penalties has the right to 
defend himself and to present his point of view. When a decision 
has been made, the member is informed of it and the reasons 
behind it. If the decision is unfavorable, the member has the 
right to appeal it (Article 24(6)).
2 2 3
since expulsion is the highest of 'normal' penalties, it is 
only carried out after a careful and balanced inquiry (Article 
24(7)). The member has the right to appeal his expulsion before 
the Central Committee or the Central Oversight Committee, but 
must do so within two months of the decision to expel him 
(Article 24(8)).
Under dire conditions (what the PFLP terms 'armed combat'), 
certain violations may call for penalties which go beyond those 
outlined in the internal regulations. These penalties are 
special forms of retribution which are determined and carried out 
by the PFLP Congress (Article 24(9)).
The PFLP's stringent membership requirements are deemed 
crucial to maintaining organizational discipline and morale and 
to protecting the organization from outside harm. The process
iallows the organization to adjust the requirements for special 
circumstances and there is no reason to assume that all 
candidates for membership follow the guidelines exactly.
The PFLP has a political goal - the " . . .  complete 
liberation of Palestine," which is to be accomplished through 
"armed struggle. The PFLP seeks to build a mass national
Sections dealing with members' responsibilities and the relationship between the politically and militarily oriented members, unless otherwise indicated, refer to information contained in The Political and Organizational Strategy ristratiiiwah al-Siyasiwah wa al-Tandhimiwahl , PFLP Central Information Department. This publication went through four editions. The author was only able to obtain the English version of the 1969 first edition [A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine!, published in Amman, Jordan. The Arabic version of the 1970 second edition was also published in Amman and is the(continued...)
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movement, from which will emanate not only those who actually 
perform the armed assaults, but also those who give them 
material, organizational and moral support. The long term battle 
against the enemy must constantly be escalated. The rank-and- 
file must be mobilized to carry out the armed assault, support 
it, and prolong it by replacing those who are either killed or 
captured. For this reason, the PFLP believes that both those who 
physically engage the enemy and those who support them must be 
aware of the reasons for doing so and must continually be 
reminded of them in order to maintain a constant momentum in the 
its long-term liberation effort.
F. Integrated Military and Political Components
Moreover, any attack which the PFLP carries out is said to 
have a political purpose, which must be made known both to the 
enemy and those whom the PFLP claims to represent. Since the 
PFLP's operations cause little material damage in compared to 
what a conventional armed force is capable of causing, the 
political message accompanying them are components which are 
crucial to their success. Consequently, both the military and 
political apparati are equally important to the PFLP because they 
support one another.
continued)text to which this analysis refers [pp. 160-167]. The 1975 third edition was unobtainable. No place of publication was given for the Arabic version of the 1983 fourth edition. It is significant that the PFLP's definition of its members' responsibilities, as well as of the relationship between its military and political personnel have remained constant in each of the four editions.
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The PFLP is wary of limiting itself to creating a mechanical 
military structure whose operatives do not know why they bear 
arms. The political apparatus supports the military by providing 
answers to both of these questions. It seeks to counteract the 
effects of enemy propaganda on the operatives, define their 
relationship with outside organizations and indoctrinate them in 
order to guide them to the PFLP's ultimate objective.
On the other hand, the PFLP has given the political 
apparatus a military structure and considers it a reserve for the 
military apparatus. Political operatives are expected to carry 
out military duties as needed. Without such an arrangement, the 
PFLP fears a polarization of the political and military apparati, 
in which case the political operatives might take political or 
moral advantage of their connection with armed activity without 
being part of the military apparatus. A political operative who 
affiliates himself with the organization's armed activities by 
wearing a military uniform and insignia without being ready to 
participate in it himself breeds resentment among the military 
operatives toward his attitude and makes cooperation between the 
two apparati extremely difficult. For this reason, political 
operatives are required to live in the same conditions as those 
who fight.
The ideal PFLP member is both politically aware and 
militarily competent. The PFLP seeks to create a system in which 
it can move its members between military and political tasks 
interchangeably. In anticipation of this, participants in the
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organization's internal education system are required to take 
part in both military and political courses.
In 1980, the commander of the PFLP's military college 
explained its educational philosophy in an interview with Al- I
Hadaf : j
Because the aim of the battle is the realization of jpolitical goals and because the graduates of the jcollege courses are cadres who command military !activity, they must acquire a theoretical, iorganizational and political awareness and the military |and college leadership give this aspect great jimportance. In addition, both the leadership and the jstudents at the college experience its [political] jparty and organizational life, time permitting, since iin addition to the regular programs, there are |political preparation lectures given by the Front'spolitical cadres. I
Political party life, the study of military science and |revolutionary discipline enable these cadres to carry 'out orders and instructions givenlby their superiorsand to take initiatives in carrying out the generalinstructions and plans of the military leadership andturn them into true builders of conscious anddisciplined fighting units, always ready to fight theenemy and to defend our masses. . . .
The PFLP's leadership effort is directed primarily toward battle
with the enemy and all organizational, political, informational,
and financial efforts are linked with it.
"Qa'id al-Kuliyyah al-'Askariyyah li al-Jabhah al- Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin li 'al-Hadaf: Kull Nuqtah 'Araq fi al-Tadrib tawfuru Qatrah Damm fi al-Ma'rakah [The Commander of the Military College of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to Al-Hadaf; Every Drop of Sweat During Training Will Increase Bloodshed In Battle]," Al-Hadaf. No. 508, October 11, 1980, p. 13.
2 2 7
G. Interlocking Operational Sections
The PFLP considers itself a fighting political party and has 
organized itself to support the efforts described above by 
dividing the organization into five interlocking sections. The 
first section carries out armed operations. The second section 
provides military operational support (presumably intelligence 
gathering, ordnance and quartermaster duties, etc.). The third 
section provides non-military operational support (termed " . . .  
the popular resistance," which presumably would provide food and 
shelter to operatives inside enemy territory). The fourth 
section indoctrinates and motivates the rank-and-file. The fifth 
section provides financial and administrative support and spreads 
the battle's political message
The PFLP does not| confine its political and organizational 
activity to the Middle East. It urges its operatives to initiate 
such activity among Palestinians who have emigrated to Western 
Europe, North and South America, and elsewhere. It considers the 
potential of these Palestinians a precious commodity to be 
utilized in every possible way. It seeks to accomplish this task 
by concluding international alliances with left-wing, and other, 
movements and organizations, and by directing the efforts of its 
constituents residing abroad.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Tasks of the New Stage (Beirut: Foreign Relations Committee, 1973), pp. 110-111. See also Khurshid, p. 118.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Tasks of the New Stage (Beirut: Foreign Relations Committee, 1973), pp. 110- 111 .
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The PFLP sees itself as a living organism whose goal it is 
to reverse Israel's establishment and to acquire for the 
Palestinians the rights which it feels they have always deserved. 
Each of the PFLP's components is essential to its existence and 
each is given equal importance.
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chapter 10 ; Operating Environments and Methods
The PFLP's cell-based hierarchy enables it to function
!either openly or underground, depending on whether its i
surroundings are friendly or hostile, and allows cell leaders to !I
make independent decisions in the event that circumstances do not j
Ïpermit them to communicate directly with their superiors. The j
Ienvironments in which PFLP cells might operate range from those j
in which they operate freely and openly to hostile environments |
in which PFLP membership is illegal or draws suspicion - !
I
necessitating a covert existence. |
A. Friendly Environments
In a completely friendly environment, such as the 'state 
within a state' which the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon 
operated between 1969 and 1982, the PFLP operates ffeely and 
openly. During this period, the PFLP, along with the other 
Palestinian groups, was able to administer its affairs without 
the Lebanese government being able to i n t e r f e r e . I t  
maintained links with scores of organizations and governments 
(both Middle Eastern and non-Middle E a s t e r n ) , ran its own 
communal i n s t i t u t i o n s , and conducted cross-border and foreign
Bekhor, pp. 181-182.
See generally PFLP Central Information Committee, Al- Tagrir al-Shahri [Monthly Report!, January 1981; PFLP Central Information Committee, Al-Taarir al-Shahri [Monthly Report!. April 1979.
P e t e e t ,  p p .  1 4 2 - 1 7 4 .
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operations against Israeli and Western t a r g e t s . B y  the 
middle of 1981 - following the conclusion of a cease-fire 
agreement between Israel and the PLO - the Lebanese government 
had lost control over the situation to such an extent that the 
PFLP was able to declare with impunity that its " . . .  operations 
will continue from southern Lebanon despite the adoption of the 
cease-fire resolution on the level of artillery and missile 
bombardment and that the Front's external operations will not 
cease.
The environment which permitted the freedom of action that 
the Palestinian organizations enjoyed in Lebanon prior to the 
1982 Israeli invasion might be characterized as 'friendly' only 
when compared with the restrictive conditions imposed upon them 
everywhere else. In fact, the Palestinian groups were able to
See, e.g. PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Raam (290) hawla Nisf al-Anabib wa Mahattah Dhakh al-Tablain fi Janub Lubnan [Opérations Statement No. (290) on the Blowing Up of the Pipeline and Pumping Station in Southern Lebanon (Leaflet) January 28, 1970; PFLP, 'Amaliwat al-Jabhah al-Sha'bivvah li Tahrir Filastin khilala Shahr Shubbat/Febravir 1971 [Operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine During the Month of February 19711. (Leaflet); Arshif Al-Hadaf [Al-Hadaf Archive], "'Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah' tutalibu Italia bi I'adah Sarukhin Sufyati al-San' ['The Popular Front' Demands that Italy Return the Two Soviet-made Missiles]," Al-Liwa'. June 8, 1990, no page number; Arshif Al-Hadaf. "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah: 'Amaliyyah fi Athina dhidda Shabakah li al-Istikhbarat al-Isra'iliyyah [The Popular Front; An Operation in Athens Against an Israeli Intelligence Network]," Al-Safir, July 27, 1981, no page number.
Al-Hadaf Archive, "Abu 'Ali Mustafa; 'Amaliyyatuna 'abra al-Hudud al-'Arabiyyah sata'khudhu Tabi'an Naw'iyyan Jadidan [Abu 'Ali Mustafa: Our Operations Across Arab Borders Will Take on a New Type of Characteristic]," Al-Safir. August 15, 1981, no page number. See also R. Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press,1986)(hereinafter "R. Khalidi"), pp. 17-41.
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move about freely only because the Lebanese government was 
powerless to control them.
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), on the 
other hand, provided a friendly environment for the Palestinian 
organizations, as well as radical groups from other countries, 
quite willingly. Soon after its formation in late 1967 the PDRY 
government declared that "the correct way to liberate Palestine 
is to support the popular armed resistance movement in it and 
consequently deems it necessary to give monetary and moral 
support to the popular armed resistance movement in Palestine. 
This is a necessary and fundamental matter. This is hardly
surprising since PDRY was established by the Adeni branch of the 
ANM, most of whose central leadership would later found the PFLP 
and other radical Palestinian organizations. South Yemeni 
territory would serve as a base and safe-haven for radical 
Palestinian and Arab movements such as the PFLP and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)
Lajnah al-Tandhimiyyah li al-Jabhah al-Qawmiyyah [National Front Administrative Committee, Kaifa nafhamu Tairibah al-Yaman al-Janubiwah al-Sha'bivyah? [How Should we understand the Experience of Popular South Yemen?! (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah wa al-Nashir, 1969)(hereinafter "Kaifa nafhamu?"). p. 240.
433 H Mandub al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir al - Khali j yaqulu: Al-Nidham al-Sa'udiyyah yal'abu Dawr al-Daraki al-Siyasi fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi. Kull Dharbah nusaddiduha li al-Ihtikarat al-Naftiyyah hiya Dharbah li Isra'il [The Representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Gulf states: The Saudi Regime plays the Role of Political Policeman in the Arab Gulf. Every Blow that we direct Against the Oil Monopolies is a Blow against Israel], Al-Hadaf, No. 43, May 23, 1970, pp. 8-9.
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B. Tolerant Environments
Other Arab governments upon whom organizations like the PFLP 
relied for support, such as Syria and Jordan, did not similarly 
welcome them with open arms, and so the environments in which the 
PFLP operated in these countries might be classified as 
'restrictive'. Although the Syrian government permitted the PFLP 
to maintain bases and institutions on its territory, the 
organization exercised strict control over its members' j
a c t i o n s . *^4 This was especially true during the 1990 Persian
Gulf crisis, during which Syria participated in the US-led 1
I
During the 1970's, for example, Syria permitted four |Palestinian organizations - Al-Fatah, Al-Sa'iqah, the PFLP, and the PLA - to operate officially on its territory. According to El-Rayyes and Nahas;
[a]11 were required to maintain a representative at the jdefence ministry to co-ordinate activities with the 'national defence authorities, and no commandos werepermitted to enter the occupied territories [Israel] . |from Syria without the ministry's written approval. IWhile in Syria, the guerrillas were prohibited fromcarrying arms when moving through the country orwearing uniforms except when carrying out officialinstructions from the intelligence department.Similarly, there were restrictions on the location of training camps and shooting ranges, the use of special identity papers, detention or questioning of suspects, unauthorized statements and marches or ceremonies.
R. El-Rayyes and D. Nahas, Guerrillas for Palestine (London:Portico Publications, 1976)(hereinafter "El-Rayyes and Nahas"), p. 114.
These restrictions continued well into the 1980's. During this period, the Syrian government allowed no cross-borderoperations into Israel from its territory, but did permit them - !under its strict supervision - to be carried out by way of Jordan. See U.S. Department of State, Telegram from U.S.Embassy, Amman to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., "New Israeli Line on Palestinian Terrorists in Jordan and Possible Implications for the Peace Process," (101359Z Nov 84).
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coalition against Iraq, yet allowed the PFLP to maintain its
headquarters in Damascus - albeit on a tight leash - despite the
letter's open and enthusiastic support for Saddam Hussein.
The Jordanian government, until September 1970, permitted
the Palestinian organizations to operate from and maintain bases
on its territory, while demanding that the Palestinian groups
respect Jordanian s o v e r e i g n t y T h e  Palestinian groups,
however, intent on operating against Israel independent of the
control of Arab governments - which they blamed for having failed
the Palestinian cause in June 1967 - routinely disregarded their
host's authority, as they would later do in Lebanon.
The guerrillas armed civilians; they disregarded Jordanian laws; they excluded themselves from Jordanian financial obligations and taxes; they established their own courts whose venue they insisted upon for trials of guerrillas accused of various crimes; they patrolled the streets and parts of the city outside their areas; they rejected the registration of their vehicles; they incited demonstrations and riots; they attacked government buildings; they abducted Jordanians and foreigners alike; they intimidated j o u r n a l i s t s .
In September 1970, the Jordanian government - prompted by the
PFLP's hijacking of four passenger airliners to a deserted
airfield within its territory, where it subsequently blew them up
- reestablished its authority by driving out the Palestinian
435 nIraq : PFLP Reopens Baghdad Office," Middle East Economic Digest, January 11, 1991, p. 12.
R. D. McLaurin, "The PLO and the Arab Fertile Crescent," in A. Norton and M. Greenberg, ed., International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989)(hereinafter "McLaurin"), p. 25.
M c l a u r i n ,  p .  2 6 .  S e e  a l s o  E l - R a y y e s  a n d  N a h a s ,  p .  8 5 .
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organizations by force. Jordan, as a result, became a hostile 
environment for groups such as the PFLP, whose remaining 
activists were forced to operate covertly
The examples of Lebanon, South Yemen, Syria, and Jordan 
clearly illustrate the three different types of environments in 
which the PFLP has operated during its existence. In all cases, 
except for South Yemen's, the PFLP believed that it was dealing 
with host governments whose interests were antithetical to its 
own^^® - namely Lebanon^° and J o r d a n , w h i c h  were openly 
pro-western or Syria, which seemed to be exploiting the
See crenerallv Munadhdhamah al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah fi al- Urdunn [Popular Front Organization in Jordan], Al-Barnamii wa al- Muhimmat [Programs and Tasks] (No place of publication: No publisher, 1986)(hereinafter "Programs and Tasks").
439 4th Congress, p. 242.
See, e.g. B. Abu Sharif, "Al-'Amaliyyat al-Suriyyah istanadat ila Taqdir Daqiq li al-Mawqif: Hal yakunu al-Janub Hadaf al-'Amaliyyat al-Muqbilah? [Syrian Operations were Based on a Precise Definition of its Position: Will the South be a Target for Future Operations?]," Al-Hadaf. No. 539, May 23, 1981, pp. 12-13.
The PFLP believes that because the Jordanian government always considered the establishment of an independent Palestinian state to be an act which would call into question its own legitimacy (including its sovereignty over the West Bank), it has adopted a policy of arresting and expelling Palestinian nationalists and supporting Palestinian leaders willing to accept Jordanian sovereignty. See Programs and Tasks. pp. 3 0-31; Munadhdhamah al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah fi al-Urdunn, Al-Taarir al- Sivasi [Political Report] (No place of publication: No publisher, 1986)(hereinafter "Political Report"), p. 14; "Fi Bayan sadr 'an al-Maktab al-Siyasi li al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah: Hukm li al-Sha'b sayunaffidhu mahma kanat Ijra'at al-Himayah al-Sahyuniyyah wa al- 'Urdunniyyah [In a Statement issued by the Popular Front's Politburo: The People's Sentence is Carried Out Despite the Zionist and Jordanian Security Measures]," Al-Hadaf. No. 808, March 10, 1986, p. 6.
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Palestinian issue in order to advance its own regional 
interests.
The anxiety of the Palestinian groups, including the PFLP, 
over the possibility that the Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian*^] 
governments would attempt to limit cross-border military 
operations against Israel led them to attempt to test their 
hosts' resolve and ability to restrict their actions. The 
Lebanese government failed this test and allowed the Palestinian 
organizations to carve out an autonomous enclave in southern 
Lebanon, eventually losing all control over them.
In contrast, the Syrian government clarified how it expected 
the Palestinian organizations to behave from the start. It 
formulated rules which governed the relationship between host and 
guest and strictly enforced them. As a result, Syria was able to 
maintain its sovereignty and the Palestinian organizations found 
a safe haven and a base from which they were able to carry out
See, e.g. "Sarkis: Ana listu Dighul [Sarkis: I am not De Gaulle]," Al-Hadaf, No. 370, September 25, 1976, pp. 10-11.
R. El-Rayyes and D. Nahas maintain that the conflict between the Hashemite government and the Palestinian organizations was in full force even in late 1967, when King Hussein claimed that " . . .  commando activity . . . could onlyassist the enemy, and announced that it was his duty to resist the commandos with all his power." While Fatah realized the importance of maintaining correct relations with the authorities for the sake of a continued armed presence on Jordanian territory, " . . .  the PFLP and PDFLP brooked no dealings with the Hashemite regime whose reactionary nature they saw as an obstacle planted directly across the path of Arab and Palestinian liberation." See El-Rayyes and Nahas, pp. 85-86. See also McLaurin, p. 24.
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(with Syrian approval) both cross-border and international armed
operations against Israel and the West.
Jordan's King Hussein, responding to the groundswell of
support for Palestinian armed activity among his subjects,
particularly in the wake of the Battle of al-Karamah in 1968, *4*
allowed the Palestinian organizations to set up bases on his
territory. Cooperation between the Palestinian organizations and
the Jordanian forces increased to the point where the government
permitted Iraqi troops to enter the country in order to provide
covering fire for the Palestinian positions. According to
McLaurin, after Israel began to attack Palestinian concentrations
in the countryside, the organizations moved their positions to
the cities, where, for the first time, " . . .  the guerrillas were
present in large numbers . . . lighting a fuse leading to an
inevitable explosion. *
The large concentration of armed Palestinians in urban areas
forced King Hussein to find a way to coexist with them.
King Hussein evolved a modus vivendi with the guerrilla leadership that was posited on (1) Jordanian assistance to the guerrillas in movement and supply and (2) permission to operate in Jordan in return for (3) guerrilla rejection of Arab government control, (4) abnegation of any involvement in internal affairs, (5) control of the refugee camps, (6) pledges not to attack Israel from Jordan, (7) guarantees to avoid specific Israeli targets, (8) promises not to arm the civilian population, and (9) assurances that armed and uniformed guerrillas would be kept out of the c i t i e s .
McLaurin, p. 24 
McLaurin, p. 25 
4" Id., p. 25.
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The Palestinian organizations violated all of these conditions 
(see above) and, by September 1970, mortally threatened the 
Jordanian government's sovereignty. Almost before it was too 
late, the government forces took firm action to drive the 
Palestinian organizations from Jordanian territory, completing 
the process by April of the following year.
The PFLP's activities in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon focused 
on cross-border strikes against Israel because these states share 
frontiers with that country. South Yemen's role as a supporter 
of militant radical movements allowed the PFLP and its allies to 
use its territory as a safe-haven and operational base for 
regional and international attacks. PDRY's location afforded 
local militant groups easy access to Western targets in the 
Persian Gulf, yet shielded them, for the most part, from 
retaliation due to the country's status (as of February 1968) as 
a close Soviet ally
The friendliness of the PFLP's operating environments in 
these countries depended upon the degree of trust which existed 
between the PFLP and the host government. In Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon, there was almost no trust between the two sides and the 
host governments took steps to restrict the PFLP's freedom of 
action. They sought, in theory, to control the Palestinian 
organization's operations against Israel - allowing them to take
44"^ El-Rayyes and Nahas., p. 87.
44^  R . Nyrop, The Yemens, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986) (hereinafter "The Yemens") , pp. 316-317.
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place when this served their interests and halting them when they 
did not. The PFLP's freedom of action depended, to a large 
extent, upon the degree to which it was able to either circumvent 
the host government's restrictions or undermine its authority.
The environments in which the PFLP operated in Arab countries 
bordering Israel, then, were at best restrictive and at worst, 
hostile. The exceptional freedom of action which it enjoyed in 
Lebanon was obtained by force and not by consent.
In contrast, the relationship between the PFLP and South 
Yemen's NLF-led government was truly friendly, having been 
established in the late 1950's and early 1960's, when Habash led 
the ANM and the NLF was its branch in Aden. Both organizations 
sought to rid the Persian Gulf region of the western presence 
and, at least from the late 1960's until the early 1980's. South 
Yemen had no goals which might override the interests it had in 
common with the PFLP.
Not a country which generated great wealth, or in which one 
could earn a great deal of money. South Yemen served as a base 
for operations by militant radical organizations against regional 
western interests. In the sphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
however, it was considered a friendly peripheral state (one which 
did not share a border with Israel), similar to Algeria or Libya. 
Although these countries have also provided the PFLP with 
financial and material aid, as well as training f a c i l i t i e s ,
443 See H. D. Nelson, ed. , Algeria ; A Countrv Studv (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1985), pp. 298-(continued...)
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they have not been able to duplicate the close relationship - 
forged during the NLF's bid for power - which existed between 
South Yemen and the PFLP through the early 1980's.
C. Hostile Environments
In the pro-western Arab countries and in the western 
countries themselves, the PFLP operated in a particularly hostile 
environment since it had officially designated these countries 
its enemies. Many Palestinians living in pro-western Arab 
nations such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and in 
western countries such as the United States, had prospered in the 
professions and in business and were willing financial sources 
for the PFLP's operations. In such circumstances, the PFLP 
operated covertly through front organizations, well aware of its
pariah s t a t u s . I n  an extreme case, local leftists in
Denmark, operating on the PFLP's behalf, carried out bank 
robberies and purchased lethal firearms and explosives, including 
shoulder-fired missiles, which were intended for the 
organization's use.
D. Targeting
Since its establishment, the PFLP's armed operations have
tended to fall into three basic categories: international
449 .continued)299; H.C. Metz, Libya: A Country Study (Washington, B.C.: U.S Department of the Army, 1989), p. 282.
4^ ° See, e.g. R. Soble, "Palestinian Unit Seeking Help in U.S., FBI Says," Los Angeles Times. March 23, 1987, p. 1.
451 IISeven Jailed in Denmark's 'Trial of the Century," Reuters, May 2, 1991.
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attacks, regional attacks, and attacks carried out against 
Israeli and Palestinian targets in Israel and the West Bank, Gaza 
Strip, and the Golan H e i g h t s . T h e y  have also tended to 
reflect the three spheres into which the PFLP's enemies have 
fallen ideologically. The organization's international, and many 
of its regional operations have been directed against Israel's 
supporters ('imperialism' and 'World Zionism'), as well as 
Israeli facilities abroad. Its regional operations have been 
directed primarily against 'imperialist' facilities in the Middle 
East and against 'Arab reactionary' targets. The PFLP's 
operations in Israel and the territories have been aimed at all 
sectors of Israeli society and government and at those 
Palestinians who cooperate with them.
The PFLP's international targets^^ included individuals, 
airliners (both mid-air hijackings and ground attâcks), as well 
as transportation, governmental, commercial, and diplomatic 
facilities. Its regional targets (located mainly in the pro- 
Western Arab countries) included government installations, 
foreign diplomatic and commercial facilities, and competing 
organizations - both Palestinian and non-Palestinian. The 
PFLP's attacks in Israel and the territories are carried out 
against targets in both the Israel and Palestinian sectors. 
Targets in the Israeli sector include individuals, industrial and
4^  ^ Referred to collectively, hereinafter, as "the territories."
4^  ^ For this study's purposes, these denote targets located outside Israel and the Arab World.
2 4 1
commercial enterprises, transport facilities, infrastructure, the 
Israeli military, and places of leisure (such as movie theaters, 
public parks, and eating establishments). Its targets in the 
Palestinian sector are mainly individuals accused of 
collaborating with the Israeli authorities, but may also include 
members of rival Palestinian factions.
The PFLP's targets vary in category and type according to 
the nature of its operating environment, as well as the 
international and regional political conditions with which it 
must contend. Its attacks can be divided among those claimed by 
the PFLP and confirmed by the mass media, unconfirmed attacks 
claimed by the PFLP, and attacks reportedly carried out by the 
PFLP, but for which it never claimed responsibility.
The PFLP has carried out armed operations against Israeli 
anb Palestinian targets in Israel and the territories since its 
founding in late 1967. It carried out operations against 
domestic and foreign targets in the Arab countries through 1976, 
although skirmishes with rival local and Palestinian 
organizations continue to the present. The PFLP's attacks on 
international targets in general ended in 1981 and its aircraft 
hijackings ended in 1970.^^4
E. International Operations
The PFLP's international operations against civilian 
aircraft began in 1968 with its July hijacking of an Israeli
4^4 Although it officially renounced hijacking as a tactic in 1971 (See below).
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airliner to A l g i e r s . T h e y  were quickly followed by further 
hijackings and by ground attacks on the aircraft of various 
western n a t i o n s . T h e  confirmed hijackings claimed by the
4^  ^ PFLP, Bavan Ragm 37 hawla al-Istila' 'ala Ta'irah IIsra'iliwah Bu'ini 707 [Statement Number 37 on the Takeover of |an Israeli Boeing 707 Aircraft!. Version I, (Leaflet). See also IPFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Ragm 37 hawla Khatf Ta'irah 'al-'Al' al- iKhutut al-Jawiwah al-Isra'iliwah [Operations Statement No. 3 7 |on the Hijacking of the El Al Israel Airlines Airlinerl. Version I11, (Leaflet) . i
456 These are attacks for which the PFLP claimed responsibility and which were reported in the mass media. See, ie.g. the December 1968 machine-gun and grenade attack on an El Al ;airliner as it prepared to depart Athens, Greece (PFLP, Bavan |'Amaliwat Ragm 77 hawla 'Amaliyvah al-Huium 'ala al-Ta'irah al- ;'Al al-Isra'iliwah [Operations Statement Number 77 on the Attack iOperations on the Israeli El Al Aircraftl, (Leaflet); J. Sibley, j"Few Terrorists are Punished for Hijackings and Killings," New York Times, December 20, 1973, p. 16); the February 1969 ground attack on an El Al Airliner preparing to depart Zurich,Switzerland (PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Ragm 91 hawla Muhaiamah wa |Tahtim Ta'irah Bu'ini fi Matar Zurikh [Operations Statement !Number 91 on the Attack on and Destruction of the Boeing Aircraft ■at Zurich Airport 1 , (Leaflet); New York Times. December 20^ , 1973, p. 16) ; the August 1969 hijacking of a TWA airliner from Rome to iDamascus, where the perpetrators blew it up (PFLP, Bavan 'Amaliwat Ragm 210 hawla al-Istila' 'ala al-Ta'irah al- Amairikiyvah wa Tadmiriha [Operations Statement 210 on the Takeover of the American Aircraft, and its Destruction!,(Leaflet); New York Times, December 20, 1973, p. 16); the attempted boarding of a TWA aircraft in Athens, in December 1969, by three Lebanese PFLP members ("Ma' al-Ta'irat wa Nusur al- Thawrah [With the Aircraft and the Eagles of the Revolution],"Al-Hadaf, No. 59, September 12, 1970, pp. 4-5; New York Times,December 20, 1973, p. 16); the simultaneous hijacking of four civilian aircraft and the diversion of three of them (TWA,Swissair, and BOAC) to Dawson's Field in al-Zarqa', Jordan. The attempt on the fourth aircraft, an El Al airliner, was foiled by the Israeli skymarshalls on board. (Al-Hadaf, No. 59, September12, 197 0, pp. 4-5; E. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronologv of Events, 1968-1979 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980)(hereinafter "Mickolus"), pp. 214-215); the January 1975 missile attack, aimed at an El Al aircraft at Orly Airport in Paris, but which hit a Yugoslav airliner instead ("Al- 'Amaliyyat alati sahama al-Rafiq Mishail Mukarbil fi Tanfidhiha [The Operations in whose Execution Michel Mukarbil (continued...)
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PFLP ended in 1970, following the organization's expulsion from
its bases in Jordan in September of that year. Nearly two months
later, the PFLP abandoned aircraft hijacking as an operational
t a c t i c . I t s  last attack on a civilian aircraft from the
ground occurred in Nairobi in January 1976 (See footnote 442,
supra) . This coincided with the shift by the Palestinian
factions to full involvement in the Lebanese civil war and the
consequent diversion of a significant portion of their resources
for that purpose.4^®
As its operations statements confirmed, the PFLP's attacks
on Israeli and Western civilian aircraft were meant to
demonstrate Israel's dependence on the West for military and
economic support and to emphasize the need to break the strong
link between them. The PFLP, for example, viewed El Al as a
military tairget and its operations against the airline were meant
to highlight the ways
. . . in which this company differs from other civiliantransport companies, and places itself, its aircraft, and its pilots within the framework of a strategic reserve for the Israeli air force. El Al's other activities, in this vein, involve special secret
4SG(... continued)Participated]," Al-Hadaf, No. 312, July 19, 1975, pp. 6-7; Mickolus, pp. 501-502); the January 1976 attempt to down an El Al aircraft with a SAM-7 missile as it took off from Nairobi, Kenya ("Al-Hadaf ma' al-Abtal al-Muharrarin: al-Mu'taqilun hawwalu Dhallam al-Asr ila Nidhal Mushriq fAl-Hadaf with the Liberated Heroes : The Detainees Transformed the Gloom of Imprisonment into a Shining Struggle]," Al-Hadaf. No. 772, June 3, 1985, pp. 35-41; Associated Press. January 13, 1978).
4='^ Al-Hadaf. No. 143, March 18, 1972.
4®® See Cobban, p. 77.
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flights, under the auspices of the Israeli Defense Ministry, during which it has transported pilots training to fly Phantom combat aircraft in preparation for surprise attacks and new aggression against the Arab states.4®®
The PFLP's operations against American and European carriers were 
intended to draw attention to the close relationship between 
Israel and its Western allies and to rally public opinion in 
those countries against the continuation of that relationship. 
Following the September 1970 hijackings, the PFLP stated that 
these...operations were aimed at putting " . . .  the general world 
view on the right track toward an understanding of the problem of 
the Palestinian people. "4®® The PFLP's attacks on ground 
targets in Western Europe were similarly aimed at underscoring 
Israel's presence there,4®^  but also its strong relationship 
with European governments4®^ and local Zionist elements.4®®
The PFLP's international operations were aimed primarily at 
placing the Palestinian cause at the top of the world agenda and 
highlighting Israel's relationship with the West. With few
4®9 PFLP, Operations Statement No. 77. o p  . cit. .
4®° Al-Hadaf. No. 59, September 12, 1970, pp. 4-5.
4®^  See. e.g. the PFLP's attack on the Israeli ZIM shipping line's London office on August 25, 1969 (Al-Hadaf. No. 59, September 12, 1970, pp. 4-5) .
4®^  See. e.g. the PFLP's grenade attack on the Israeli Embassy in Bonn, West Germany on September 8, 1969 (Id.).
4®® See. e.g. the PFLP's assassination attempt on British Zionist leader Edward Sieff in London on December 30, 1973 ("Man Huwa Juzif Sif aladhi atlaqa 'alaihi al-Nar Ahad Fida'iyu al- Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah? [Who is Joseph Sieff, who was shot at by One of the Popular Front's Fighters?]," Al-Hadaf. No. 234, January 5, 1974, p. 14).
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exceptions, these operations were not aimed at causing extensive 
material d a m a g e , 4 ® ^  but rather at forcing global public opinion 
to pay greater attention to the Palestinian viewpoint.
F. Regional Attacks
In the Arab World, where public opinion had long been 
sensitized to the Palestinian viewpoint, the PFLP's operations 
were aimed at demonstrating the alleged harm that the link 
between the West and some Arab governments was inflicting on the 
Palestinian c a u s e . 4®® By attacking Western targets in the 
Middle East, the PFLP hoped to reveal the scope of the foreign 
presence in the region and rally the populace to rise up and 
expel it, thereby depriving the Israeli enemy of one of its 
pillars of support. Whether or not the PFLP's attacks 
successfully conveyed this message to the rank and file in the 
region is uncertain. Telegrams purportedly sent by local 
underground leftist organizations to the PFLP indicate their
4®4 The exceptions were the joint PFLP-Black September attack on the Trans-Alpine oil terminal in Trieste, Italy on August 5, 1972, which destroyed six out of twenty-five storage tanks (Mickolus, p. 335) and the January 1974 joint PFLP-Japanese Red Army attempt to blow up the Shell Oil refinery in Singapore ("Al- Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin wa al-Jaish al-Ahmar al- Yabani yaqumuna bi 'Amaliyyat Dharb Masafi al-Naft fi Jazirah 'Bakan' bi Singhafurah [the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army Carry Out an Operation to Strike at the Oil Refinery on 'Bakan[?]' [Palau Bokum] Island in Singapore]," Al-Hadaf. No. 239, February 9, 1974, pp. 4-5.
4®® A link which the PFLP described in its publications in great detail. See, e.g. "Kull Shai' 'an Qisf 'Kural Si': Asabat al-Sawarikh Thalathah Ahdaf fi Lahdhah Wahidah [Everything on the Shelling of the 'Coral Sea': The Missiles Hit Three Targets at Once]," Al-Hadaf, No. 105, June 19, 1971, pp. 3-7.
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agreement with the letter's assessment.^ ®® However, these same 
organizations had long been engaged in attempting to overthrow 
the governments in their respective countries. The Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)^? had been waging an armed 
rebellion against that country's sultanate since its founding in 
1965.4®® While the PFLO's armed activity had all but ceased by 
1979 - due to the Omani government's successful counterinsurgency 
campaign - the organization's political structure remained.4®®
4®® gee, e.g. "Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i fi al-Su'udiyyah: Hizbuna yunadhilu bi Thabbah dhidda al-Tawajud al-Amairki wa al-Atlasi fi al-Khalij [The Communist Party in Saudi Arabia: Our Party Struggles Resolutely Against the American and NATO Presence in the Gulf]," Al-Hadaf, No. 894, January 4, 1988, p. 61; "Al-Hadaf tuhawiru al-Rafiq 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qadhi al-Amin al-'Am li al- Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir 'Uman: Qabus yaftahu al-Abwab amama al-Tawajud al-'Askari al-Atlasi wa yas'i li Tamyi' al- Harakah al-Siyasiyyah al-Jamahiriyyah [Al-Hadaf talks to 'Abd al- 'Aziz al-Qadhi, Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman: Qabus Opens the Doors to the NATO ^Presence and seeks to Weaken the Political Mass movement]," Al-Hadaf. No. 853, February 23, 1987, pp. 32-37; "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah fi al-Bahrain; Lan taflahu Juhud al-A'da' fi Iqtila' al-Thawrah al- Filastiniyyah [The Popular Front in Bahrain: The Enemy's Efforts to Uproot the Palestinian Revolution will not Succeed]," Al- Hadaf , No. 846, December 29, 1986, p. 9.
4®"^ The PFLO, in July 19 92, changed its name to the Omani Democratic Popular Front (al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah al- Dimuqratiyyah al-'Umaniyyah), although its aims remain the same. See "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir 'Uman ta'qidu Mu'tamaraha al-Watani al-'Am al-Rabi' [The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman holds its Fourth National Congress]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1106, July 5, 1992, p. 28.
468 'Aman 'ala al-Thawrah al-'Umaniyyah: Na'milu min ajliI'adah Bana' Anfusina wa Muwasalah al-Harb al-Thawriyyah [13 Years Since [the Beginning of] the Omani Revolution: We will Work to Rebuild Ourselves and to Conduct the Revolutionary War]," Al- Hadaf , No. 38 9, June 3, 1978, p. 25.
4®9 "Al-Thawrah al-'Umaniyyah: Afaq Wasi'ah li Nuhudh Jadid [The Omani Revolution: Wide Horizons for a New Revival]," Al- Hadaf , No. 443, June 23, 1979, pp. 34-35.
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Outside Oman, the Popular Front in Bahrain (PFB) and the Bahraini 
National Liberation Front (BNLF) engaged in underground trade 
union and political activity in that country - activity which was 
successfully suppressed by the government.^® With opposition 
political and military activity hobbled in the Persian Gulf 
states, there was no one to take up the Habash's call for general 
rebellion against the local pro-western Arab governments during 
the 1990-91 crisis. Consequently, this aspect of the PFLP's 
strategy remains another of its unrealized goals.
The PFLP's regional operations in the late 1960's and early 
1970's, however, seemed appropriate in light of the perceived 
danger which the West and its Middle Eastern allies posed to the 
Palestinian cause. The targets of these operations were almost 
always commercial. The most spectacular attacks were aimed at 
exposing a purported conspiracy among Israel, the conservative 
Arab governments and American and European oil companies to 
supply the Western world with petroleum, in which Israel allowed 
its territory to be used by the oil consortia to build pipelines 
for trans-shipping petroleum overland to the Mediterranean Sea.
On May 31, 1969, PFLP operatives set off an explosive charge 
in the Banyas River, at a point twelve miles north of al-
4'^® "Nadhrah Thaniyah 'ala al-Intikhabat fi al-Bahrain [A Second Look at the Elections in Bahrain]," Al-Hadaf, No. 183, December 23, 1972, p. 8; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 945.
4"^  ^ "Palestinian Leader Urges Strikes at Western, Israeli Interests," Reuters. September 3, 1990.
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Qunaitrah, heavily damaging a section of the Trans-Arabian 
Pipeline, which was owned by the Arab-American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO). Damage from the explosion blocked the flow of oil 
through the one-thousand mile long pipeline, which began in 
Dharan, Saudi Arabia and terminated at the Mediterranean port of 
Sidon in Lebanon. The pipeline provided " . . .  millions of 
dollars in royalties and transit fees to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon . . . , all of whose governments were
hostile to the PFLP at the time.
472 Mickolus, pp. 121-122. See also Beirut RNS in Arabic. 2300 gmt, June 25, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report; Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 123, June 26, 1969, p. A l .
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The PFLP communique, which appeared both in leaflet form in 
1969 and as an article in Al-Hadaf in 1978,4'^ ® made the 
following points:
1) By targeting a pipeline owned by a consortium of American 
companies (ARAMCO), the PFLP was indirectly striking at the 
United States government itself, which it accused of 'leading 
world imperialism', providing " . . .  the Israeli enemy with 
material, political, and moral support," and allying itself with 
the pro-western Arab states in the region.4"^^
4"^® PFLP, Bavan Ragm 129 hawla Nisf Khatt al-Anabib al-Batrul (al-Tablain) fi al-Jawlan [Statement No. 129 on the Blowing Up of the Petroleum Pipeline (Tapline) in the Golanl. May 31, 1969.See also "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin Bayan Raqm 129 hawla Nisf Khatt Anabib al-Batrul (al-Tablain) fi al-Jawlan [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Statement Number 129 on the Blowing Up of the Petroleum Pipeline (Tapline) in the Golan]," Al-Hadaf, No. 386, May 13, 1978, pp. 14-15. See also Beirut RNS in Arabic. 1755 gmt, June 25, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. June 26, 1969, Vol. V, No. 123, p. Al; Tripoli Libvan News Agency in Arabic. 1030 gmt, June 7, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. Ill, June 10, 1969, pp. A l ; Beirut RNS in Arabic. 163 0 gmt, June 6, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 110, June 9, 1969, p. A 2 ; Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo. 1929 gmt, June 3, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report : Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 108, June 5, 196 9, p. Al ; Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo. 09 05 gmt, June 1, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 107, June 4, 1969, p.Dl; Cairo MENA in Arabic. 063 0 gmt, June 1, 1969 in FBIS DailvReport: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 106, June 3, 1969, p.G 4 ; Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic. 1100 gmt. May 31, 1969 inFBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 105, June 2, 1969, p. Al.
4"^4 Palestine Liberation Organization, "Al-Sabt 31 Ayar (Mayu) 1969 [Saturday, May 31, 1969] , " Al-Yawmiwat al- Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Diaries: 7/1/70 - 12/31/701. Vol. 12 (Beirut: Markaz al-Abhath [Research Center], 1971), pp. 402- 403 .
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2) By attacking the Tapline, the PFLP sought to call 
attention to its allegation that Israel was permitting the 
passage through its territory of petroleum originating in the 
pro-western oil-producing Arab states. It also sought to 
highlight the benefits that it believed Israel was deriving from 
this arrangement. 4“^®
3) The PFLP attack constituted a warning to the pro-western 
Arab nations against further complicity or participation in this 
arrangement with Israel. Far from being intimidated, Saudi 
Arabia, as well as Lebanon and Egypt, sharply criticized the PFLP 
for its action.4"^®
The PFLP also attempted to underscore Israel's direct 
commercial links with the pro-Western Persian Gulf states by 
attacking that country's maritime vessels. The PFLP claimed
4"^® Palestine Liberation Organization, Al-Yawmiwat al- Filastiniwah; 7/1/69 - 12/31/69 [The Palestinian Diaries: 7/1/69 - 12/31/69, Vol. 10 (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1970?), p. 218; "Al-Naft al-Sa'udi yatadaffiqu 'abra Isra'il [Saudi Oil is being pumped through Israel]," Al-Hadaf. No. 50, July 7, 1970, pp. 8-9.
4"^® Mickolus, p. 122. See also Beirut RNS in Arabic, 1050 gmt, June 27, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 126, July 1, 1969, p. B2; Beirut RNS in Arabic. 1045 gmt, June 25, 196 9 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V., No. 123, June 26, 1969, pp. B1-B2; Beirut RNS in Arabic. 173 5 gmt, June 9, 1969 in FBIS Dailv Report : Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. Ill, June 10, 1969; Beirut RNS in Arabic.1855 gmt, June 3, 19 69 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East and Africa. Vol. V, No. 107, June 4, 1969, p. B2; Palestine Liberation Organization, "Al-Ithnain 9 Haziran (Yunyu) 1969 [Monday, June 9, 1969]," Al-Yawmivvat al-Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Diaries: 1/1/69-6/30/691. Vol. 9 (Beirut: Markaz al- Abhath [Research Center], 1970), pp. 438 and 475.
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responsibility for having fired " . . .  five missiles . . . "4??
from a speed boat at the Liberian-registered oil tanker. Coral 
Sea, which, on June 11, 1971, was transporting Iranian crude oil 
to the Israeli " . . .  port of Eilat to be pumped to Ashqelon and 
from there, to be [transported] to Western Europe. "4"^® The 
missiles struck the tanker in two places and caused it to ignite, 
but inflicted no casualties.
This operation was aimed specifically at disrupting what the 
alleged collusion between Israel and the pro-western Persian Gulf 
states - specifically Saudi Arabia and Iran - which allowed these 
countries to pump their crude oil exports through Israel's 
pipeline, from Eilat to Ashdod, whence the petroleum would be 
transported to the Western European countries .4'^®
4'^’^ Other sources claim that the PFLP fired bazooka shells instead of missiles. See. e.g. Mickolus, p. 267.
478 IIKullu Shai' 'an Qisf 'Kural Si': Asabat al-Sawarikh Thalathah Ahdaf fi Lahdhah Wahidah [Everything Concerning the Shelling of the 'Coral Sea': The Missiles Hit Three Targets at Once]," Al-Hadaf. No. 105, June 19, 1971, pp. 3-7. See also Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic. 0400 gmt, June 14, 1971 in FBIS Dailv Report: Middle East & Africa. Vol. V, No. 114, June 14, 1971, p. G7.
479 "Al-Naft al-Sa'udi yatadaffiqu 'abra Isra'il! [Saudi Oil is Pumped through Israeli], Al-Hadaf. No. 50, July 11, 1970, pp. 8-9. See also "Al-Hilf al-Sirri baina al-Su'udiyyah wa Isra'il [The Secret Alliance Between Saudi Arabia and Israel]," Al-Hadaf. No. 24, January 10, 1970, pp. 6-7 and "Wathiqatan Sirriyyatan tafdhahan Haqiqah al-'Alaqat al-Iraniyyah - al-Isra'iliyyah alati tushrifu alaiha Washintan [Two Secret Documents Expose the Truth About Iranian-Israeli Ties which are Supervised by Washington]," Al-Hadaf. No. 31, February 28, 1970, pp. 8-9; Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo. 0650 gmt, June 15, 1971; "Al-Ithnain 14 Haziran (Yunyu) 1971 [Monday, June 14, 1971]," Al-Yawmiwat al- Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Diaries]: 1/1/71-6/30/71. V ol. 13 (Beirut: Markaz al-Abhath [Research Center], 1972), pp. 654-655;(continued...)
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The PFLP claimed that its operatives set out from their
'headquarters' at the Jordanian port of 'Aqaba. It reported that
the sea-borne unit
equipped itself with fuel, ammunition and provisions at contact points with which they worked, at most places along the Saudi coast, while the tanker "Coral Sea," which was [supposed] to begin its work later at the Eilat pipeline, left the Iranian loading port at Kharg Island in the direction of the Red Sea.
The unit encountered its target at the appointed location, at which time the tanker was compelled, because of the narrow passageway, to decrease its speed. The missiles scored direct hits and the unit left the area of operations without sustaining any losses.
The confrontation took place about 50 kilometers north of al-Barim Island off the coast of North Yemen.4®°
All of the PFLP's international and regional operations
targeted governments, organizations, and commercial firms which
it believed actively supported or acquiesced to Israel'^s
existence. The PFLP sought to dissuade its target victims from
47®(... continued)Id., pp. 660-661; Id., p. 676; %d., p. 703; Id., p. 739. During the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the PFLP reinterated its belief in the existence of a strategic alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia with the claim that Israeli Construction and Housing Minister Ariel Sharon had travelled to Saudi Arabia to take part in the command of United States military operations there, although this was probably aimed at arousing anti-American sentiment among its supporters. "Al-Natiq al-Rasmi: Sharun fi al-Su'udiyyah li al- Ishraf 'ala 'Amaliyyat Quwwat al-Tahluf al-Amairki [The Official Spokesman: Sharon is in Saudi Arabia to Supervise the Operations of the American Alliance]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1039, January 27, 1991,p . 30 .
4®® Al-Hadaf, June 19, 1971, pp. 3-7, o p . cit. See also Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo, 0825 gmt, June 14, 1971; Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, 1300 gmt, June 13, 1971 in FBIS Dailv Report; Middle East & Africa, Vol. V, No. 114, June 14, 1971, p. HI.
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continuing this support and to weaken their links with its 
primary enemy. All such operations had ceased by July 1981, when 
a PFLP unit bombed and shot at a travel agency, which the 
organization claimed was a cover for Israeli intelligence 
operations.4®^  The following summer, Israeli forces invaded 
Lebanon, once again driving the PLO's constituent groups from 
their principal staging area.
While the PFLP was able to operate from Lebanon with no 
interference from-the Lebanese authorities, the Syrian government 
severely limited its operational options - after establishing 
its headquarters in Damascus in 1982 - and thereafter, focused 
its armed attacks on targets located within Israeli-controlled 
territory. The operations were carried out either from across 
the border or from within Israel and the territories themselves, 
and were aimed either at Israelis or Palestinians whom the PFLP 
accused of collaborating with the Israeli government.
G. Operations on Israeli-Controlled Territory
The PFLP has been carrying out and claiming responsibility 
for operations in Israeli-controlled territory almost since its 
founding at the end of 196?4®^ and is the only operational
4®^  New York Times, August 11, 1981. See also "Al-Jabhah al- Sha'biyyah: 'Amaliyyah fi Athina dhidda Shabakah li al-Istikhbarat al-Isra'iliyyah [The Popular Front in Athens against an Israeli Intelligence Network]," Al-Safir, July 27, 1981;"Wara' al-'Aduw fi kull Makan: Al-Hujum 'ala Wakr li al-Musad fi Athina [At the Enemy's Rear Everywhere: The Attack on the Mossad Den in Athens]," Al-Hadaf, No. 549, August 8, 1981, pp. 14-15.
4®^  PFLP, "Al-Rafiq al-Shahid al-Munadhil: Riyadh Amin Jabir] ," Sin il al-Khalidin: Al-Juz' al-Awwal 1964-1970 [Register(continued...)
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category in which it continues to engage at present. Its
operations against Israeli targets have generally been intended
to create a climate of fear in order to force the average Israeli
to question his government's ability to protect him. According
to an early PFLP strategic analysis :
. . . la resistance a frustre Israel en 1'empêchant de profiter au maximum de sa victoire pour assurer sa sécurité intérieure, des frontières sures et une vie civile exempte de pressions militaires, que ce soit par les dépenses militaires ou par la mise en cause des programmes de développement, etc. . . .  La Resistance, par sa presence permanente, par les coups qu'elle porte a 1'intérieur, dans les territoires occupes en 48 et en 67, contre les objectifs économiques et civils, a réussi a supprimer ce sentiment de sécurité.4®®
Early statements speak of attacks " . . .  spreading terror
and panic within the Zionist ranks. They began to push and shove
each other mindlessly, amid a wave of total chaos, in which a
number were wounded as a result of the pushing and shoving, not
to mention the direct injuries as a result of the shrapnel from
the charges. "4®^  Perhaps the most grim example of a successful
PFLP attack in Jewish residential areas occurred on October 22,
4®"(... continued)of the Immortals; Vol. I 1964-19701 (Beirut: Mu'assasah 'abd al Hafidh al-Basat, undated), pp. 60-61.
483 ppLP, La Stratégie Militaire du F.P.L.P. [The PFLP's Military Strategvl (Amman: Département de L'Information, 1970), p . 10 .
4®4 PFLP, Bavan 'Amalivvat Ragm 14 3 hawla al-Infiiarat ourb Ha'it al-Mabka (al-Burrag) fi al-Ouds [Qnerations Statement No. 143 on the Explosions Near the Wailing Wall (al-Burraa) in Jerusalem!, June 1969 (Leaflet). See also Mickolus, p. 123.
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1969, when its operatives set off explosives in apartment 
buildings in Haifa.4®®
These operations were examples of attacks carried out by 
PFLP cells inside Israeli-controlled territory. During the 
1970's, the PFLP also carried out cross-border raids and 
shellings against Israeli villages, mainly along the Lebanese 
frontier, for the similar purpose of sowing terror among the 
r e s i d e n t s .4®® The expulsion of the PFLP's leadership from
Lebanon was followed by a lull of nearly two years as the 
organization worked to re-establish at least a military presence 
in the country. In 1984, the PFLP resumed its cross-border 
attacks, not only from Lebanon, but from Jordan as well.4®"^ In 
the wake of its first such operation - a rocket attack on Kibbutz
4®® PFLP, Bayan 'Amaliyyat Raam 23 5 hawla Silsilah al- Infiiarat fi Yawm al-Ra'b fi Haifa [Operations Statement No. 235 on the Series of Explosions on the Day of Terror in Haifa!. October 23, 1969 (Leaflet). See also Mickolus, p. 143.
4®® See. e.g. "Thuwwaruna al-Abtal yaqtahimuna Musta'mirah Hanita wa yuwaqi'una Khasa'ir Fadihah fi Sufuf al-'Aduw [Our Heroic Revolutionaries Storm the Hanita Settlement and Inflict Heavy Losses in the Enemy's Ranks]," Al-Hadaf, No. 317, August 23, 1975, pp. 4-5; "Hakadha Iqtahamu Musta'mirah Kfar Jil'adi: Abtal al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah min Majmu'ah al-Rafiq al-Shahid Abu Hassan nafadhu 'Amaliyyah Ham wa Hurrah li al-Mu'amarah wa Intiqaman li al-Shuhahda' [This is how Kfar Gil'adi was Stormed: Heroes of the Popular Front from the Comrade Martyr Abu Hassan Unit executed the Operation to Counter the Conspiracy and in Order to Avenge the Martyrs]," Al-Hadaf. No. 319, September 6, 1975, pp. 4-5.
4®"^ During the 1980's and early 1990's, it was a common practice for Palestinian groups based in Syria to infiltrate into Jordan first before executing operations against Israeli targets. See, e.g. "Jordan Says it Killed Palestinian Guerrilla Infiltrators," Associated Press, July 22, 1990; "Arabs Slain in Border Clash came from Syria - Jordan Source," Reuters, March 11, 1991.
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Ha'on, south of Tiberias - the PFLP claimed that " . . .  [a]
feeling of anxiety and terror [had] pervaded the ranks of the 
settlers."4®® Succeeding cross-border operations followed a 
similar pattern.4®®
The mid-1980's were also marked by joint Israeli-Jordanian 
efforts to establish a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation on the 
West Bank. The PLO, in an effort to play at least an indirect 
role in the process, held discussions with the Jordanian 
government which eventually resulted in the signing - at the 
beginning of 1985 - of the so-called Amman Accord, which gave the 
PLO the right to participate (albeit indirectly) in negotiations
488 ITThuwwar al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah yuhajimuna Mustawtinah Hawun bi al-Sawarikh [Popular Front Revolutionaries Fire Missiles at the Ha'on Settlement]," Al-Hadaf. No. 718, April 9, 1984, p. 17.
4®® See. e.g. "Riddan 'aLa Tasa'ud al-Irhab al-Sahyuni: Thuwwar al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin yaqsufuna Musta'mirah Yardinah bi Sawarikh [In Response to the Escalation of Zionist Terror: Revolutionaries of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Fire Rockets on the Yardena Settlement]," Al-Hadaf. No. 746, November 12, 1984, p. 7; "Abtal al-Jabhah al- Sha'biyyah yuhajimuna Musta'mirah Sahyuniyyah: Ta'kid Jadid 'ala Tarabut al-Dakhil wa al-Kharij wa Wahdah al-Sha'b al- Filastiniyyah [Popular Front Heroes Attack a Zionist Settlement;A New Affirmation of the Close Connection Between the Interior and the Exterior [as well as] the Unity of the Palestinian People]," Al-Hadaf, No. 924, August 28, 1988, p. 22. Post-1991cross-border operations, however, - coming during a period when a successful outcome to the Arab-Israeli peace process seems likely - have generally been aimed at undermining that process. One such attack occurred on October 9, 1993, when the PFLP attempted to land a Lebanon-based seaborne unit at Nahariyyah, on Israel's Mediterranean coast. See, e.g. "Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin tan'i al-Shahid al-Batal: al-Mulazim 'Ahd Marwan al-Bana Batal 'Amaliyyah al-Quds al-Bahariyyah [The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Mourns the Passing of the Heroic Martyr: Second Lieutenant 'Ahd Marwan al-Bana, Hero of the al- Quds Seaborne Operation]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1166, October 24, 1993,p . 12 .
2 5 7
over the West Bank's fate and called for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state.4®° In deference to Israel's
aversion to negotiating directly with the PLO, 'Arafat was
permitted to appoint only non-PLO Palestinians to the negotiating 
team.4®^  Predictably, the PFLP, which was opposed to any sort 
of negotiation with Israel, reacted negatively to the agreement 
and in March, formed an alliance with other radical Palestinian 
factions (known as the Salvation Front) to combat it.4®^ It 
also threatened to kill any participating Palestinians and in
some cases, carried out those threats.4®®
H. Attacks on Fellow Palestinians
For most of its history, the PFLP has implemented a policy 
of targeting fellow Palestinians, whose views and actions are 
inconsistent with its program to recover all Israeli-held 
territory, for assassination. The motives for this policy range 
from the logical to the visceral, but all are consistent with the 
PFLP's belief that Palestinian differences with Israel can only 
be resolved through armed conflict.
An important element in the PFLP's strategy against Israel 
is the mobilization all rank-and-file Palestinians to take part
4®° A. Gresh, The PLO - The Struggle Within; Towards an Independent Palestinian State (London: Zed Books,1988)(hereinafter "Gresh"), pp. 239-240.
4®^  Wallach & Wallach, pp. 320-321.
4®^  Gresh, p. 240.
4®® "Li Aladhina aghdhabahum I'dam Dhafr al-Masri [To Those Who Are Angered by Zafir al-Masri's Execution]," Al-Hadaf, No. 810, March 24, 1986, p. 26.
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in this armed conflict, either by carrying weapons themselves or 
providing material or moral support to those who do. Such 
support may take the form of building social institutions which 
are independent of the Israeli administration (schools, 
hospitals, and marketing cooperatives, for example), 
participating in anti-Israel demonstrations, or providing food, 
shelter, and medical care for who engage in violent 
confrontation.
The PFLP divides Palestinians who are not part of this 
network into two categories: neutrals, who attempt to lead 
normal, non-political lives and collaborators, who either operate 
on Israel's behalf against the Palestinian resistance movement or 
attempt to work within the system to improve their economic and 
political conditions. Neutrals have not yet realized the 
importance of confronting Israel and need only to be educated, f 
Collaborators, on the other hand, have consciously chosen to 
either work for Israel or reconcile themselves to its existence. 
The PFLP's policy for dealing with them initially, is to try to 
convince them of the error of their ways, and failing that, to 
kill them.
In addition to the doctrinal logic which PFLP leaders employ 
to justify the killing of their fellow Palestinians, there is the 
incredulity and rage which many of them feel toward their 
brethren who deal or cooperate with the enemy, whom they believe 
has done them an incalculable wrong. In his autobiography.
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George Habash recalled the day that the Israeli army forced him
and his fellow residents out of his hometown of Lod:
I was jolted by the sight of the Israeli officer and soldiers and the feeling took hold of me that if I had a pistol with me, I would empty its bullets into their heads. I found myself burning to fight them. Were it not for the fact that I did not have a weapon, I would have killed them without a word. I would have gone up to them and said; This is our land, you dogs. This is our country and not your country. We shall stay to fight you and you will never win the battle .4®*
Later that year, Habash and his fellow students at the American
University of Beirut, formed the 'Urwah al-Wuthaa [the
Indissoluble Bondi - the first of several successive
organizations (of which the PFLP is the most recent) which he
formed to fight Israel and those who aided in its establishment.
Habash and his colleagues concluded that the Arabs might have won
the 1948 war with Israel had it not been for certain of their
leaders, who-were either behaved incompetently or actively sought
to make peace with the enemy. For this, they deserved to die.
As Habash related:
During this period, our ideas were concentrated around those who had betrayed the cause and not around the state which had arisen at Palestine's expense. Our only concern was that we take revenge against those who had betrayed Palestine. Our conception at the time was based on the premise that as soon as the matter of the traitors was over, the Arab nation, through its masses, would be able to continue the battle.
The names of King 'Abdullah, Glubb Pasha, Shukri Al- Quwatli, King Faruq, Bisharah Al-Khuri and others had great meaning for u s . We found these leaders guilty and we came to the conclusion that there was no other
4®4 Matar, pp. 19-2 0.
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way to bring them down and take revenge on them without using weapons.4®®
Among the Palestinians whom the PFLP targets for
!
assassination, those who inform on resistance members or operate |
against them on Israel's behalf are the ones to whose elimination j
the organization gives top priority. The PFLP is careful to I
iemphasize in its publications that it follows an established I
procedure whenever it targets and kills a suspected collaborator. !
After investigating the suspect, PFLP operatives confront him
with the evidence and extract a confession from him. In addition
to treason, the operatives often accuse the suspect of such moral |
crimes as drug dealing, prostitution, and rape. They then offer |
him the opportunity to repent and mend his ways. Should this
fail, the operatives kill him.
In June 1985, a PFLP member, recently freed from an Israeli i
prison, gave an interview to the organization's weekly magazine, i
Al-Hadaf, in which he described his role in killing a Palestinian
suspected collaborating with Israeli intelligence:
This agent had been placed in the same cell that wewere in and as we were getting to know him, he mentioned that his name was "Mazin." I knew then that he was the man that we were after. As soon as I took him to a corner and asked him a few questions, he realized that I was on to his treason and that the poisoning, rape, and sex which he had committed were known to us.
In any event, he began to talk and said that he had been interrogated by brothers from Fatah in Janin prison and had not confessed to a single thing. After this, he was asked by an intelligence officer not to confess anything having to do with the poisoning matter
4®® Matar, pp. 24-25.
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and only to admit that he was an agent, since he had been discovered. Afterwards, he was interrogated three times, with the help of another comrade, and we summarized the information which he had given to us.
Acceding to the request from the brothers in the Fatah movement, we decided to carry out the killing of this agent together, in which brother Bakr Khawarisah, who was serving a term, participated with me.
The night of 5/15/84, the anniversary of the partition, was set as the time to execute the operation, during which I jumped on the agent's chest and applied pressure with my hand onto his neck, while brother Bakr blocked off his mouth for half a minute until I asked him to raise his hand. I applied pressure to the agent's neck for another minute until he died. The operation ended successfully, quickly, and in complete silence, such that those present in the room were not aware of what had taken place.4®®
While some Palestinians, such as the suspected informant 
whose killing was just described, present an immediate 
operational threat to the PFLP, others threaten its long-term 
political aim of eliminating Israel altogether, because they 
reconcile themselves to Israel's existence and negotiate with the 
Jewish state to obtain what the PFLP considers ephemeral gains at 
best.
In June 1979, for example, the PFLP ". . . executed the
death sentence . . ." on Hashim Al-Khaznadar, a Palestinian
religious leader on the Gaza Strip, by stabbing him to death, for 
speaking out in favor of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations 
and the plan for Palestinian autonomy which was being discussed
4®® "Al-Hadaf ma' Abtal al-Muharrarin: Al-Mu'taqilun hawwalu Dhallam al-Asr ila Nidhal Mushriq fAl-Hadaf With the Liberated Heroes: The Detainees Transformed the Gloom of Imprisonment Into a Shining Struggle]," Al-Hadaf. No. 772, June 3, 1985, p. 36.
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at the time.4®”^ The PFLP also carries out such 'executions' 
against those whom it believes threaten its political control 
over the inhabitants of a given area. This was certainly true in 
the case of the Israeli-appointed Mayor of Nablus, Zafir al- 
Masri, who, in 1985 and 1986, was active in promoting a coalition 
between certain Palestinian leaders on the West Bank and the 
Jordanian government as a substitute for the Palestine Liberation 
O r g a n i z a t i o n .4®® The PFLP realized that the leadership of such 
a coalition would most likely settle for an arrangement which 
would fall short of an independent Palestinian state and Israel's 
elimination. The PFLP viewed al-Masri's appointment as a threat 
to its political program and feared that rank-and-file 
Palestinians might forego long-term nationalist goals for what it 
considered short-term economic gains, and that Israeli control 
over the West Bank, through puppet politicians, would be 
legitimated:
If such an appointment had been allowed to stand, otherIsraeli appointees might have taken their seats in
497 "Bayan sadr 'an al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin bi Dimashq hawla Tanfidh Hukm al-I'dam bi al-'Amil Al- Khaznadar [A Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Damascus on the Execution of the Death Sentence on the Agent Al-Khaznadar]," Al-Hadaf, No. 441, June 9, 1979, p. 7.
4®® Despite this, the PLO gave its tacit approval to Al- Masri's appointment. H. Kamm, "West Bank Mayor, Named by Israel, Killed by Gunman. Nablus Slaying Linked to Split Among Palestinians After Hussein-Arafat Break," New York Times. March 3, 1986, pp. Al and A3. The PLO condemned Al-Masri's assassination, characterizing it as a crime "in the service of the agents of Israel." Y . Litani, et.al., "Jordan, Palestinians Condemn Murder; Masri Killing Major Blow to Devolution Proposals," Jerusalem Post, March 3, 1986.
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other West Bank municipalities. 'Civil' administration might have become a reality, despite the continued presence of the Zionist occupation army. This would be conducive to direct Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, 'settling' the Palestinian question via an Israeli- Jordanian condominium on the West Bank . . . .  For the Palestinian people as a whole, it spells no return to their home, no self-determination or other national rights, no independent state.4®®
After PFLP operatives gunned al-Masri down, in March 1986, the
organization warned from Damascus that " . . .  this sort of
treason, by whomever it is perpetrated, will be met with direct
and harsh punishment. Indeed, the PFLP intended al-Masri's
killing to be a warning to others who might share his views and
have similar aspirations. Soon after the killing, Al-Hadaf
reported that ". . . i t  was not long after this operation before
all of the candidates in the scheme of appointments to the
municipal councils hurried to withdraw their candidacies . . .
^ II 501
The PFLP displayed similar intentions in a statement 
justifying a 'warning operation' against newspaper editor Hanna 
Sinyurah, after he announced his candidacy for the Jerusalem
49® "Execution of Zafer al Masri," Democratic Palestine, April 198 6, p.5.
"Fi Bayan sadr 'an al-Maktab al-Siyasi li al-Jabhah al- Sha'biyyah: Hukm al-Sha'b sayunaffidhu Mahma kanat Ijra'at al- Himayat al-Sahyuniyyah wa al-'Urdunniyyah [In a Statement Issued by the Popular Front's Politburo: The People's Sentence is Carried Out Despite the Zionist and Jordanian Security Measures]," Al-Hadaf, No. 808, March 10, 1986, p. 6.
501 IIEl Aladhina aghdhabahum I'dam Dhafr Al-Masri [To Those Who Are Angered by Zafir Al-Masri's Execution]," Al-Hadaf, No. 810, March 24, 1986, p. 26.
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municipal council, in which they fire-bombed his two automobiles 
in June 1987:
This operation serves as a warning to the person known as Sinyurah and his ilk: Those who allow their sick souls to be seduced by going outside of the national consensus and its plans should either return to the mainstream of this consensus or else their fate will be no better than those who in the past have been the object of the people's j udgement.
As expected, Sinyurah heeded the PFLP's warning and withdrew his
candidacy.
In December 1987, the Palestinian uprising, generally known 
as the intifadhah. broke out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
While the uprising achieved no material gains for the Palestinian 
residents of these territories, it succeeded in drawing 
international media attention to the Palestinian cause as never 
before and subjected Israel to unprecedented criticism and 
pressure from those countries which it considered its friends.
It also heralded the emergence of vigilante groups claiming to 
operate in the name of the PFLP and Fatah, but over which these 
organizations apparently had very little control.
In its efforts to collect intelligence in order to arrest or 
kill the uprising's activists, the Israeli internal security 
apparatus increased the size of its informant network in the
"Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah: Al-Kharijun 'an al-Ijma' al- Watani sayuwajihuna Hukm al-Sha'b [The Popular Front: Those Outside of the National Consensus Will Face the People's Judgement]," Al-Hadaf. No. 869, June 29, 1987, p. 17.
P. Taylor, "'Black Panther' Gang Stalks Nablus, Sparking PLO Concern," Reuters, October 17, 1989; See H. Hamad, "Palestinian Gangs Blamed for Murders," October 24, 1989.
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territories. By October 1989, it became apparent that Israel's 
counterintelligence activities were beginning to impair the 
Palestinian underground organization's ability to function 
properly. At that time, units affiliated with the PFLP and Fatah 
emerged^^ whose primary function was to eliminate suspected 
collaborators.
The Fatah-linked Black Panther organization, and its PFLP
counterpart, the Red Eagle group, appear to have been formed,
initially, to persuade Palestinian residents, through
intimidation and terror, not to cooperate with the Israeli
authorities. Composed of young males, the undisciplined groups
(particularly the Red Eagles) lashed out at fellow
P a l e s t i n i a n s . I n  their zeal, they murdered their victims,
many of whom had no ties with the Israeli authorities, in a
brutal and gruesome fashion. On December 1 1 9 8 9 ,  Israeli
television interviewed Red Eagle member Jabir Hawash, who had
been arrested three weeks before :
Hawash's job was to question suspected collaborators and to kill those targeted for special treatment. "I questioned 140 collaborators," he said. "We'd ask them a few questions. Eventually, we'd use force and they'd tell everything."
He described how he murdered a Nablus woman, Umm
P. Taylor, "'Black Panther' Gang Stalks Nablus, Sparking PLO Concern," Reuters, October 17, 1989.
505 There is no indication that Red Eagle operatives receive any sort of ideological training. A photo essay in Hamas' monthly magazine however, shows recruits receiving religious instruction, as well as combat training. See "I'dad al-Mujahidin [The Preparation of Holy Warriors]," Filastin al-Muslimah (March 1990), front inside cover.
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Barakat, who happened to be his cousin; "I said to the guy that was with me, 'Let's kill Umm Barakat.' He said, 'Why not.' So we went up to her flat (at night).We went in and knocked on the door. She woke up. Of course, we were masked and were wearing khaki."
"She came down with us. I didn't ask her anything until she had come down with us. I took her out in the street, to the spot where I intended to kill her. I tied her up. I blindfolded her and smashed her head with an axe .
The apparently indiscriminate manner of the actions against 
suspected collaborators led many residents to complain to 
journalists and the PLO to broadcast appeals to the groups to 
correct their b e h a v i o r T h e  PFLP, in contrast, issued no 
such appeals and Hamas called specifically for the intimidation 
of suspected collaborators. Local Palestinian activists and 
journalists interpreted the attacks as a loss of control by the 
uprising's Unified Leadership, of which both the PFLP and Fatah
"Confessions of a Youthful Casbah Killer," Jerusalem Post, December 4, 1989. See S. Shargorodsky, "Soldiers Kill 4 Members of Underground Palestinian Group," December 1, 1989;"Serbia Unleashes Trade War on Fellow Yugoslav Republic,"Reuters, December 2, 1989; H. Carnegy, "Brutality and Harsh Attitudes Mark Intifada's Anniversary," Financial Times. December 8, 1989, p. 4; M. Curtius, "Intifadah: 2 Years Lead to Impasse," Boston Globe, December 8, 198 9, p. 1.
P. Taylor, Reuter, October 17, 1989, o p . cit. ; See H. Hamad, "Palestinian Gangs Blamed for Murders," October 24,19 89; J. Greenberg, "IDF Smashes 'Red Eagle' Terror Gang in Nablus," Jerusalem Post, November 10, 1989; "Deaths Mark Anniversary of 'State,'" Facts on File, November 17, 1989, p. 856 B2 ; J. Greenberg, "Suspected Informer on 'Red Eagles' Gang Stabbed in Nablus Casbah," Jerusalem Post, November 22, 1989.
A. al-Qassam, "Al-Intif adhah al-Mutamayyizah [The Outstanding Uprising]," Filastin al-Muslimah (March 1989), pp. 37-38 .
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were members. The Christian Science Monitor quoted an Fatah 
activist as saying that " . . .  until now the Unified Leadership 
has controlled the intifadah, but after a year or two, it may not
be able t o . The appearance of Revolutionary Security I
IApparatus, a group affiliated with Fatah, in January 1990, Ijsignaled that organization's attempt to regain control of the i
vigilantes. On January 16 of that year, it staged a march |
through Nablus, " . . .  vowing to fight thieves and those who |
Iabuse power," referring to members of the Black Panther and Red I
Eagle g r o u p s . I t  was not long, however, before the
Revolutionary Security Apparatus began to mimic the very groups I
ito which it claimed to be opposed. On February 26, in the West |
Bank village of Beit Furik, for example, it incited a mob to I
lynch a suspected collaborator. Residents claimed that Ali 
Nasrara " . . .  was attacked by hundreds of villagers,'who 
trampled, kicked and beat him with sticks and rocks . . . .  He
Neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Islamic Jihad joined the Unified Leadership of the Uprising, due to its secular character. They operated independently instead, issuing their own statements, organizing their own commercial strikes, and carrying out their own attacks, while maintaining an informal liaison. See Bekhor, pp. 43-46.
G. D. Moffett III, "Legacy of Resistance Lives On," Christian Science Monitor. November 28, 1989, p. 6; T. M. Phelps, "Grim Forecast on Uprising; As Intifadah Enters 3rd Year, Fears That Guns Will Replace Stones," Newsdav. December 9, 1989, p. 7.
511 "Palestinians March in Nablus, Warn Collaborator Killers," Reuters. January 16, 1990.
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was seriously wounded and taken to his aunt's home, where the 
crowd attacked again, killing him.
Another group, whose affiliation is unclear, also attempted 
to halt the vigilantes' activity. The Guardians of the Uprising, 
formed in December 1989, dealt with collaborators by holding them 
under house arrest and punished vigilantes by beating them in 
public.
Most efforts to control the vigilantes have come from Fatah 
activists. Likewise, most expressions of concern regarding the 
vigilante phenomenon have emanated from figures affiliated with 
the mainstream PLO factions. They have not come from the PFLP 
and groups (such as Hamas) which share its outlook, for whom 
intimidation and assassination of suspected collaborators are a 
matter of policy."^ PLO activist Adnan Damiri recently wrote 
in the pro-t’atah Jerusalem daily Al-Fair that " . . .  the 
revolution is the phantom starting to eat its children . . . .
For too long we have been trying to find excuses for all these 
executions of people who work with the authorities . . . .  We 
run away from questions by the foreign and Israeli press about
J. Greenberg, "W. Bank Mob Lynches 'Collaborator, ' Jerusalem Post, February 28, 1990.
s" G. D . Moffett III, "Palestinian Leadership Tries to Discipline Vigilantes," Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1990,p. 1.
See, e.g. Abu Ahmad Fu'ad, "Al-Kifah al-Musallah Khiyaruna al-Thawri [The Armed Struggle is our Revolutionary Option]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1082, December 22, 1991, pp. 50-55; Filastin al-Muslimah (March 1989), pp. 37-39. on. cit.
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the phenomenon that has emerged: every knock on a door by a 
masked man becomes a nail in the coffin."®^®
The PFLP refrained from publicly acknowledging its 
association with the Red Eagle organization until relatively 
recently, although the Red Eagles have identified with their 
parent organization from the b e g i n n i n g . I n  July 1991, the 
PFLP printed a statement in the name of the "Red Eagle Units of 
the Popular Front" in Al-Hadaf. in which they claimed 
responsibility for attacks on Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip. 
It made no mention of suspected collaborators.
In late October of 1991, as the parties to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute prepared to send delegates to the peace conference in 
Madrid, the PFLP's representative in the West Bank, Riyadh al- 
Maliki, threatened to apply psychological pressure to the 
Palestinian delegates, in an attempt to dissuade them from
B. Hepburn, "Palestinians Grow Critical of 'Collaborator' Killings," Toronto Star. June 15, 1991, p. A 2 .
Hamas, unlike the PFLP, was headquartered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its leaders and operatives readily acknowledged their links with the organization's armed units from the start, whether they were the pre-1992 Palestinian Mujahidin ("Palestinian Sentenced to Three Life Terms," Xinhua News Agency, Item No. 1006006, October 6, 1991) or the Al-Qassam Brigades which succeeded them (V. Lysechko, "Hamas Claims Responsibility for Explosions on Gaza Strip," TASS, February 13, 1992; S. al- Hijjawi, Interview with Ibrahim Ghawshah, Official Spokesman for Hamas," Al-Ufua. May 11, 1994, pp. 22-24 in FBIS-NES-94-094, May 16, 1994, pp. 16-18.).
517 "Thuwwar al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah - Majmu'at al-Nisr al- Ahmar - tuhajimu Quwwat al-Ihtilal fi Khan Yunis [Popular Front Revolutionaries - The Red Eagle Units - Attack the Occupation Forces in Khan Yunis]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1059, July 7, 1991, p. 13.
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attending, but stated that neither he nor his followers would 
physically prevent them from going.
More recently, the Red Eagle organization has attempted to 
derail the peace process by brutally attacking Israeli civilians 
living or working in the West Bank and Gaza, including those 
advocating Israeli withdrawal from those areas. On April 18, 
1993, for example, the PFLP claimed responsibility for an 
operation in which Red Eagle operatives killed Israeli attorney 
Ian Feinberg as-he took part in a meeting to coordinate the 
distribution of European Economic Community aid for the Gaza 
S t r i p . H i s  assailants hacked him to death with axes and 
knives. In its statement, the organization warned that " . . .  
every Zionist who touches the ground of Gaza and the West Bank is 
a target for our weapons.
R. Beeston and G. Brock, "Palestinian Team Meets Approval of Israeli Delegation," The Times, October 23, 1991, no page number given. See also "Al-Maliki wa Abu Hilal ya'qidan Mu'tamaran Sahafiyyan fi al-Funduq al-Watani fi al-Quds wa yu'akkidan 'ala Rafdh Mu'tamar Madrid [Al-Maliki and Abu Hilal hold a Press Conference at the National Hotel in Jerusalem and affirm their Rejection of the Madrid Conference]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1075, October 27, 1991, pp. 10-11.
The statement further strengthened suspicions of a direct link between the PFLP's Damascus headquarters and the Red Eagle group. The link was confirmed, however, in a joint PFLP-DFLP statement, issued in the wake of the February 1994 Hebron massacre, in which " . . .  [t]hey promise the 'martyrs and the people' that the DFLP's Red Star fighters and the PFLP's Red Eagles in the territories will take revenge against settlers and Israeli troops." "Arafat Calls for International Protection After Massacre," Acrence France Presse, February 25, 1994.
"Ji'na naqtula al-Sahyuni [We Came to Kill the Zionist]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1144, April 25, 1993, p. 19.
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The PFLP's tendency was to use assassination and
"Palestinian Radicals Threaten Arafat with Death, "Reuters. August 30, 1993.
M. Hutten, "Russia Injects Hope into Autonomy Talks, " Agence France Presse, March 12, 1994.
K. Dozier, "PLO Faces New Task: Governing. New Police Force Lacks Funds, Gear," Washington Post, May 6, 1994, p. A30. Both the PFLP and Hamas, however, stipulated that should the police attempt to confiscate their members' weapons, the latter(continued...)
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intimidation in its attempts to scuttle PLO initiatives with I
Iwhich it disagreed. The PFLP was able, in this way, to exert a j
countervailing influence on policymaking in an organization so I
completely dominated by Fatah that the former could never hope to I
prevail by legitimate means. As long as the PLO did not |
negotiate directly with Israel, however, the PFLP remained a 
member, regarding the umbrella group as a symbol of Palestinian I
national legitimacy.
The PFLP thought it necessary to preserve at least the 
appearance of organizational unity. When the PLO entered into 
direct negotiations with Israel in 1993, the PFLP's strict 
adherence to its ideological principles left it with no choice 
but to leave the organization. However, unlike the PFLP-GC, it !
made no physical threats against 'Arafat^^ and, at worst, 
demanded his resignation. Even after the PLO-Israel accord 
on Palestinian self-rule was signed in May 1994, the PFLP 
undertook not to attack the Palestinian authority's police force, 
fearing that this would foment civil unrest in the autonomous 
area.
The PFLP's ideology, structure, and operating environment 
are the primary factors which determine its policies, strategies, 
operating methods, and targets. While the PFLP's operational 
scope theoretically still covers actions against its 
international, regional, and local enemies, its current meager 
means have severely limited its options. With the Soviet bloc's 
disappearance, it can no longer count on the logistical support 
for its international operations which it once enjoyed from that 
quarter. With the loss of Lebanon and Jordan as primary staging 
areas for cross-border attacks against Israel, as well as for 
operations against Western targets in the Middle East - and with 
the severe restrictions imposed upon its movements in Syria - the 
only area where the PFLP can still operate with any degree of 
initiative remains Israeli-controlled territory. It is this 
arena where the PFLP has decided to focus most of its 
efforts.
^^  ^(. . . continued)would defend themselves. On May 18, 19 94, Hamas' representative in Damascus warned that " . . .  [i]f the Palestinian police try todisarm our people they will be subjecting themselves to grave dangers because our men will not allow them to do so . . . theywill kill anyone who tries to deprive us of the right to confront the enemy." See I. Hamza, "Radicals Refuse to Disarm, Warn Palestinian Police," Reuters, May 18, 1994. They continued to hold these views despite their petitions to the PLO to be allowed to participate in the autonomous authority's governing bodies.See MENA in Arabic, 1305 gmt, April 23, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-079, April 25, 1994.
"Assad Changed Syrian Stance on Peace with Israel: PFLP, " Agence France Presse, January 18, 1994.
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The PFLP also remains adamantly opposed to any peace 
agreement with Israel whatsoever. The PLO's decision to 
negotiate directly with the Israeli government led to the PFLP's 
withdrawal from the organization which it formerly recognized as 
the Palestinian people's 'sole legitimate representative'. While 
the PFLP had been a member of the PLO since the former's 
establishment in late 1967, its rigid conformity to a maximalist 
doctrine has caused it to continually lag behind the more 
flexible Fatah in being able to influence the organization's 
decisionmaking p r o c e s s .
The following chapter describes the PFLP's relationship with 
and position within the PLO over the years and how its inability 
to adapt a doctrine to changing times has marginalized it as a 
force in mainstream Palestinian politics.
H. Habib, "Al-Yawm al-Aswad fi al-Bait al-Abyadh [The Black Day in the White House]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1162, September 19, 1993, pp. 8-9.
Hamas, which is also resolutely opposed to any peace agreement with Israel, was never in direct competition with Fatah, since it never belonged to the PLO. Instead it has succeeded in creating an independent parallel movement to which it hopes to attract followers disenchanted with the PLO's policies. It has succeeded in developing its own powerbase and financial sources and has received aid from both the conservative Persian Gulf states and through private donations. (See B. W. Nelan, "Hamas and The Heartland," Time, February 15, 1993, p.37). The PFLP, whose threats against wealthy pro-western Arab governments guaranteed that it would receive no aid from that quarter, appears to have relied solely on private - and comparatively paltry - donations. (See, e.g. "Tabarru'at [Donations]," Al-Hadaf, No. 1005, May 6, 1990, p. 9; "Tabarru'at [Donations]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1101, May 24, 1992, p. 17, which indicate individual contributions of a few thousand dollars, at most).
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Part Three; The PFLP's Role and Position within the PLO
This chapter will discuss the rivalry which has existed 
between Fatah and the PFLP since the letter's establishment 
shortly after the June 1967 war. Almost from its founding in 
December of that year, the PFLP participated in the PLO's 
deliberations and functions and remained in the organization 
until September 1993. At that time, the PLO's dominant Fatah 
leadership - under Yasir 'Arafat - committed what the PFLP 
considered the 'unpardonable sin' of direct negotiations with 
Israel, aimed at reaching a peace agreement. The traditional 
differences outlined earlier in this study between the centrist, 
non-ideological Palestinian nationalist trend and its more 
doctrinaire radical counterpart are nowhere more clearly
illustrated than in the competition between Fatah and the PFLP
for influence within the" PLO. While several organizations have 
comprised the PLO during the course of its history - in addition 
to countless independent members - they have generally belonged 
to one of two blocs headed either by Fatah or the PFLP. This
section, then, will focus on these two groups and the
characteristics which have made Fatah dominant within the PLO and 
the PFLP either subordinate or marginal.
Fatah has historically concentrated its efforts on achieving 
one aim: the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on 
the territory which had constituted Palestine under the former 
British Mandate, even if only on a portion of that territory. 
Having set this goal, all strategies, alliances, and tactics
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which might aid in its attainment have been theoretically 
acceptable to Fatah's leadership^^"^ (including recognition of 
Israel), the only limiting factors being Palestinian public 
reaction or the effect that a particular policy might have on the 
organization's links with valued allies.
While the PFLP has shared Fatah's goal of establishing a 
sovereign Palestinian state, the two groups have disagreed on 
practically all other issues. The PFLP's program calls for a 
Palestinian state on all territory currently controlled by Israel 
and absolutely refuses to coexist with the latter. While in 1981 
it belatedly accepted the notion of phased territorial recovery, 
first articulated by the PLO in 1974, the PFLP has regarded this 
as only a tactical step to place the Palestinian resistance in a 
more favorable position against its stronger enemy. The PFLP's 
program is also more multifaceted than Fatah's, with Israel's 
elimination and the establishment of a Palestinian state in its 
place being the first among several slightly less important aims. 
Basing its strategy on the Maoist doctrine described earlier, the 
PFLP has tended to categorize other organizations and governments 
as either enemies or friends according to stringent ideological 
criteria and assessments based on sweeping generalizations.
Fatah, on the other hand, has tended to ally itself, or at least 
have dealings with any element likely to aid in achieving its aim
Among Fatah's early founding principles was the notion that ". . . the liberation battle takes priority over anyideological, political, and social contradictions." Fatah, p. 206 .
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and, as a result, has been able to maneuver more deftly than the 
PFLP.
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Chapter 11: The PFLP as Fatah's Principal Competitor: A Comparison Between Approaches
Shortly after its founding in 1967, the PFLP began to 
establish itself as Fatah's main competitor for dominance in the 
Palestinian national movement. The competition tilted in Fatah's 
favor from the start. By late 1967, Fatah had already been 
operating as a cohesive, unified organization for the past eight 
years, while the PFLP had only recently been constituted from a 
coalition of three groups: Heroes of the Return (led by Habash), 
Vengeance Youth (led by Nayif Hawatimah), and the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF) (led by Ahmad Jibril). The first two had 
been the conservative and radical wings of the PFLP's 
predecessor, the ANM, and the third had been a group of 
Palestinian refugees who had served in the Syrian army in the
1950's and had formed a faction of the Fatah organization in the
Iearly I960's. Responding to call by Habash for unity, the groups 
formed the PFLP at year's end.^^®
The unity, however, was short-lived. By August 1968, Jibril 
had split with the PFLP to form the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). Jibril, who 
had hitherto commanded the PFLP's field operatives, had become 
disillusioned with what he considered the Front leadership's 
excessive attention to ideology at the expense of armed 
operations. Jibril also criticized the Front's emphasis on
See generallv Cobban, pp. 140-163
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overthrowing Arab governments over operations against Israel.
In February 1969, the PFLP's 'leftist' faction under Hawatimah 
broke away to form the Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Hawatimah's faction had 
attempted to take over the Front's leadership after Habash had 
been imprisoned by the Syrian government in March 1968.®®°
After escaping from prison in November, Habash reasserted his 
authority in the organization by initiating a campaign of 
physical intimidation against the Hawatimah faction. Hawatimah 
and his followers received protection from Fatah units, and 
reconstituted themselves as the PDFLP (the word 'popular' was 
dropped in mid-1974) .
It was Fatah's cohesiveness and ability to form alliances 
with other Palestinian factions, in contrast to the PFLP's 
disunity, which enabled it to amass the required number of seats 
to gain a majority at the Fifth PNC session in February 1969. It 
has maintained that majority since then and expanded its 
influence within the PLO by gaining control of all key leadership 
positions and determining the proportion at which it and other
J. Amos, Palestinian Resistance; Organization of a Nationalist Movement (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 91.
The Syrians, who feared Israeli retaliation, were reported to be suppressing the activities of the Palestinian organizations operating from its territory. L. Sobel, ed., Palestinian Impasse: Arab Guerrillas and International Terror (New York: Facts on File, 1977)(hereinafter "Sobel"), p. 22.
Cobban, pp. 144-145.
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constituent groups are represented in the organization's 
governing bodies.
A. International and Regional Alliances
The PFLP's practice of allying itself only with 
ideologically compatible governments and actively threatening the 
existence of states with whose position it disagreed necessarily 
deprived it of important sources of revenue and political 
support. Fatah, on the other hand, accepted aid from wherever it 
was forthcoming and was consequently able to broaden its regional 
and international support base. Since the early 1960's,®®® for 
example, Fatah had developed close unofficial relations with 
Saudi Arabia. For the Saudis, Fatah was an attractive 
alternative to radical nationalist groups, such as the ANM. The 
anti-Nasserist attitude of many Fatah leaders and the group's 
sizable contingent of Muslim Brotherhood members allowed Saudi 
Arabia to distance itself from the leftist Palestinian 
organizations, while maintaining its Islamic activist image and 
demonstrating its pro-Palestinian nationalist sentiments.®®^
S. Mussalam, The PLO: The Palestine Liberation Organization (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books,1990)(hereinafter "Mussalam"), p. 9. See also H. al-Husayni,"Dr. George Habash on Madrid Peace Conference, Just Peace: I am for Peace, Repatriation Right, Jerusalem, and State; We will Stay within PLO Framework Through National Council," Al-Shara al- Awsat, November 1, 1991, p. 5 in FBIS-NES-91-220, November 14, 1991, pp. 5-7.
®®® Fatah's expansion of its ties occurred at a time when the PFLP's predecessor, the ANM, was committed to acting on Egypt's behalf alone.
El-Rayyes, p. 118.
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At the same time, Fatah courted the Algerians, who had 
become independent of France in 1962. While Algeria did not send 
Fatah its first arms shipment until 1965, when Houari Boumidienne 
came to power, it did arrange Fatah's first direct contacts with
the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and the Viet
Cong. In early 1964, Fatah's representative in Algiers, Khalil
al-Wazir, was able to arrange for his inclusion in a high-level
Algerian delegation to Beijing, where he inaugurated what was to 
become a close relationship between Fatah and the Chinese 
government. ®®®
B. Al-Karamah Boosts Fatah's Regional Standing; Fatah Deals With All Interested Parties
In the wake of the battle of al-Karamah in March 1968,®®® 
and the consequent upsurge in the Palestinian organizations' 
popularity in the Arab world, Fatah sent emissaries to the major 
Arab countries in order to solicit financial aid and political 
support. While the PFLP's leadership continued to characterize 
the Egyptian government as a 'petit bourgeois' regime',®®"^ Fatah 
strengthened its links with 'Abd al-Nasir, securing promises of 
arms and training.®®® Saudi Arabia (which regarded the PFLP as a
535 Cobban, pp. 31-32. See also Abu lyad, p. 42.
®®® During which the Palestinian organizations stationed there inflicted unexpectedly heavy losses on their Israeli attackers.
®®’^ Cobban, p. 144.
®®® Abu lyad, pp. 62-63.
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threat)®®® viewed Fatah as an effective counterweight to the 
Palestinian national movement's leftist trend and authorized 
immediate financial aid for its activities. In addition, Fatah 
secured the Saudi government's permission to set up support
t
committees among the Kingdom's Palestinian population and i
arranged to have seven percent of every resident Palestinian's |
!
salary automatically deducted each month in order to augment its |
finances.®^® Fatah representatives were equally successful in !
Iwinning Sudan's s u p p o r t . j 
It was Fatah's newfound relationship with the Egyptian I
government which enabled it to establish links with the Soviet j
Union. 'Arafat joined Nasir on a 1968 journey to the USSR and I
this was followed by a visit to Moscow by 'Arafat alone in ;
October 1971. By January 1972, Fatah had secured Soviet 
agreement to provide its members with military training and 
logistical support and by September, as a result of a return ' ,
visit by 'Arafat to Moscow ~ accompanied by Habash - both 
organizations began to receive direct arms shipments from the 
USSR.®^®
®®® Abu lyad, p. 63; See also El-Rayyes, p. 118.
®^ ° Abu lyad, p. 63. See also El-Rayyes, p. 118.
®^  ^Abu lyad, p. 64.
®^ ® J. Reppert, "The Soviets and the PLO: The Convenience of jPolitics," in A. Norton and M. Greenberg, eds., The International jRelations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Carbondale, jIL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989)(hereinafter "Reppert"), p. 112; "Moscow Plans Its Next Show Trial. In An Explosive Court Case, Russia Will Re-examine Its Ban On(continued...)
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Fatah'S relationship with the USSR bore diplomatic fruit in 
1970's when the Soviets repeatedly referred to the PLO as the 
Palestinian people's 'sole, legitimate representative'. They 
made efforts to have the organization included in international 
conferences and deliberations®^® and the PLO's achievement of 
observer status at the United Nations in 1974 is due, in no small 
part, to Soviet efforts on its behalf.
Fatah's first official meeting with the Chinese leadership 
occurred in February 1970, followed by a visit to North Vietnam 
during the same month. In both China and North Vietnam, Fatah 
representatives were impressed with the realistic, surprisingly 
non-ideological approach taken by the leaders of those countries 
in pursuing their agenda. Chinese leaders were not the least bit 
fazed when they were told that Fatah was seeking aid from the 
Soviet Union at a time when Sino-Soviet tensions were at their 
height. On the contrary, Premier Zhou Enlai told Fatah delegate 
Salah Khalaf that as a national liberation movement, Fatah . .
®^  ^(. . . continued)Communists," Time, June 8, 1992, p. 26; P. Quinn-Judge, "Files Show KGB Ties to Terrorism," Boston Globe, May 29, 1992, p. 1; J. Lloyd, "Soviet Communist Party to Go on Trial; Old Regime Likened to Nazis as Moscow Prepares to Judge Lenin and his Heirs," Financial Times, May 27, 1992, p. 2; "Opening the Moscow Files," Los Angeles Times, May 27, 1992, p. B 6 ; A. Cooperman, "Russia Reveals Communist Party's Past Role in Terrorism," May 26,1992; S. Schmemann, "Soviets Gave Arms to Palestine Band," New York Times, May 26, 1992, p. A 7 . The Soviets agreed to provide the PFLP with " . . .  substantial military aid . . ." in returnfor that organization's curtailment of its foreign operations.See El-Rayyes, p. 130.
®^ ® El-Rayyes, pp. 130-132.
i
®^  ^ R e p p e r t ,  p .  1 1 4 .
2 8 3
should try to get help wherever you can find it. In
Vietnam, Khalaf learned the value of tactical compromise - the
acceptance of a less than total fulfillment of demands - in order
to achieve intermediate gains, as the Vietcong had done when it
accepted Vietnam's partition into two sovereign states.^®
A 1969 interview with 'Arafat printed in the Beirut daily
A l - Sawad sums up the reasons for Fatah's policy of seeking aid
and support from a variety of sources :
I want that homeland even if the devil is the one to liberate it for me. Am I in a position to reject the participation or assistance of any man? Can I be asked, for example, to refuse the financial aid of Saudi Arabia with the claim that it belongs to the right? After all, it is with the Saudis' money that I buy arms from China.
By maintaining friendly links with governments of all 
political shades - and constantly seeking out new friends - the 
Fatah-dominated PLO was able to expand its influence 
internationally and participate in initiatives affecting the 
Arab-Israeli dispute as an element to be reckoned with. It had
Abu lyad, p. 67.
®^ ® Abu lyad, p. 69.
Interview with Yasir 'Arafat in A l - S a w a d . January 23,1969, quoted in A. Gowers and T. Walker, Behind the Mvth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1992)(hereinafter "Gowers and Walker"), p. 62. Such a course of action was unacceptable to the PFLP. In an interview given the following year, Habash asserted that ". . . w e  wouldnever accept the money they are getting from reactionary [regimes ?] ; we would never touch money that smells of American oil . . .. for us to accept money from them would mean to trample on our moral beliefs, to lose our honor." O. Fallaci, "A Leader of the Fedayeen: 'We Want a War Like the Vietnam War'," Life, June 12,1970, p. 34.
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transcended its status as a mere 'guerrilla group' and had 
effectively become the Palestinians' representative to the world 
community.
C . PFLP Deals Only With Ideologically Compatible Interlocutors; Its Isolation Increases as Regional Conditions Change
The PFLP, on the other hand, insisted on dealing only with 
elements which were both pro-Palestinian and militantly anti- 
Western. It remained hostile to all other elements, in many 
cases targeting them for armed attack.®^® This attitude has 
earned the PFLP hostility and fear in kind from most quarters and 
left it little room for either political or diplomatic maneuver. 
Consequently, while Fatah (as the PLO's dominant faction) has 
risen from a militant organization to the status of a government- 
in-exile, the PFLP remains - in the eyes of most governments - a 
terrorist organization whose theater of operations has been 
reduced by political and economic circumstances from the world 
arena to the area encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip.
The PFLP's political isolation became even more apparent 
with the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991 and that event's 
convergence with the Madrid Middle East peace conference in
®^ ® The PFLP's role in escalating tensions between the Jordanian monarchy and the Palestinian organizations operating in Jordan led to the letter's expulsion from the country - despite Fatah's efforts to maintain a correct relationship with King Hussain - beginning in September 1970. The PFLP similarly encouraged leftist Lebanese groups to overthrow the conservative Phalangist government in Lebanon, in contrast to Fatah's efforts to coordinate its anti-Israel operations with its hosts, (See Chapter 2).
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November of that year.®'^ ® In one fell swoop, the PFLP lost the 
support of a superpower, as well as its ability to count on 
Syria®®® for shelter and aid. With the Soviet Union's 
disappearance, the PFLP also lost the support of Moscow's Eastern 
European satellites and was compelled to begin a desperate search 
for other ideologically compatible allies.
Unwilling to modify its views, even at this late date, the 
PFLP choice of partners was narrowed to the world's remaining 
communist countries (Cuba and North Korea), the militantly anti­
western Middle Eastern nations (Iran and Libya), and the 
Palestinian and Islamic groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Its opposition to the 1993 Israeli-PLO negotiations led 
it to effectively withdraw from the PLO altogether. As a result, 
the PFLP has been marginalized as an actor in mainstream 
Palestinian politics.
54® "Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadr 'an al-Lajnah al-Markaziyyah li al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir Filastin, Ayar 1991: Harb al-Khalij Muraja'ah wa Taqyim al-Marhalah al-Siyasiyyah al- Jadidah [The Political Report Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, May 1991: The Gulf War - Review and Evaluation of the New Political Stage]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1075, October 27, 1991, pp. 24-28.
550 Syria had also depended on the Soviet Union for military and financial assistance.
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Chapter 12 : Fatah-PFLP Rivalry within the PLO
The PLO considers itself a political umbrella for the major 
Palestinian resistance organizations, the Palestinian trade, 
professional and student associations, and Palestinian population 
concentrations all over the world. Although Fatah dominates the 
PLO, the PFLP was - until the 1993 signing of the Declaration of 
Principles with Israel - the organization's second largest 
constituent group and played a prominent, if indirect, role in 
'its affairs. This section will discuss the rivalry which has 
existed between the two organizations since the late 1960's, 
examining the PFLP's efforts to influence the PLO's 
decisionmaking and the degree to which Fatah has been successful 
in countering that influence.
The Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Executive 
Committee, and the Central Council are thè PLO's three primary 
decisionmaking bodies. The PNC is the PLO's 'supreme authority' 
whose task it is to formulate the organization's policies and 
programs (Article 7 of the PLO's Fundamental Law) . It is 
elected for a three-year period and meets annually (article 8).
A. Palestinian National Council
PNC members may be elected as representatives of 'political- 
military organizations (such as Fatah or the PFLP), 
representatives of 'mass' organizations, representatives of the
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualtv and Surety Co.. 368 F. Supp. 1098, Exhibit 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd., 505 F . 2d 898 (2d. Cir. 1974)(hereinafter FundamentalLaw) .
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Palestine National Liberation Army (PNLA) , or individually,®®^
Outwardly, at least, the PNC appears to reflect the widest 
possible political and social spectrum of Palestinians world­
wide. In reality, PNC members are selected, for the most part, 
through outright appointment by the PLO's chairman, as well as 
through efforts by the dominant Fatah group to gain control of 
the Palestinian trade unions and professional organizations (see j
below). I
B. Executive Committee
Despite the PNC's official status as the PLO's ultimate j
authority, it is the Executive Committee (whose chairman is, at j
least formally, chosen by the PNC [article 13]), which formulated j
the law governing elections to the National Council (article 5). |
jIt is also the Executive Committee's chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, who j
effectively determines each PLO constituent group's degree of I
representation at PNC meetings, thereby ensuring his re- 
election.®®®
Formally, however, the PNC - as the organization's supreme !
authority®®^ - reviews the Executive Committee's annual report ;
on the PLO's activities. It considers the Palestine National 
Fund [PNF]'s annual report and approves the PLO's budget. The
®®^  Mussalam, p. 12.
®®® H. Al-Husayni, "Dr. George Habash on Madrid Peace Conference, Just Peace: I am for Peace, Repatriation Right, Jerusalem, and State; We will Stay with PLO Framework through the National Council," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 1, 1991 in FBIS- NES-91-220, November 14, 1991, pp. 5-7.
®®^  M u s s a l a m ,  p .  1 1 .
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PNC's various committees may also submit proposals to be 
deliberated (article 10).®®®
Finally, the PNC elects the Executive Committee chairman, 
who in turn, appoints its fourteen other members (articles 13 and 
14). Whereas the PNC has supreme authority in voting in 
formulating the PLO's general policy, the Executive Committee is 
considered the organization's " . . .  highest executive authority 
. . . "; that is, it has the final say in all matters related to
executing the resolutions approved by the PNC. While the PNC 
meets only once a year, the Executive Committee is constantly in 
session and its members carry out their tasks on a full-time 
basis (article 15) .®®®
The Executive Committee may carry out PNC resolutions as it 
sees fit, provided that its actions do not contradict the PLO 
Charter or Fundamental Law. It is authorized to establish the 
departments and sub-organizations necessary to execute PLO policy 
and to perform the organization's routine tasks (article 18).
The Executive Committee is additionally charged with preparing 
the annual budget (article 16) .
The functions which the departments established by the 
Executive Committee perform have been likened by some 
commentators to those in which a government engages.®®’^ Indeed,
®®® See also Id. . pp. 15-16. 
®®® Id. , p. 22.
557 See, e.g. Id., p. 5 and C. Rubenberg, The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Structure (Belmont,(continued.
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were it an actual government, the PLO could be said to 
incorporate the equivalents of a presidential cabinet (the 
Executive Committee), a Judicial Branch, a foreign affairs 
ministry (the Political Department), a defense ministry (the 
Military Department), a finance ministry (the PNF), and an 
education ministry (the Higher Learning and Education 
Department) , to name a few.
This analogy, however, is not an entirely accurate 
characterization of the PLO. While these departments have 
equivalents in legitimate governments, one can find their 
parallels in non-governmental organizations as well (labor unions 
and corporations, for example) . The PLO differs from a 
state, such as Egypt, in that it exercises no sovereignty, for 
the time being, and is subject to the benevolence of the 
government dn whose territory it r e s i d e s . T h e  PLO also
ss7(... continued)Mass.: Institute of Arab Studies, 1983)(hereinafter "Rubenberg"), p . 5 .
Mussalam, p. 23.
Most large corporations have security departments and internal organizations competent to rule on infractions of company by-laws. Many corporations and unions which can afford to do so see to the social needs of their employees and members as well.
560 This transient status made it difficult for the PNC to meet regularly in order to deal with whatever "legislative or quasi-legislative" problems arose between its sessions. In 1973, " . . .  it was decided to establish a second but smaller legislative body which would function as a link between the PNC when it was in recess and the PLO's Executive Committee."
Mussalam, p. 19. (continued...)
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differs from a government-in-exile, such as that of Poland 
following its occupation by Nazi Germany in 193 9, in that the PLO 
did not previously exercise sovereignty. Such a position creates 
serious difficulties for the PLO in extending its authority over 
constituent groups and organizations outside its authority, as 
well as enforcing its decisions among those whom it claims as 
s u b j e c t s . S i n c e  Palestinians are scattered all over the 
world, and since PiO decisions generally carry no authority in 
the countries in which they live, compliance with them is 
voluntary and becomes difficult if the decisions conflict with 
local laws. The result is that agreements concluded with the PLO 
by other parties are not binding on all of its proclaimed 
constituents because the organization may not be capable of 
applying them in all regions.
sGo (. . . continued)
Even in its present incarnation as the Palestinian National Authority, the PLO leadership - under its agreement with Israel - must coordinate its actions with the Israeli government.
These subjects are Palestinians everywhere, according to article 4 of the Fundamental Law, which states that " . . .  [a] 11 Palestinians are natural members in the Palestine Liberation Organization. They execute their duties in Liberating their homeland according to their abilities and capabilities [sic].The Palestinian people is the basic foundation of this Organization." The PLO's ability to extend its authority over all Palestinians under its jurisdiction will be tested in the coming months, when it is expected to assume power in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. C. Murphy, "Israeli, PLO Negotiators Agree on Police Force, Prisoner Release," Washington Post. April 13, 1994, p. A24. See also C. Hedges, "Israel and PLO in Accord on Palestinian Police Force," New York Times. April 13, 1994, p. A3 .
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c. Enforcement of Decisions
The PLO incorporates institutions and departments which 
could, however, assume the duties of government upon achieving 
sovereignty over a territory. Its closest parallel is the Jewish 
Agency, which served as the recognized representative of the 
Jewish community in pre-1948 Mandatory Palestine to the British 
authorities and provided for many of its constituents' social, 
economic, and security needs. The quasi-governmental 
institutions which it developed were later converted into what 
became the government of the State of Israel in 1948.^^^
Like the PLO, the Labor Zionist-oriented Jewish Agency 
competed with rival organizations (such as the Revisionist 
Zionists) for authority and influence over Mandatory Palestine's 
Jewish population. This competition finally reached the point 
where the Jewish Agency's unofficial military wing, the Haganah,
Article 4 of the League of Nations' authorization of the British Mandate over Palestine (September 29, 1923) states that:
[a] n appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.
The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
Survey of Palestine, p. 5.
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captured and imprisoned members of the Revisionist-led Irgun and 
LEHI militant groups. This was an attempt to limit the ability 
of those organizations to carry out operations which might 
embarrass the Jewish Agency before world public opinion.
The Haganah's efforts to extend its authority over rival 
Jewish organizations finally met with success, following Israel's 
establishment, in what later became known as the 'Altalena 
incident'. On June 20, 1948, five weeks after Israel declared 
'•its independence, the cargo ship Altalena attempted to land near 
Tel Aviv with a shipment of weapons which the newly-formed Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) badly needed in order to repel the invading 
Arab forces. The Irgun, which had hitherto been an independent 
underground organization - and owned the ship and its cargo - 
demanded that the weapons go to its soldiers and that it have 
control over how those weapons were to be used. Israel's new 
prime minister, David Ben Gurion (under whose authority the pre­
state Haganah had operated), refused, countering that Israel had 
one army now and that only the government had the authority to 
decide on how the weapons would be allocated. When it became 
clear that the Irgun would not hand over the weapons, Ben Gurion 
ordered the IDF to destroy the ship and its cargo. Soon 
thereafter, the Irgun disbanded.
I. Black and B. Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: A Historv of Israel's Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Weidenfeld,1991)(hereinafter "Black and Morris"), p. 18.
564 "Altalina, " Al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniwah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial , Vol. 1 (Damascus: Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastiniyyah, 1984), p. 281.
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The Fatah-dominated PLO similarly vies with rival 
organizations for dominance, both inside and outside the umbrella 
organization. This rivalry is most clearly visible in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, where the local militant and Islamic 
fundamentalist Palestinian groups compete for control of local 
commercial and professional associations (as well as geographical 
areas) in an effort to emerge the dominant political organization 
should a Palestinian state be established. The intensity of this 
competition has often resulted in bloody armed clashes among the 
groups and diverted their efforts away from their declared common 
aim of forcing Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.
The absence of a territory over which it could exercise 
control greatly hampered the PLO in its efforts to establish a 
stable regime capable of enforcing its decisions among those over 
whom it claims authority. In those countries which have allowed 
it to operate within their boundaries, it is subject to the will 
of the governments in power. In Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza 
Strip, it was considered an illegal organization and therefore
See, e.g. M. Parks, "In Peace Talks' Shadow, Islamic Group Fights PLO for Place in Sun. Gaza Strip: Just as in Former Colonies in Africa and Asia, Political Rivalries are Intensifying as a Palestinian State Looks More Possible, " Los Angeles Times. November 4, 1992, p. A 5 . See also "Palestinian Nationalists Torch West Bank Houses," Reuters. April 4, 1990; "Qutaish: Ma jara fi 'Awarta Tandhif li al-Jabhah al-Dakhiliyyah min al- 'Umala' wa al-Mashbuhin [Qutaish: What Happened in 'Awarta is a Cleansing of the Internal Front of Agents and Suspicious People]," Al-Hadaf. No. 1002, April 15, 1990, p. 18.
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required to operate underground. Under such circumstances, 
it is difficult for any organization to consistently enforce its 
decisions - or to even be assured that it will remain the 
dominant power. Consequently, it was difficult to conceive of 
the PLO as a conventional government or even as an authority 
which truly represented its putative constituents.
Despite these limitations, however, the PLO succeeded in 
establishing the basic principles under which the secular 
Palestinian resistance movement operates. Until September 1993, 
there were two primary factions within the PLO itself; Fatah, 
which dominated the organization and the PFLP, which was the 
organization's largest opposition faction. While both were 
united in their desire to establish a Palestinian entity along 
secular lines (as opposed to Hamas, which advocates an Islamic 
state), they were nonetheless at odds 6n most other issues. 
Viewing disunity as detrimental to achieving their primary common 
goal of setting up an independent Palestinian state, they sought 
to cooperate wherever possible and, in cases where they
On January 19, 1993, the Knesset annulled a provision of Israel's Anti-Terror Law, enacted in 1986, forbidding Israelis from meeting with PLO members. See "Israeli Parliament Overturns Ban on PLO Contacts," Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1993, p. 14. While individual Israelis were now able to meet with PLO officials, Israel still opposed any role for the organization in the Middle East peace negotiations (See "PLO Aide Hails Israel Legalising Contacts," Reuters, January 20, 1993) and continued to regard it as ". . . an illegal terrorist organisation underIsraeli law." See H. Carnegy, "Israel Ends Ban on PLO Contacts," Financial Times, January 20, 1993 and "Israeli Embassy Justifies Expulsions," MTI Hungarian News Agencv, January 20, 1993.
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disagreed, to at least maintain a working relationship with one 
another despite their differences.
D . Fatah's Flexibility versus the PFLP's Strict Adherence to Doctrine
As shown earlier, the PFLP and Fatah adopted markedly 
different approaches to achieving their common aim of 
establishing an independent Palestinian state. The PFLP's 
emphasis on ideological integrity over actual progress in 
reaching its goals stood in sharp contrast to Fatah's ability to 
modify its strategies to fit changing circumstances and in order 
to achieve positive results. While the PFLP's approach was to 
demand power from the PLO leadership - and then, after receiving
an unsatisfactory reply, to complain loudly of unfair treatment •
Fatah's approach has been to amass power and influence through 
persuasion, deal-making, and immediate exploitation of 
opportunities.
Fatah's flexible style long ago transformed it into the
PLO's " . . .  dominant ruling party," while the doctrinaire PFLP
assumed the role of the 'loyal o p p o s i t i o n . it is Fatah ". .
M. Shemesh, The Palestinian Entitv 1959-1974; Arab Politics and the PLO (London; Frank Cass, 1988)(hereinafter "Shemesh"), p. 154.
568 The ability to provide social services to its constituents has also been a key factor in determining the degree of support which Fatah - as the PLO's dominant force - enjoys among Palestinians. While no Fatah official would be foolish enough to state openly that his organization provides social services to Palestinians in order to 'buy their support', most political organizations (Palestinian or not) are known to administer social welfare programs for just that purpose. The PLO's social welfare system's apparent goal, however, has been to(continued...)
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(, . . continued)provide an alternative source of benefits for Palestinians, who may not, as a result of discrimination by the governments of the countries in which they reside, be receiving equal access to services. (See Mussalam, p. 34; L. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 3-4.)
The PLO's ability to provide services to its constituents, of course, required financial support. Such assistance was forthcoming - particularly from the Persian Gulf Arab states - with whom the PLO maintained friendly ties. It was abruptly halted, however, in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, due to the PLO's open approval of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. (See D. Evans, "Palestinian Police Urgently Need More Funds," Reuters,May 5, 1994.)
The degree to which the PLO's constituency decreased as a result remains unclear. Financial solvency and the ability to provide social services were two of many other factors affecting the PLO's popularity, not the least of which were its quasi- governmental status and its reputation as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. The PLO's»sudden destitution, however, had an obvious negative effect on its capacity to function to the extent that it was unable, by 19 93, even to pay the salaries of its administrative staff. (See D. Evans, Reuters, May 5, 1994, o d . cit. ; "Another Israeli Miirdered by Palestinian," ABC World News Tonicrht, April 7, 1994, 6:30 pm. Transcript No. 4069).
Hamas, on the other hand, having emulated Fatah's earlier policy, remained neutral during the Gulf War. It was thus able to maintain its reputation among Palestinians as a legitimate revolutionary organization, while simultaneously not offending its Saudi benefactors. As a result, Hamas was able to continue to receive substantial monetary assistance from the conservative Persian Gulf states while Fatah's aid was cut off. (See J. Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," in J. Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago, Illinois: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), p p . 70-84.).
Whether Hamas' increase in popularity (as indicated by its increased representation in certain Palestinian trade associations and labor unions in the West bank and Gaza Strip) in the early 1990's was the direct consequence of Fatah's financial troubles is not apparent, but one may assume that a lack of funds to support its activities was a factor. Hamas continued access to financial aid clearly allowed it to continue its activities(continued...)
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(. . . continued)unabated and was able to make significant political gains at Fatah's expense (as demonstrated by its increased representation on the councils of certain Palestinian trade associations in the West Bank and Gaza. There were other factors, as well. Hamas had a clear, unchanging goal based upon a centuries-old religious doctrine that was readily understood by the common man: Israel's replacement by an Islamic state. The Fatah-dominated PLO had tacitly accepted Israel's right to exist towards the end of 1988 in its 'declaration of independence' and in 1991, was conducting indirect negotiations with Israel. The PLO's apparent vacillation (as opposed to Hamas' stubborn adherence to doctrine) could not have been conducive to improving its image among Palestinians.
The PLO's signing of the self-rule agreement with Israel in May 1994, however, was clearly motivated primarily by a desire to improve the economic lot of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, since the organization's political gains were minuscule. The entity which the PLO was to administer was far from being independent; nearly all major Palestinian policy decisions had to be coordinated with the Israeli government. In terms of territory, the entity's boundaries (the Gaza Strip [excluding areas of Jewish settlement] and the city of Jericho on the West Bank) were far smaller than those specified in the PLO's opening negotiating position (the entire West Bank, the entire Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem).
The Palestinian administration, however, was expected to receive billions of dollars in foreign aid, which it intended to invest in the local economy and infrastructure. At the same time, the PLO would continue its negotiations with Israel in order to determine the territories' final status, at the end of which it hoped to attain full sovereignty over them. The interim period would be probationary, during which the PLO would demonstrate its ability to maintain internal security, live at peace with its Israeli neighbor, and, most importantly, stimulate the area's economic development.
In this case, at least, the PLO's success in winning the loyalty of the majority of Palestinians is directly tied to its continued access to financial aid, which would enable it to maintain the Palestinian entity's infrastructure, maintain internal order, and develop the local economy. A successful autonomous administration would allay Israeli fears that any future Palestinian state would be unstable and hostile. If the PLO can bring about full Palestinian independence and economic contentment, it will have succeeded in winning the loyalty of most of the area's Palestinian residents and will have greatly reduced the appeal of the groups opposed to the peace process.
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. which, in consultation with other organizations and politically 
active members of the Palestinian community, decides to a large 
extent the political guidelines to be followed by the PLO.
E. Groups Challenging Fatah's Dominance are Quickly Marginalized 
Groups attempting to challenge Fatah's dominance have either 
been marginalized within the PLO or compelled to leave the 
umbrella organization. 'Arafat aide Dr. Sami Mussalam has 
written that the opposition's differences with Fatah
"are occasionally severe enough to prompt the opposition parties to suspend their membership or to refuse participation in forming the Executive Committee. Additionally, there is an extra-parliamentary opposition composed of extremist elements, whose objectives are hidden behind radical, nationalist terminology. This extra-parliamentary opposition is not officially recognized by the PLO and constitutes the fringe groups which were responsible for the fall [sic] 1983 inter-Palestinian conflict in Lebanon.
Mussalam, p. 8. The degree to which Fatah dominates the PLO is most graphically illustrated in the 1984 edition of the Palestinian Encvclooedia. which states that " [a]s for those Arab countries which did not recognize the PLO [in 1970], such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Fatah carried out the mission of the PLO bureau as well."
Palestinian Encvclopedia - Fatah, p. 209.
570 This refers to the revolt led by Sa'id Musa Muraghah (Abu Musa), between May and December 1983, in which his organization of Fatah dissidents - Fatah-the Uprising - together with other pro-Syrian Palestinian groups drove the pro-'Arafat forces out of northern Lebanon. The dissidents were opposed to the PLO's strategy of supplementing armed confrontation against Israel with diplomacy. They sought to restore the PLO to being an organization which relied solely on violent action. The dissidents disputed in particular the PLO's acceptance in 1974 of the notion of 'liberating Palestine in stages', which called for the establishment of a Palestinian authority on any territory wrested from Israeli control, whether diplomatically or by armed force. They rejected this notion and called for a return to the idea of armed struggle as the only permissible means to 'liberate(continued...)
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They are without question extremist and against the democratically elected and legitimate leadership of the IPLO. I
Prior to the start of the Israeli-PLO negotiations, the PFLP j
could be described as a vocal minority PLO constituent group and |
its differences with the dominant Fatah organization are often I
acute. Nevertheless, it always viewed the PLO as the |
\ I
Palestinians' 'sole legitimate' representative and quasi- |
governmental body. In past cases of seemingly irreconcilable 
differences with 'Arafat, the PFLP temporarily withdrew its 
representation from one or more of the organization's
authoritative bodies (usually the PNC or the Executive |
Committee), forming its own organizational blocs in an attempt to i
'^^° ( . . . continued)Palestine.' The dissidents received the support of Syria, which sought to create a more militant alternative to the PLO led by 'Arafat. In rebelling against the traditional Fatah establishment, the dissidents sought to inspire Palestinians in general to transfer their support to the new organization. This effort failed miserably. While the dissidents managed to entice a number of senior Fatah officers into joining their faction, they were unable to win the support of a single political figure. Although the PFLP also opposed many of 'Arafat's positions, it refrained from siding with the dissident coalition against the PLO chairman, whom it viewed as a national symbol. In addition, the PFLP felt that the split within Fatah would provide 'Arafat with the 'shock treatment' it believed that he needed to prompt him to restore the PLO to its former militancy.
See Bekhor, pp. 216-221. See also A. 'Abd al-Rahman, "Al-Nidhal al-Filastini fi Itar Munadhdhamah al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah [The Palestinian Struggle Within the PLO Framework]," Al-Mawsu'ah al- Filastinivvah [The Palestinian Encvclopedial . Vol. V (Beirut; Hai'ah al-Mawsu'ah al-Filastiniyyah, 1990)(hereinafter "'Abd al- Rahman), pp. 246-251.
Mussalam, p. 9.
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counter a particular t r e n d . H o w e v e r ,  it never disputed the 
PLO's legitimacy or usefulness, and justified these steps as 
attempts to ". . . returning the PLO to the national line as
spelled out in legitimate PNC s e s s i o n s . Even after its 
effective withdrawal in 1993, the PFLP reaffirmed the PLO's role 
as the Palestinian people's representative, but added that 
'Arafat's leadership no longer reflected the umbrella 
organization's true aims .
The PFLP's criticism of the Fatah-dominated leadership has 
traditionally focused on: 1) its own relatively limited 
representation within the PLO and the need to rectify this 
condition; 2) the means of struggle to be employed against 
Israel; and 3) the question of whether or not to accept the 
reality of Israel's existence.
In the autumn of 1974, the PFLP formed the Rejection Front. The Rejection Front was composed of organizations opposed to a resolution adopted by the Twelfth PNC which permitted the PLO to establish a Palestinian state (albeit temporarily) " . . .  on every part of Palestine to be liberated . . . ," a solutionwhich they believed would postpone Israel's destruction indefinitely. See Cobban, p. 62. The PFLP formed the Palestinian National Salvation Front in 1984 because it disapproved of Arafat's seemingly close relationship with Jordan and indirectly, it believed, with Israel. See Wallach and Wallach, p. 242. Following the start of the Israel-PLO negotiations in September 1993, the PFLP effectively withdrew from the PLO to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (composed of Islamic fundamentalist, as well as secular Marxist groups.See Chapter 2).
"Interview with Comrade Habash, " Democratic Palestine,No. 13 (January 1986), p. 7.
574 tipLo Radicals Plan New Leadership to Replace Arafat," Reuters, October 7, 1993.
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Since 1968, the PFLP has sought to extend its influence 
within the PLO umbrella group. Despite 'Arafat's claim that the 
PLO is a democratic organization which represents all 
Palestinians, both Fatah and PFLP sources make it clear that 
it is Fatah (and principally 'Arafat) which determines the 
proportion at which the PLO's various constituent groups are 
represented within its governing bodies. Mussalam, for example, 
has written that " . . .  Fateh is by far the largest and most 
powerful party among the various Palestinian organizations which 
comprise the PLO - and could at any time easily form and control 
the Executive Committee . . . ." Although he downplays Fatah's
role as 'political orchestrator' by emphasizing that since 1969, 
it has " . . .  opted for the formation of a coalition form of 
government . . . ," he nevertheless does not attempt to hide the
fact that Fatah " . . .  has assigned itself three of the 15 
portfolios of the Executive Committee. These portfolios are the 
chairmanship of the Executive Committee, the Political Department 
and the Department of National Relations." Despite Fatah's 
control of the organization's three key positions, Mussalam
See, e.g. an 'Arafat speech on the occasion of the 'Uprising's' fifth anniversary, reported by Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic. 170 2 gmt, December 10, 1992 in FBIS-NES-92- 239. December 11, 1992, p. 7, in which he ". . . emphasized thatwe went to the negotiations out of conviction. We will continue to do so with conviction and will boycott them out of conviction because our Palestinian decision is a free one, and stems from the decisions made by the Palestinian National Council." (Emphasis added).
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continues to maintain that Fatah " . . .  does not endeavor to 
dominate the PLO.
F . Alliances of Convenience
Through September 1993, the PFLP favored - at least at the 
highest levels - cooperation with Fatah in matters on which the 
two organizations agree and responsible opposition to it on 
issues on which they disagree. The 1983 version of the PFLP's 
Political and Organizational Strategy stated that :
[t] he law which governs our relations with this class is the alliance between it and the revolution to stand in the face of the fundamental contradiction, represented by the enemy camp . . . and at the sametime, oppose this class so that it, its programs, and its strategy do not become part of the revolution's leadership. s??
More recently, in 1992, PFLP Secretary General George Habash 
referred to his organization's relationship with the PLO as one 
which was governed by ". . . the law of unity and struggle."
"Our position toward the PLO," Habash explained, " . . .  could 
first of all be defined in light of the political stand. If we 
agree on this stand, we will encourage the process of alliance. 
But if we differ with this stand, we will say so.
Mussalam, p. 9. 
Strategv 1983, p. 67
M. Sukkariyah, "Hiwar ma' Jurj Habash . . . Al-Halim al-Rafidh tadhakkara 'abd al-Nasir wa Baka al-Qutriyyah al- Filastiniyyah Sabab Ra'isi fi Azmat al-Nidhal [An Interview with George Habash . . . 'Abd al-Nasir is Remembered as a RejectionistDreamer and the Wailing of Palestinian Regionalism is a Major Reason for the Crisis in the Struggle]," Al-Safir. June 8, 1992, p . 3 .
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In 1992, PFLP cooperated with Fatah against efforts in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Hamas) to compete with the PLO's secular nationalist 
leadership for control of the Palestinian political movement (see 
above). The PFLP regarded Hamas's aim of establishing an Islamic 
state as dangerously contradictory to its vision of a 'secular, 
democratic' Palestine - dangerous for non-Muslim Palestinians in 
particular. "^9 The concern of the Palestinian movement's 
secular wing over Hamas' approach - as well as the political 
challenge which it represents - has been reinforced by the 
violent clashes which have taken place between Hamas and PLO 
supporters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1991, for 
example, a Palestinian journalist reported that Hamas operatives 
in Nablus " . . .  captured a [PLO] activist wanted by the Israeli
Democratic Palestine warned that :
. . . Hamas could serve to distort the image of theintifada and the Palestinian national movement in the eyes of the world. To further illustrate the real face of Hamas, it is sufficient to point to some of Hamas' seemingly silly but actually dangerous mottos, like:"the Ouran is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Another slogan, "After Saturday comes Sunday,' could be understood as an indication that after finishing with the Jews, Hamas will turn to the Christians. How can such mottos serve the Palestinian struggle?"
"The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Palestine: Focus on Hamas," Democratic Palestine. No. 51, July - August - September 1992, p. 15.
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army for more than three years, stabbed him 17 times, then left 
him bleeding in the street.
The PFLP's fear of an Islamic fundamentalist take-over of 
the Palestinian national movement led it to form political 
alliances of convenience with Fatah against Hamas in trade union, 
professional organization, and student group elections in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. In November 1992, for example, Reuters 
reported that Fatah, the PFLP, and the DFLP had joined forces to 
defeat the Hamas candidates in an election to the student council 
of Bir Zait University - in which the PLO bloc won 66% of the 
vote - stressing that " . . .  [tjhree PLO factions put aside 
differences on Middle East peace talks to block the election of 
Moslem fundamentalists to the student council of a key West Bank 
university . . . .
E. Fraitekh, "Intifada: Now the War Among the Palestinians. The Secular-Fundament a1i s t Schism on the West Bank," Washington Post. November 24, 1991, p. C2.
581 IIPLO Unites to Block Fundamentalists at University, " Reuters, November 12, 1992. Hamas competes with the PLO in the social services area as well. The Economist reports that the fundamentalist organization " . . .  runs an efficient network of welfare institutions. . . . " i n  the territories (See "IslamVersus Israel," Economist, December 19, 1992, p. 47; B. Hepburn, "HAMAS Militant Islamic Fundamentalist Movement Has Become More Violent and Popular Among Palestinians than Israel Ever Imagined," Toronto Star, January 3, 1993, p. FI; and Y. Ibrahim, "Arabs to Seek U.N. Pressure on Israel Over Deportations," New York Times, January 13, 1993, p. A2) and maintains that Hamas's activities are funded by the Saudi and Iranian governments, as well as by contributions from supporters world-wide. See I. Black, "Israel: Hamas Fills PLO Vacuum," Guardian. December 18, 1992, p. 8 and P. Inbari, "Cooperation of Convenience," Jerusalem Post, December 25, 1992. The Israeli government has made similar accusations. See C. Walker, "PLO Fears Rise of Fundamentalists," Times, December 18, 1992; IDF Radio, 1700 gmt, December 22, 1992(continued...)
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In this case, the PFLP united with Fatah in order to respond 
to Hamas' challenge, which they each saw as a threat to their 
very existence. In cases where differences on important 
doctrinal questions^^ _ such as Palestinian participation in
(. . . continued)in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts, December 24, 1992, p. ME/1572/A/1; J. Ferziger, "Israel Accuses Saudi Arabia of Funding Hamas," UPI, January 11, 1993; and "Administration asked to Help Cut Flow of Hamas Funds from US to Territories," Jerusalem Post. January 11, 1993.
An example of an important doctrinal question on which the two organizations disagree is whether or not one should openly call for Israel's destruction. As stated earlier in this chapter, the PFLP is generally very forthright on this issue and consistently avers that Israel's disappearance is a prerequisite to the Arab-Israeli conflict's peaceful resolution. Fatah, on the other hand, is not averse to appearing moderate in order achieve tangible results or to enhance its image.
In May 198 9, for example, Yasir 'Arafat declared that the Palestinian National Charter had been "superseded" in order to assuage western fears that the PLO still sought Israel's ,destruction. "Arafat Visits France: Declares PLO Charter ''Superseded'," Facts on File World News Digest. May 5, 1989, p. 314 FI. Although the PLO later disavowed 'Arafat's statement (Kuwait KUNA in Arabic, 13 25 gmt. May 6, 1989 in FBIS-NES-89-087.May 8, 1989, p. 3), George Habash nevertheless demanded that herelinquish his chairmanship:
I state clearly that if Arafat has reached the point where he considers the PLO covenant to be null and void, he should look for another organization, because the masses have embraced the PLO and its covenant and tens of thousands of martyrs, for whom we are responsible, have died under the PLO and we will never betray the blood of our martyrs, the blood of (Abu Jihad), Wadi' Haddad, Guevara Gaza, Ghassan Kanafani,and the blood of tens of thousands of heroic martyrswho died under the banner of the PLO and its covenant .
"Habash fi Muqabalah ma' Roitir hawla Mawdhu' al-Mithaq al- Watani: Sanunadhilu dakhil al-Mu'assasat wa fi Itar Jamahirina li Fardh al-Mawqif al-Sahih [Habash in an Interview with Reuters: We will Struggle within the Institutions and in the Framework of our(continued...)
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the peace process currently taking place between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors - the PFLP attacked Fatah's position favoring 
participation.
Habash recently criticized the PLO leadership for . .
calling for pragmatism and saying that the Arab and international 
conditions are forcing us to enter into this process," and called 
for working to ". . . protect and continue the intifadah in
preparation for escalating it." When reminded that the
(. . . continued)Masses to Impose the Correct Stance]," Al-Hadaf. No. 959, May 31, 1989, pp. 8-9.
In late 1991, for example, George Habash severely criticized the PLO leadership for backing Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace conference and called for a less pacific means of confronting Israel:
I regret to say that we have started negotiations while settlement building,continues. Therefore, it is the duty of the PLO to change its current course very quickly and to lead the masses down the road of struggle in order to change the balance of power. I regret to say that some leaders are celebrating their own defeats. Well, I could sympathise with someone who says ["]This is a difficult situation, a terrible situation, into which we were forced against our will, etc. But, really, to celebrate our defeats, this is a situation that I hope some leaders would reconsider.["]
"Text of Recording of 'Exclusive' Statement by Dr. George Habash, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] to MBC Correspondent Sa'd al-Silawi in Amman," date not given, in BBC Summarv of World Broadcasts. November 18,1991, p. ME/1232/A/1 (emphasis added).
Habash indicated that his criticism was directed at Fatah when he declared, on November 6, 1991, that ". . . w e  cannot bearresponsibility for the wrong policy adopted by the dominant leadership . . ."of the PLO, referring to the organization'ssupport for the Madrid talks.
"PFLP Quits PLO in PLO Executive Committee," Xinhua GeneralOverseas News Service, November 6, 1991, Item 1106017.
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uprising's violent aspects had achieved few practical gains, !
Habash countered with his familiar advocacy of the 'long-term 
popular liberation war', asserting that ". . . w e  want to
struggle for one year, two years, a thousand years. What is 
important is to obtain our liberty.
On this critical issue at least, the PFLP was prepared to 
temporarily collaborate even with the rival Palestinian 
organizations which it feared most - Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad - based on a common opposition to Palestinian 
participation in U.S.-sponsored negotiations with Israel. The 
aim, according to Habash ". . . is to make the American plan
fail. Then the United Nations will have to deal with the 
Palestinian issue. When that happens, world opinion will support 
us, not Jihad or Hamas.
G. The Limits of Compromise
As demonstrated earlier, the PFLP does not reject the 
principle of a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
but rather, opposes a settlement in which accepts of any kind of 
coexistence with the Israel and in which its aim to destroy 
Israel is either postponed or foregone.^®® Its response to the 
Palestinian delegation's participation in the 1991 Madrid peace 
talks was to remain within the PLO framework, while continually
584 Al-Safir. June 8, 1992.
P. Eedle, "PFLP Leader Habash Condemns Peace Process as Trap," Reuters. January 25, 1993.
Al-Hadaf. No. 936, November 20, 1988, pp. 7-10.
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reminding the organization of the absence of concrete positive 
results and calling for Palestinian withdrawal from the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e  PLO's entry into direct negotiations with 
Israel however, violated the PFLP's most fundamental principle of 
neither recognizing nor dealing with the enemy. This prompted it 
to leave the umbrella organization to form an 'alternative PLO' 
in the form of the Alliance of Palestinian Organizations, 
incorporating both secular and Islamic Palestinian groups opposed 
to peace negotiations with Israel (see chapter 2).
H. The Method to 'Arafat's 'Madness'
The PLO's 'dealings with the enemy', however, were aimed at 
accomplishing many of the goals that the PFLP contends were 
conceded in the May 1994 self-rule agreement; namely, the 
attainment of a de facto status for Jerusalem as the 
administrative seat for Palestinian political affairs in Jericho 
and the Gaza Strip and, by logical extension, the remainder of 
the West Bank. They present, once again, an opportunity to 
contrast the PFLP's insistence on strict doctrinal adherence with 
the Fatah leadership's predilection for exploiting existing 
conditions to the greatest possible advantage.
The Israel-PLO peace agreement gave the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) jurisdiction over most of the Gaza Strip and
See, e.g. "PFLP Calls for Withdrawal from Peace Talks Following 'Atrocities' in Gaza," Al-Ouds Palestinian Arab Radio. 1730 gmt, December 13, 1992 in British Broadcasting Corporation: Summarv of World Broadcasts. December 15, 1992, p. ME/1564/A/1; "Palestinian Radicals Condemn Israeli Measures," Reuters. December 15, 1992.
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Jericho. Despite the PLO's initial acceptance of these 
conditions, it continued to insist that the issue of eventual 
Palestinian control of East Jerusalem and the rest of the West 
Bank was far from dead and, as stipulated in the DOP, would be 
taken up once more within three years of the agreement's signing.
In the interim, both parties expressed fears that the other 
was attempting to create irrevocable facts on the ground to 
preclude further negotiations. On May 10, shortly after the 
signing of the peace agreement, 'Arafat addressed congregants at 
a mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa during which he warned 
that the Israelis would exploit the three year period to weaken 
the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and strengthen their own.
He called upon his audience to ". . . come to fight, to begin the
jihad to liberate Jerusalem, your first shrine . . . ." and
charged that there was ". . . a constant conspiracy against 
Jerusalem . . . .  [I]n the next three years, (negotiations) will 
start no later than the beginning of the third year. They (the 
Israelis) will try to wipe out and change the demography of 
Jerusalem." This was the reason, 'Arafat asserted, for his 
insistence on an Israeli guarantee that existing Palestinian 
institutions in Jerusalem would not be disturbed before he would 
sign an agreement with the Israeli government. The Israelis, he 
further maintained, had outlined these guarantees in a letter 
given to him in Cairo in which ". . . 1  insisted that they
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mention that we are responsible for all the holy sites, Christian 
and Muslim.
'Arafat's Johannesburg speech triggered an alarm in the 
editorial and opinion sections of Israel's major daily 
newspapers; not so much over 'Arafat's call for j i h a d , a s  
over the possibility that the Israeli government might have made 
commitments to the PLO which would compromise Israeli sovereignty 
in what was considered " . . .  Israel's eternal capital."®^®
Israeli Foreign Minister Peres responded that no such letter was 
given to 'Arafat in Cairo and that he was probably refering to 
the Israeli letter sent to Norwegian mediator Johan Holst in 
which Israel undertook to preserve all existing Palestinian 
institutions in Jerusalem and to respect the religious rights of 
all. There was no commitment by Israel, he explained, to allow 
the PLO to extend its authority beyond what was outlined in the 
peace agreement and DOP.®^^
Ha' aretz in Hebrew, May 23, 1994, p. A2 in FBIS-NESA-94- 100. May 24, 1994, pp. 1-3.
The term jihad. or 'holy war', refers to a military campaign against non-Muslim forces in order to further or protect the Islamic community's interests. See H. Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Arabic-Encrlish) (edited by J.M. Cowan) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), p. 169. It was generally agreed, however, that the PLO did not have the resources for such an undertaking and only the agreement's staunchest Israeli opponents made an issue of 'Arafat's unfortunate remark.
Yedi 'ot Aharonot, June 8, 1994, p. 2 in FBIS-NES-94-111. June 9, 1994, pp. 34-35.
Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, Israel Television Channel 1 Network. 1530 gmt, June 9, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-112. June 10, 1994, pp. 30-34. See also Jerusalem,(continued...)
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Concurrent press accounts, however, indicated that this was 
precisely what the PLO was attempting. The preeminent 'existing 
Palestinian institution' in Jerusalem was Orient House, built on 
the property of Palestinian negotiator Faisal al-Husseini, and 
housing his Arab Studies Center until 1988. Closed down by the 
Israelis during that year for its role during the uprising as a 
front for PLO activities in Jerusalem, it was re-opened in 
1992 to serve as the headquarters of the Palestinian delegation 
to the Madrid formula autonomy negotiations,^® at which they 
held news conferences and working sessions, and through which all 
fax and telephone communications with the PLO in Tunis were 
conducted. The Palestinian technical committees, which had been 
assembled to plan the infrastructure for autonomy arrangement 
envisioned under the Madrid formula, held their meetings there
(. . . continued)Israel Television Channel 1 Network in Hebrew, 1800 gmt, June 6, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-109. p. 54; "Economical With the Truth," Economist, June 18, 1994, pp. 48 and 51.
Two additional offices, located in the Wadi al-Jawz and Shu'afat neighborhoods, were closed down by the Israeli government in February 1991 for similar reasons. A. Cohen, "Two of Hussaini's Offices Closed by Security Police," Jerusalem Post, February 25, 1991, p. 12. It acquiesced, however, to ". . . thebasing of numerous Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, most of them affiliated with the PLO, such as newspapers, press services and labor and social organizations." Y. Goell, "Rethinking the Jerusalem Status Quo," Jerusalem Post. February 27, 1991, p. 4.
S. Helm, "Opening Doors to the Past and the Future," Independent. August 1, 1992, p. 13. See also "Husseini's Arab Studies Center Reopens After Four Years," AFP. July 29, 1992.
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and have since evolved into quasi-ministries for a shadow 
Palestinian government in East Jerusalem and the Territories.
The 'ministries' were quickly staffed with secretaries, 
clerks, economists, and administrative and legal experts. 
Computers and telephone lines were also installed. An office to 
deal with foreign representatives was established and diplomats 
based in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, as well as foreign delegations 
from abroad, interacted with Palestinian elements from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip through Orient House.
Since the signing of the DOP on September 13, 1993, the PLO 
has incrementally attempted to secure at least de facto 
international acceptance of East Jerusalem, rather than Jericho, 
as its seat of g o v e r n m e n t . The Palestinian flag was raised 
on top of the roof of Orient House on the day of the signing. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the Gaza-Jericho autonomy " 
agreement in May 1994, the Japanese foreign minister paid a visit 
to the building, during which the Palestinian and Japanese flags 
were flown side by side, ". . . i n  accordance with the rules of
R. Shaqed, Yedi 'ot Aharonot (Leshabat Supplement) . June 10, 1994, pp. 7 and 26 in FBIS-NES-94-121, June 23, 1994, (hereinafter "Shaqed"), pp. 5-8.
Amid speculation over whether the DOP would indeed be signed, 'Arafat made no secret of his intention to press on in demanding full Palestinian control over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. See, e.g. "'Arafat yubashshiru al- Sha'b al-Filastini fi Khitab Mu'aththir bi al-Hatif min Tunis: Nahnu Qadimun al-Dawlah al-Filastiniyyah 'Asimatiha al-Quds Qaribah ['Arafat Announces to the Palestinian People in a Moving Speech by Telephone From Tunis : We are Advancing and the Palestinian State, Whose Capital is Jerusalem, is at Hand],"'Uman, September 2, 1993, pp. 1, 17.
3 1 3
.J
diplomatie etiquette." This was quickly followed by the arrival 
of a Turkish parliamentary delegation and at the beginning of 
June, a joint cooperation agreement was signed there between 
France and the PNA.®®®
Towards the end of May, reports began to appear in the 
Israeli press that the PNA was indeed attempting to set up a 
shadow government at Orient House, citing the establishment there 
of a Statistics Bureau for the autonomous region and the planned 
creation of an economic commission to receive and disburse the 
financial aid provided by the donor countries to the Palestinian 
e n t i t y . T h e  Jordanian daily, Al-Dustur quoted an unnamed PNA 
official as saying that the shadow government would " . . .  
comprise several ministries, including 'social affairs, housing, 
tourism and antiquities, education, sports and youth, health, and 
awqaf [Islamic religious edicts]' in addition to any other 
ministries the PNA thinks are necessary to consolidate the 
Palestinian presence in the city." According to the official, 
these measures were aimed at preventing "'. . . the Israeli
government from changing the status quo of the city to weaken the 
Palestinian negotiating stance' before starting the final
596 Shaqed.
Jerusalem, New Channel 2 Television Network in Hebrew, 1700 gmt. May 28, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-104. May 31, 1994, pp. 6869.
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negotiations that will determine the fate of the city . . .
_ / 1|598
While Faisal al-Husseini and others denied that such a 
government currently e x i s t e d , t h e y  nevertheless maintained 
that it was their intention to eventually form one. In an 
interview with the Jerusalem daily Al-Nahar. Husseini stated 
that :
[t]he battle of Jerusalem is a political, diplomatic, social, educational, and cultural battle. On the political and diplomatic levels, we are doing our best.This place, the Orient House, is one of the areas that has made a great effort toward that end. I believe that we gained a preliminary presence. This place has turned into a meeting place for the Palestinians with foreigners as well as among the Palestinians themselves to discuss several internal issues. At the economic level, this center has endeavored to call for an economic workshop on Jerusalem, and I believe that we must convene such a conference in Jerusalem as soon as possible to send a message to the Israelis that Jerusalem's importance is not just religious. The Israelis must realize that this is the Palestinians' religious, political, economic, and educational capital. "GOO
The Israeli government's response was to insist, in 
discussions with Husseini and his colleagues, that the PLO abide
G08 Al-Dustur, June 9, 1994, p. 29 in FBIS-NES-94-111. June 9, 1994, pp. 3-4.
GOO See. e.g. Jerusalem Israel Television Channel 1 Network in Hebrew, 1800 gmt, June 7, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-110. June 8,19 94, p. 8; Jerusalem Ool Yisra'el in Hebrew, 0705 gmt, June 7, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-109. June 7, 1994, pp. 11-12.
GOO 'A. Arna'ut, Interview with Faisal al-Hussaini, Al-Nahar, June 3, 1994, pp. 1,8 in FBI5-NES-94-108, June 6, 1994, pp. 6-8. Hussaini later told Al-Shara al-Awsat that "East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian state." M. Abu-'Id, Interview with Faisal al-Hussaini, Al-Shara al-Awsat. June 25, 1994, p. 6 in FBIS-NES-94-123. June 27, 1994, p. 9.
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by its agreement with Israel to administer PNA affairs from 
Jericho and the Gaza Strip only and to refrain from establishing 
and operating political institutions in Jerusalem. Rabin 
instructed the Israeli Police and internal security agencies to 
closely monitor Orient House and to immediately put a stop to any 
activities detected there which violate the PLO's May 1994 
agreement with Israel, particularly law enforcement.
Despite its apparent determination to halt the extension of 
Palestinian political authority to East Jerusalem, the Israeli 
government will be hard-pressed to achieve final success without 
risking unwanted attention and negative world reaction. Any 
government attempt to close down Palestinian institutions or 
arrest their employees would be well-covered by the mass media, 
potentially damaging Israel's rising status in the international
M. Einstein Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, Jerusalem, Ool Yisra'el in Hebrew, 0405 gmt, June 9, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-111, June 9, 1994, pp. 33-34. See also A. Ben, Ha'aretz, June 20, 1994, p. Al in FBIS-NES-94-118, June 20, 1994, p. 1. Environmental Affairs Minister Yossi Sarid, a leftist member of Rabin's cabinet, echoed the prime minister's response in no uncertain terms :
One, that institutions of the Palestinian self-rule authority will be in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho area, and only there. Two, any organizational activity that is diplomatic or resembles diplomatic activity that relates to Palestinian rule or resembles it in Jerusalem will require the endorsement of Israeli authorities, and each case will be examined by Israel based on the accord with the PLO. And three, there is only one police force in Jerusalem - Israeli, not Palestinian, and security and public order in Jerusalem is the responsibility of the Israeli police force, no other.
Jerusalem, Ool Yisra'el in English, 1000 gmt, June 1, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-105, June 1, 1994, p. 44.
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community and endangering the economic benefits connected 
therewith. Moreover, according to M. Peleg of Ha'aretz. there 
already exists a de facto social, economic, and political 
separation between the Jerusalem's Arab and Jewish sectors, a 
factor which tends to support Palestinian statements on their 
need for separate institutions and would will make it difficult 
for the Israeli government to assert control over Arab 
neighborhoods beyond mere political s o v e r e i g n t y . M .
Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, develops this 
argument further by contending that like the Jewish Agency and 
Histadrut Labor Federation of Israel's pre-statehood days. Orient 
House and its satellite institutions form the nucleus of a 
nascent sovereign government whose emergence into legitimate 
existence is inevitable.
The Rabin government, however, if it is seen to be losing 
control over Jerusalem (for millenia, the focus of Jewish 
nationalist and religious aspirations), would be endangering its 
existence and must weigh these risks against the possibility of a 
much stronger domestic popular backlash. This has moved it to 
reiterate its commitment to a united Jerusalem under Israeli
The most conspicuous example of the disconnection of the city's Arab and Jewish sectors are the separate electrical power grids which serve them, with the Israeli Electrical Corporation supplying Jewish neighborhoods and the East Jerusalem Electricity Company supplying Arab neighborhoods. See Summary of report by M. Peleg in Ha'aretz, June 3, 1994, pp. 36-38, 40 in FBIS-NES-94- 111 , June 9, 1994, pp. 35-36.
M. Benvenisti, "Jericho is No Substitute," Ha' aretz in Hebrew, June 16, 1994, p. B1 in FBIS-NES-94-129, June 22, 1994, p p . 34-35.
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sovereignty and to warn the PLO against administering the PNA 
from Orient House.
The PLO, for the time being, is taking these warnings 
seriously and avoiding public statements - to the Israeli press, 
at least - which might antagonize the government. its 
response has been to deny that such activities are taking place 
while quietly continuing them.®°G The Israel-PLO negotiating 
process continues, however. Their focus this time will be on the 
extension of Palestinian authority to the remainder of the West 
Bank. The PLO hopes, in time, to secure Israeli recognition of 
East Jerusalem as the PNA's capital. Israel has accepted in 
principle the expansion of the area under the Palestinian
Jerusalem Ool Yisra'el. 0800 gmt, July 12, 1994 in FBIS- NES-94-133. July 12, 1994, p. 34.
G°G Cairo Voice of the Arabs in Arabic, 0510 gmt, June 21, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-119. June 21, 1994, pp. 2-3. Among the factors behind the PLO's decision to lower its profile in Jerusalem was the arrest by the Israeli authorities of ". . . anumber of East Jerusalem residents who attempted to set up a Palestinian police framework in the city." See A. Ben and G. Alon, Ha'aretz. June 26, 1994, p. A4 in FBIS-NES-94-123. June 27, 1994, p. 52. 'Arafat's political advisor, Nabil Sha'th, stated in an interview with Israeli television that the PLO would gain political control over East Jerusalem only through a negotiated agreement with the Israeli government. See Jerusalem Israel Television Channel 1 Network in Hebrew, 1800 gmt, June 20, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-119. June 21, 1994, p. 2.
G°G M. Amir reporting on Jerusalem Ool Yisra'el in Hebrew, 0405 gmt, July 12, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-133. July 12, 1994, p. 2. See also N. Sandler, Jerusalem Ool Yisra'el in English, 1500 gmt, July 12, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-134. July 13, 1994, p. 35.
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authority's control, but rejected its political claims on 
Jerusalem.
As the second stage of negotiations begins, Israel and the 
PLO each hold trump cards to check the other's ambitions.
Whether Israel cedes the entire West Bank to the PNA or only 
portions thereof may depend on the extent to which the PLO 
presses the Jerusalem issue, and vice versa. In the final 
analysis, however, Israel can only make concessions (in terms of 
territory and sovereignty), while the PLO can only gain (in the 
same terms). The PLO can gradually and patiently transform 
Jerusalem into the PNA's effective capital city through 
imperceptible and incremental infractions of its agreement with 
Israel.
As the next phase of the Israeli-Palestinian discussions 
progresses, a skillful PNA leadership will likely maintain a low 
profile in Jerusalem, restricting its activity there to what has 
already been generally accepted as legitimate; unofficial 
meetings, the receiving of foreign diplomats and financial aid, 
the maintenance of a statistics bureau for the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, etc. As the PNA assumes power in the rest of the West 
Bank, it can turn its attention to defying Israeli authority in 
East Jerusalem. While Israel can legitimately suppress such 
obvious symbols of Palestinian sovereignty as a police force, its 
taking action against what would appear to be social and economic
607 Drozdiak, "Arafat, Rabin Open Next Phase of Talks: Israel Urges Caution, PLO Sees Urgency," Washington Post, July 7, 1994, p. A12.
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research institutions would be considered unacceptable behavior 
by the outside world and open it to political and economic 
sanctions.
Israel's response, so far, has been to continue the gradual 
strengthening of its presence in East Jerusalem by building new 
Jewish areas and expanding those which already exist. The 
outcome is likely to be a patchwork of Jewish and Arab 
neighborhoods, each with its own physical and economic 
infrastructure, and neither capable of dislodging the other.
The PNA's political entrenchment in Jerusalem, together with 
its enduring demand that the city's eastern half be the capital 
of a future Palestinian state, ensure that this issue will 
continue to confront Israel for years to come. In negotiating 
with Israel, the Palestinian authority, in order to succeed, must 
accustom its counterpart to the idea of making territorial and 
symbolic concessions. The Israel-PLO talks' current focus on 
extending PNA authority to the remainder of the West Bank^®® is 
part of this process. Israel's attachment to East Jerusalem, 
however, makes it unlikely that the PNA will locate its capital 
there in any other manner except through stealth. In addition, 
the agreement which resulted from the Israeli-Jordanian 
rapprochement in July 1994 promises Jordan a greater role in
The Israeli government has suggested that this take the form of autonomous PNA enclaves in Palestinian population centers, with the roads connecting them to be jointly patrolled by Israeli and Palestinian security forces. R. Ben-Yishay, Yedi'ot Aharonot. July 10, 1994, pp. 1, 22 in FBIS-NES-94-132.July 11, 1994, p. 52. See also "Arafat, Rabin Pledge Cooperation on Self-Rule," Washington Post. August 11, 1994, p. A32.
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administering Jerusalem's Muslim holy places, a prospect 
which 'Arafat views with alarm since this is a role which he has 
long coveted for the Palestinians.Nevertheless, the PLO's 
practice of incremental encroachment has proven considerably more 
effective than the PFLP's 'all or nothing' approach.
Despite its opposition to the Israel-PLO negotiations, the 
PFLP will not likely want to be excluded from their outcome. 
Should the Palestinian entity envisioned in the DOP be 
established in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PFLP's 
local supporters will almost certainly wish to play a part in its 
government. In March 1994, Riyadh al-Maliki, the PFLP's 
unofficial spokesman in the territories doubted that " . . .  the 
opposition cannot do [much] to boycott the agreement, especially 
since the 10 opposition groups have failed to form a real front 
against the accord. He said the Popular Front now needs to look 
ahead and define its new role under Palestinian self-rule.
In April, meetings occurred between Fatah and PFLP 
representatives both in Tunis and in the Gaza Strip in order to 
reach an understanding between the groups ahead of the expected
E . Sciolino et. al., "Amid Debt, Doubt and Secrecy, Hussein and Rabin Made Peace," New York Times, July 31, 1994, pp. 1 , 8 .
C. Murphy, "Israelis See Accord as Affirmation of Growing Acceptance in Arab World," Washington Post. July 26, 1994, p.A13. See also C. Murphy, "Arabs Feud Over Role of Jerusalem: Jordan's King, Arafat Dispute Roles in City," Washington Post, August 3, 1994, p. A23.
"Palestinian Groups agree Autonomy will come True,"Xinhua General Overseas News Service, No. 0328197, March 28,1994 .
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Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. In Tunis, PFLP 
politburo member 'Abd al-Rahim Malluh requested a role for his 
organization both in the self-governing authority and in the 
security forces, indicating a measure of pragmatism at the 
group's highest levels.
At the same time, the PFLP's leadership outside the 
territories continues to attempt to build its coalition against 
the Palestinian authority and to work actively to undermine it. 
The PNA's establishment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then, 
will provide the PFLP with the opportunity - should it choose to 
take exploit it - to re-enter mainstream Palestinian politics 
(and effectively, the PLO) without seeming to compromise its
defiant patriotism.
See "Palestinian Factions meet Ahead of Self-Rule, " Reuters, April 23, 1994; S. Nasrawi, "Arafat Opponents seek Role in Self-Government," April 21, 1994; 'A. Arna'ut, Al-Nahar(Jerusalem), April 24, 1994, pp. 1 and 7 in FBIS-NES-94-083, April 29, 1994, p. 10.
G^G At the end of May, 'Arafat met again in Tunis with PFLP and Hamas representatives, offering them positions in the Palestinian authority. They declined, although there was speculation that the PFLP would eventually be convinced to join. See S. Nasrawi, "Hamas Refuses to Join National Authority, New Member Named," May 30, 1994; "PNA Members to 'Start Work onthe Ground'," Reuters, May 29, 1994.
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Part Four: Conclusion
This study has attempted to characterize the PFLP's role 
within the Palestinian national movement, as well as to suggest 
reasons for the organization's ever-growing marginalization from 
the Palestinian political mainstream. Because of its stubborn 
insistence - despite changing circumstances - on implementing a 
complex ideological program with highly ambitious goals, the PFLP 
has found itself increasingly unable to compete with the more 
influential Fatah, whose aims are far simpler and whose program 
is more flexible. Because PFLP doctrine does not permit it to 
adapt quickly to changing political circumstances, the 
organization has become increasingly marginalized in Palestinian 
and regional politics/"^ while Fatah has achieved nearly total 
dominance.
A. Fatah's Flexibility Widens Its Range of Choices
Fatah's sole aim has consistently been limited to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state; preferably in place of 
Israel, but if this is not possible, then alongside it. How the 
program's goals are accomplished is less important than its 
eventual success. Fatah's view permits it to accept aid from any 
source, ally itself with any party, and conclude agreements even 
with its former enemies.
Hamas' ideology - fundamentalist Islam - is equally rigid, but has won greater appeal among Palestinians in general. Most were raised as Muslims and understand its precepts. In contrast, only a few, well-educated Palestinians have a sufficiently acute understanding of Marxism to be inspired by it
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This flexibility enabled Fatah to gain control of the PLO in 
February 1969 and remain at its head since. Fatah's leadership 
transformed the PLO from a marginal non-state regional actor into 
an international political force with the characteristics of a 
government-in-exile. In the years following the October 1973 
war, the PLO - recognizing the futility of defeating Israel on 
the battlefield - shifted its emphasis from military to political 
activity. In 1974, it gained recognition in the Arab world as 
the Palestinians' 'sole legitimate representative' and was 
accorded full diplomatic status in Arab capitals. In that year 
as well, the PLO officially endorsed the concept of establishing 
a Palestinian state on any territory from which Israel might 
withdraw (ie., the West Bank and Gaza Strip), implying a 
readiness to coexist - for tactical reasons, at least - with its 
enemy. The PLO's apparent willingness to accept Israel's 
presence provided the basis for altering its negative reputation 
as a terrorist organization among western governments and laid 
the groundwork for its acceptance as a legitimate international 
actor. While it had formerly been perceived as a threat to 
international stability, the PLO was now increasingly regarded as 
the key to a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
With the aid of its allies in the Soviet bloc, the PLO was 
able to achieve observer status at the United Nations in 1974, 
giving it an official platform from which to present its case.
For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the Palestinians could claim victory over their Israeli
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counterparts. As a result of the PLO's efforts - in conjunction 
with the Soviet bloc, Arab, and third world governments - the 
United Nations passed one resolution after another against its 
enemy, with Israel and the United States powerless to halt the 
trend. The PLO's rising international status led to full 
diplomatic representation in nearly all Arab states and most 
Soviet bloc and third world countries. Western European 
governments granted the PLO quasi-diplomatic status in their 
capitals and dealt with it openly, some at the highest levels.
Despite these diplomatic accomplishments, however, the PLO 
had come no closer to forcing Israel to withdraw from its 1967 
territorial acquisitions. While the establishment of friendly 
links with these governments had contributed to improving the 
PLO's international image, they had achieved no practical gains 
for the Palestinians in terms of the peace process. Israel 
remained adamantly opposed to ceding territory to the 
organization or to even recognizing its legitimacy. None of the 
governments with which the PLO had established ties had 
sufficient influence over Israel to move it in that direction.
The United States did, however. Despite the perception 
among most Palestinians that the United States was Israel's 
protector, the Fatah-dominated PLO adopted the realistic approach 
of regarding this circumstance as an obstacle to be removed not 
by force, but through persuasion. The PLO hoped to secure U.S. 
recognition of its status as the Palestinian people's sole 
representative and to convince the United States government - as
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other Arab states were attempting to do - of what it viewed as 
the need to pressure Israel into ceding territory in exchange for 
peace agreements. It sought to achieve this without being 
required to recognize Israel's right to exist or to renounce 
armed struggle - terrorist or otherwise - as an option for 
dealing with its enemy.
Thus began a long series of clandestine and informal 
contacts between the PLO and the United States government, in the 
early 1970's, in which each sought to entice the other into 
altering fundamental positions. The United States - mainly 
through private intermediaries - offered the PLO recognition in 
exchange for the letter's renunciation of terrorism and 
recognition of Israel's right to exist.
Both sides were hampered by prior commitments made to their 
allies and constituents, who were not yet ready to accept 
Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation on these terms. In exchange 
for total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the United States 
had promised Israel in 1975 that it would not negotiate with the 
PLO until the organization had met the foregoing conditions. 
'Arafat was reluctant to formally recognize Israel and to 
renounce terrorism without a concrete reward for these 
c o n c e s s i o n s ,  out of fear of the strong opposition he expected 
to encounter from the majority of Palestinians.
G^G Namely, territory on which a viable and independent Palestinian state could be established.
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Nevertheless, political and financial circumstances forced 
the PLO, Israel, and the United States to soften their positions 
and diminish their resolve. Media coverage of the uprising in 
the West Bank and Gaza, which began in late 1987, successfully 
portrayed Palestinian armed activity to both Israeli and 
international public opinion as a popular revolt and altered the 
commonly held perception that all Palestinians were terrorists. 
'Arafat's offer nearly one year later to enter into direct 
negotiations with the Israeli government - based on U.N. 
resolutions 242 and 338 - demonstrated a stark contrast between 
the PLO's dominant Fatah faction and the radical groups both 
inside and outside the PLO, whose leaders rejected any 
negotiation or compromise with the Jewish state. His apparent 
renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel in December 
1988 cleared the way for an open, but limited dialogue between 
the PLO and the United States government.
While the PLO's new position was sufficient for the United 
States to rescind its ban on contacts with the organization, 
Israel's Likud-led government under Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir 
remained unconvinced of the sincerity 'Arafat's renunciation. 
Israel's suspicion's appeared to be vindicated when 'Arafat 
failed to condemn a May 199 0 attack by a PLO constituent group 
(Muhammad Abu al-'Abbas' PLF) on a crowded Tel Aviv beach, an act 
which terminated the United States-PLO dialogue.
The PLO's response to the 1991 Persian Gulf war between the 
U.S.-led alliance and Iraq placed it in an even more precarious
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diplomatie position, not only with the United States, but with 
its most important Arab benefactors as well. Apart from the 
obvious result of angering the United States, the PLO's open 
support for Iraq against the alliance led to an immediate cutoff 
of financial aid by Saudi Arabia and other pro-western Gulf 
n a t i o n s . T h e  organization's new-found poverty, together with 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc, left it with no option but to 
involve itself in the direct negotiations begun between Israel 
and its Arab counterparts in Madrid toward the end of the year.
In deference to Israel's refusal to negotiate directly with 
the PLO, the latter bargained with the Israelis through nominally 
non-PLO Palestinian West Bank and Gaza residents, reiterating its 
call for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in 
the territories with Jerusalem as its capital. While the 
Israelis were willing to accept local Palestinian control of 
administrative functions such as education, sanitation, and law 
enforcement, this fell far short of the PLO's expectations.
Although officially excluded from the negotiations, the PLO 
used the opportunity to show that, try as it might, Israel could 
not put off direct contacts with the organization for much 
longer. Soon after Yitzhaq Rabin's ascent to power in 1992, 
Israel rescinded its ban on contacts between Israelis and PLO
G^G The Persian Gulf Arab states are reported to have given the PLO roughly ". . . $1.5 billion in the 11 years prior to the1991 Gulf War." See A. Fouad, "PLO Urges Gulf Arabs to Finance Palestinian Force," Reuters, April 20, 1994. Saudi Arabia alone provided the PLO with $85.5 million annually. "Saudi Committee Contributes 2.3 Million Dollars to the PLO," Acrence France Presse, January 29, 1994.
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members and in 1993, began secret talks with the PLO in order to 
work out a formula under which both parties could openly 
negotiate with one another.
By September of that year, Israel and the PLO had recognized 
each other and had signed a declaration of principles outlining 
the framework of future negotiations. Under the declaration's 
terms the PLO would temporarily accept authority over a limited 
portion of the territories (the Gaza Strip and Jericho area), 
after which further negotiations would be conducted to determine 
the area's final status. While Israel remained officially 
opposed to a Palestinian state, the way had been cleared for its 
eventual establishment.
Fatah's goal of establishing a Palestinian national 
authority on any territory evacuated by Israel is on the verge of 
being realized. While the present Palestinian national authority 
in Gaza and Jericho does not fully meet the demands of 
Palestinian secular and Islamic rejectionists (who seek Israel's 
disappearance as well), it appears to be the surest path to full 
and recognized sovereignty over at least a portion of what they 
consider their original homeland - a portion to which all 
Palestinians will have the right to return and live as citizens 
of their own country. Should this come to pass, Fatah's core aim 
will have been achieved.
Already, the PNA - under Fatah's leadership - is slowly and 
almost imperceptibly inching beyond the limits of its agreement 
with Israel, particularly with regard to the issue of Jerusalem.
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While the accord which the PLO and Israel concluded in May 1994 
allows Jerusalem's existing Palestinian institutions to continue 
to operate and postpones the question of sovereignty over the 
city's eastern half for later negotiations, Israel has made it 
clear its intention to retain all of Jerusalem under its 
political control. To that end, it has repeatedly warned the PNA 
not to extend its political authority beyond the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho areas and has expanded and strengthened East Jerusalem's 
Jewish neighborhoods. The PNA leadership is taking advantage of 
the intevening period, as well, to quietly strengthen - often on 
a piecemeal basis - its unofficial network of quasi-governmental 
bodies there, while openly declaring its intention to establish 
its political capital in Jerusalem at a later stage.
Factors such as Israel's determination to retain sovereignty 
over the entire city and the possible transfer of authority over 
the Muslim holy places to Jordan have complicated the PNA's 
efforts in this regard. The end-result of the negotiations over 
Jerusalem's future may well be an uneasy coexistence among well- 
entrenched Palestinian, Jordanian, and Israeli sectors, each 
exercising control over its own constituents and under the 
nominal control of an Israeli sovereign authority. While this 
arrangement will not likely satisfy the requirements of the 
Palestinian opposition factions, it will nonetheless constitute a 
significant achievement for the Palestinian national movement not 
witnessed since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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The Fatah movement's goal - the establishment of a sovereign 
Palestinian state - was singular, utilitarian, and 
straightforward. It was aimed, first and foremost, at alleviating 
the Palestinians' condition of homelessness and suffering. The 
PFLP's aspirations, on the other hand, were based primarily on 
the need to exact revenge on its enemies.
PFLP leaders yearned for a Palestinian state no less than 
their Fatah counterparts, but this had to be accomplished in a 
certain manner. Steeped in the writings of generations of Arab 
nationalists, Habash and his colleagues regarded the western 
nations as the eternal adversary, which they believed had sought 
to strip the Arab world of its wealth and resources for their own 
profit from time immemorial. It was the West and its Arab 
supporters in the region - in their view - which had supported 
Israel's creation and were, consequently, responsible for the 
Palestinians' dispersion and poverty. The West continued to 
support Israel as a surrogate through which it could suppress the 
activities of Arab nationalist groups which posed a threat to 
their local interests. The West and its regional allies, 
therefore, were no less of a threat than Israel. There could be 
no cooperation - and certainly no negotiation - with any of them.
For the PFLP, these ideas were far more than mere doctrine; 
they were immutable historical laws. In its view, the 
Palestinians remained dispersed due to Israel's existence.
Israel continued to exist because of the support of the western 
nations and the acquiescence of the conservative Arab
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governments. In order to return the Palestinians to their 
homeland, then, Israel had to be eliminated; and in order to 
eliminate Israel, the western governments which sustained it had 
to be neutralized and their client Arab regimes overthrown.
The elimination of so many enemies seemed a gargantuan task 
for so small an organization with limited means. The PFLP's 
division of the world into enemies and friends necessarily 
limited its sources of aid. Only ideologically compatible 
providers - such as the communist nations and 'progressive' Arab 
governments - could be approached. In the end, political 
circumstances proved these providers unreliable. The alliance 
between the PFLP's predecessor, the ANM, and 'abd al-Nasir's 
Egypt, was based on the former's assumption that the Egyptian 
government would make good on its promise to eliminate Israel. 
Israel's victory in 1967 over the Egyptian-led Arab military 
alliance and 'abd al-Nasir's attraction of Fatah forced the 
proto-PFLP leadership of the time to seek assistance elsewhere. 
Consequently, the PFLP turned to the Soviet bloc to provide it 
with moral and military backing against Israel and 'western 
capitalism'. When the Soviet Union eventually ran out of money 
and later collapsed, the PFLP was left to fend for itself with no 
alternate sources of aid.
While Fatah, in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise, could 
approach wealthy conservative Persian Gulf states, such as Saudi 
Arabia, for financial assistance, the Jordanian government for 
diplomatic support in its negotiations with Israel, and the
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United States and the European Economic Community for financial
support for the embryonic Palestinian entity in the territories,
the PFLP could expect aid from none of these sources since it
continued to regard them as enemies. The leadership of both the
ANM and PFLP had attempted to overthrow the Jordanian and Saudi
monarchies since the early 1950's and PFLP operatives had
attacked western civilian targets since the late I960's. Habash
most clearly expressed his organization's attitude toward
accepting financial aid from the pro-western Gulf states in an
interview given to Life magazine in 1969:
I could show you that the worst obstacles have always been those placed in our path by Arab reactionaries.Like Saudi Arabia, where the majority of oil wells are in American hands. Or Lebanon, with its rotten government. Then there is Jordan, whose king is ready to recognize Israel. And the list could be extended.These are all countries with whom Al Fatah collaborates: but for us to accept money from them would mean to trample on our moral beliefs, to lose our honor. We have been collecting money among ourselves, and if the financial problem becomes crucial we will take money away from those who have it. We will takeit, not ask for it. Those who join the Popular Frontknow that we are not joking. After all it is us [sic]who give the revolutionary momentum to Palestine, notAl-Fatah.
The PFLP's disregard for diplomatic convention and national 
sovereignty earned it a reputation among potential benefactor 
governments as a lawless and subversive organization; a 
reputation, which does not demonstrate its potential for 
transformation into a responsible governing authority. The PFLP
See Fallaci, p. 34 (emphasis added) .
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has done little since its inception to dispel that reputation.
Mutual hostility, consequently, remains high.
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the PFLP did indeed 
" . . .  give the revolutionary momentum to Palestine . . ." by
carrying out high profile operations against airliners and other 
civilian targets outside the Middle East. These operations 
focused international media attention on the Palestinian cause, 
forcing western governments to reconsider their perception of 
Palestinians as mere refugees and to regard them as a people with 
legitimate claims. Having accomplished this, the PFLP should 
logically have become less of an underground group relying almost 
solely on violence and shifted its emphasis - as Fatah did - to j
diplomacy. j
IHowever, the primary reason for the failure of the PFLP's i
program was its imperfect assessment of the reasons for popular 
resentment toward the West. While perceptions of foreign threats 
to indigenous Islamic values do indeed exist at the grass-roots 
level, these do not necessarily extend to the economic sphere. 
Islamic fundamentalists, in fact, favor expanded trade with 
western nations as long as competing cultural values are not 
imposed as a result (Iran's continued commercial relations with 
Western Europe and Japan, for example). The PFLP's calls for 
economic class warfare have, therefore, become irrelevant, while 
calls by Islamic fundamentalist organizations for the 
preservation of the area's cultural and religious identity have 
generally been well received.
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Apart from its ideology and popular appeal, however, the 
PFLP's ultimate fate may well be determined by events over which 
it has little control. The recently-concluded agreement and the 
continuing negotiations between Israel and Jordan only validated 
the PFLP's longstanding charges that an unofficial alliance has 
always existed between the two governments against the 
Palestinian nationalist movement. The PNA's haste in arranging 
meetings with the Jordanians to coordinate negotiating positions 
confirmed as well 'Arafat's role in what would be, in its view, 
total capitulation to Israeli and Western i n t e r e s t s .
Despite the anger and disgust with which the PFLP greeted 
the Israeli-Jordanian accord, and the PNA's acquiescence thereto, 
the agreement alone will likely only marginally increase inter- 
factional Palestinian tensions - the initial Israeli-PLO 
agreement of September 1993 having dealt a crippling blow to any 
existing facade of Palestinian solidarity. More significant in 
exacerbating tensions between the PFLP and the PNA have been the 
steps which each has taken to intimidate the other and to subvert 
the other's program. PFLP activists in the territories have 
accused the PNA's internal security service of issuing death 
threats against them in order to intimidate them into supporting
B. Lynfield, "Hussein, Arafat Urged to Skip Jerusalem," UPI. August 11, 1994. See also "Al-Husayni Calls for Saudi Role in Jerusalem," International Intelligence Report. August 10,1994 .
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the Palestinian authority's a g e n d a . P N A  statements on the 
necessity of disarming members of the Palestinian opposition 
groups have been met with PFLP avowals of violent resistance to 
such s t e p s . T h e  PFLP's priority, then, lies in maintaining 
at least a viable presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip - its 
primary operating arena. Concern over its steadily eroding 
position within the bordering Arab countries (Syria, in 
particular) is of secondary importance. In any case, there is 
very little which the PFLP can do in this regard.
In light of recent tendencies among Arab states to accept 
Israel's permanent presence in the Middle East, the PFLP expects 
little support from that quarter for its goal of destroying the 
Jewish state. Should efforts to conclude a peace treaty between 
Israel and Syria be successful, the PFLP's presence in Damascus - 
already low-key - may prove to be an embarrassment for the Assad 
government. In the event of expulsion from Syria, the PFLP would 
literally have nowhere to turn. Reports of secret Israeli-Iraqi 
diplomatic contacts (possibly as part of an Iraqi effort to 
reverse the policy of international sanctions against it through 
Israeli intervention on its behalf) have led to speculation that 
Iraq may soon follow Syria in concluding an agreement with Israel 
and that any possibility for sanctuary in that country would
c. Murphy, "Palestinians Fear Authoritarian Trend of Leaders," International Herald Tribune. August 23, 1994. See also J. Immanuel, "Death Threats Haunt Ramallah Woman Opposed to Palestinian Authority," August 23, 1994, p. 2.
Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, 170 0 gmt, August 15, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-158. August 16, 1994, p. 7.
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evaporate shortly thereafter.Consequently, the PFLP has 
adopted the only available logical choice: temporary assent to 
the PNA in hopes of avoiding marginalization within the 
Palestinian national movement.
The PFLP, accordingly, has vowed to intensify its activity 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the form of attacks on Israeli 
soldiers and settlers, as well as strengthening its front 
organizations, and participating in the PNA as an opposition
621 Milhim, Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, 1700 gmt,August 12, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-157, August 15, 1994, p. 1.Perhaps most illustrative of the 'new world order' with which the PFLP now has to contend are the reactions of its former regional allies to the arrest and extradition to France on August 15, 1994 of Illich Ramirez Sanchez {'Carlos'), who led many of the PFLP's international assassination and hostage-taking operations in the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's. Governments which (with Soviet assistance) formerly supported covert armed actions against the United States and its allies, now clamored to curry favor with the world's remaining superpower. Syria, where the PFLP is now headquartered, denied any connection with, or support for Carlos or his actions. In an interview with Radio Monte Carlo, Syrian Information Minister Dr. Muhammad Salman asserted that " . . .  [w]e in Syria know nothing about him or where he usedto be. Nobody has asked us to extradite him." See T. al-Imam, Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, 2000 gmt, August 23, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-164, August 24, 1994, p. 46. Syria also " . . .initiated urgent contacts . . . "  with the United States and a number of Arab and European countries denying any connection with Carlos and rejecting " . . .  all forms of terrorism and extremism . . . ." See Al-Shara al-Awsat. August 23, 19 94, p. 3. Yemensimilarly denied any current links with him and contended that past links were never direct. See 'A. Hammudah, Al-Shara al- Awsat . August 18, 1994, p. 1 in FBIS-NES-94-161. August 19, 1994,p. 16. The only element to criticize Sudan's decision was the PFLP, which could do very little to help its former operative.See "PFLP Blasts Sudan for Handing Carlos Over to French Authorities," Deutsche Presse-Aaentur, August 17, 1994.
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faction. In so doing, it seeks to maintain and extend its base 
of popular support in order to compete with Fatah and H a m a s .
In terms of the Palestinian movement in general, the PFLP's 
violent tactics and uncompromising strategy have been both 
beneficial and detrimental to Fatah's efforts, as the PLO's 
dominant faction, to legitimize Palestinian national aspirations 
in the international arena. On the one hand, Fatah can portray 
the PFLP's approach as the unpleasant alternative to political 
progress on the Palestinian issue. On the other hand, the PFLP's 
advocacy and execution of armed attacks against civilian targets 
has unfairly reinforced the image of all Palestinians as 
bloodthirsty terrorists. Even those observers who are capable of 
distinguishing between attitudes of Fatah and the violent 
Palestinian opposition are hard-pressed to explain how the PLO 
intends to disarm and control opponents of the peace process - a 
task at which it has, so far, failed miserably.^ 3^
Nevertheless, it is Fatah's flexible, single-aim approach 
which has brought the Palestinians closer to national sovereignty 
than ever before. Fatah has successfully evolved from an unknown 
underground organization into what is gradually becoming a 
legitimate and internationally recognized government. The PFLP, 
however, remains the perennial subversive underground
"Palestinian Groups Agree Autonomy Will Come True, "Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Item No. 0328197, March 28, 1994. See also C. Murphy, "Unity Marks New Jericho Era," International Herald Tribune. August 29, 1994.
G^  ^N. Ha'etzni, Ma'ariv fShabbat Supplement] . June 22, 1994, pp. 14-15 in FBIS-NES-94-142, July 25, 1994, pp. 14-15.
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organization, which allies itself with such diverse factions as 
the DFLP and Hamas. Their only common denominator seems to be an 
intense hatred of Israel and those who support the Arab-Israeli 
peace process.
B. The PFLP's Inflexibility Severely Limits Its Options
The PFLP's political outlook has changed little since its 
leadership first swore revenge on a multitude of enemies in the 
1950's. The circumstances under which it operates, however, 
have. With no reliable super- or regional power to provide it 
with political and financial backing, the PFLP must now compete 
with Palestinian organizations which have either learned to adapt 
their strategies to new international conditions or have been 
fortunate enough to find a sponsor with similar ideological 
goals. Fatah, which has altered its methods in response to 
sweeping regional changes, has taken the nonviolent path to 
Palestinian sovereignty. Playing upon the current Israeli 
government's aversion to ruling over a hostile population, as 
well as its desire to retain political control over East 
Jerusalem at almost any cost, Fatah - in the form of the PNA - 
has been able to gradually extend its control over the remainder 
of the West Bank. While this process is far from over, its 
completion seems inevitable. In the meantime, the industrialized 
western nations have committed themselves - at least on paper - 
to providing the nascent Palestinian entity with the financial 
means necessary to make it economically viable. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, Hamas has had to alter neither its ideology
3 3 9
nor its strategy, partly because of Islamic fundamentalism's 
widespread appeal among an angry and desperate Muslim population 
and partly because of the support which it receives from 
economically stable regional powers such as Iran.
The PFLP enjoys none of these advantages. It has from the 
beginning had a relationship of reciprocal hostility with the 
industrialized West and can expect no assistance from that 
quarter. Its Marxist ideology is not as popular as Islam among 
the general populace, nor is it as well understood. The Arab 
states which give sanctuary and support to groups such as the 
PFLP generally do so for reasons of self-interest. These 
organizations allow the sponsoring government - when necessary - 
to demonstrate support for militant Palestinian nationalism and 
allow it to clandestinely strike at its enemies' interests while 
simultaneously enabling it to deny involvement and engage them in idiplomatic dialogue. Prior to 1991, Arab governments allied with i
the Soviet Union - primarily Syria, Iraq, and Libya - routinely j
sheltered such militant leftist Palestinian groups. The USSR's j
disolution, however, has deprived these governments of a powerful I
and trusted protector and forced them to attempt to ingratiate 1
themselves with the United States - the world's remaining
superpower and a potential source of financial aid. Syria, the i
PFLP's principal regional ally, and on whose territory its 
headquarters is located, is currently contemplating a peace
treaty with Israel and there are rumors that Iraq - in order to ;
persuade the international community to lift the economic
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blockade imposed on it in the wake of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait 
- may not be far b e h i n d .
In a region where the PFLP's traditional allies appear to be 
abandoning the Palestinian cause in its militant form, Libya 
remains the only Arab country which continues to openly advocate 
conflict with the United States and the destruction of 
I s r a e l . I t  is, therefore, the most likely candidate to 
replace Syria as the radical Palestinian organizations' primary 
sanctuary. Although, unlike Syria, Libya is not considered 
immune from western aerial strikes, it has the strategic depth 
necessary to conceal training and supply bases for groups such as 
the PFLP; and unlike Iraq, Libya continues to trade with the 
industrialized Western European nations.
Without the Soviet Union's protection, Libya is vulnerable 
to diplomatic and military attack by the United States and its 
allies. Syria, in the past, was spared these attacks. Syrian 
President Hafiz al-Assad was able to establish a working 
relationship with the United States by virtue of his government's
M. Shahin, Jordan Times. August 10, 1994, pp. 12, 7 in FBIS-NES-94-154. August 10, 1994, pp. 32-34. See also J. al- Zayn, Interview with Mas'ud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Al-Safir, August 2, 1994, p. 10 in FBIS-NES-94- 154 , August 10, 1994, pp. 35-39; Al-Muharrir, September 5, 1994, p. 7 in FBIS-NES-94-176. September 12, 1994, pp. 34-35; A. Bender et.al., M a 'ariv, September 25, 1994, p. 16 in FBIS-NES-94-186. September 26, 1994, p. 32; IDF Radio in Hebrew, 1100 gmt, September 26, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-18 7 , September 27, 1994, p. 44.
Speech by Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi at a Ceremony Marking the 1 September Revolution in Triploi - Live, Libyan Television Network in Arabic, 1846 gmt, September 1, 1994 in FBIS-NES-94- 173, September 7, 1994, pp. 27-34.
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influence over the radical groups which held the nationals of 
western nations hostage in the 1980's and, in many cases, was 
able to secure their release. By allowing radical Arab 
organizations - including the PFLP - to operate from its 
territory against western interests (while claiming an inability 
to control their actions), Libya too has the potential to 
establish itself as the most effective interlocutor between the 
West and the anti-western militant groups. The relocation of the 
PFLP and similar organizations its territory will provide the 
Libyan government with that opportunity.
With its activity paralyzed in Syria, its presence unnoticed 
in Lebanon, and its influence in the PNA-controlled areas of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip waning further with each passing day, 
the PFLP must re-establish itself as an effective 'politicized 
combative organization' or risk fading out of existence. In tile 
late 1960's and early 1970's, the PFLP's leadership determined 
that spectacular and violent operations were needed in order to 
draw world attention to the Palestinian cause and the civilian 
aircraft hijackings and embassy attacks in Western Europe which 
characterized the period answered this need. Now, it is the 
Palestinian public whose attention the PFLP believes must be 
focused - this time, on what the group considers the PNA's 
mistaken path of 'surrender' to Israel and the West. It cannot 
accomplish this effectively in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
(hounded as its leaders there are by the PNA's internal security
apparatus) and is powerless to serve its teeming diaspora 
constituency from Damascus.
It is from a reorganized headquarters in Libya that the PFLP 
can activate its international cell network - maintained since 
its founding - and resume the armed attacks for which it was 
known its early years. Strikes against PNA, Israeli, and Western 
targets abroad would signal to the Palestinian diaspora that it 
has not been abandoned as a result of the PLO-Israeli agreement; 
they would signal to the Israeli government the re-emergence of 
an effective - and deadly - radical Palestinian opposition 
capable of operating out of reach of the PNA and Israeli security 
services; and they would warn the PNA that its cooperation with 
the Israeli, Western European, and United States governments can 
continue only at its own peril and that Israel's elimination must 
be the'PNA's paramount aim.
Today, the PFLP's enemies are stronger than ever, its 
friends have all but vanished, and it has, consequently, taken 
its place at the fringes of Palestinian and Middle Eastern 
politics. To ensure its continued survival as an effective and 
influential actor in the Palestinian and Arab political arenas, 
the PFLP must once again command the world's attention. Just as 
its campaign of international aircraft hijackings and attacks on 
civilian targets in the late 1960's and early 1970's served to 
highlight the long-ignored condition of Palestinians in general, 
so too would a renewed series of armed operations against 
international civilian targets force the PNA leadership and the
world community to question the wisdom of rushing of negotiating 
an agreement with Israel at any cost. These operations are 
likely to find support among diaspora Palestinians - the PFLP's 
primary constituency - whose plight the agreement seems to have 
ignored. Should the PFLP adopt this strategy, it can reverse the 
the gradual process of evanescence and restore its dominant 
position in the Palestinian national movement's militant wing.
1 / 1 / 1 .
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